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dogmatic pursuit of economic uniformity is identified as marking a
critical shift, the moving of the disaffected element within the
political nation to open collusion verging on civil disobedience to
obstruct the implementation of directives from Court.	 The pursuit of
uniformity, especially evident in Charles' promotion of the common
fishing and tariff reform, coupled to his cavalier disregard for the
establishment of sound money in Scotland, served not only to induce
economic recession but to differentiate between the royal interest and
the national interest.
This crucial differentiation which was to underwrite the
Scottish revolution was simultaneously carried a combustible stage
further by Charles' censorious management of his coronation parliament,
by his exemplary prosecution of James Elphinstone, Lord Balmerino, as a
leader of the disaffected element and by his public endorsement of
episcopally inspired campaigns to eradicate nonconformity in the Kirk.
The rallying of the disaffected element and their mounting of public
demonstrations against liturgical innovations, as manifest by the
rioting which greeted readings from the Service Book in Edinburgh
during the summer of 1637, form the substance of the next three
chapters and are complemented by the subsequent two which trace the
progressive emergence of the Tables from a vehicular organisation for
public protest into a provisional government resolved on a radical
interpretation of the National Covenant.	 In spite of the apparent
conservatism of its framing, this document was in essence both a
nationalist and radical manifesto to secure the fundamental reordering
of government in Kirk and State while reasserting the political
independence of the Scottish people.
Rather than seek to retread ground well served by political
narratives of the Covenanting Movement following its emergence in 1638,
the last three chapters prior to the conclusion scrutinise the
revolutionary attainments of the elite directing the cause from the
first constitutional defiance of Charles I at the general assembly of
1638 through recourse to hostilities between Covenanters and Royalistsduring the Bishops' Wars of 1639-40.	 Having brought to bear
sufficient military and political pressure to oblige Charles I to
concede diplomatic recognition for the Scottish state as an independent
identity within the British Isles, a concession furthered by the
willingness of the Covenanting leadership to export revolution, the
entrenchment of oligarchic control over Scottish affairs was
consurated by the parliament of 1641.
t
Because the contrasting political fortunes of Charles I and
the Covenanting Movement nationally are appraised summarily in the
penultimate chapter, the formal conclusion takes the unconventional
format of providing a regional perspective - that of the west of
Scotland - to successive government by Crown and Covenant between 1625
and 1641.	 Although local particularism persisted throughout these
sixteen years, there was a significant difference in the regional
response to centralised directives before and after 1638.	 That the
grievances of the west tended to coaliesce with the rest of Scotland
in the course of the personal rule suggests that Charles I regionally
as well as nationally was the political architect of his own downfall.
By way of contrast, despite unprecedented ideological, military and
financial demands, the Covenanting Movement retained wholescale support
in the west for its national endeavours through its reinvigoration and
reorientation of local government - along lines attempted but never
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Introduction 
On Sunday 23 July 1637, a riotous reception was accorded, in
St Giles cathedral and other Edinburgh churches, to the first reading
of the Service Book.	 This tumultuous rejection of the liturgical
measures which Charles I, on the strength of his prerogative, wished
to introduce into the Church of Scotland was supplemented, in the
following months, by nationwide petitioning against ecclesiastical
innovations and their unconstitutional imposition.	 By the end of the
year, opposition forces convening in Edinburgh had composed themselves
into a body, known as the Tables, to receive petitions of grievance
from the localities and to co-ordinate resistance to the Crown at
national and local levels.	 This body, consisting of commissioners
drawn from the four estates of the nobility, gentry, clergy and
burgesses, was instrumental in issuing, on Sunday 28 February 1638,
the National Covenant.	 The Covenanting Movement was thereby formally
launched as an overt attempt to defend and preserve the reformed
religion, in association with the liberties and laws of the kingdom.
General assemblies were to be the ultimate authority for ecclesiastical
affairs and parliaments, likewise, for matters of state.
A general assembly which ) though called by the king, met under
the management of the Tables at Glasgow in November 1638, continued to
sit in defiance of a royal order to dissolve and proceeded to establish
presbyterianism, at the expense of episcopacy, as the means of
government for the Kirk.	 By resorting to arms during the summers of
1639 and 1640, in what became known as "The Bishops' Wars", the
Covenanting Movement forced the Crown to accede to its ecclesiastical
measures.	 By invading and occupying the north of England, the
Covenanters precipitated the calling of the English parliament, thereby
triggering a further constitutional crisis for Charles I. 	 After the
tOkkal.k
conclusion of lengthy peace negotiations with the Crown, at-Reft in
August 1641, the Covenanters were able to exploit the political
situation in England to demand and gain full control of government in
the State.	 At the parliament in Edinburgh during the autumn, Charles
conceded that the appointment of his councillors, executive officials
and members of the judiciary, should be subject to parliamentary2
approval.	 This new right of the legislature was implemented in
November 1641.	 Thus, within the space of four years, the Covenanting
Movement had organised a revolution which effectively limited the
sovereignty of the Crown.	 Moreover, as public subscription to the
National Covenant had become compulsory from 1639, the Movement had
entrenched itself as the politically dominant force in Scottish
society.
Within a broader chronological perspective, the origins and
organisation of the Covenanting Movement was but a further development
of the theme which had dominated Scottish history since the
Reformation: namely the search, from 1560, for 'a political
equilibrium' in the relationship between Kirk and State. 1	At the one
extreme was the presbyterian claim for the autonomy of the Kirk, whose
supreme government was to reside within general assemblies rather than
be entrusted to bishops as erastian agents of the Crown. At the other
extreme was the autocratic ambition of the monarchy to subordinate all
constitutional forums, parliaments as well as general assemblies, to
the exercise of the royal prerogative.	 The emergence and
establishment of the Covenanting Movement marks the fulcrum point in
this constitutional struggle.	 As a result, contemporary commentaries
on the fractious events of the sixteen years between 1625 and 1641,
whether recounted by activists or mere observers, assume and reflect
this political polarisation.
Moreover, commentators in the following decades, especially
after the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, were not immune from
partisanship or the manipulative use of hindsight when recording events
or revising memoirs.	 With the constitutional establishment of limited
monarchy and presbyterianism at the Revolution, there was, from 1690, a
gradual decline in the political dominance exercised by the
relationship between Kirk and State.	 Yet no amicable settlement was
finally resolved until the late nineteenth centrury. 	 Writings on the
Covenanting Movement, meanwhile, continued to be tinged with a
denominational bias which ranged from political aversion to religious3
hagiography.	 Furthermore, despite the abundance of source material,
of both official records and private collections, to set against the
prevailing political and religious climate when commentaries were
originally written and subsequently published, a 'dearth of specialist
inquiries' into the early Covenanting Movement has produced a rather
superficial corliensus of opinion in the modern interpretation of its
origin and organisation.2
In 1639, Charles I was reported to have asserted that 'the
seeds of Sedition were sowen by the plotters of their Covenant, made
under the pretence of Religion, long before any of the grievances or
pretended innovations in Religion complained of by them were ever
heard amongst them'.
3	Yet, since public opposition to the Crown was
demonstrably initiated on religious issues, the origins of the
Movement have been traditionally interpreted on essentially
ecclesiastical grounds.	 The works of W.L. Mathieson and J.K. Hewison
mark a gradual admission within Scotland that political grievances
contributed to the growth of opposition and eventually to the
constitutional crisis which terminated the personal government of
Charles I. 4	The British impact of the emergent Covenanting Movement
has tended to concentrate on the political effects which followed the
intervention of the Covenanters in England.	 However, it was an
Englishman, S.R. Gardiner, who pioneered a greater modern awareness of
the Movement's political origins within Scotland as well as the
revolutionary trigger which it loosed in England. 5 It was left to a
Welsh bishop, David Mathew, to broaden the political and ideological
background of the Covenanting cause by a perceptive - if occasionally
idiosyncratic - examination of the social and religious geography of
Scotland prior to the establishment of the Movement.
6	Nevertheless,
the appreciation of the Covenanting organisation by these historians
has tended to derive from the Movement's dominance of political events
rather than from its capacity to mobilise support within the
localities.
Greater balance in the interpretation of the origins of the4
Covenanting Movement has been given by the reappraisal of G. Donaldson,
which sets ecclesiastical issues against the growth of constitutional
opposition.
7
	The resentment aroused by the fiscal as well as the
political policies of the Crown are also touched upon.	 It is his
central contention, that 'essentially the covenanting movement was,
and as its history unfolded, it long continued to be, an aristocratic
and conservative reaction'.	 This has led to a rather cursory
treatment of both the influence and political management of the Tables
and of the seizure and retention of political initiative by the
Covenanters.	 As a result, the progress of the Movement tends to be
charted without its organisational structure being analysed.
In a recent study, D. Stevenson comprehensively demonstrates
that lay control was the dominant feature influencing the course of
the Covenanting Movement.
8	Yet the common unity of purpose throughout
the country behind the Covenanting cause, which he finds 'striking',
is never fully developed in relation to the ability of the Covenanters
to organise support at the grass-roots.	 Accordingly, the radical
nature of the Movement tends to be confined to ecclesiastical issues,
the Covenanters being pushed only by circumstances and the pace of
events, rather than by ideological commitment or political design, to
accomplish a constitutional revolution.	 The element of constitutional
discontent in the Movement's origins is correspondingly played down,
though the political, fiscal and administrative estrangement within
the country from the policies of royal government are seen as important
precursors to the unrest occasioned by the religious issues.	 The
possible existence of social factors in the origins of the Movement is
dismissed by his assertion that 'the causes of the revolt were "social"
only insofar as a variety of motives led Scottish society to unite to
an unusual extent against its head'.	 Such a restrictive definition
tends, on the one hand, to confine social history to issues affecting
the lower classes not normally involved in central politics.	 On	 the
other hand, it ignores the customary inclination of political
leadership to follow social standing within a pre-industrialised
society.	 Scotland throughout the seventeenth century undoubtedly5
remained a basically agrarian country.	 Hence, the denial of social
causation amounts to a rejection of any fundamental threat inherent in
the non-ecclesiastical policies of Charles I to the status and
resources of the nobility, gentry and burgesses who, along with the
clergy, composed the political nation of Scotland.	 Moreover, such an
analysis affords comfort to the revisionist and irredentist who
anachronistically wishes to interpret the Covenanting Movement as a
religious reaction, by regarding Scotland as being impervious to the
economic forces which were affecting the rest of contemporary Europe.
Thereby, the long-term social consequences of inflation in the late
sixteenth century are specifically rejected and consideration of the
political problems so accumulated for the public financing of
government is avoided.
9
A welcome awareness of the profound influence exercised by
social change on the foundations of Scottish politics is made in the
most recent study of the Covenanting Movement by W. Makey.
10	The
impact of inflation, coupled to the secularisation of the kirklands is
seen as bringing about, from the mid-sixteenth century, not only a vast
transfer of wealth which undermined feudal privilege, but also the
gradual erosion of the traditional decentralised framework of
government in Scotland.	 The appearance of institutional stability
concealed this 'silent revolution' until the outbreak of the
Covenanting Movement.	 Even then, the initial semblance of unity
within the Movement on political and eccelesiastical issues masked a
divergence between the feudal superstructure and the increasingly
commercialised fabric of society.	 Politically, the Covenanting
Movement remains reactionary, being interpreted initially as an
aristocratically dominated reaction against the promoters of
revolutionary social change.	 In the first place, the Covenanters
were opposed to the 'sheer radicalism' of the anglicised faction among
the bishops whose promotion of liturgical reform was part of a wider
programme of episcopal aggrandisement which included traditional
clerical claims to recover the patrimony of the Kirk from lay control.
Secondly, the Covenanters were opposed to the 'subtly different6
radicalism' of an absentee monarch whose policy of liberating the
gentry from the influence of the nobility responded to the shift in
resources from feudal to commercial interests.	 Thereby, Charles I
sought to bring about a more centralised structure of government
while repairing the impoverished finances of the Crown.
However, such an analysis can lead to the revolutionary
potential of the objective forces initiating social change being
over-stressed and the radicalism of the subjective forces organising
political opposition being underestimated. 	 The reassessment of
social causation is not helped by the blatant assertion that 'the price
rise was much greater in Scotland than anywhere else'. 	 No reference
is made to any comparative statistics for the rates of inflation in
other European countries.	 The estimation of a ten-fold increase in
prices, during the century which culminated in the Covenanting
Movement, relies on the indexing of agricultural goods - commodities
more noted for their volatility than their reliability as price
indicators - as against the more accurate measurement provided by
consumer durables.	 In considering the massive transfers of wealth,
primarily through secularisation, as 'catastrophic', it must be borne
in mind that such a shift of resources was essentially between classes.
Though the gentry were now arguably as wealthy a class as the nobility,
individual levels of wealth still favoured the smaller number of
nobles, particularly when combined with rigorous management of estates.
Indeed proprietary exploitation of resources to maximise income was
common to both classes, and as such, can be regarded as a progressive
source of stability within landed society.	 A more traditional source
of stability, bolstering feudal privilege, were ties of affinity,
whether through kinship or local association, between nobility and
gentry.	 Such ties also applied outwith landed society in the
customary regulation of estate management between landlords and
tenants.	 Moreover, even in areas where landlords sharply increased
rents in sporadic or belated attempts to keep pace with inflation,
stability within Scottish society was in no small measure preserved by
emigration.	 Although the continent remained the traditional outlet7
for frustrated social expectations, an alternative was provided in the
early seventeenth century with the plantation of Ulster.	 Therefore,
it was not an inherently unstable society in which the Covenanting
Movement originated: though this is not to deny the importance of
social tensions in helping the Movement flourish.
Furthermore, the stress on social causation carries the
danger of determining political attitudes according to social class.
The initial aristocratic dominance of the Covenanting Movement, in
accordance with customary social leadership, does not mean that the
nobles any more than the gentry were averse to the exercise of radical
measures through the Tables.	 The objectives of the Covenanters were
not conservatively confined to the establishment of presbyterianism
and limited monarchy.	 To effect these constitutional ends, the
Tables were prepared to formulate and apply a more centralised style
of government than ever practised by the bishops or attempted by
Charles I.	 The revolutionary essence of the Covenanting Movement is
recorded in an unpublished, and hitherto unacknowledged, blueprint
drawn up prior to the commencement of the general assembly which met
at Glasgow in November 1638.	 To ensure both the political and
military victory over Charles I, the Tables, as the central executive
for the cause in Edinburgh, was linked to the localities by a
hierarchical series of committees for the mobilisation of manpower and
finance, the provision of military training, and the management of
elections.
11
	Of the opponents of the Covenanters, the contemporary
most cognizant of the rigorous efficiency of their radical organisation
was James, third marquis (later first duke) of Hamilton, whose
perception is not invalidated by his much maligned political
leadership.	 Having been appointed King's Commissioner to the fateful
assembly at Glasgow, he struggled forlornly for the next three
critical years as the main co-ordinator of the Crown's attempts to
wrest the political initiative in Scotland from the Covenanters.12
The primacy of political factors requires to be emphasised, therefore,
both in the forging of the common front among Covenanters against the
bishops and Charles I, and in the break-up of solidarity between8
radicals and conservatives after 1641.
The diverse nature of the beginnings of the Covenanting
Movement, the social composition of its support, and the extent to
which it was radically motivated and structured during the initial
sixteen years of the reign of Charles I, remain to be thoroughly
investigated.	 A further unfulfilled requisite is a regional
case-study, outwith the milieu of Edinburgh, the capital, concentrating
on the extent to which the emergent Covenanting Movement enjoyed the
support of the local community and was in turn responsive to local
aspirations.
With these ends in view, no analysis of the origins and
organisation of the Covenanting Movement can proceed without prior
consideration being given to the social structure of Scottish politics:
to examine the nature of the political nation which was moved to oppose
Charles I.	 Furthermore, the accession of James VI to the English
throne in 1603 was accompanied by the absorption of the Scottish Court
into that of England and its consequent redundancy as the central
reference point for political activity within Scotland. 	 In this
respect, the capacity for dissent within the political nation after
the Union of the Crowns can be encompassed within divergent plameters;
set on the one hand by the political, religious and economic
aspirations of Scottish society and on the other, by the central
direction of government in the interests of absentee kingship.
Moreover, the crisis in the constitutional relationship between the
Crown and the political nation was not a uniquely Scottish phenomenon.
In determining the position of Scotland within any contemporary
spectrum of European crisis, cognizance must be taken of the special
tensions manifested by the conflicting forces of nationalism and
provincialism which contributed to the emergence of the Covenanting
Movement.9
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Chapter I	 The Political Nation 
Government in Scotland depended less on long established
central institutions than on the contensus provided by co-operation
between the Crown and the four estates of the nobility, gentry,
burgesses and clergy, who collectively composed the political nation,
each representing a social class with separate privileges and vested
interests.	 On the one hand, the orientation of government was
decentralised, following more the practice of Germanic States within
the Holy Roman Empire than the centralised conformity expected in
England. On the other hand, the particularist interest of each social
class contained variations of group and individual status definable not
only on a political basis, but also on feudal, judicial and even
ecclesiastical grounds.	 The latter categorisation was rooted in the
secularisation of the property of the medieval Church during the
sixteenth century, the others in the theory of medieval kingship.
Class within this context, and especially when applied to landed
society, is to be viewed more in the vertical terms of feudal title,
kinship and social deference, than in the horizontal terms of material
resources and cultural consciousness.
The most important estate within the political nation was
that of the nobility.	 The theoretical values governing nobility in
Scotland - such as personal virtue, public authorisation, valour and
skill in military affairs or knowledge and learning, and an unblemished
pedigree on either side for eight generations - followed Germanic, or
rather Imperial, precepts.	 In practice, the designation was reserved,
as in England, for the peerage and did not encompass untitled members
of landed society as elsewhere in Europe)	 Every duke, marquis,
viscount, earl and lord was individually summoned to parliament to
give counsel and consent to major issues of royal policy.	 From the
fifteenth century, the new rank of parliamentary lord emerged to
broaden this basis of consultation.	 As well as being politically
expedient, such an obligation was rooted in the feudal duty of
tenants-in-chief to advise their king, as their superior, in return for
the lands and resources heritably bestowed on them by charter.2
Moreover, the king was not only the ultimate superior of Scottish land,11
but was regarded as the upholder of justice and the source of all
temporal government.	 Grants of charters to the nobility, therefore,
had the two-fold effect of decentralising government through the royal
gift of judicial privileges and, simultaneously, providing an
objective definition of status, based not on gradations of rank, but
on the amount of judicial control individual nobles could exercise
over their heritable resources.
Within the ranks of the nobility, each territorial lordship
was bounded by a jurisdiction usually that of a barony court.	 By the
seventeenth century, the main concern of such courts was basically
estate management.	 The barony court administered and interpreted
the customary relationships on which the rural economy operated.
The court had also supplementary powers to try actions arising from
petty debt and rent arrears as well as breaches of the lord's peace,
the punishment for which ranged from forfeiture of tenants' holdings
or escheat of their possessions to fining or even imprisonment. 	 Its
criminal competence was confined to cases of theft and slaughter
where the offenders in either instance were caught red-handed, the
respective summary penalties being corporal and capital punishment.
By the early seventeenth century the former was exercised occasionally,
the latter rarely.	 The lord was no more than an ordinary litigant in
cases affecting his own interests and was expected to attend regularly
at the sheriff court in whatever shire his barony lay.	 In turn, the
lord could repledge cases from the sheriff court in which his tenantry
were cited and over which he had judicial competence.
The primary responsibility of the Crown within such a
baronial framework was the harmonising of local interests.	 In the
event of baronial divergence, sheriff courts and justice-ayres could
hear appeals on the grounds of partial justice or deal with civil and
criminal cases beyond the competence of the barony court.	 However,
this framework was complicated from the later middle ages by the
heritable annexation of the office of sheriff by leading noble
families and the infrequency with which judicial circuits were12
conducted.	 Civil litigation was as a result increasingly attracted
to the Court of Session. The Privy Council took cognizance of serious
crimes, though the actual trial of capital offences was usually before
a tribunal specifically appointed by the Crown.
A regional alternative existed for certain localities.
Higher rights of public justice, encompassed within a regality court,
had been heritably bestowed on leading nobles since the later middle
ages.	 In addition to the usual baronial privileges, such nobles had
the same civil jurisdiction as sheriffs and the criminal competence of
justice-ayres within their own estates: namely, the right to try the
four pleas of the Crown - rape, murder, arson and robbery. 	 Only
charges of treason were reserved for the Crown.	 Furthermore, the
lords of regality could be given judicial rights over lands and
baronies outwith their own estates.	 Such baronies, though losing
their jurisdictional autonomy, continued to operateJatt'-the
hierarchical framework of the regality.	 Thus, lords of regality
acquired the right to repledge from the local and central courts of
the Crown not only cases affecting their tenantry, but also those
citing neighbouring barons and landlords within their judicial spheres
of influence.	 In return for the exclusion of royal officials, the
exercise of regalian privilege demanded the development of procedural
competence and administrative sophistication.	 Within extensive
regalities, internal administration - financial and secretarial, as
well as judicial - was conducted by chamber and chancery. 	 Apart from
annexed baronial courts, ordinary courts within the regality were
presided over by bailies - occasionally a heritable office within
another landed family - and higher jurisdiction was implemented
through the establishment of judicial circuits. 3	Moreover, regalian
administration was continually evolving in co-operation with the Crown.
Ordinary taxation was traditionally assessed on the landed resources of
the four estates and was collected by government agents within each
shire.	 When James VI decided to impose a levy on financial loans in
1621, regalities as well as shires were used as distinct land wards for
the assessment of this extraordinary tax on personal income, their13
officials being directly accountable to the Exchequer for its
collection.4
The secularisation of church property provided the major
extension of landholding during the sixteenth century. The main
beneficiaries among traditional noble families were those who had
acquired, as lay commendators, a life interest in the landed resources
of the late medieval Church.	 When James VI annexed the temporal
property of the pre-Reformation Church to the Crown by an act of 1587,
he inserted the provision that church property already in the hands of
lay commendators should be heritably erected into temporal lordships.
The king was also given parliamentary approval to make heritable
grants from the considerable portion of kirklands which were annexed,
with the hint that further lordships of erection could be created as a
special mark of Crown favour.	 As a result, temporal lordships became
the most important avenue for elevation into the peerage. 	 Although
James had an act passed in 1606 which removed episcopal temporalities
from the scope of the 1587 act, he reserved the right to create
lordships of erection from secularised monastic property.
5 Indeed, by
using temporal lordships to reward officers of state, James was able to
draw lesser members of the landed classes into the service of the
Crown.	 Thus, within the ranks of the peerage, he built up a nobility
of service with a vested interest in the maintenance and
intensification of royal government. At the same time, by delegating
baronial and regalian rights to lordships of erection, James continued
to underwrite the decentralised orientation of government in Scotland.
At James VI's death in 1625, twenty-one abbeys, eleven priories, six
nunneries and one preceptory, either separately or conjointly, had
been erected into temporal lordships.	 Indeed, of the fifty-four major
ecclesiastical foundations in Scotland, only one (Dunfermline abbey)
had been retained, but not wholly preserved,  by the Crown.
6
The acquisition and heritable possession of land was the
traditional source of wealth and power. 	 The nobles' control over land
created a wide nexus of social and political clientage.	 However,14
before an appraisal can be made of their pervasive territorial
influence, distinction must be drawn between lands directly managed
as property and those perpetually tenanted, or subinfeudated, as
superiority.	 The lands which composed the property of the nobility
were worked andleased by the peasantry as removable tenants, either
by rentallers who possessed their holdings for life, or by leaseholders
who possessed their holdings for a fixed number of years.	 The
superiority of the nobility consisted of lands bestowed irredeemably
to feuars who, as heritable tenants, were deemed members of the landed
classes.	 Moreover, although the heritable as well as the removable
tenants came within the jurisdiction of both the barony and the
regality, the feuars, in keeping with their status as landowners, were
not bound to observe the dictates of estate management from either
court.	 Furthermore, rigorous exploitation of landed resources or of
judicial privilege on the part of the nobility was diluted by ties of
kinship and customary association with their tenantry. This was
particularly evident in the designation kindly-tenant, applied to
possessors and lesser proprietors whose families had enjoyed long and
continuous settlement on the estates of the nobility. 	 Another
instance was the lord of regality's ability to repledge neighbours as
well as tenants from royal courts, thereby bringing them within his
protection.	 In turn, kinship and customary association reinforced
social and political deference towards the nobility.	 Such ties could
be extended territorially outwith the estates and the jurisdictional
bounds of the nobility by family bonds of blood and marriage among the
landed classes.	 Longstanding affinities towards neighbouring families
and communities were manifested as relationships of kindness.
The secularisation of the kirklands during the sixteenth
century affords particularly striking testimony to the continuing
importance of kinship and kindness within Scottish society.	 Indeed,
secularisation primarily augmented the territorial spheres of
influence of the nobility rather than their economic resources.
Prior to the heritable conversion of lay commendatorships into
lordships of erection, nobles who had acquired church property sought15
to protect their interests by apportioning about a third of all
kirklands within their control among their families and customary
associates.	 Kindness was further cultivated among the longstanding
tenants of ecclesiastical foundations by the  wholescale feuing,
m-040-	 votv0—
Around sixty-five per cent of allt kirklandsil,to the existing
possessors.
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The general expectation that lay commendators, and;	 _
0-hrt at-aA.401, a41f-f,
subsequently lords of erection, would feu their kirklands
superiority left little for their own immediate exploitation as
property.	 Moreover, the feuing of kirklands coincided with a period
of persistent inflation which depreciated, but not necessarily
decimated, the value of landed incomes, particularly within those
temporal lordships where feuing had been accompanied by the
commutation of provender rents into fixed monetary payments. 	 This
combination of feuing and inflation has been interpreted as promoting
a collective transfer of wealth away from the nobility - and also the
Crown - towards the rest of landed society by the early seventeenth
century.	 However, although the traditional equation of landed wealth
and landed power was undoubtedly distorted, a temporal lord still
retained the largest share of the actual income generated on his
estate - individual estimates vary from a fifth to a third.8
Furthermore, although the feuing of kirklands in alliance with
inflation eventually eroded customary social relationships, there was
no immediate restructuring of customary expectations.	 Land was still
regarded as a source of political and social clientage as much as it
was viewed as a commercial asset.	 Thus, the territorial spheres of
influence of James, first duke of Hamilton, during the 1640s, were
encompassed by a five-fold classification of kinship and kindness:
twenty-eight household men, of whom all but nine were Hamiltons,
apparently responsible for the routine management of his extensive
estates in the central Lowlands, particularly in the shires of Lanark
(including Lesmahagow priory), Stirling and Linlithgow (West Lothian),
as well as on the isle of Arran; one hundred and twenty-three of his
surname, seemingly neighbours, feuars and foremost removable tenants;16
thirty-eight neighbours and feuars, none of whom were Hamiltons, cited
as gentlemen and loyal dependants; fifty removable tenants, associated
by kindness not kinship; and seventeen retainers who actually ran his
household.
9
Nevertheless, since feu-duties were fixed in perpetuity and
rent rises were less responsive to the market than to custom, the
nobility were particularly concerned to expand as well as to conserve
their landed resources.	 A further sphere of influence accrued from
the secularisation of the kirklands.	 During the middle ages, the
teinds - the nominal tenth (tithe) of all revenues produced within the
bounds of the parish - though giving economic definition to the
parochial framework of the pre-Reformation Church, had been grossly
appropriated by ecclesiastical foundations, especially the monasteries
and cathedral chapters.
10	Any church whose parsonage (or major)
teinds were appropriated invariably had its right of patronage annexed.
The creation of lordships of erection had led to the secularisation of
these parochial rights, thereby the patron of the parish church became
also the titular of the parish teinds.	 Thus, temporal lords acquired
ecclesiastical status as titulars of the teinds.	 In essence, this
prescriptive development apportioned the same parochial rights to the
titulars as were already possessed heritably by the Crown and by some
landlords, in their capacity as lay patrons, over the minority
(fourteen per cent) of parishes where the teinds had remained
unappropriated.
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However, there were significant divergences in the practical
exercise of these parochial rights between the lay patrons and the
titulars.	 Lay patrons tended to exercise their ecclesiastical
superiority over single parishes where, not infrequently, the
geographic bounds of the parish and the landlord's barony court
coincided.	 Titulars tended to exercise their ecclesiastical
superiority over a large number of parishes which were not always
grouped together nor, of necessity, did the temporal lords have
exclusive jurisdiction within these geographic bounds.	 Within every17
parish, the lay patron or the titular had the disposal of the teinds
of other landowners, designated ecclesiastically as heritors. 	 Each
heritor within the parish of a lay patron was usually a feuar. 	 Thus
the patron to whom he paid his teind was also the landlord (or feudal
superior) to whom he paid his feu-duty.	 Even where the heritor held
his lands directly from the Crown as a freeholder, he usually had a
family or customary association with the lay patron who had disposal
of his teind.	 In parishes which either contained, or lay adjacent to,
the domain of the temporal lord, a similar nexus prevailed between the
titular and the heritors.	 However, where a temporal lordship was
geographically dispersed and titularship was not exercised over a
consolidated group of parishes, a considerable portion of the heritors
were not bound to the titular by ties of feudal superiority, kinship
or kindness.	 Indeed, some were not only freeholders, but possessed
baronial rights and even headed their own local nexus of kinsmen and
customary associates.
12
	Thus, the lords of erection, in their
capacity as titulars, exercised a control over other men's lands which
was perennially contentious.	 Hence, like the ecclesiastical
institutions which they had replaced, the titulars continued the
expeditious practice of farming the teinds to a speculative group of
middlemen, the tacksmen.	 In return for the security afforded by long
leases, the tacksmen, who were often prominent local landowners,
guaranteed the temporal lord a definite income from the teinds as well
as the stipends for the ministers of every parish within his
titularship.13
In sum, the territorial spheres of influence of the nobles,
when converted into political power, made them the traditional leaders
of society.	 The nobility did not expect to rival or supplant the
monarchy, nor necessarily seek to control the agencies of central
government.	 But without their active co-operation, royal authority
had little effective power within the localities.
After the nobility, the most influential estate within the
localities, though the most recently established in national politics,18
was the gentry.	 This collective term, as applied to members of 	 landed
society individually designated as lairds, was coming increasingly
into common usage in the early seventeenth century, Charles I being
among its most active promoters.	 Again, like the nobility, any
definition of the gentry as a social class has feudal, judicial and
ecclesiastical connotations.	 Feudally, the gentry consisted, on	 the
one hand, of the lesser or untitled barons and the freeholders who
heritably held their lands directly from the Crown and on the other,
of the feuars who heritably held their lands within the superiority of
other landowners.	 Judicially, though the lesser barons had the
privilege of holding barony courts, they, like all freeholders, were
expected to give regular attendance at the sheriff or regality court
within whose bounds their estates were located. Feuars, especially
those owing suit to a barony court, were not necessarily required to
give regular attendance at sheriff or regality courts.
Ecclesiastically, all the gentry - apart from a select few possessing
rights of lay patronage - were committed to paying teinds in their
capacity as heritors.
The gentry, unlike the nobility, were not individually
summoned to parliament, but had to suffice with the election of
commissioners, usually two, from each shire to represent their estate.
It was not until the end of the sixteenth century that shire
commissioners were actively summoned to parliament, where each shire
was allowed only one vote.	 Since the gentry were the last constituent
group within the political nation to become regular attenders at
parliament, the4A"CVN44144114 fourth estate. However, the
political estate neither encompassed nor directly represented the
gentry as a distinct social class.	 The parliamentary franchise in the
shires was restricted to those gentry who, as lesser barons and
freeholders, paid taxes direct to the Crown and whose estates were
rated for such purposes at not less than forty shillings old extent.
Freeholders whose lands were rated at less than forty shillings old
extent were unenfranchised and had to rely on kinship and customary
association for the representation of their interests. 	 The feuars19
paid taxes indirectly, as reliefs to their feudal superiors in
proportion to their landholdings.	 Accordingly, their interests were
deemed to be represented in parliament by the nobility.
14
	Lairds
entitled to participate in the election of shire commissioners composed
a political elite who, as the shire gentry, may superficially be
identified with the mainstays of county government in England. Those
lairds not entitled to participate in shire elections, who had to rely
on the virtual representation of their interests, may accordingly be
identified with the parish gentry.	 Nevertheless, contemporary
divisions among the English gentry cannot meaningfully be transplanted
into Scotland, given both the nature of the parliamentary franchise
and the tradition of decentralised government in the State.
The restriction of the franchise to a freehold of forty
shillings old extent was based on a traditional, even anachronistic,
land rating.	 The old extent of an estate was distinct from both its
current income, or rental, and its heritable liability, or feu-duty.
The original application of old extent, as a rating for ordinary
taxation on secular estates, was continued into the seventeenth
century.	 By medieval convention, the barons - greater and lesser -
and the freeholders paid a third of all taxation levied by the Crown,
half was collected from the ecclesiastical foundations, with the burghs
being accountable for the remaining sixth.	 Old extent was the
distinctive basis for evaluating the rate of taxation necessary to
fulfil the quota of one-third from the secular estates.	 Thus, the
first ordinary taxation of Charles I in 1625 rated the estates of
barons and freeholders at thirty shillings for every one pound-land of
old extent.
15
	However, the linking of the parliamentary franchise to
old extent meant that the electoral entitlement of the gentry was
fraught with anomalies.
Electoral participation was effectively confined to those
lairds who held their lands from the Crown by tenures in vogue when
secular estates were initially assessed for taxation in the middle
ages, that is by the traditional tenures of ward and relief and of20
blench.	 Both tenures had resulted from the commercialisation of the
military and personal obligations as specified in royal charters: the
former into incidental casualties paid during delays in heritable
succession (non-entry) and minorities (wardship), and for the marriage
of heirs; the latter into a fixed, though usually nominal or even
idiosyncratic, annual payment.	 However, the much increased feuing of
Crown lands from the late fifteenth century as well as kirklands during
the sixteenth century had led to the popularising of feu-ferme, a
tenure which marked a further commercialisation of the feudal
relationship between superior and heritable tenant. 	 As a feuar, the
heritable tenant had his annual feu-duty fixed in perpetuity, in return
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for an annual payment to his superior of an entry-fine (grassum) -
which was usually a direct multiple of his feu-duty. 	 The electoral
exclusion of gentry holding by feu-ferme was not merely a matter of
technical significance.	 For the feuing of royal property to removable
tenants by successive monarchs meant their immediate social elevation
into the ranks of the freeholders rather than the feuars.	 In like
manner, the Crown's annexation of ecclesiastical estates in 1587
converted feuars of annexed kirklands into freeholders.	 These
synthetic freeholders could not acquire the political status of shire
gentry since they owned lands on which taxation had never been levied
directly.	 Their freeholds, therefore, had never been valued to old
extent.	 This anomaly was intensified from the 1590s after the Crown
decided that all such synthetic freeholds were, for the purposes of
taxation, to be retoured to old extent.	 By this process, a notional
old extent was derived by local comparison rather than independent
assessment: the feu-duty of each synthetic freehold was deducted from
its current rental, the resultant free rent was then matched with that
of a neighbouring estate traditionally valued to old extent.
Freeholders on the proper and annexed lands of the Crown, though
denied the franchise until after the Restoration, thereby became
directly and distinctively liable for taxation.16
Undoubtedly, the greatest anomaly of the restricted franchise
was that feuars of kirklands were debarred from electoral participation21
on the grounds of legal status. Yet they had accrued landed resources
from the wholescale secularisation of the ecclesiastical estates which
often matched, and occasionally outstripped, the freeholds of the
shire gentry.	 Not only did the feuars of kirklands constitute a
large numerical presence within landed society, but secularisation had
offered an opportunity for individual lairds to augment their existing
landed resources.	 However, the Crown preferred to rectify fiscal
rather than electoral anomalies arising from secularisation,
particularly the blurring of the distinction between secular and
spiritual categories of taxpayers.	 Rather than overhaul the
distinctive conventions for levying taxation, royal policy from the
late sixteenth century laid down that secularised kirklands - other
than synthetic freeholds annexed to the Crown - were still to be taxed
as part of the spiritual quota.	 Hence, kirklands, together with the
separate category of synthetic freeholds, continued to provide around
half of all taxation collected during the personal rule of Charles I.
17
Feuars of kirklands remained indirect payers of taxation, relieving
the temporal lords and the bishops in proportion to the free rents
derived from their estates after the deduction of feu-duties. 	 Their
parliamentary enfranchisement, therefore, remained out of the question.
Unresolved electoral anomalies were a manifestation that the
gentry, as a political estate, were neither as powerful nor as cohesive
as the nobility.	 Indeed, the tendency of the gentry to act in
association with, rather than independently of, the nobility, had
meant that the enactment first summoning shire commissioners to
pro ')(k.bre
parliament in 1428 had - with thepexception of the Reformation
parliament in 1560 - remained inoperative until its reiteration in
1587.	 Thereafter, the restricted franchise had a latent potential as
a source of political frustration, especially among the feuars of
kirklands who can be regarded as the main beneficiaries of
secularisation.	 Their superiors initially profited from high
entry-fines and the opportunity to increase rents formerly paid by
removable tenants.	 In the longer term, the feuars gained not only
heritable security of tenure, but fixed feu-duties and their estates22
were exempt from the managerial dictates issued by barony and regality
courts. Thus, the feuars were provided with a valuable hedge against
inflation and, simultaneously, with an opportunity to profit personally
from the steady increase in grain prices which, for almost forty years,
characterised the rule of James VI.	 Moreover, the gentry as a whole
did not lack social assertiveness nor the ability to mount their own
political initiative.	 They had constituted the major social class
among activists in the political and religious movement known as the
Congregation, which had been primarily responsible for mobilising
support within Scotland for the Protestant Reformation, a cause for
which few members of the nobility were more than lukewarm.
18	Hence,
the regular appearance of shire commissioners in parliament by the turn
into the seventeenth century was symptomatic of a growing awareness
among the gentry that they were not just a distinct social class, but
a separate political estate.
Although the gentry were still in the process of establishing
themselves as a political estate in the early seventeenth century,
their leading social position within the localities had been actively
deployed in the service of the Kirk since the Reformation. 	 In
particular, as the nobles were reluctant to undertake local
administrative duties outwith their heritable jurisdictions, the gentry
were continuously encouraged to serve as elders on kirk sessions.
Thus, the gentry, along with the ministers, were responsible for the
religious welfare of Reformed congregations through their collective
exercise of discipline within every parish.	 Moreover, as the State
increasingly underwrote the commitments of the Kirk to social welfare
and education, the gentry, in their capacity as heritors, were held
financially accountable for the efforts of kirk sessions to apportion
relief to the deserving poor in times of dire necessity, like the
famine of 1623, and to establish schools in every parish after 1633.
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Participation as elders, or less routinely, as heritors in association
with the kirk session on an augmented parochial executive, was not
restricted to the shire gentry.	 Feuars, as well as freeholders and
lesser barons, were not only offered greater opportunities for23
official employment in the Kirk than in the State, but also gained
experience of a more centrally orientated structure of government
uncluttered by heritable jurisdictions.	 In turn, the Kirk can be
regarded as more responsive to the vast expansion in the ranks of the
gentry effected by the secularisation of the kirklands. 	 These new
proprietors brought a commercial, as distinct from a traditional,
attitude towards landownership into the service of the Kirk. 	 Within
the localities, therefore, the Kirk was becoming attuned to the
proprietary aspirations of the gentry whereas the State seemingly
remained thirled to the feudal privileges of the nobility.20
The distinctive role of the gentry within the Kirk was thrown
into sharper relief by the failure of the Crown to harness their
administrative energies to the service of local government. 	 In 1609,
James VI launched a scheme for justices of the peace which, though
based on his experience of such officials in England, had been first
projected in 1587.	 'Some godlie, wyse and vertuous gentilmen of good
qualitie' were commissioned to oversee, prevent and try all incidents
which disrupted or threatened the peace within every shire.	 After
meeting initial hostility from the barons and the burghs who
discharged their tenants from acknowledging the peace commissions,
James modified their composition to include nobles and bishops. 	 He
then re-launched the scheme in 1612 as a local supplement rather than
an alternative to existing heritable jurisdictions. 	 Landed gentlemen
whose rent exceeded one thousand merks Scots were to be referred to the
Privy Council for breaches of the peace, making them effectively exempt
from the jurisdiction of the peace commissions. 	 Once a sheriff had
punished an offender, the justices could not impose a stiffer penalty
for the same offence and thereby counteract any undue local influence
brought to bear in the original trial.	 Barons and lords of regality
could repledge their tenants from trial before the justices within
fifteen days of the date of an offence, even although the apprehension
of offenders had been left entirely to the justices.	 Barons and lords
of regality were also entitled to the fines imposed on any of their
tenants following trial by the peace commissions.	 Justices of the24
peace were allowed neither to infringe the traditional privileges of
royal burghs nor to interfere with their profits of justice through
the trial of crimes which came within the competence of burgh courts.
So constricting was the scope of their revised powers, that the
justices complained that they were 'bot as serjeandis and officearis
to the uther judgeis in the countrey'. 	 Hence, despite a further
parliamentary ratification for peace commissions in 1617, the scheme
met with so little enthusiasm from the gentry that less than half the
Scottish shires had commissions still functioning by 1625 - on which a
mere handful of gentry were left to serve as justices of the peace.
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In seeking to define the social composition of the gentry
one problem, however, remains.	 The pervasive secularisation of the
kirklands provided the major avenue of upward mobility into the landed
classes throughout the sixteenth century.	 Over half the feuars who
gained ownership of kirklands came from the ranks of the removable
tenantry, the vast majority of whom acquired no more land than that
which they already occupied and cultivated.
22	This social movement
resulted in a diverse and dispersed grouping of portioners and
'bonnet-lairds' whose status was that of lesser proprietors, but whose
respective agricultural holdings were indistinguishable from those of
tenant-farmers.	 By the seventeenth century, the two most prevalent
forms of agricultural holdings in Scotland were the multiple-tenant
and the single-tenant tounships (ferme-touns). 	 The holding of the
portioner was equivalent to a share in the former, that of a
'bonnet-laird' may be identified with the latter.	 Indeed, some
tenant-farmers, who formally enjoyed no security of heritable tenure as
rentallers and lease-holders, possessed more land. 	 As a virtual
aristocracy within the ranks of the peasantry, they often held more
shares than the portioners or individually tenanted more tounships
than the 'bonnet-lairds'.	 The holdings of these tenant-farmers were
either sub-tenanted to other peasant farmers and crofters or cultivated
with the help of their own labour pools, drawn from their household
servants and day-labourers, mainly cottars - who, in return for their
daily labour, occupied tied cottages and cultivated small plots of25
ground within the tounships.23
Distinction in status between the proprietor and the
removable tenant may, perhaps, be suggested by the designation 'of' a
certain land for the former and 'in' a particular tounship for the
latter.
24	But this can be no more than a rough and ready guideline.
For in the same way that barons and freeholders could actually feu
lands from a superior while continuing to hold the bulk of their lands
from the Crown, so feuars could also lease from other landowners.
Although the designation 'of' tended to be confined to landowners, it
was probably most applicable to a proprietor who held sufficient lands
in feu to be considered a laird.	 The designation 'in' continued to
be applied indiscriminately to lesser proprietors, that is portioners
and 'bonnet-lairds', as well as to tenant-farmers of substance. 	 The
term 'goodman of' a particular tounship was often reserved for
individuals within this latter category who would seem to have formed
a separate, albeit amorphous, social class between the gentry and the
peasantry.	 In England, though the legal terminology applicable to
landholding differed, there was an analogous problem of meaningfully
classifying the lower ranks of landed society and the upper echelons
of the peasantry. 25
	After the Union of 1603, no doubt fortified by a
growing awareness of English social divisions, a certain currency was
gained for the term yeomen in relation to this amorphous class within
official circles.
26	By mid-century, however, it was the Kirk rather
than the State which was promoting recognition of the yeomen as a
distinct social class.	 While their political standing remained
negligible, their active support was sought as elders in rural
parishes where there was either a shortage of resident gentry or a
reluctance among local lairds to serve on kirk sessions.
27
Outwith landed society, the one remaining political estate
among the laity was that of the burgesses.	 Indeed, since commercial
activity still tended to be concentrated within the towns in the early
seventeenth century, the burgess estate may be regarded as representing
the commercial interest.	 The more important towns, that is nucleated26
settlements of both political and economic potential, had been erected
into burghs during the middle ages.	 As corporate feudal entities,
the burghs held their privileges of government and trade either
directly from the Crown or, by royal licence, within the superiority
of a secular or ecclesiastical landlord.
From the end of the thirteenth century, burghs holding
directly from the Crown had gradually acquired administrative and
fiscal autonomy.	 In return for a fixed annuity, the burgh-ferme, a
teneurial variant of feu-ferme without entry-fines - since the burgh
community never died - royal officials were excluded from the internal
government of the king's burghs.	 Subsequently, the fixed value of
the burgh-fermes to the Crown had relatively depreciated against the
revenues retained by the towns - such as land rents, court fees, petty
customs and burgess fees - which accrued to the common good, that is
the funds for each town's common works and common affairs. 	 Although
the Exchequer doubled the revenues it derived as burgh-fermes by
successfully demanding increased annuities from the foremost towns at
the end of the sixteenth century, its endeavours to establish a right
of supervision over each town's common good was collectively resisted
by the burghs throughout the seventeenth century. 	 The Crown's major
source of regular income from the burghs remained the great customs
exacted as export duties on staple wares within every town's trading
precinct.	 Originally, these precincts, which amounted to a monopoly
trading area around each town, had sometimes extended to at least the
whole of the shire in which the king's burgh was located, but had
often been diminished by the Crown's continuous erection of
neighbouring towns into burghs.	 Thus, the collection of great
customs tended to be fragmented rather than augmented. 	 Moreover, a
comparable revenue was ultimately yielded to and retained by the
burghs from the less onerous but more wideranging petty customs which
were resourcefully, and often ingeniously, extended to virtually
every transaction by land or sea.
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In addition to its regular income from burgh-fermes and27
great customs, the Crown exacted contributions from the burghs towards
extraordinary expenditure incurred in the national interest.	 Such
assiduous tapping of commercial wealth had resulted in commissioners
from the burghs becoming established as the third estate in parliament
during the fourteenth century.	 The burgh commissioners were neither
assigned nor expected a decisive influence in the formulation of royal
policy.	 But, in return for their contribution of a sixth of all taxes
levied by the Crown, the burghs, in effect the mercantile community,
gained a monopoly over foreign trade.	 These political and trading
concessions led to those burghs which held from the Crown being
re-classified as royal burghs after 1400.	 In the case of the existing
king's burghs, parliamentary representation was, in part, merely being
extended to corporate tenants-in-chief.	 However, the prime
consideration in this re-classification was the superior ability of the
royal burghs to make meaningful corporate contributions to the fiscal
quota generally apportioned to the burghs.	 Nevertheless, certain
dependent burghs, namely St Andrews, Glasgow and Brechin, who held from
ecclesiastical superiors and already possessed similar trading
privileges to the king's burghs, were progressively allowed
parliamentary representation, thereby lessening the common fiscal
obligations of the royal burghs.
The emergence of the royal burghs led also to the
re-classification of the dependent burghs, whose privileges of
government and trade were bestowed on superiors rather than the
corporate community.	 Dependent burghs had tended to evolve from the
estate management of the barony courts, their marketing privileges
being located at a convenient town within the bounds of a barony and
their areas of trading monopoly were usually confined within baronial
precincts.	 From the mid-fifteenth century, such burghs acquired a
standardised status as burghs of barony.	 Whereas the corporate
communities within the royal burghs organised their commercial life
around both foreign and local trade, the communities within the burghs
of barony merely appended a local trading superstructure onto their
main corporate pursuit of agriculture. 	 It was this greater capacity28
to generate wealth rather than different teniurial conditions which
in practice demarcated the royal burgh from the burgh of barony.	 For
the effective control of the superiors was progressively lessened in
the later middle ages through the spread of feu-ferme in the
allocation of lands within their burghs.	 Feuing afforded the
burgesses greater participation in the corporate management of their
communities: an analogous development to the greater individual
control acquired by portioners and 'bonnet-lairds' from the feuing of
lands which they had formerly held as tenant-farmers.
Undoubtedly, burghs of barony did provide a stimulus to the
creation of local markets which, when combined with the extra source
of income their superiors derived from commerce, fostered a spirit of
rivalry and emulation within the landed classes.	 Indeed, the
functioning tally of such burghs prior to the Reformation more than
doubled that of the forty-five royal burghs.
29
	Despite individual
rivalry, which was occasionally formidable, the burghs of barony never
posed any wholescale threat to the overseas trade of the royal burghs.
Within the localities, however, the trading precints of the burghs of
barony cut across the traditional monopolies of the latter. 	 Hence,
from 1552, the burgess estate sought greater formulation and promotion
of their common interests through the Convention of Royal Burghs.
The conservator of the Scottish staple in the Netherlands, which
traditionally acted as the main overseas agency for the wholesale
distribution and purchase of merchandise, was appointed by and became
accountable to the Convention. 30
	Through its legalisation, the
Convention, like parliament, upheld the trading monopolies of the
royal burghs, especially the merchants' monopoly over foreign trade,
on the grounds that all who infringed this privilege were not only
defrauding the merchants but were also lessening the revenues
available to the Crown.	 Whenever taxation was levied by the Crown,
the Convention assumed responsibility for allocating the amount each
burgh was to be assessed to meet their estate's fiscal quota.	 Any
royal burgh excluded from the Convention's stent-rolls was effectively
denied parliamentary representation and could no longer be guaranteed29
access to foreign trade.
Through the existence of their Convention, the royal burghs
appeared to compose the most cohesive class interest among the
political estates.	 Although the other estates were each able to meet
and consult on national issues when authorised by the Crown, only the
burgesses met formally on a regular basis several times a year to
legislate on matters of common interest, to impose stents for the
promotion of trading embassies overseas, and to protect as well as to
administer their political and economic privileges.	 Thus, the
Convention both facilitated the formulation of common policy and
ensured a continuing momentum behind every issue brought before
parliament by the burgesses.	 Elections of parliamentary commissioners
by the town-councils of every royal burgh were conducted under the
auspices of the Convention which was also responsible for the
allocation of commissioners to each burgh and monitoring their
subsequent attendance at parliament.	 From the late sixteenth century,
no royal burgh sent more than one commissioner to the Convention other
than Edinburgh, the capital, which was allowed two on account of its
unrivalled commercial prosperity and its watching brief over the
interests of the royal burghs during the intervals between Conventions.
In the interests of internal harmony, this practice was adopted as the
standard for parliamentary representation by 1621. 31	For the
respective positions of the burghs on the stent-roll after Edinburgh
cannot be taken as an accurate indicator of their relative prosperity
nor, therefore, of their numerical entitlement to commissioners. 32
In effect, the burgess estate in parliament was limited to around
fifty commissioners.
Yet the royal burghs were still able to exert a significant
concerted influence on any matters affecting their interests.
Usually, the burgess estate in parliament comprised the same
commissioners despatched by the royal burghs to the Convention.
Moreover, in contrast to England which lacked any comparable
institution to the Convention, the influence of the burghs in30
parliament was not diluted by 'carpet-bagging'. 	 All commissioners
were drawn from the ranks of the burgesses and answerable to the
Convention, thereby their collective exposure to political manipulation
by the landed interest was minimised.	 The nobility and gentry,
however, were not without political influence over the affairs of
individual burghs.	 Rather than elect a burgess as provost, an office
which normally carried no fiscal responsibilities, several burghs
preferred to bestow the title of  lord provost on a powerful
neighbouring lord or laird.
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In essence, the royal burghs were corporate pockets of vested
interests.	 Internal government was entrusted to town-councils, with
jurisdiction over the burgh courts being exercised by the magistrates,
namely the bailies, who were also responsible for the allocation,
either by feu or lease, of the lands and tenements within each burgh.
In addition, the admission of burgesses came within their general
competence whereas the administration of 'unfree' lands or suburbs
attached to, but outwith, the burghs was specifically assigned to
individual bailies.	 Only merchants and craftsmen, the freemen of the
burghs, who promoted and defended their vocational interests through
the cellular organisation of their guilds, were eligible for the status
of burgess.	 All other inhabitants were classified as indwellers and,
like strangers, were either denied any marketing privileges or
subjected to specially onerous local tariffs.	 Because of their
superior ability to accumulate capital from their trading ventures,
the merchants, through their guild, aspired to dominate the
town-council as well as monopolise the overseas trade of each burgh.
Moreover, the jurisdictional competence of the burgh court enabled the
mercantile community to consolidate their control over the corporate
life of the burgh.	 Its main concerns were the regulation of internal
marketing standards, the keeping of order within the burgh, and the
preservation of good neighbourhood to counter such perennial hazards
as fire and inadequate sanitation.	 Nevertheless, the jurisdictional
competence of the merchants was effectively limited to the physical
confines of the burgh.	 Unlike the barony court, the burgh court31
could not repledge from royal officials, though an assize of
burgesses was used in royal courts from the fifteenth century for the
trial of townspeople indicted for offences committed outwith their
burgh's bounds.	 Outwith the market place, the merchants exercised no
judicial control over the rural community within the burgh's trading
precinct.	 From the mid-sixteenth century, burgesses were exempt from
service on any inquest or assize for the trial of crimes committed
within the shires by persons other than townspeople.
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The privileged position of the merchants within the royal
burghs was enhanced and preserved with the co-operation of the Crown.
Town-councils were permitted to become self-perpetuating oligarchies
from the later fifteenth century.	 The retiring town-council chose
their successors and the magistrates in every burgh were chosen by the
combined old and new councils, together with a token representative
from each craft.	 Furthermore, a rigid social divide between merchants
and other burgesses was usually maintained by the requirements for
entry into the merchant guild: namely, an apprenticeship of at least
eight years accompanied by high entry fees beyond the resources of
most craftsmen.	 Indeed, a craftsman could only become a merchant, and
thereby participate in the town-council, by renouncing his craft. 35
In most major burghs by the sixteenth century, the defence of
mercantile privileges was personally entrusted to the dean of guild.
As head of the mercantile community, the dean acquired jurisdiction
over commercial transactions and marketing standards, involving not
only cases between merchants or mercantile contracts with mariners, but
also cases concerning indwellers or strangers who attempted
independently to engage in trade.	 Moreover, the dean of guild's
court was subject to no other jurisdiction save the Court of Session.36
Even the right to fix the price of craftsmen's work was
vested in town-councils from the fifteenth century.	 Craft guilds,
however, continued to proliferate as protective institutions.
Primarily, the craft guilds were concerned to safeguard the vocational
monopoly of their members against competition from rural artisans and32
indwellers and to act as a mutual assurance society against pauperism.
Accordingly, the need to promote the skills of each craft and to
maintain standards of good workmanship was met by restricting entry
into each guild.	 Although the crafts' rates were lower than those of
the merchants, high entry fees were again demanded and each craftsman
was allowed only a limited number of apprentices at any one time.
Entrants to the crafts had to undergo long periods of training - up to
thirteen years as apprentices and journeymen - prior to their full
acceptance into a guild. 37	By assiduous organisation in the course
of the fifteenth century, crafts began to acquire seals of
incorporation from burgh courts which bestowed on the deacon of each
craft disciplinary authority over the activities of his guild. 	 The
right of deacons to try offenders for breaches of the rules and
privileges of their crafts was subject to appeals to the burgh court.
While the jurisdiction of the deacons was never as diverse or
comprehensive as that of the dean of guild, the deacon convener of all
crafts was able to try any case affecting the general privileges of
craftsmen 38
During the sixteenth century, the combined effects of
inflation, the entrenchment of craft guilds as self-governing
incorporations and the economic aspirations of the landed interest,
progressively eroded the political hegemony exercised by the merchants
within the burgess estate and, indeed, the commercial dominance of the
royal burghs.	 The general rise in prices produced an element of
social insubordination.	 A series of mob riots within the burghs	 in
mid-century had even been exploited politically by the exponents of
the Reformation.	 However, the craft guilds also exploited such unrest
to exact economic and political concessions from the mercantile
oligarchies.	 The town-councils' fixing of market prices were
increasingly relaxed and usually only exercised after consultation with
the appropriate craft.	 Furthermore, commencing with Edinburgh in
1583, local accords or setts were negotiated within the major burghs,
whereby craftsmen were assured of minority representation on the
town-councils, though magisterial positions were normally restricted to33
the merchants.	 The old council continued to elect the new.
39	By the
early seventeenth century, the craft guilds in each of the major burghs
had organised themselves within a Trades House. 	 Thus, the common
interests of the crafts were not only articulated coherently, but also
consolidated powerfully into a continuous lobby of the town-council.
StimuJted by the pressures of inflation on their rather
inelastic incom s from feus and rents, proprietors seeking to exploit
the market potential of their estates mounted an external threat to
the commercial privileges of the royal burghs which materialised in
several directions.	 Hence, burghs of barony continued to be founded.
Although as many as forty per cent of such foundations in the century
after the Reformation were still-born 'parchment burghs', the viability
of the remainder bolstered the continuing vitality of earlier
creations.	 As a result of this baronial endeavour, a network of
local markets had been established by the early seventeenth century -
albeit mainly in the Lowlands.	 Moreover, a new category of dependent
burgh, namely the burgh of regality, was established in the later
sixteenth century.	 The burgh of regality differed from that of barony
more in terms of social aspirations than economic substance or
privilege.	 Like the burghs of barony, regalian burghs ranged from
ecclesiastical corporations, which had been relatively prosperous prior
to the Reformation, to small rural communities primarily concerned with
the communal pursuit of agriculture rather than trade. 	 The
proliferation of burghs of regality, especially with the creation of
lordships of erection from 1587, marked a desire among proprietors to
create larger market monopolies within their jurisdictional bounds:
that is, trading precincts which accorded more with their status as
lords of regality than that of a mere baron.	 Nevertheless, the
greater the expectations this new category of burgh generated among
proprietors, the stricter their communal privileges were supervised by
their lords.	 Thus, the burghs of regality faced a more immediate
threat to their stability as self-governing corporations than the
commercial hostility of the royal burghs, however sustained.34
Nonetheless, the commercial competition which the royal
burghs encountered within the localities was not restricted to the
burghs of barony and of regality.	 By licensing weekly markets and
annual fairs in towns and rural communities which lacked burghal
status, the Crown enabled local gentry, who lacked baronial
jurisdiction, to develop the commercial potential of their estates.
The mushrooming of such licenses by the mid-seventeenth century, though
technically curtailing the trading precincts of the royal burghs, had
the effect of extending marketing facilities into remote areas of
Scotland.	 The royal burghs inevitably regarded this competition from
local markets, like that from the dependent burghs, as a grievance,
tantamount to a breach of privilege.	 Yet the consistently vigorous
defence of the political and economic interests of the royal burghs by
the Convention never amounted to the maintenance of a closed shop.
Positive discrimination was continuously, albeit sparingly, practised
in favour of the more prominent and prosperous dependent burghs which
had the commercial capacity to participate in overseas trade. 	 The
addition of a dependent burgh to the stent-roll helped curtail
smuggling and spread the burden of fiscal liabilities borne by the
royal burghs. Contribution to the burghs' quota of taxation served
as a precursor to parliamentary representation and eventually to the
dependent acquiring the status of royal burgh.4°
The commercial activities of urban communities, allied to the
general thrift and frugality of their lifestyles and their amenability
to discipline, would seem in Scotland, as elsewhere in Europe, to have
afforded a special affinity for Calvinism.	 That the leading towns
served as the vanguard for the development of Reformed principles, as
propagated through the pulpit and rigorously implemented through the
kirk session, was demonstrated by the model scheme for presbyteries in
1581.	 The supervision of neighbouring kirk sessions by higher
ecclesiastical courts was based on thirteen of the most prominent
burghs in the Lowlands, selected not just for their accessibility from
surrounding rural parishes, but on account of the support forthcoming
from their inhabitants for such an experiment.
41
	Yet these burghs35
cannot necessarily be regarded as the domicile of 'the most modern and
progressive elements' within Scotland,  in so far   as-ffieir support for
v Kot-foecosiA .
Calvinism, from its reception at the Reformation, waccompa led by
the promotion of a capitalist mentality.42
The unique feature of Calvinism among Christian theologies
was that it allied the individual believer's striving for assurance of
salvation to a strict adherence to worldly asceticism and the diligent
exercise of his lawful calling.	 In particular, the Calvinist doctrine
of predestination has been seen as a psychological sanction for the
modern capitalist ethos.	 For the elect were constantly required to
demonstrate their perseverance in the faith and self-confidence in
their own assurance by the productive pursuit of their chosen vocations
as well as by formal attendance to their religious obligations.	 That
each individual was accountable for his systematic use of time was a
predominant theme of Scottish pastoral theology by the seventeenth
century.	 Moreover, though neither prosperity nor poverty were
especially deemed distinguishing marks of the elect, Scottish
Calvinists did not condemn the accumulation of wealth as inherently
evil.	 Indeed, prosperity was seen as a trial for the truly pious.
The elect were distinguished from the reprobate by their attitude
towards prosperity, in that their piety was manifest by their
productive use of worldly wealth.	 Anyone who acquired wealth through
Ad;
ascgism and diligence was actively discouraged from dissipating his
prosperity by conspicuous consumption.	 Yet he was not actively
exhorted to give away a large proportion to charity. 	 Calvinism, in
short, laid stress not on good works, but on hard work. 	 For the
prosperous, therefore, there was apparently little alternative to the
investment of wealth to promote the further accumulation of capita1.43
Nonetheless, however much the accumulation and investment of capital
was sanctioned by Scottish Calvinists in the seventeenth century, the
creation of a capitalist mentality was, at best, a piecemeal and
gradual development.
Through their involvement in commerce, the merchants in36
particular and the burgesses in general were the main accumulators of
liquifiable capital in Scotland. Yet their working of money was not
necessarily, nor even directly, conducive to the economic individualism
of the capitalist entrepreneur.	 The commercial activities of the
mercantile community may still be depicted as traditionalist in the
century after the Reformation.	 Rather than maximise individual
profits, they preferred to share trading ventures in order to minimise
risks.	 Moreover, although their partnerships tended to last only as
long as each venture, their co-operative inclinations were strengthened
by family ties.	 Habitual and informal alliances between relatives and
friends served as a surrogate for the lack of consolidated commercial
firms and insurance societies.
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	Furthermore, burgesses in public
office were not noted for their progressive spirit.	 Those who served
as elders on kirk sessions tended to be drawn from the oligarchic
town-councils.	 Though the burgesses, of all the estates, were most
adept at the collective articulation of their interests, the Convention
was more concerned to preserve and perpetuate privilege than to
advocate social and political reform.	 Nor were the finances of burghs
run on particularly modern principles of management in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when the common good of most
towns was appreciating at a greater rate than the coinage was being
debased by inflation.	 Yet burgh accounts were characterised by a lack
of ready money, by the need to earmark funds to implement specific
projects, by a continuous recourse to loans on the security of the
common good and by inadequate and often erroneous accounting.45
Despite the commercial propensities of urban communities,
strong affinities existed with rural society in the neighbourhoods of
royal as well as dependent burghs.	 Most burgesses outwith the
commercially specialised confines of Edinburgh possessed crofts and
small-holdings.	 Indeed, in some of the smaller royal burghs, the
burgesses placed as great an emphasis on agriculture as trade. 	 Such
was the importance of rents and feus from lands, mills and fishings
that they accounted for at least half the total revenues of many
burghs, including those closely involved in trade. 	 Kinship and37
customary association also played an important part in maintaining
favoured status in town as in country.	 The acquisition of an
apprenticeship which, in turn, led to the status of burgess, was most
readily available to the sons of merchants and craftsmen and then, in
order to preserve the matrimonial prospects of the daughters of
existing burgesses at a premium, to their sons-in-law. Conversely,
marriage afforded a means of short-circuiting entry into the burgess
estate for the younger sons of the gentry and the yeomen whose material
prospects, as members of landed society, were poor. 	 Fines for the
admission of new freemen were viewed less as a source of revenue than
as a means of regulating entitlement to the privileges of a burgess.
For the prospect of gainful employment in trade and commerce did
attract a steady flow of recruits from the countryside to the craft
and merchant guilds.	 Whereas the crafts tended to attract apprentices
from a non-landed background, the superior potential of the merchants
to accumulate capital led to the younger sons of local gentry being
enlisted into the mercantile community. 46
In terms of material wealth, the resources of the merchants
were generally on a par with all but the richest of the nobility,
though they consciously refrained from the high levels of expenditure
and conspicuous consumption prevalent within landed society. 	 As a
result, their frugality facilitated a degree of social mobility and
intercourse from the towns into the neighbouring countryside. 	 On the
one hand, the prospect of handsome dowries induced lairds to marry
merchants' daughters.	 On the other hand, merchants moved onto the
land either through marriage, which depended as much on social
opportunity as capital, or by direct purchase of an estate, which
depended onaadlly available land-market.	 Yet no more than eight
C
per cent of allik,kirklands had passed into the hands of burgesses in
the course of the sixteenth century.
47
A more indirect, but
steadier, means of social advancement for merchants - and to a lesser
extent for lawyers and wealthy craftsmen from the larger burghs - came
from the provision of mortgages for nobles and gentry. A dependence
on agriculture and customary practices of estate management meant that38
both during and after a period of inflation, the landed classes were
not always able to maintain their social - and even their political -
position from the rather inflexible revenues at their immediate
disposal.	 The merchants, as the major source of liquid capital in
the early seventeenth century, were most able to profit from this
situation, especially as the relaxation of usury which followed the
Reformation allowed them to exact interest at the annual rate of ten
per cent.	 Sums lent in mortgage to the nobility and gentry were
usually secured by heritable bonds on the revenues of their estates.
As the lender, the merchant would be infeft in a portion of the
borrower's estate until sufficient revenue was exacted to repay the
capital sum and the interest arising - both components being known
respectively as the wadset and the annualrent. 	 Failure to repay the
debt within the specified time, usually varying from seven to thirteen
years, led to the title as well as the revenues of the estate, or at
least that portion which remained unredeemed, passing permanently into
the hands of the merchant.
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Moreover, the acquisition of estates by merchants often had
the social effect of assimilating their aspiration to those of
existing members of landed society, leading, at its most conservative,
to their eventual withdrawal from commerce.	 However, to see this as
a general European phenomenon, by which 'the bourgeois felt that he
belonged ultimately only to the rank towards which he a,spired',
underestimates the affinities between those merchants who remained
active in commerce and neighbouring nobles and gentry.
49
	For the
mercantile community, regardless of their landed aspirations, became
enmeshed in the local interests of landed society, who, in turn, became
involved in the affairs of towns in the vicinity of their estates.
Traditionally, the nobles and other politically committed members of
landed society had maintained prestigious lodgings in towns of national
or regional prominence.	 By the early seventeenth century, however, it
had become fashionable for the gentry to erect houses of more modest
character in smaller towns in order to retain a watching brief over the
commercial as well as the social life of their localities.
50	Thus,39
without any fundamental alteration to the traditional structure of the
Scottish economy or the social fabric of the political nation,
merchants and other wealthy burgesses sought social respectability
through the acquisition of a rural estate, while nobles and gentry, as
a means of supplementing their landed incomes, were occasionally
induced to become partners in the financing of trading ventures.
The remaining political estate, the clergy, were more noted
for their material acquisitiveness than their spiritual zeal by the
later middle ages: a condition which promoted the secularisation of
the kirklands as well as the Reformation during the sixteenth century.
Nevertheless, the Reformation in Scotland, which  was carried out in
defiance of the Crown, confirmed the clergy's idpogical influence
over the political nation.	 As elsewhere in Europe, the Reformation
was a response to a general desire for spiritual nourishment, a
concern for the more efficacious cure of souls. 	 Yet the success of
the movement had depended on andwas shaped by political rebellion.
In their justification of the Scottish Reformation, foremost clerical
polemicists, like John Knox, had appealed for support not only from
the nobility, as the natural leaders of society, but from the
political nation as a whole.	 In essence, this was achieved by.
4144,44
emphasising a minor aspect of Calvinist teaching, namely thel,duty of
the lesser magistrates to resist tyranny in the head of state, which
was broadcast as the right to take arms against an ungodly Crown.
Thus, the Reformation in Scotland provided the political nation with
the ideological basis for resistance to monarchy in order to correct
or repress any deviation from godly government. 51
Moreover, since the Reformation was not maintained by
princely dictate, the new Kirk was able to mould its own government
according to its own conceptions of best scriptural warrant,
jettisoning medieval precepts and practices which were deemed contrary
to the founding spirit of the apostolic church.	 Whereas the
government of the Church of England from the time of Elizabeth can be
regarded as both royal and episcopal, that of the Kirk has best been40
described as 'conciliar and anti-erastian'.	 Its ecclesiastical
authority was separately vested in a hierarchical structure of
representative courts which culminated nationally in the general
assembly 52
Although the Scottish Reformation marked a distinct break in
polity as well as doctrine between the medieval Church and the Kirk,
the clerical estate continued to be represented in parliament; albeit
technically.	 The clergy had been traditionally represented by
bishops, abbots and priors who, in addition to being spiritual lords,
received individual summons as tenants-in-chief of the Crown and
possessed temporal jurisdictions as barons or even as lords of
regality.	 Despite secularisation, abbacies and priories continued to
be represented by lay commendators, whose right to sit as clerical
commissioners was confirmed in 1597.	 However, after the passing of
the annexation act of 1587 - which initiated lordships of erection
whose holders joined the estate of the nobility - the practice of lay
commendators sitting in parliament was gradually eroded and eventually
ceased by 1621.	 The right of parliamentary attendance of the
otmilk61,-4A-w-c ‘
pre-Reformation prelates was inherited by Protestants, as titular
bishops.	 Even when episcopacy was eclipsed within the Kirk -
following the annexation of their property to the Crown in 1587 and
then the initial establishment of presbyterianism in 1592 - titular
bishops continued to sit in parliament, paving the way for the full
spiritual restoration and reconsecration of the bishops in 1610.
Indeed, the Kirk during the presbyterian hegemony was not altogether
averse to the idea of parliamentary bishops to ensure meaningful
representation for clerical interests.	 Thus, James VI had a ready
made excuse in 1597 when he proposed to increase the number of titular
bishops in parliament.	 Nine years later, he passed an act for the
restitution of the estate of bishops, restoring their landed resources
and jurisdictions in order to maintain their parliamentary status.53
This programme of restoration, though piecemeal, was highly
contentious.	 Where James VI believed that ecclesiastical policies41
could be resolved in parliament, with the bishops representing the
clerical estate, a vociferous minority within the Kirk, led by
Andrew Melville, sought supreme ecclesiastical authority to be vested
in general assemblies.	 Where James conceived an erastian framework of
government for the Kirk, with the bishops as agents of the Crown, the
Melvilleans preferred to adhere to a presbyterian framework of courts,
structuring government from local kirk sessions through district
presbyteries and regional synods to national general assemblies.
Where James ultimately believed that supreme government in Kirk and
State was part of his prerogative, the Melvilleans believed that Kirk
and State were two distinct kingdoms, the former exercising moral
supervision over the latter.
The ecclesiastical controversy which dominated the last
decade of the sixteenth century and the first of the seventeenth was,
however, governed more by empirical than ideological considerations.
The authorisation of presbyterianism by the 'golden act' of 1592 was
essentially a compromise between the aspirations of the Crown and the
Melvilleans.	 Though weighted in favour of the latter, no recognition
was accorded to the Melvillean resurrection of the Gelasian theories
of Church independence - first advocated  by the papacy in the early
middle ages.	 The supremacy of general assemblies in ecclesiastical
affairs was licensed by parliament.	 Although there were to be annual
general assemblies, the Crown retained the right to appoint the time
and place of their meeting.	 No contingency provisions were adequately
established if the Crown, when present at an assembly, declined to
appoint its next meeting.	 James, therefore, retained an effective
lever for insinuating royal control over the Kirk and restoring
authority to the episcopacy.	 His nomination and endowment of
parliamentary bishops was accompanied by a tampering with assemblies
which was designed to frustrate and isolate the Melvilleans.	 So
successful was this policy that, by the end of 1606, six of the
fourteen ministers who had been imprisoned for attempting to constitute
an assembly at Aberdeen in July 1605 without royal approval were
banished from Scotland, while Melville and eight other presbyterians42
who had gone to London to protest against this hectoring were
arbitrarily detained.	 By 1607, James had inveigled V:ygeltito
Kok,
accepting bishaps as constant moderators which, in turn,  qavo bishops
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the opportunity to appoint constant moderators for the
Three years later, episcopl aCy was further fortified by the creation of
Courts of High Commission which provided civil sanction for
ecclesiastical censures.	 The restoration of spiritual powers to the
episcopacy was given formal approval by the general assembly at
Glasgow.	 Thus, James had achieved an ecclesiastical settlement in
accord with his wishes by 1610.
54
Yet James VI had preferred to graft diocesan control onto
the existing framework of government rather than totally abolish
presbyterianism.	 Notwithstanding the omission of any reference to
the bishops being subject to the censure of general assemblies in the
parliamentary ratification of James' overhaul of ecclesiastical polity
in 1612, the assembly was never formally superseded as the highest
legislative authority for the national affairs of the Kirk. 	 In turn,
a spirit of moderation and co-operation characterised the subsequent
relationships of synods and presbyteries with the bishops.	 These
regional and district courts continued to exercise ecclesiastical
discipline under episcopal oversight.55
In any case, contention between Kirk and State was not
designed to produce a system of political apartheid.	 Protagonists on
both sides were essentially advocating alternative means of governing
the Christian Commonwealth, not the separation of the Scottish people
into adherents of the Kirk or the State.	 Underlying the whole
controversy was a basic co-operation between laity and clergy within
local communities, as manifest in the running of kirk sessions by lay
elders and ministers.	 Strengthening the bonds between such prominent
members of local communities were their common social as well as
ecclesiastical affinities. The emphasis during divine service on the
preaching of the word, more than the administration of the sacraments,
allowed the eldership scope for authoritative pronouncements on the43
manner and content of sermons in keeping with their position of social
leadership within the parish. Conversely, the growing attainment of
the Reformed ideal of an all-graduate profession by 1600 imparted an
authentic mark of learning to the ministry. 	 Their religious
leadership with the parishes was further consolidated by their family
ties of kinship and local association with the landed classes; by their
inter-marriage with the families of the gentry and burgesses; and by
their acceptance of lay patronage and titularship of the teinds for
both parochial placement and the provision of stipends.
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Moreover, apart from a few well-endowed sons of the gentry
among the clergy, all ministers had a minimum landholding within their
parishes of a manse and glebe - a house, with four acres of kirkland
provided by their patrons.	 The increasing level of personal income
and assets recorded in ministers' testaments during the opening
decades of the seventeenth century suggest a growing involvement in
landholding and, perhaps, commerce.	 Ministers were prepared both to
acquire land by purchase and to lend money in support of other
landowners, taking advantage themselves of the relaxed ecclesiastical
attitudes to usury which had accompanied the Reformation.	 Landed
affinities were especially prevalent among the episcopacy.	 Most
bishops were men of property, independently acquired or inherited
prior to the restoration of their temporal lordships in 1606.
Testaments of the restored Jacobean episcopate reveal substantial
financial resources matched, among the clergy, only by ministers in
the wealthier parishes of the leading towns and cities. 57	Like
prominent families among the gentry, the bishops were linked to the
nobility either as cadets or as customary associates.	 Thus, despite
their Protestant persuasions, they exhibited the traditional
characteristics of the 'somewhat ancestral type of Scottish
churchman' 
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Regardless of the particular ascendancy of episcopacy or
presbyterianism, the position of Protestantism as the national faith
of Scotland was undoubtedly consolidated by the Kirk's hierarchical44
structure of representative courts.	 In addition to the maintenance
of religious standards within the ministry, the ecclesiastical courts
exercised a moral oversight of family life with the aim of fostering
and encouraging the household as the basic unit of religious worship.
The household, however, was viewed more in terms of the nuclear
family than that of the extended family traditionally associated with
the retinues of the nobility.	 Hence, the Protestant appeal to the
political nation was patently more suited to the gentry and burgesses.
While the discipline of the Kirk could effectively be brought to bear
against gentry and burgesses, the nobility were not so amenable to
presbyteries and synods counteracting their traditional dominance of
local communities or censuring their defiance of kirk sessions. 	 The
ultimate and socially, most contentious, sanction of the Kirk was that
of excommunication which carried the civil consequence of outlawry.
From 1605, James VI had insisted that no excommunication of a noble
could proceed without the consent of the Privy Council. 	 In like vein,
the general assembly of 1610 was obliged to agree that no sentence of
excommunication could proceed without episcopal approval.	 The real
design of this measure was to deny the incidental power of outlawry to
ministers.	 Its success was reflected in the steady decline in the
number of excommunications instigated by presbyteries in the last
fifteen years of James VI's reign.59
As well as differences with the nobility over the exercises
of discipline, the clergy also had a certain divergence of interests
with the gentry and burgesses which can be traced to the actual
operation of the ecclesiastical courts.	 Although lay commissioners
continued to attend general assemblies in the early seventeenth
century, they did so as representatives of the whole membership of the
Kirk, drawn from the political estates, rather than as nominees of the
synods and presbyteries. The lack of lay participation in the
intermediate courts of the Kirk suggested by this situation was
essentially a reflection on the administrative routine of both synod
and presbytery.	 While synods never usually met more than twice a
year, they lasted several days, dealing mainly with the oversight of45
presbyteries and the disciplining of ministers. 	 In the opening
decades of the seventeenth century, synods had been able to attract
lay commissioners to deliberate issues of regional importance. 	 But
their attendance was never sustained and would seem to have lapsed by
1620.	 This may, in part, be attributable to the dampening effect
which the restoration of the episcopacy had on ecclesiastical
controversy at diocesan level.
The main concern of the presbytery, which was expected to
meet weekly was to serve as an exercise for the regular maintenance of
doctrinal orthodoxy among the ministry and to oversee the work of the
kirk sessions within its bounds.	 It was a court of referral for
contumacious sexual offenders, Sabbath-breakers and non-church goers.
It had a special concern to discipline Catholic recusants and to search
out priests and witches.	 The attendance of lay elders at presbyteries
was never regular before 1600 and there would seem to be little
evidence for their presence thereafter. 	 As only ministers were
censurable by presbyteries for absence, this may be taken as an
admission that the working of these district courts was intrinsically
the concern of the ministers.	 In any case, support and sympathy for
the work of the presbytery from landed society within its bounds was
arguably of greater importance than the actual attendance of lay
elders 60
The national influence of the Kirk was qualified
geographically as well as socially.	 The hierarchical structure of
representative courts had still not been fully implemented in the
Highlands and Islands by 1625.	 In most large rural parishes, special
difficulties were encountered in establishing a regular ministerial
service to dispersed communities, remote and even periodically isolated
by climatic vicissitudes from their parochial churches.	 Within the
Highlands and Islands, the Kirk's operations were at no more than a
missionary level.	 Within the Lowlands, where parishes tended to be
smaller and settlements more nucleated, the Kirk was at its most vital
and entrenched.
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Outwith the framework of its representative courts, the Kirk
exercised a further influence, nationwide, over matters of material
welfare of particular concern to the wealthier classes.	 For in 1609,
James VI had restored consistorial jurisdiction to the bishops. 	 The
archbishops of St Andrews and Glasgow each elected two commissioners to
the central commissary court in Edinburgh which had exclusive control
over all cases of divorce.	 Local commissary courts, operating within
each diocese under episcopal supervision, had special competence over
wills and testaments, and also over contracts engaged under oath. 62
The Calvinist principles which inspired the Scottish
Reformation have been depicted as politically and socially
'subversive', supplementing the 'silent havoc' wreaked by the price
rise of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.63
Undoubtedly, Protestantism and inflation were the two major influences
shaping the development of the political nation, challenging the
traditional dominance of the nobility in the country and the mercantile
community in the towns.	 Nevertheless, despite the growing
assertiveness of the gentry and the craftsmen, and even the emergence
of the yeomen as a distinct social class, the political nation did not
break up under the strain of competing vested interests or frustrated
aspirations.	 The four estates remained interdependent, both
traditionally and commercially.	 Protestantism was not just a means
of promoting commercial acumen, of cultivating an alternative form of
government to the decentralised structure of the State, or of
providing, as a last resort, an ideological check on the ungodly
exercise of royal authority.	 The profession and exercise of the
Protestant faith constituted, above all, the cement which consciously
bound together the political nation and justified their control over
the rest of Scottish society.	 Within this context of respect for
lesser magistrates, it has been estimated that the ratio for ministers
exhorting their congregations to wholehearted obedience, as against
reminding masters of their obligations to their servants, was 10:1
during the seventeenth century. 64	Protestantism, indeed, was to be of
paramount political importance in projecting and preserving national47
identify when Scotland was faced by an international shift in economic
power in favour of northern Europe and, simultaneously, confronted by
the threat of provincial relegation following the Union of the Crowns
in 1603.48
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Chapter II	 The Union of the Crowns and Scottish Internationalism 
The successful exercise of kingship by James VI in Scotland
was based essentially on his management of affairs as a 'practical
politician', not on his abilities as a theorist or polemicist.1
Before 1603, however, James VI had been an ardent propagandist of
divine right monarchy in order to counter dissent within Kirk and
State occasioned by demands for presbyterian autonomy or by
fractiousness among the nobility and, simultaneously, to promote his
dynastic claim to the English throne.	 His polemics emphasised his
preference to maintain the royal supremacy by co-operative persuasion
rather than by coercive force.	 After 1603, the equilibrium of the
component interests of Scottish society continued to rest upon the
political entente created by the personal forbearance of James.	 He
accepted the locally orientated patterns of organisation in Kirk and
State as his basis for adaptation.	 Thus, episcopacy was grafted onto
the framework of presbyterianism.	 At the same time as he intensified
the scope of royal government, he confirmed and bestowed hereditary
titles and jurisdictions over secularised kirklands, benefiting
traditional noble families as well as lesser members of the landed
classes drawn into royal service.	 Above all, by such expressions of
solidarity with the ruling elite, James nullified fractiousness among
the nobility and isolated clerical extremists.	 Hence, the explosive
alliance of religion and politics which had made the Reformation
possible was prevented.
In constitutional terms, the union of the Crowns - itself a
misnomer - was a purely dynastic event.	 James' initial schemes for
political union and closer economic integration were little desired by
the parliaments of both Scotland and England and were effectively
terminated by a wrecking motion in the House of Commons, in
August 1607, which unacceptably demanded the assent of the Scottish
estates to a complete incorporating union under English law.
2
Nevertheless, the dynastic union, which created the most enduring
political feature of the seventeenth century, that of absentee
monarchy, was not without its immediate political cost to Scotland.54
Although the union of the Crowns was a demonstrable
enhancement of James' prestige as a monarch, there was a marked decline
rfPtf! ,it.k:At.is hr
both in his appeals to, and sens_itivity of, public opinion within
Scotland after 1603.
3	In part, this can be attributed to James'
pre-occupation with the government of England where he succeeded more
in aggravating rather than solving his inherited difficulties in
matters of royal finances, parliamentary privilege and religious
dissent.	 More particularly, the familiar presumption among prominent
Scottish politicians in both Kirk and State to criticise royal policies
tended to be replaced by the adulation and flattery of Scottish and
English favourites and their clients once the Court moved south.
4
Scottish interests generally tended to be subordinated to those of
England.	 Most markedly, Scotland was effectively deprived of a
foreign policy from 1603 in the strategic interest of securing
England's northern flank.
5
Furthermore, the removal and absorption of the Scottish Court
affected the conduct of executive government within Scotland.	 Indeed,
it can appear that 'Scottish independence was in a large part
illusory', as Scotland was ruled, though not administered, from what
was essentially the English Court. 6
	James, himself, contributed to
this notion by his exaggerated claim before the English parliament, in
March 1607, concerning the facility of governing Scotland from the
Court.	 'Here I sit, and govern it with my pen: I write, and it is
done and by a clerk of the Council I govern Scotland now - which others
could not do by the sword' .
7
	On this occasion, however, James VI and
I was attempting to placate the resentment and suspicions aroused among
English politicians by the influx of Scots to positions of prominence
at Court.	 In actuality, the government of Scotland after 1603 did not
depend simply on the royal word.	 On the one hand, James ensured that
his copious and didactic instructions for government could be speedily
conveyed to the Privy Council and their diligence in administration
monitored by his prompt establishment, from May 1603, of a postal
service between London and Edinburgh.	 The lack of royal complaints
with the service over the next twenty-two years can be attributed to55
its efficient maintenance by the Privy Council.
8
	On the other hand,
the efficacy of royal government in Scotland depended also upon the
personal initiatives of leading civil servants, the most notable -
rewarded with lordships of erection - being successively
Sir George Home, earl of Dunbar and Alexander Seaton, earl of
Dunfermline.
From 1603 until his death in 1611, Dunbar was the effective
political manager of Scotland.	 His office of treasurer within the
Scottish administration was combined with his position at Court as
master of the wardrobe in the royal household and even as a member of
the English Privy Council.	 Through continuous travel and liaison
between Edinburgh and the Court, Dunbar uniquely influenced the
implementation of royal policy, dominating the Privy Council in
Scotland at the same time as he personally retained the confidence of
the king at Court.	 In the eleven years following the death of Dunbar,
Dunfermline's dislike of travel led to a decisive shift in political
management.	 As chancellor, he preferred to entrench his chairmanship
of the Privy Council while utilising the postal system between
Edinburgh and London for his own benefit.	 Through regular
correspondence with royal favourites until his death in 1622, he
assiduously cultivated allies at Court, with their advice drawing up
proposals for government which the king would find acceptable.9
Thus, although James retained his definite ideas on the ruling of
Scotland and implemented them from the Court, neither effective
decision making nor administrative initiative was totally surrendered
by central government in Edinburgh.	 Indeed, through the influence of
leading civil servants and courtiers, Scottish government after 1603
was increasingly being managed by cabal.
Moreover, the migration of the Court, allied to the
monopolising of central government by cabal, had a disruptive effect
on the customary harmony between Crown and nobility, the prerequisite
for ordered government within the Scottish localities.	 The
traditional nobility less frequently attended the Privy Council, the56
formal remnant of the Scottish executive.	 As the most important
grouping within the political nation, they had been attracted to
central government in Edinburgh through the social prestige of the
Court, not by the professional appeal of administration. 	 The
altered focus of Scottish politics after 1603 restricted their contact
with the Crown, gradually leading to their impersonalised alienation
from the monarchy.
10	Henceforth, although discontent was muted,
lacking in direction and largely ineffective during the reign of
James VI and I, the working of royal government within the localities
was characterised more by limited accomplishment, even inertia, than
by spirited co-operation.
More immediately, the political nation's feelings of
remoteness from the centre of decision making were heightened by
English antagonism during the negotiations for closer political and
economic union.	 James VI and I, much to the appreciation of his
Scottish estates, demonstrated his sympathetic awareness of Scottish
fears for the continuing independence of their kingdom when he
asserted, in an emotiWspeech to the English parliament on
31 March 1607, that 'for want of either magistrate, law or order, they
might fall into such a confusion as to become like a naked province,
without law or liberty, under this kingdom'.
11
	Nevertheless, James,
though steeped in and appreciative of Scottish sentiment, was not
always fully cognisant of Scottish fears of provincialism after 1603.
Despite promising on his accession to the English throne that he would
return to Scotland every three years, he only did so once, in 1617, and
that in a controversial attempt to introduce ecclesiastical
innovations.
12
Once the danger of closer union had passed, but prior to the
establishment of indifference in place of hostility as the normal
English response to Scottish affairs, the Scottish estates warned
James, in August 1607, of their resolve that 'your Majesteis ancient
and native Kingdome should not be so disordoierit and maid confusit by
turneing of it, in place of a trew and friendlie Unioun, into a57
conquered and slavishe province to be governed by a Viceroy or
Deputye'.
13
	This statement on the unacceptability of provincial
status had been provoked by a tactless reference of James.	 In his
March speech to the English parliament he had sought to ridicule any
supposition that Scotland should be garrisoned like a Spanish
province.	 The dependencies explicitly alluded to were Sicily and
Naples.	 For the Scots the more obvious, albeit implicit, model was
the English province of Ireland.
The union of the Crowns undoubtedly caused the political
nation to adopt a protective stance towards Scottish independence.
Nevertheless, Scotland's satellite relationship with England was
neither all-embracing nor necessarily irreversible from 1603.
Anglicised courtiers were certainly prepared to acquiesce in the
provincial relegation of Scotland after the death of James VI and
some, such as the Oxford-educated James, third marquis of Hamilton,
were so averse to life in Scotland, that they actively promoted this
end. 14	The English Court, however, was not the only channel for
Scottish international relations.	 Affluent members of landed
society, especially the heirs of noble house, personally experienced
the European mainstream by undertaking the grand tour, that customary
but flexible finishing school after attendance at a Scottish
university. Thus, during the 1630s, James Graham, fifth earl (later
first marquis) of Montrose, used his three-year continental excursion
not only to travel extensively and inquisitively in France and Italy,
but to acquaint himself with the latest application of mathematical
concepts to military strategy.
15
	Notwithstanding such an educational
contribution to the nation's sense of belonging to a European
community, internationalism for the Scottish estates as a whole was
largely expressed through its commercial contacts and its religious
aspirations in the early seventeenth century.	 At a time when
economic power was shifting from the Mediterranean to North Atlantic
communities and when Protestantism in western Europe was under siege
from the forces of the Counter-Reformation, Scotland, as an
internationally distinct political entity, was preserved and58
consolidated by trade and above all, by faith.
Trade, though the most geographically dispersed, was
probably the most socially restricted form of regular international
contact.	 Nevertheless, opportunities of projecting Scottish identity
through economic growth were limited less by the constraints imposed
by the Convention of Royal Burghs for the maintenance of mercantile
privilege, than by the basic nature of Scottish commerce in the early
seventeenth century.	 As borne out by the Book of Rates drawn up by
the Privy Council in October 1612 - to impose a chargeable custom of
five per cent on the rated values of 47 exported and 149 imported
commodities - Scottish trade was dominated by the exchange of raw
materials, foodstuffs and coarse cloth for wines, luxuries and
manufactured goods.	 The importing bias was directed more towards
domestic consumption than industrial reprocessing.
16
	Therefore,
despite the fundamental shift of economic strength in favour of
North Atlantic communities - notably the Netherlands - Scotland could,
like the Baltic countries, still be classified as having a dependent
or even a 'colonial' economy owing to its comparatively low level of
commercial activity and industrial development.17
Indeed, the Scottish response to the general price rise -
primarily stimulated by the influx into Europe of precious metals from
the Americas - had apparently much in common with that of a Baltic
country like Poland.	 For the restricted development of its monetary
economy, signified by payments in kind and work services as well as
money in meeting estate dues, was allied to a lack of systematic
technical progress in manufactures, a necessary prerequisite for the
reduction of prices and the stimulation of consumption.	 Such
structural deficiencies meant that the burden of inflation was largely
borne by agriculture as the dominant sector of the Scottish economy.
Moreover, since the increase in monetary supply could not be readily
absorbed into the costs of estate management, agricultural productivity
tended to fall behind the rise in prices.
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In Poland, the landowners were able to exploit their
political and social dominance at the expense of both the peasantry
and the mercantile community.	 Landowners in western Europe tended
to benefit indirectly from increased grain prices through the
conversion of customary rents into cash which, in turn, stimulated
productivity through increased wage-labour. 	 Whereas the Polish
landowners, in order to maximise the revenues from their estates,
enforced serfdom on their peasantry.	 Furthermore, agricultural
produce and raw materials were, in contrast to manufactured goods,
exempt from price control.	 At the same time, the Polish nobility
enjoyed immunity from customs and the availability of cheap transport,
either by river or through labour services on land.	 As a result,
the merchants, especially in the interior towns, were deprived of
substantial opportunities to accumulate capital. 	 In Scotland, the
Convention of Royal Burghs prevented a similar decline in the
merchants' dominance of the market in the face of proprietary
enterprise, or rather, exploitation.	 Conversely, however, the
commercial co-operation of the urban communities had not yet given way
to the economic individualism which characterised the emergent
capitalist societies of the Netherlands and, to a lesser degree,
England and France.	 Moreover, unlike Poland, Scotland generally
tended to export rather than enslave its peasantry.	 Although
landlords who sought to exploit the coal deposits around the Firth of
Forth acquired powers from 1606 to brutally restrict the mobility of
colliers, coal-bearers and salters on their estates, serfdom was only
gradually imposed on such labourers from the mid-seventeenth century:
a development made possible by the unique character of their
subterranean and largely unskilled work within small, but distinctive
communities. 19
Although the actual development of the Scottish economy does
not readily lend itself to contemporary analogy, Scotland did conform
to the general pattern of changing values in land-use throughout
Europe.	 The growth of the feu-ferme movement during the sixteenth
century expanded the land-market and promoted more intensive estate60
management.	 The greater exploitation of the soil which followed
also from inflation led to dislocation among the peasantry and the
formation of surplus labour pools as permanent features of the
national economy.
20
	Furthermore, the relative inelasticity of the
Scottish economy, manifested by its failure to broaden its
manufacturing base to keep pace with the apparent, but indeterminate,
population growth of the late sixteenth century, meant that inflation
had the prime effect of accelerating emigration. Throughout that
century, the consistently high levels of migrants from Scotland had
served to indicate the country's traditional incapacity to support
its population.	 The main continental repository for these migrants
was Poland which, as the adopted home for reputedly thirty thousand
Scots, was termed 'the mother of our Commons' by William Lithgow,
probably the most widely travelled Scot of the early seventeenth
century. 21	Ironically, such an influx of Scots, to a country where
the conduct of trade was restricted to Jews and foreigners,
consolidated the landlords' dominance over the Polish economy at the
expense of the indigenous population.
Moreover, although the influx of American bullion had
reached its peak by 1610 and went into a steady decline after 1620,
the resultant devaluation of European currencies, coupled to the
strain imposed on the availability of commodities during the
'Thirty Years War', meant that price stability was unobtainable for
most of the seventeenth century. 22
	Scotland, therefore, while
suffering no violent change in its price structure in the early
seventeenth century, continued to be a major exporter of people
within Europe, especially as the decreasing incidence of famine and
plague after 1600 diminished natural checks to population growth.23
The ill-fated venture to colonise the nebulously defined Nova Scotia,
undertaken from 1621 by Sir William Alexander of Menstrie (later
first earl of Stirling), was an attempt to divert the perennial
'swarmes' sent to the continent: Scotland 'by reason of her
populousnesse being constrained to disburden her selfe (like the
painfull Bees)'.
24
	Following the union of the Crowns, however, the61
main opportunities for colonisation occurred with the plantation of
Ulster.	 Over fifty-thousand Scots were to settle in that
province prior to the outbreak of the Covenanting Movement.
25
The conflict for hegemony within Europe, particularly the
hostilities within the Holy Roman Empire which dominated the first
half of the seventeenth century under the misnomer of the "Thirty
Years War", provided dramatic opportunities for the employment of
Scottish trrops either as mercenaries or as part of national levies.
Indeed, few areas of Scotland would seem to have escaped the
recruiting net.	 Between 1626 and 1627, over fourteen thousand men
were drafted into the army of Christian IV of Denmark, of whom around
ten to twelve thousand actually served under Robert Maxwell, first
earl of Nithsdale.	 James, third marquis of Hamilton, took a further
six thousand into his expeditionary force of 1631-32 to assist
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.	 Around twenty to thirty thousand Scots
eventually participated in the civil and military service of the Swedes
and the Protestant German princes. With regular enlistment into the
Scots brigades in France and the Netherlands and mercenary service in
Spain, Poland and Russia also taken into account, the numbers involved
probably exceeded fifty thousand.	 In total, therefore, in excess of
one hundred thousand people left Scotland either as colonisers or
soldiers, approximating, perhaps, to a tenth of the population in the
early seventeenth century.
26
Despite the basic nature of its commerce, the structural
deficiencies exposed by inflation and its traditional incapacity to
support its population, Scotland may on balance be placed within the
emergent capitalist, rather than among the feudally entrenched,
nations of Europe.	 The scales were tilted by certain indicators of
progressive, if gradual, economic growth: namely, in the spheres of
monetarism, agricultural productivity and sea-borne commerce.
A more widespread use of money would seem to be indicated  by
the seventy-nine per cent growth in locally viable burghs, either of62
regality or of barony, in the century after the Reformation.27
Moreover, the popularising of feu-ferme tenure during the sixteenth
century secularisation of the kirklands led to a significant
commutation of annual liabilities.	 A high proportion of all rents
were now expected to be paid in money rather than in kind and work
services tended to be minimised, if not eliminated, throughout the
Lowlands. 28	Furthermore, around 1620, in shires such as Haddington
(East Lothian) and Fife, county fiars were instituted to allow the
annual conversion of rents in kind into money.	 Following the
harvests, a notional or just valuation for each specified quantity of
victual - usually per boll - was established in the sheriff courts:
the resultant fiar being based on the fluctuating prices of grain
within the the burgh markets of each shire -44r-i4g—t-14e—pa-st-iLe-ar.	 Such
rates of commutation, initially designed to facilitate the collection
of revenues due to the Crown and the Church, were also applied in
commissary courts for the evaluation of moveable property bequeathed
in testaments.	 Fiars were eventually extended nationwide to give
liquidity to rentals and contracts between landlords and tenants.
29
Within the communal framework of agricultural production, a
move towards economic individualism was first manifested by the
piecemeal replacement of runrig.	 Instead of the arable strips of
land on the farm-touns of every estate being periodically reallocated
among the removable tenantry, fixed runrig was increasingly being
adopted as a means of permanently associating specific arable strips
with the individual families who, as multiple-tenants, shared each
farm-toun.	 This process of consolidation was carried a stage further
by rundale, the formation of the single strips into concerted blocks
of arable once farm-touns had passed into the control of individual
tenant-farmers or were specifically and permanently divided among the
multiple-tenants as portioners.	 Such developments, though by no means
universal in the early seventeenth century, had gathered momentum with
the spread of feu-ferme throughout the Lowlands during the sixteenth
century which heritably associated specific strips and blocks of
arable with portioners and individual tenant-farmers.
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Furthermore, the re-orientation of estate management in the
wake of the feu-ferme movement would seem to have stimulated a
significant, if not a dramatic, improvement in agricultural
productivity.	 Despite the difficulties of internal communication
and the hazards of international shipping which made the trade in
grain highly unstable, imports to Scotland from Baltic granaries fell
appreciably between 1590 and 1620, while substantial amounts of grain
were annually exported from Scotland during the second decade of the
seventeench century.	 Admittedly, the re-exporting of Baltic grain
at increased prices to the continent was an attraction for merchants
which cannot be overlooked.	 Nor can the improvement in agricultural
productivity be considerqd to have ikept pace with theprowth in
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population.	 Nevertheiess lorompted by the expansion of cultivated
land, notably through the paring and burning of lowland peat-mosses,
and by the sporadic use of lime to improve the fertility of soils,
particularly heavy clays, Scotland was beginning to move towards
self-sufficiency in victuals by 1620. 31	Whereas the use of marl was
restricted to lighter soils, as in the Lothians, liming was to be
practised over substantial areas of Scotland in the first half of the
seventeenth century, especially within localities with a plentiful
supply of fuel to reduce the limestone.	 Elsewhere, the cost of
transporting the quantities of lime required for agricultural, as
distinct from building, purposes was still regarded as too expensive
to be undertaken on a regular basis.32
Estate re-orientation was not restricted to the improvement
of agricultural productivity.	 The lack of indigenous supplies of
coal adequate to fuel the rapidly expanding economy of the Netherlands
acted as a stimulus for proprietors on the east coast, especially
around the Firth of Forth, to exploit their underground resources of
coal.	 Given the security of demand from the Dutch market in the
early seventeenth century, bolstered from 1599 by the high, if not
exorbitant, export duties on English coal, Scottish mineowners were
prepared not only to impose serfdom on their workforce, but to invest
heavily in the technology required for deep mining.	 As a result,64
annual exports of coal increased dramatically, from approximately
one thousand tons in 1560 to an estimated sixty thousand tons by
1631.
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Although no distinctive industrial, as against agricultural,
sector of the economy had emerged by the early seventeenth century,
there is limited evidence that Scotland was preparing to generate-a--
greater sea-borne commerceAl impetus.	 There was a marked upsurge in
the direct importation of raw materials from Scandinavia and the
Baltic.	 Regular imports of Norwegian timber and Swedish iron were
supplementing an increased, if fluctuating, traffic in iron, textiles,
fibres, tar and pitch from the Baltic.	 As in the Netherlands, such
imports opened up possibilities for the expansion of shipbuilding.
Indeed, prior to the death of James VI and I, shipbuilders in the
south-west of England were regularly supplied with masts from Scotland.
While there is little supporting evidence for a widespread shipbuilding
industry in Scotland, there is scant corroboration for the notion that
Scottish merchants had sufficient funds, even when costs were
relatively low, to purchase ready-made ships from countries where
construction techniques were more advanced.	 Economically and
strategically, the national interest required the continued development
of the native industry, centred at Leith on the east coast and probably
at Ayr on the west. 34
Moreover, although the Scots lacked the technical competence
and the commercial inventiveness of the Dutch, a similar emphasis was
placed on shipping for mercantile rather than martial purposes. 	 As
recognised by the mobilisation of English commercial opinion against
closer economic integration following the union of the Crowns, the
Scottish preference for lightly crewed cargo vessels, instead of
heavily manned armed cruisers, ensured lower capital costs in shipping.
This advantage in carrying bulky commodities was allied to lower
working expectations, in terms of wages and diet, among the crewmen and
to the practice, among Scottish merchants, of minimising commercial
risks by sharing the costs of trading ventures. 	 Within a British65
context, therefore, the Scots could offer the lowest freight rates.
The complaints of English merchants testify to the psychological, if
not the actual material, impact of such competitive costing.	 In
particular, Bristol merchants, though their direct trade with Scotland
was insignificant, asserted that their carrying trade was in danger of
falling into the hands of Dutch and Scottish shipping.	 Indeed, by the
turn of the century, Scottish vessels were regularly deployed between
the ports of eastern England and the continent.	 Furthermore, the
diplomatic neutrality of Scotland prior to 1603 and her diplomatic
dubiety thereafter, allowed Scottish ships to be employed with
relative impunity by both England and France in waters where warfare
imperilled their own nationals. 35
Growing confidence in the nation's economy, as much as
English hostility, was probably behind the Scottish aversion to closer
commercial integration following the union of the Crowns.	 In 1604,
James VI and I established a commission of both countries to treat for
union.	 Within three years it produced draft proposals for freedom of
trade.	 The Scottish estates were able to give their conditional
assent confidently aware that vested commercial interests, who feared
the efficiency of the Scottish carrying trade, would ensure that any
treaty for free trade foundered in the English parliament. 36	There
was thus no immediate danger that Scotland would become an economic
satellite of England.	 Nevertheless, the union did have a definite
impact on the Scottish economy, which was not always benign.
The improving Scottish economic performance of the early
seventeenth century was certainly not hindered by the stabilisation of
Scottish currency which resulted from the union of the Crowns.	 From
the late sixteenth century, the monetary policies of the Scottish
government had tended to follow English initiatives.	 In 1587, sixteen
years after the ban on lending money at interest had been lifted by
the Church of England, Scotland followed suit: the governments of both
countries setting a legal limit of ten per cent which remained in force
throughout the reign of James VI. 37	In the wake of the Elizabethan66
revaluation of sterling, failure to take complementary action in
Scotland caused the ratio of the Scots to the English pound to fall
from around 5:1 in 1571 down to 12:1 by 1603.	 Within fifteen days of
his accession to the English throne, James ratified this rate of
exchange by making the issue of Scottish gold - and subsequently
silver - coins legal tender in England.	 The Scots pound and mark
were to remain at one-twelfth of the value of their sterling
equivalents throughout the seventeenth century.
38	Not only did this
devaluation amount to a realistic appraisal of the need to stabilise
prices within Scotland, but the permanent association of Scottish
currency with the stronger sterling helped promote confidence in the
exchange of Scottish specie in continental markets.
More immediately, Scots were exempt from the discriminatory
tariffs levied on merchandise imported by aliens into England after
Christmas 1604.	 While this concession was to be of particular value
to Scottish exports of livestock and salt, it had to be reaffirmed in
1615 owing to the reluctant compliance of English customs officials.
Henceforth, Scottish wares were still regarded as foreign imports
though Scottish merchants were no longer considered aliens.	 This
arrangement was reciprocated for English commodities and traders in
Scotland.	 Common nationality for all born within both countries was
eventually upheld by the English courts in 1608, after a case brought
on behalf of an infant born in Edinburgh, Robert Colville, son of
James, first Lord Colville, established his entitlement to purchase
and have freehold and inheritance of lands in England.	 Ultimately,
this judgement was to benefit individual Scottish entrepreneurs
seeking, as residents in England, admission to English trading
companies on equal terms with English nationals.
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 The abandonment
of wholescale commercial integration by 1607, however, meant that no
access to English markets or imperial ventures was freely afforded or
guaranteed to Scottish domiciles.
Less tangibly, the union was to help in the promotion of
political stability on the Borders with England and on the western67
seaboard with Ireland.	 Concerted government action in London,
Edinburgh and Dublin against reivers and marauding clansmen allowed
disruptive energies within Scotland to be re-channelled into more
socially cohesive and economically positive directions after 1603.
Manifestly, the most spectacular consequence of the union of
the Crowns was Scottish participation in the plantation of Ulster, an
undertaking which was to have a profound political and religious impact
as well as a social and economic significance. 	 The proximity of the
west and south-west districts of Scotland suited the convenience of the
English government in its efforts to displace the native Irish and to
colonise lands devastated by a series of rebellions against the
English Crown.	 Migration to Ulster from the Lowlands, which was
underway by 1606, was indicative of the growing prosperity rather than
the customary paucity of the Scottish economy.	 For it was only by
the acquisition of capital at home that the colonisers were provided
with the necessary stake 'to develop the wilderness in Ulster'.	 The
plantation, moreover, acted as an immediate boost to Scottish trade.
Not only did the planters look to the home market for the tools and
provisions necessary to initiate agricultural regeneration, but
Scotland became the major supplier of raw materials, fuels and
manufactures necessary to sustain settlement in Ulster. 	 Scottish
merchants were also the main suppliers of luxuries imported from the
continent.	 In return, Scotland provided a ready market for
agricultural produce exported from Ulster.	 Indeed, Ulster was to
become a cheaper alternative to the Baltic as an emergency granary.
As many as twenty-six ports in the west and south-west benefited from
this Irish connection, especially as Scotland came to dominate, if
not monopolise, the carrying trade of Ulster.
However, Ulster's exports steadily began to outstrip its
imports after 1612, thereby affecting adversely the Scottish balance
of trade.	 Good harvests in Scotland from 1617 to 1620 meant that
imports of grain produced a glut on the home market which threatened
the profitability of domestic farming. 	 The response of the landed68
interest was to persuade the Scottish government to impose punitive
tariffs on the importing of Irish as well as Baltic grain from 1619.
As a result, profits from farming in Ulster declined despite the
continuance of the livestock trade and the smuggling of grain shipments
to Scotland.	 Such a constriction of the agricultural market reduced
immigration from Scotland to a trickle by 1622.	 Nevertheless, after
two bad harvests in successive years, which threatened to undermine the
social expectations built up by landowners and peasantry over the
previous decade, a renewed flood of migrants - mainly from the north
of Scotland - crossed to Ulster from 1635.
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	Moreover, although the
English government exercised sovereignty over Ulster, the province's
special commercial rapport, allied to its common Protestant heritage
with Scotland, ensured that a particular affinity was retained between
Ulstermen and Lowland Scots and that the Scottish colonisers remained
a distinctive entity within Irish society.
The union of the Crowns also had detrimental effects on the
Scottish economy.	 In the first place, the removal of the Court to
London transferred a considerable amount of purchasing power which
could have stimulated not only the local commerce of Edinburgh, but
the national trade and manufacture of luxuries, consumable goods and
fashionable garments. 41	Secondly and more seriously, Scotland in the
course of the seventeenth century was to suffer economically from
political association with England through the difficulties experienced
by continental powers in dissociating separate national interests
within the British Isles.	 In the short term, however, the major
European powers were still willing to discriminate positively, albeit
as a means of embarrassing the English Crown.	 Thus, when Charles I
initiated war with Spain in 1625, the Spaniards reciprocated by
declaring war on England, Scotland and Ireland. 	 Yet freedom of trade
was maintained with the Scots and the Irish, 'as they coloured not
English goods 1 . 42	Likewise, after Charles opened hostilities with
France in 1626, the French were sufficiently mindful of the 'auld
alliance' to set at liberty the sixty Scottish ships among the hundred
and twenty British vessels impounded while loading wine at Bordeaux.4369
In the following year, when Charles I decided to launch an
expedition under the command of his favourite, George Villiers, first
duke of Buckingham, to relieve the Huguenots in La Rochelle, he
experienced the greatest difficulty in raising the two thousand men he
required from Scotland.	 Furthermore, this disastrous venture, which
was accompanied by a royal embargo on the importation of French goods,
was generally resented by the political nation and distinctly
unpopular among the mercantile community.	 Their concern for the fate
of Calvinist co-religionists was secondary to their desire to maintain
their favoured relationship in the wine trade. 44	For Scottish wine
traders had traditionally 'enjoyed the same immunities and privileges
of the French themselves since they always professed partiality for
the most Christian Crown'. 45	Moreover, although divergence in
religion and politics since the Reformation had caused a growing
cleavage of interests between Scotland and France - for which the
union of the Crowns provided a permanent wedge - the actual sundering
of the special relationship between both countries cannot necessarily
be regarded as inevitable, far less irrevocable, in the early
seventeenth century. 46	Indeed, as was noted by successive Venetian
ambassadors to the Court of Charles I, popular sentiment within
Scotland still manifested a distinct preference for the French rather
than the English: 47 albeit such affinities were 'kept aglow by the
steady consumption of French wine'.
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The declining economic rapport with France was more than
compensated by direct commercial contacts between Scotland and the
Netherlands, since the Dutch were emerging in the early seventeenth
century as the leading European entrepreneurs.	 The dynamic growth of
the Dutch economy can fundamentally be attributed to the revolt of
the Netherlands against Spanish domination, launched by the foundation
of the United Provinces in 1579.	 The migration of merchants,
craftsmen and capital from the provinces which remained in Spanish
hands led to the replacement of Antwerp by Amsterdam as the leading
commercial centre, unrivalled in western Europe.	 Moreover, the Dutch
proceeded to develop Amsterdam as an entrepot of world stature by70
founding financial exchanges, by building specialised warehouses and
by encouraging refining and processing industries.	 Furthermore, the
incorporation of Portugal under the Spanish Crown in 1580 subjected
the extensive empires of both countries to the commercial rivalry of
the Dutch.	 Through the formation in 1602 of an East India Company
on a more permanent and more heavily capitalised basis than its
English counterpart, the Dutch came to dominate not only the spice
trade direct from Asia to Europe, but eventually the luxury trade
from the Indian Ocean and the Levant to the Mediterranean.	 A final,
structural advantage promoted economic expansion.	 For the
States-General, which loosely controlled the United Provinces, tended
to favour the most commercially orientated provinces, namely Holland
and Zeeland, the main contributors of revenue to the national coffers.
Hence, a mercantile influence, unparalleled throughout Europe,
influenced the formulation of government policy.49
Consolidating the commercial predominance of the Dutch was
their carrying trade, the most efficient in Europe.	 The expeditious
use of Baltic imports in shipbuilding led to the standardised
development of the fly-boat, or 'fluit', to suit bulk trading in
northern Europe.	 The deployment of the trading fleet in convoys was
generally promoted to reduce shipping risks and maintain low rates of
freight.	 There were two distinct zones of Dutch trade in the early
seventeenth century, both relying on functional shipping and the
competitive pricing of the convoy system.	 In the familiar waters of
northern Europe the Dutch achieved dominance in the carriage of bulk
cargoes by accepting low profits on each venture in return for a high
turn-round of 'fluit'-convoys.	 Competitive pricing and prompt
delivery were enhanced by the establishment of permanent factors in
most Baltic ports which enabled Dutch merchant houses to deal
throughout the year in commodities with differing seasonal peaks of
production.	 In the Indies, the Americas and the Mediterranean, the
Dutch strove to minimise the notorious risks and maximise the volatile
profits derived from their trade, mainly in luxuries but infested with
pirates, by placing emphasis on the naval supremacy of their convoys71
which, in contrast to northern Europe, carried goods of low bulk but
of high prices.
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In material terms, Scottish society gained several distinct
advantages from the rise of Dutch commerce.	 In October 1578, three
months prior to the foundation of the United Provinces, which
guaranteed to respect the rights and privileges of each city and
province within its jurisdiction, the magistrates of Campvere and the
Convention of Royal Burghs had contracted to reaffirm the Scottish
staple. 51
	The location of the staple within Zeeland had ensured that
no major commercial disruption was experienced by Scotland during the
revolt of the Netherlands.	 Owing to the shallow nature of the inland
waterways through Brabant province, the expansion of Antwerp's trade
in the sixteenth century had been beneficial to the ports in the
adjacent coastal province of Zeeland, particularly in the development
of shipbuilding and of the carrying trade.	 In turn, as Zeeland also
bordered Holland, the towns of both provinces were able to share in
the greater prosperity generated by the rise of Amsterdam. 52
 Through
Campvere, therefore, Scotland gained access to the commodities of
world markets exchanged at Amsterdam.	 As an entrepot, the benefits
of its economics of scale outstripped any advantages derived from
direct trading in specific commodities.	 The export of Scottish
staple commodities - raw materials, foodstuffs and coarse cloth - was
enhanced by the entrepot's co-ordinated distribution and collection of
partial cargoes.	 The importation to Scotland of wines, luxuries and
manufactured goods was facilitated by the entrepot's packaging of
mixed cargoes with respect to both cost and bulk.
Furthermore, the rivalry among the towns of Zeeland, which
was engendered by the prosperity of the province, was open to
exploitation by the Scottish mercantile community.	 By threatening to
remove the staple to neighbouring Midikurg, the location of the
English staple, Scottish commercial privileges and trading facilities
at Campvere were cultivated and augmented.	 In 1602, the Convention
of Royal Burghs comprehensively defined staple commodities as all72
merchandise liable to pay customs.	 From 1610, the Convention
enforced the requirement that all trade with the Low Countries be
directed through the staple to prevent the export of Scottish goods
through England to other towns in the Netherlands.	 In return, the
magistrates of Campvere were expected to uphold and respect Scottish
mercantile interests, especially as the channelling of all trade
through the staple heightened rather than lessened the vulnerability
of Scottish shipping to piracy.	 As a result, a revised contract was
drawn up between the Convention and the magistrates of Campvere in
January 1612.
The Scots gained concessions and fiscal exemptions
at least comparable to those enjoyed by the English at Middl burg.
Scots were also given the same judicial privileges as the citizens of
Campvere and legal assistance both to pursue commercial actions and
to seek compensation for victims of Dutch pirates.	 In addition,
Scottish merchants were afforded extensive hospitality rights by the
town, including a furnished lodging house - a conciergery - and a kirk
was provided for the worship of the resident Scottish community.
However, friction and misunderstandings between the Convention and the
magistrates of Campvere were continuously aroused by sharp practices
among Scottish factors.	 Thus, some factors sought to profiteer at
the expense of both Scottish and Dutch merchants by purchasing whole
cargoes on their arrival at the staple in order to monopolise the
market.	 This practice of forestalling, which was outlawed within the
Scottish burghs, was not effectively checked until 1625 when the
Convention barred all factors from participating in either shipping
or trading.	 Scottish dissatisfaction with local conditions at
Campvere was never entirely eradicated.	 In particular, the cavalier
behaviour of the magistrates towards the Scottish community led to
diplomatic touchiness during the reign of Charles I, though the
location of the staple was never seriously questioned till after the
Restoration.53
Another profitable and, indeed, the most recent, commercial73
contact between Scotland and the United Provinces was the direct export
of coal and salt from the Firth of Forth in Dutch ships.	 The
promotion of this trade, rather than undermining Scottish shipping, was
beyond its capacity." Moreover, the trade was a major earner of
foreign currency for Scotland.	 These earnings were largely recycled
to purchase imports at more favourable rates of exchange than the
native specie, a policy which admittedly did more to raise social
expectations than promote indigenous manufactures.	 In turn, since the
'riskdaler' (rix dollar) was guaranteed to contain a fixed quantity of
silver from 1606, it won greater acceptance than native currency for
commercial transactions within Scotland.	 Nonetheless, the willingness
of the Dutch to pay more for coal than the Scottish merchant could
afford helped stimulate industry, notably the development of inland
mining in the Lothians.	 This alternative to the coastal mines
catered for the expanding domestic market in Edinburgh.55
Finally, despite the relative economic dependence of the
Scots on the Dutch, the strong mercantile links fostered between both
nations were to be of particular advantage to the Scots after
hostilities recommenced between Spain and the United Provinces in 1621.
In addition to the random disruption of Dutch trade brought about by
sporadic warfare over the next three decades, Spain actively sought to
exact economic reprisals against the Dutch who had even come to
dominate the carrying trade of the Iberian peninsula.	 To counter
Spanish naval offensives against their shipping, the Dutch were obliged
to deploy heavily armed convoys on their northern European trading
routes as well as the Mediterranean.	 While the resultant sharp rise
in freight costs benefited all competitors of the Dutch in the carrying
trade, the Scots mainly profited from two other expedients adopted by
the Dutch to maintain their commercial leadership. 	 For the Dutch were
increasingly obliged either to hire ships of neutral, but sympathetic,
nations or to crew their vessels with reliable foreigners. Scottish
crews were especially prominent in the carriage of salt from Portugal
by 1623.5674
The Dutch connection was by no means confined to trade.
The strong commercial links with the United Provinces made the sea
journey from Scotland quicker and cheaper than the overland trip from
Edinburgh to London.	 Not only were Scottish students attracted to
Dutch universities, but the Scots were anxious to keep the Dutch
informed about their affairs, especially ecclesiastical matters. 	 In
turn, the Reformed Kirk of Scotland was greatly influenced by Dutch
theology.	 Particular attention was paid to the controversy aroused
within the Dutch Reformed Kirk by the Arminian challenge to the
prevailing Calvinist interpretation of Protestantism in the early
seventeenth century.
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Arminianism, while accepting Calvinist orthodoxy with regard
to original sin and justification by faith, rejected its absolute
belief in predestination which offered salvation only for the elect
and eternal damnation for the reprobate.	 For the Calvinist, the
Christian's assurance of salvation, through membership of the elect,
depended on the effectiveness of his or her calling.	 Whereas all
believers who attended the visible church on earth to hear the
preaching of the word and receive the sacraments were partakers of an
outward calling, only the true believers, as the elect members of the
invisible church, had an inward calling from God to the communion of
the saints.	 For Arminians, because of their belief in God's universal
bestowal of divine grace, salvation was obtainable for all, not just
the elect, through the exercise of free will.	 Hence, the Calvinist
teaching that the grace of God was irresistible for the elect who, as
the true believers, could not fall from grace, was renounced in favour
of universal atonement.	 This precept offered salvation to every
individual prepared to repent his or her sins.	 For the Arminian,
therefore, the assurance of salvation was freely available for all
believers but conditional on human endeavour.	 The true believers
chose their own salvation.	 For the Calvinist, who believed in
absolute and exclusive salvation for the elect, the Arminian doctrine
of free will was an unwarrantable limitation on the sovereignty of
God 5875
Arminianism was promoted by a minority among the Dutch
clergy, known as the Remonstrants, who were backed mainly  by commercial
interests prominent in the provincial governments.	 Whereas the
orthodox Calvinist majority, designated the Counter-Remonstrants, had
the support not only of the urban artisans and the peasantry but also
of the patricians associated with the House of Orange.	 Led by
Prince Maurice of Nassau, the patricians seized power in the United
Provinces in July 1618.	 Hence, the Synod of Dort, which was summoned
that autumn by the States-General to settle theological differences
within the Dutch Reformed Kirk, was manipulated by Prince Maurice to
entrench oligarchic control at the expense of provincial government.
Swamped by Counter-Remonstrants, who constituted seventy-nine of the
eighty-two official Dutch delegates, the Synod unequivocally
reaffirmed Calvinist orthodoxy and condemned the Remonstrants as
heretics.
Although James VI and I had originally suggested the Synod
to resolve the Arminian controversy, the Scottish Reformed Kirk was
not directly represented at Dort.	 However, both the presbyterian and
episcopal factions accepted the canons issued at the close of the
Synod in May 1619 as a definable standards of orthodox
Protestantism.	 Foreign delegates who attended from the Reformed
Churches of Germany and the Swiss Cantons and from the Church of
England composed about a quarter of the Synod's membership. Their
presence gave Dort the international standing of the general council
safeguarding the Reformation, comparable to that of the Council of
Trent which launched the Counter-Reformation in 1543.
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	While the
Synod of Dort only lasted six months in contrast to the sixteen years
of intermittent deliberations at Trent, its definition of Protestant
orthodoxy was not only a rebuttal of Arminianism but of the ultimate
enemy, Roman Catholicism: 'the extirpation of the Remonstrant heresy
meant the destruction of the Scarlet Woman'.	 After Dort, any
minister who was other than an uncompromising Calvinist was suspect
within the Kirk of Scotland. 6076
The Synod of Dort, moreover, reinforced the claims which the
Kirk of Scotland, through its Confession of Faith, propagated as
cardinal precepts in the early seventeenth century.	 The Reformed
Kirk's continuance 'in the doctrine of the prophets and apostles,
according to Canonicall Scriptures, ministering the sacraments, and
worshipping god purelie according unto them', manifested 'the true
marks whereby the true visible Church on earth may be knowne and
discerned'.	 Though only the true believers, as members of the
invisible Church, were chosen 'according to the purpose of god's
eternal election' to life everlasting, every member of the visible
Church could derive hope from the precept that man's righteousness was
not inherent, 'but freely given of gods free grace through faith in
Jesus Christ'. The precept that there was 'a holy universall Church
and Catholicke Church' composed of the whole company of the elect was
combined with the Confession's constant affirmation 'that the Church
of Scotland through the abundant grace of our god is one of the most
pure churches under heaven this day, both in respect of trueth and
doctrine and puritie of worship'. 61
	The Kirk of Scotland, therefore,
was concerned not only to promote the salvation of the elect, but to
identify the national interest with a dutiful dedication to the godly
life: that is, every member of every congregation striving to attain
a state of grace as the precondition for election must adhere
systematically to a Calvinist code of ethics for everyday conduct. 62
In turn, these doctrinal precepts underwrote the
international responsibilities of the Kirk of Scotland.	 As the only
national church in Europe committed to Calvinism but uncompromised by
the need to tolerate other religious groups in the interests of
political expediency, the Reformed Kirk retained a watching brief over
the fate of Protestantism in general and of Calvinist minorities in
particular.	 This special concern was intensified by the progress of
the Counter-Reformation and the political alignments brought about by
the Thirty Years War .	 For militant Catholicism, allied to the
autocracy of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, was ranged against
and initially triumphant over Protestant and particularist interests77
within the Holy Roman Empire. 63	Thus, two years after the marriage
of Charles I to the Catholic French princess, Henrietta Maria, a
clerical convention in the summer of 1627 set aside two days of public
humiliation and fasting for Scottish congregations because of the
threat, albeit unsubstantiated, of a revival of popery at home coupled
to 'the distress and cruel persecution of the Reformed kirks in
Bohemia and the adjoining Provinces in Upper and Lower Germanie and
the Palatinate'.
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While the internationalism of the Kirk was not directly
impaired, the union of the Crowns was not without its ecclesiastical
impact, most noticeably in matters of worship, as James VI became
increasingly impressed with the emphasis on order and ceremony in the
Church of England.	 Although the Second Prayer Book of Edward VI had
initially been adopted by the Scottish reformers, the distinctly less Pr6ifel& r liturgical, Genevan inspired, Book of Common 	  was generally
commended from the 1560s for the conduct of prayers and sacraments.
However, neither the format nor the need for a liturgy won wholescale
acceptance.	 On the one hand, the Second Prayer Book was never totally
displaced, finding renewed faniOur with members of the episcopal
faction, especially those forming close contacts with Anglican clergy
after 1603.	 On the other hand, ministers of pronounced presbyterian
sympathies, influenced by the Puritan minority who rejected the use of
the Second Prayer Book within the Church of England, tended to deviate
from, if not ignore, the Scottish Book of Common Order. 65
Furthermore, an alternative religious standard, which may be
characterised as 'a new liturgical form with a wide mass appeal', was
being indigenously promoted from the 1590s.	 In the face of James VI's
_
aversion to the autonomous establishment of presbyterianism within the
Kirk and his decided preference for an erastian episcopacy - whose
insinuation into a position of dominance was subsequently enhanced in
the light of the king's Anglian experience - militant presbyterians
began to express their dissent by locally banding together in
covenants.78
In Scotland, banding together for the purposes of local
government or political alliance was a socially inured practice by the
sixteenth century and had, indeed, been specifically adopted for
religious purposes prior to the Reformation.	 Yet the description of
a religious band as a covenant only gained common currency after 1590,
as the result of the permeation from the continent of federal theology.
Nor was the conception of a covenant peculiarly Scottish, but was
shared by evangelical Protestants in areas as diverse as Transylvania,
Ireland and New England. 66
Covenant or federal theology, as identified with the
evangelical ministry in Scotland from the early seventeenth century,
emphasised the contractual relationship between God and man rather than
the stark Calvinist reliance on election by divine decree.
Predestination, and thereby man's ultimate dependence on divine grace
for his salvation was not, however, denied.	 No accommodation was
made with Arminianism.	 The true believer proved his election by
covenanting with God, not by exercising his free will to choose
salvation.	 His participation in the covenant did not determine his
election, but merely realised the predetermined will of God.	 It was
only divine grace which moved man to covenant.	 But once man had so
banded himself to God, he was assured of his election.	 Hence,
through the covenant, God gave man discernible ground for his election.
Salvation became man's just due in return for such an affirmation of
his faith.	 The assurance of the covenant, therefore, was a
'functional equivalent' to the diligent pursuit of the godly life,
providing a comforting testimony for the true believer during life's
travails.
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Moreover, in Scotland, as in the Puritan communities of
New England, the idea of the covenant was popularly translated in the
early seventeenth century not simply as an elaboration of God's
compact with the elect, but as a means of revealing God's purposes
towards his people.	 One such strand in New England even went on to
assert that man should reach out for the covenant as a means of79
securing faith, in the hope of being rewarded with divine grace. 68
Within Scotland, however, the practical vitality of the covenant was
derived from the expansion of the concept to cover works as well as
grace, thereby banding for religious purposes was allied to spiritual
assurance.	 The covenant gave tangible form to the cardinal precepts
of the Confession of Faith: specifically to the assurance of
salvation, of which all members of congregations should be persuaded
by 'giving credite both to the externall promise of the word and the
internall witnessing of the spirit', and to the necessity of doing
good works for the glory of God, for confirmation of the elect and as
an example to others, since 'faith that bringeth not foorth good works
is dead, and availeth nothing to justification or salvation'. 69
Furthermore, in using the concept of the covenant to
propagate gospel truths among their congregations, the evangelicals
were able to draw upon the dominant ideal of a national Kirk as well
as the prestige and pervasive social influence all ministers acquired
from the reformed emphasis on the preaching of the word.	 At its most
potent, the covenant could be interpreted as a divine band between God
and the people of Scotland.	 Such a covenant had a comprehensive
rather than a sectional appeal, for Scottish society as a whole not
just the political nation, providing 'a larger vision of something that
transcends the exigencies of the Scottish environment'. 70	However,
anticipation of divine favour through the covenant cannot necessarily
be equated with the imminence of a divine event nor the revelation of
a people's manifest destiny.	 Covenanting adherence was still a
minority activity for presbyterians in the opening decades of the
seventeenth century.	 After the exhortation of the general assembly
in 1596 for a mutual band among ministers - at synods and
presbyteries - and within their congregations, no national renewal of
the religious band took place until 1638.
71
	Rather than manifesting
an apocalyptic faith or even a people's destiny, covenanting can be
associated more with militant presbyterianism which kept alive an
evangelical tradition of dissent from an erastian establishment.	 For
such militants, special emphasis was attached to the sacrament of80
communion, as 'certaine visible sealls of gods eternall covenant
ordeined be god to represent unto us Christ crucified and seall up our
spirituall communion with him'.
72	The covenant's political potential
was still latent.
With Scotland's political interests formally subordinated to
those of England after 1603, the religious aspirations of the national
Kirk, like the country's expanding commerce, became the most
distinctive means of promoting Scotland internationally.	 Thus, the
maintenance of spiritual welfare and the enhancement of material
prosperity were not just the respective preserves of the clerical and
burgess estates, but the special concerns of the political nation as a
whole.	 In particular, the close religious and commercial links with
the United Provinces served as substantial counterpoints to Scotland's
diminished political standing in the early seventeenth century.	 In
turn, the Dutch connection has suggested an historical analogy for the
strains imposed by the political association of separate states.	 The
impact of the union of the Crowns has been compared to that of the
Netherlands and Spain in the early sixteenth century. 73
After Charles V had become the ruler of Spain as well as the
Netherlands in 1516, an initial influential influx of counsellors and
favourites from the Netherlands aroused resentment at the Spanish
Court, souring the next forty years of his reign.	 But in the
following generation, his son, Philip II, as a culturally assimilated
Spaniard, provoked the revolt of the Netherlands by treating that
country as a Spanish province from the commencement of his forty-two
year reign in 1556.	 However, this parallel with Scotland under
Charles I benefits much from hindsight.	 Scotland was not
geographically separated from England.	 Edinburgh and Glasgow were
less remote from London than Antwerp and Amsterdam from Madrid.
Although Scottish influence at the English Court was initially
weighty, neither the dominant Scottish presence nor the resultant
English antagonism was to be sustained throughout the reign of
James VI and I.	 Moreover, the secession by the United Provinces in81
1579 had still left a Belgian rump as the Spanish Netherlands. 	 In
short, insufficient time had elapsed in the opening decades of the
seventeenth century to suggest that Anglo-Scottish relations were
going to develop along similar lines.
Arguably the closest, though by no means a linear, analogy
to the Scottish situation in the early seventeenth century was to be
found in the Iberian peninsula.	 The strained relationships of
Catalonia and Portugal to the Castilian dominated, Spanish throne
culminated in separate revolts in 1640, at the same time as the
Scottish Covenanters were resorting to arms against Charles I.
Catalonia was a dominion of the kingdom of Aragon whose dynastic
unification with the kingdom of Castile in the late fifteenth century
had forged the foundation of the Spanish state.	 The kingdom of
Portugal was annexed to Spain in 1580.	 While Scotland had provided
the king of England and separately supported a national Reformed Kirk,
neither Catalonia nor Portugal had specifically provided a monarch for
the Spanish throne and both shared, with the rest of Iberia, a common
Catholicism.	 However, like Scotland, both were afflicted by absentee
kingship.	 Though formally supervised by viceroys, both had retained
a large measure of independence through nationally disparate agencies
of government and constitutional assemblies.
Moreover, Catalonia and Portugal, together with Scotland, do
not apparently conform to the conventional interpretation of the
mid-seventeenth century revolutions in western Europe: namely, that
the 'general crisis' - as manifest in England, France and the United
Provinces - resulted from a cleavage between Court and Country.	 Such
revolts were the culmination of almost a century of mounting crisis in
the relationship between state and society, through the resentment
aroused within each country by an increasingly voracious Court allied
to the steady dominance of government by a centralised bureaucracy.
Hence, although intervening events and political errors divergently
affected the movement from a revolutionary situation to actual
revolution, each revolt was the product of the same general grievance:82
specifically, the character and cost of the state.
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Neither Catalonia nor Portugal contributed to the upkeep of
the Castilian Court or to the centralised bureaucracy of the Spanish
state in the early seventeenth century. 	 In like manner, the Scottish
Exchequer, apart from sundry pensions to Scottish courtiers, was not
directly expected to pay for the upkeep of either the English Court or
the English government.
75
	The main precipitants of the Iberian
revolts were war and taxation.	 After the termination of the twelve
year truce drawn up between Spain and the United Provinces in 1609,
Olivares, the chief minister of Philip IV of Spain, was resolved to
renew the war as a military and commercial exercise.	 From 1621,
Spain was faced with mounting and recurrent costs for defence and
warfare.	 The determination of Olivares to restructure the Spanish
fiscal system was allied to further radical schemes. Not only were
the resources of the kingdoms of Aragon and Portugal to be exploited
financially, but the authority of the Spanish monarchy was to be made
uniformly effective throughout its constituent kingdoms by the
imposition of the style and laws of Castile. Hence, Catalonia and
Portugal rebelled primarily because of the Castilian imposed threat
to their economic resources and their separate national identities.76
The threat of war, and the resultant increased burden of
taxation, cannot afford to be overlooked as significant precipitants
of Scottish discontent with absentee kingship.	 For the diplomatic
symmetry of James' foreign policy as king of England was beginning to
sunder by 1621.	 The marriage in 1613 of his daughter, Elizabeth, to
the influential German prince, Frederick, the Elector Palatine, was to
be balanced by the betrothal of Charles, Prince of Wales to the
Spanish Infanta.	 Such a protest, however, steadily receded with the
renewal of war between Spain and the United Provinces and the
possibility of British involvement in a wider European confrontation.
Frederick, the Elector Palatine, had headed the opposition of
the Protestant states within the Holy Roman Empire to the83
reconciliation of the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs on a common plan
of action in central Europe.	 By the treaty of Onate in 1617,
Ferdinand, the Austrian archduke, was to be promoted as King of Bohemia
and of Hungary, and thereby as successor to the Emperor.	 In return,
Spain was to be given sufficient imperial fiefs to link its provinces
in Italy and the Netherlands.	 In effect, the intolerant Catholicism
and the centralised absolutism of the Austrian Habsburgs was
threatening religious toleration and the maintenance, or even the
extension, of feudal privilege within the Empire.	 In March 1618,
militant Protestant nobles went on to the offensive in Bohemia.
Leading imperial administrators were unceremoniously ejected, an
exercise which attained notoriety as the defenestration of Prague.
Sixteen months later, on 26 August 1619, two days before the election
of Ferdinand II as Holy Roman Emperor was confirmed, the Bohemian
estates chose Frederick as king of Bohemia declaring Ferdinand deposed.
Following the victory of the imperial forces in the battle of
White Mountain at the gates of Prague in November 1620, Frederick's
kingship was overthrown and the power of the Bohemian estates was
annihilated.	 Ferdinand II proceeded to annex Bohemia as a hereditary
possession of the Austrian Habsburgs and, simultaneously, set out to
suppress Protestantism within his imperial estates.
Of the European powers outwith the Empire, only the Dutch had
actively supplied Frederick with troops and money to combat the
imperial forces and their Spanish allies.	 Commercial tensions
between the Dutch and the English, particularly over fisheries, had
served to excuse James' refusal to mount any concerted diversionary
attack on the Spanish Netherlands prior to the expiry of the truce
between the United Provinces and Spain.	 By 1621, however, Europe was
faced with the imminent realisation of Habsburg hegemony.	 As a
result, war within the Empire continued to be waged against the
imperial and Spanish forces by Protestant contingents supported by
English and Danish, as well as Dutch, money and diplomacy. Moreover,
the Spanish Crown's patent lack of enthusiasm for a marriage alliance
meant that James, in his last years, was drawn increasingly by84
established family ties towards direct intervention in the Thirty
Years War .	 Not only was his son-in-law, Frederick, requiring help
to repulse imperial assaults on the Palatinate, but his brother-in-law,
Christian IV of Denmark, had territorial ambitions in the northern
parts of the Empire adjacent to his kingdom.	 Christian's desire for
direct intervention was compounded by the attachment of Poland, which
was in permanent conflict with its Baltic neighbours, to the Habsburg
alliance.
77	Scotland, though neither affected territorially nor
entangled diplomatically by the course of the Thirty Years War
would not be regarded as exempt from contributing manpower and finance
to any British expeditionary force.	 Indeed, this outcome became
inevitable after Charles I publicly professed at the commencement of
his reign, 'that the welfare of England is inseparable from
Scotland' 78
This international aspect of Scottish subordination to
English political interests, however galling, was secondary to the main
domestic irritants caused by the anglophile policies of absentee
monarchy.	 National identity, though first ostensibly threatened in
ecclesiastical affairs, was in substance challenged and undermined not
by the corporate importation of English laws and customs, but solely
on the strength of the royal prerogative.
79	Therefore, unlike the
tn.
Catalan and Portuqese revolts against forcible assimilation to the
style and laws of leastile, which took the form of movements of
national separation from the Spanish state, 80 the emergence of the
Covenanting Movement in Scotland was to mark a concerted effort at
national consolidation.	 The Covenanters reacted against an
innovating monarchy, not against the English nation.
The nationalist impulses motivating the revolts in Scotland,
Catalonia and Portugal, though recognised as being worthy of
comparison, have all been summarily dismissed as 'largely irrelevant'
to the conventional interpretation of the mid-seventeenth century
revolutions. 81 Nevertheless, it can be contended that these
nationalist revolts, despite their peripheral location, were an85
alternative, but none the less integral, facet of the general European
crisis.	 As the opposition to the personal rule of Charles I made
manifest, the Scottish revolt, like that of the Catalans and the
Portugese, was the product of growing tensions, not just between Court
and Country, but between absentee kingship and the political nation.
The alternative to revolution was provincialism.86
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Chapter III	 The Scottish Inheritance of Charles I 
The creation of the Covenanting situation cannot be
attributed wholly to Charles I.	 Some consideration must be given to
the monarchical legacy left by his father James VI.	 The achievement
of James had been the permeation, nationwide, of loyalty to a strong
monarchy which had endured the removal of the Court to London in 1603.
The position of the monarchy in 1625 however, though secure, was
relatively not so strong after the union of the Crowns because of the
gradual erosion of stability within the Jacobean establishment.	 In
the last decade, 1615 to 1625, the landowning classes were becoming
increasingly disillusioned with absentee kingship; the mercantile
community were growing restless; clerical faction was again unsettling
the Kirk; and central government was less receptive to directives from
the Court at London.
Landowners had specific legal, ecclesiastical and fiscal
grievances aroused by royal policies within the last decade of James'
reign.	 In 1617 James had instituted the Public Register of Sasines to
give uniformity and security of title in the transfer of landownership.
Thereby, all changes in heritable property, outwith the royal burghs,
were to be recorded either in Edinburgh or in the most geographically
appropriate of seventeen specified registration districts. 1	At the
same parliament James declared that all rights of title to land, held
without quarrel for forty years, were to be incontrovertible.	 But he
included a provision that lands, which had already been held within
the one family for forty years, could still have their ownership
contested over the next thirteen years, regardless of any case-history
of untroubled possession.	 Such royal action amounted, in the
short-term, to the encouragement of litigation over the ownership of
land which, however unsubstantiated, prejudiced longstanding rights of
property.
2	In 1617 also, James appointed a commission to augment
ministers' stipends to a yearly minimum of five hundred merks, or five
chalders of victual where payment was made in kind.	 This was to be
achieved by the re-allocation of parochial teinds, the majority of
which were appropriated as a secular resource, controlled mainly by the
nobles as titulars of the teinds and leased to other nobles and93
affluent lairds who farmed the teinds as tacksmen. 	 The commission
made no attempt to challenge directly the propertied claims of the
titulars to the teinds.	 However, the obstructiveness of the tacksmen
considerably restricted the success of the commission.	 It was only
able to exercise its compulsory powers to make inroads into the profits
of teind-farming after the tacksmen were compensated for their loss of
yearly revenue by extending the duration of their existing leases.
The initial commission lasted barely a year and a renewed commission of
1621 apparently never functioned. 3	In 1620, a convention of the
nobility had forwarded a resolution to the Crown that any attempt to
raise money by voluntary contribution in preference to a compulsory,
but constitutionally authorised, levy would prove abortive.
4
Moreover, as the burden of taxation was felt by the nobility, to fall
inequitably on the landowners, parliament in the following year
consented not only to an ordinary tax on landed resources, but also to
an extraordinary tax on financial transactions.	 This latter measure
was known as the taxing of annualrents, based on the temporary grants
of land which secured interest on loans. 5
	Since this tax was to be
levied yearly for the next four years, it opened up the possibility of
regular inquiries into the financial competence of each landowner's
management of his estates.
This tax on annualrents, which simultaneously amounted to an
assessment of income and acted as a disincentive to the free working
of capital, was disliked even more by the mercantile community than by
the landed classes.	 The estate of burgesses in the parliament of 1621
feared that an individual's financial standing, in particular his
worthiness as a creditor, would be undermined by the tax's revelation
of his debts.
6	For the liability of each individual was assessed on
his free income, after borrowed money was deducted from that loaned.
7
Furthermore the mercantile community considered that their ability to
accumulate capital was already being undermined by the readiness of the
Crown to grant patents and monopolies, a policy begun in the late
sixteenth century but accelerated since the union of the Crowns.	 In
theory, the objectives of monopolies were to free Scotland from94
dependence on imports of such commodities as linen and soap, to raise
the quality of native manufactures, most notably in the tanning of
leatner, and to promote new industries like the making of paper and
glass.	 In practice, monopolies were usually sold to courtiers and
speculators concerned more to market, than manufacture, specific
products under patent. 8	The Crown, moreover, did not actively
discourage profiteering by monopolists. 	 James was primarily concerned
with the fiscal benefit the royal finances derived from the purchase of
monopolies than with the technical promotion of native manufactures.
The development, under patent, of products within Scotland as an
alternative to foreign imports necessarily entailed a drop, in the
short-term, in revenue from customs which the Crown was unwilling to
bear.
9	Monopolies, for James, therefore, became a means of farming
out a value added tax olt-tcommodities which had exclusively been
marketed by the mercantile community.
Although such a royal policy was not regarded as serious a
grievance in Scotland as in England, it nevertheless remained an
economic irritant.	 Hence when James in 1623 rather insensitively
designated a noted monopolist, Nathanial Udward, as the next
conservator of tne Scottish staple at Campvere, the outcry raised
within tne Convention of Royal Burghs was hardly surprising. 	 In part,
Udward was regarded as both objectionable and unsuitable because his
most recent monopoly, granted over soap in 1619, prevented the
mercantile community importing, mainly through Campvere, what they
considered to be a superior product.	 More pertinently, however, the
Convention was determined to retain a decisive influence in the
appointment of the conservator.	 In making the previous appointment
in 1589, James had outmanoeuvred the Convention by creating a
courtier, Sir Robert Denniston as both conservator at Campvere and
ambassador to the Low Countries.	 After initially repudiating this
appointment the Convention was forced to compromise when James
temporarily stopped trade with the Netherlands and threatened to
liberate the conservator from obedience to any decision taken on the
sole authority of the Convention.	 On Denniston agreeing to accept95
its oversight, the Convention had retained responsibility not only for
supervising the conservator's general conduct at Campvere, but also
for regulating his fees and reinforcing his authority over the factors.
The Convention was not therefore prepared to accede to Udward's
purchase of the office without any attempt having been made by the
Crown to obtain its consent.	 By July 1624, as the result of pressure
exerted by the Convention, Udward was induced to resign his claims to
the office of conservator in return for compensation of six thousand
merks.	 The Crown, in turn, underwent a change of heart.	 In
recommending Patrick Drummond for the post of conservator in November,
James subjected his appointment to the approval of the Convention of
Royal Burghs. 10
	After subscribing lengthy and specific articles of
appointment from the Convention, Drummond was accepted as conservator
in January 1625.	 Because of James' death the following March, final
ratification before the Privy Council was delayed until July when the
Convention reminded the new monarch, Charles I, that its acceptance of
the royal candidate was a 'meir favour' which was in no way to
prejudice its rights to present and discharge conservators in the
future) 1
On the religious front James had, at a managed assembly of
the Kirk at Perth in 1618, intruded a liturgical programme which laid
stress on the observance of holy days, genuflection, episcopal
confirmation and private ceremonials for both baptism and communion.
Within the Kirk, the promulgation of these Five Articles revived the
erstwhile moribund Presbyterian party which sought a return to the
undiluted Reformation principles which had marked a clear break with
Catholicism. 12	The most controversial aspect of this programme was
the requirement of kneeling for all members of congregations
participating in communion.	 As the laity were primarily affected,
resistance to genuflection provided the common ground to unite the
opposition to the ratification of ecclesiastical innovations in the
parliament of 1621.
13
	To prevent the royal programme being
compromised by the issue of kneeling James insisted, as he had done at
the general assembly in Perth, that the vote should be taken on all96
Five Articles in a block rather than separately. 	 Yet, against the
grain of parliamentary subservience to royal directives, the packaged
passage of the Five Articles provoked a substantial dissenting
minority.
14
	To achieve their parliamentary ratification, James had
to guarantee that he would not attempt any further liturgical
innovations.	 Plans for a draft liturgy which would have brought
closer conformity between the Scottish and Anglican churches were
shelved.	 The one legacy of this liturgical policy to the
ecclesiastical establishment was the continued use of the English Book
of Common Prayer in the chapel royal, in the universities and in some
cathedrals. 15
The most striking political feature of the parliament of
1621, however, was the ability of the opponents of the Five Articles
to draw support from the nobility, both the traditional and the
Jacobean creations, from the shire commissioners as representatives of
the gentry and from the commissioners of the royal burghs. 16	It is,
perhaps, only with the advantage of hindsight that direct correlation
can be made between opposition to the Five Articles and the rejection
of the liturgical innovations of Charles I, leading ultimately to the
overthrow of episcopacy at the general assembly in Glasgow in 1638.17
Yet, this Jacobean programme had awakened and galvanised a new
generation of radicals within the ministry who had hitherto acquiesed
in the governing of the Kirk by an erastian episcopate. 	 Of greater
importance was the continuing disquiet expressed by nobles, such as
John Leslie, sixth earl of Rothes, a prominent member of the
parliamentary opposition in 1621.	 Within three weeks of the death of
James VI, Rothes sought, in a letter of 14 April 1625 to a leading
Scottish courtier, Sir Robert Kerr (later first earl of Ancrum),
indication of Charles I's attitudes towards the policies of his late
father which 'did bread greit greif and miscontentment amongst the best
both in plac and knawledg'.	 Rothes specified that the two most
controversial aspects of the royal programme had been 'the imposing of
certain nouations upon the Kirk' and 'the irrWring of the libertys of
the Nobility both in Counsell and Parliament'.	 In effect Rothes, as97
well as expressing the general hostility of the political nation to
ecclesiastical innovations, was articulating the declining
commitment of the traditional nobility to absentee monarchy in the
face of James' reliance on professional administrators within the
Privy Council and the royal manipulation of the parliamentary agenda
in 1621.	 In short, he contended that minds which should have been
united for the good of Scotland had become 'jangled with changes both
in kirk and ciuil Stat'.
18
A further pertinent point in relation to the parliament of
1621 was that although the opposition in both Kirk and State had
neither been concerted nor sustained, a loss of confidence was
precipitated within the administrative framework of absentee kingship.
Representing the king, as parliamentary Commissioner, was James' chief
confidant at Court for Scottish affairs, James Hamilton, second marquis
of Hamilton.	 As a result of bearing the brunt of public odium for
enacting the Five Articles, Hamilton's interest in Scottish affairs was
much lessened.
19
	The death of the Chancellor, Dunfermline, in 1622,
removed not only the pre-eminent administrator within the Privy
Council, but also the one politician based in Scotland who was able to
exercise an unrivalled influence at Court.
20
	Simultaneously, the
confidence of James VI in his Scottish administration was being
undermined by rumours from factions commuting between the Court and
Edinburgh.	 John Erskine, ninetkenth earl of Mar, the Treasurer, was
reputed to have a predilection to dispose 'whatsumever did belong to
the King in revenue and casualtie at his pleasour'.	 Thomas Hamilton,
first earl of Melrose (later of Haddington), as Secretary of State and
President of the Council allegedly so dominated both administrative
and judicial proceedings that 'be his absolute overruleing in Councell
and Session did carrie all maters reason or none'.	 In order that
James might reaffirm his grip over his Scottish administration,
Robert Maxwell, first earl of Nithsdale, emerged as the principal
schemer at Court for realigning the channels of government.	 He was
principally supported from 1622 by the new Lord Chancellor,
Sir George Hay. of Kinfauns (later viscount Dupplin, thereafter earl of98
Kinnoul), by William Douglas, sixth earl of Morton, and by Robert Kerr,
first earl of Roxburghe.	 While Chancellor Hay was attempting to
establish his hegemony over the Scottish administration, Nithsdale,
Morton and Roxburghe were striving to promote themselves as the main
counsellors at Court for Scottish affairs.	 Borrowing on Irish
precedent for disciplining officers of state, Nithsdale conceived that
a Commission of Grievance would be the effective means of reforming
'the lamentable estait of Scotland'.
21
Grievances aroused by the multiplication of monopolies and
patents had provoked the dissolution of the English parliament in
January 1622.	 James, nevertheless, authorised a Scottish Commission
of Grievance in March 1623, in the hope of providing a less politically
fractious 'remedie to the lyk disease'.	 Immediately the Commission
became a forum, especially for the mercantile community, to protest
against monopolies and the rate of customs which the burgesses claimed
were against their privileges and their commercial welfare.
22
	The
Commission, however, failed to accomplish the political objective of
its initiator, namely the unchallenged establishment of Nithsdale and
his faction in control of Scottish government.	 As a result, no
effective single channel of liaison had been restored between the Court
and the Scottish administration in Edinburgh prior to the death of
James VI on 27 March 1625.	 Most ominously, though the Commission had
operated merely as a sub-committee of the Privy Council, a precedent
had been created for factional attempts to achieve dominance over
Scottish affairs through the creation of procedure to review the
working of government.	 For an executive which had no strong tradition
of independent action, the Commission was no more than the final
instalment of the Crown's habitual interference in Scottish
government.	 Yet this last Jacobean bequest was hardly conducive to
furthering the confidence of the Scottish administration in directives
from the Court or their desire to uphold the monarchical position
within Scotland on their ow/n initiative.	 There was no immediate
prospect of a collapse of central government.	 But it was against this
background of diminishing confidence in absentee monarchy, which the99
Scottish administration in Edinburgh shared with the political nation
in general, that Charles I acceded to the throne, determined to effect
a fundamental change in the style, pace and direction of royal
government.
However, the major obstacle to Charles' political ambitions
was the perennial problem faced by the Stewart monarchy, namely the
lack of readily available finance.	 Aggravating the financial position
of the Crown in England was the cost of maintaining that traditional
English diplomatic aspiration, the pursuit of premier league
recognition as a European power.	 Charles inherited an English Crown
approaching a chronic state of insolvency.
23
	The financial legacy of
James I of England was the commitment of the monarchy to expenditure
well in excess of £1,000,000 sterling by the end of 1625.
24
Essentially this situation was brought about by a militant change in
foreign policy.	 After the breakdown of the proposed marriage of
Charles to the Spanish Infanta in October 1623, James became prepared
to provide military aid for the recovery of the Palatinate on behalf
of his son-in-law, Frederick, who was languishing in the Netherlands as
a pensio4rdy'of the Dutch Republic.	 James' sponsorship of military
intervention in the Thirty Years War proved a financial liability.
The expeditionary force which embarked from England in January 1625,
under the command of the German military adventurer, Count Ernest von
Mansfeld, was still entrenched in the Netherlands by James' death at
the end of March.	 Moreover, after an imperial diet at Ratisbon, in
February 1623, had deprived Frederick of his electoral dignity, James
had, along with the French, been drawn by the Dutch Republic towards an
alliance against the Austian and Spanish Habsburgs.	 Since 1621 the
Dutch had not only been waging war with Spain, but were providing the
financial support, as bankers and organisers, which allowed the
Protestant princes within the Empire to retain an army in the field
against the emperor Ferdinand II.	 This tripartite coalition was to	 be
formalised at the Hague Convention in December 1625, having entailed
large financial outlays for diplomatic embassies. 25	The alliance had
also opened the door to further military expenditure- the employment100
of forces against the emperor, the equipping and manning of the English
navy, and the fortification of coastal defences around the British
Isles in the event of any seaborne offensive from Spain or the Spanish
Netherlands.	 Furthermore, to confirm the growing rapport between the
English and the French Crowns, the marriage was arranged between
Charles and Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII.	 Though married by
proxy in Paris at the end of the spring, Charles gained only a
prolongation of, not a respite from, the lavish costs of wedding
ceremonial which had to be borne until his queen arrived in London on
16 June.	 Finally, Charles was not only expected to meet the debts and
financial commitments of his father, but he had also to incur the
considerable expense of the state funeral of James VI and I in
Westminster Abbey on 7 May. 26
England, despite the European aspirations of its Crown,
lacked any financial institution such as a national bank comparable to
the Bank of Amsterdam founded in 1609, or the Banco Giro of Venice
established ten years later, which could provide long-term credit for
central government. 27	The shortage of liquid capital, therfore, was
to remain a current feature of the monarchy of Charles I.	 The English
government under James had repeatedly resorted to a number of financial
expedients, especially reliance on farming of the customs.	 In turn,
indefinite delays in paying expenses had become routine practice for
the Crown.	 This had led, however, to administrative inefficiency and
even to the political alienation of landed and commercial interest.
28
To ensure that the expansion of English foreign trade was not adversely
affected by royal diplomacy, 'the men of property' had been moving
towards parliamentary scrutiny of the economic policies of the Crown.
Thus by the end of James' reign in England, the House of Commons was
seeking to prevent the establishment of a royal right to levy
impositions at will on new imports, which would have extricated the
Crown from dependence on taxation voted by parliament.	 Hence
insolvency on the part of the Crown sowed the seeds of consitutional
conflict which Charles was to bring to fruition.	 In Charles' first
parliament of 1625, the dues from the customs, of tunnage and poundage,101
kctol, couwIloAttr
which were traditionally awarded to the Crown for life, wer . amended_to
t 11aty grant.	 Charles dissolved parliament in July before the
passage of the bill and proceeded with the unauthorised collection of
tunnage and poundage. 29	He thereby paved the way towards a
consititutional impasse in England which reinforced his need for a
policy of financial retrenchment throughout the British Isles.
The financial situation of the Crown, if not its economic
expectations, was more healthy in Scotland than in England. 	 Charles
inherited through the Scottish Treasury a total expenditure for the
ordinary running of royal government which amounted to £159,091 11s 8d.
Just under half of this recurrent cost,i45,717 6s 8d, was taken up by
pensions to courtiers and leading government officials. 	 The routine
income available to the king in the last year of James' reign,
1 March 1624 to 1 March 1625, amounted to £259,878 19s, a surplus over
expenditure of £100,787 7s 4d.	 Although this level of profitability
was not fully maintained in the financial year after 1 March 1625, when
the ordinary income of the king fell to £223,930 7s 31d, a healthy
surplus of £64,838 15s 7fd remained.	 This shortfall of
£35,948 11s 8fd in the first year of Charles' reign can largely be
attributed to a decline in the efficiency of royal officials in central
4)c,
and local government, particularly in the colytion of revenues from
the property directly managed on behalf of the monarchy, the Crown
lands.	 Although the impost on wines was probably collected after
1 March 1625, no attempt was made to record in the Treasury, before
1 March 1626, its financial yield to the Crown. 3°	 However, the
surplus income available through the Scottish Treasury, equivalent to
£8,398 19s sterling in 1625 and £5,403 4s 2d sterling in 1626, was not
going to ameliorate drastically the financial embarrassment of the
Crown in England.	 Nevertheless, Scotland, as an English diplomatic
satellite, was expected not only to contribute to the cost of the
common monarchy but to help finance the foreign policy of the Crown,
over which the Scottish executive exercised no meaningful control.
Moreover, a financial appeal to Scotland had two distinct advantages
for Charles.	 Scotland had a potential for raising revenue which lay102
outwith the control of the English parliament and a comparatively
underdeveloped sense of parliamentary privilege or initiative.
Indeed, in contrasting the position facing him in both countries,
James had, in 1607, asserted to the English parliament that the
Scottish estates enjoyed neither freedom of speech nor the right to
instigate discussion on any issue without royal approval.31
While parliament was recognised  by the early seventeenth
century as the supreme legislature, there was still no Scottish concept
of 'the unchallenged sovereignty of an omnicompent parliament'.32
Routine parliamentary functions, including the right to assent to
taxation, could be devolved onto a Convention of Estates which drew
representatives from the nobility, gentry, clergy and burgesses.
Conventions were traditionally utilised, in the interests of
constitutional expediency, to pass temporary legislation which
parliaments subsequently confirmed, frequently without alteration; to
interpret and modify acts of parliament; and to enlarge the basis of
agreement for executive enactments.	 Furthermore, although James VI,
after the union of the Crowns had initially used Conventions for
executive functions, the Convention which he summoned in 1617 was
exclusively concerned with finance; namely to vote f200,000 for his
impending state-visit to Scotland.	 Charles, therefore, had in
Scotland a co4tutional alternative to parliament which was expected
in practice to ibe even more amenable to the promulgation of any
programme designed for the financial advantage of the Crown.	 By
playing on the threat to British interests inherent in the European
escalation of the Thirty Years War , Charles was able to place
Scotland on a war-footing by the late autumn of 1625, and at the same
time to summon, by the end of October, a Convention of Estates to meet
the cost of this alleged emergency. 33
In his inaugural message to the Convention on 27 October
1625, Charles stressed his need for sufficient taxation not only to
honour his Scottish commitments, especially his coronation, but
'likewayes suche designes as we haif in hand bathe at home and abroade103
for the weele of our kingdomes'.	 The Estates dutifully responded,
awarding an ordinary taxation of £400,000, to be paid in equal
instalments over the next four years and an extraordinary taxation of
the twentieth penny (five per cent) of all annualrents, to be spread
over eight terms in biannual payments.	 However, the unanimity and
willingness of the Estates to give such satisfaction 'that we dar
trewlie afferme the like was never hard of nor scene in this kingdome
in ony praeceiding aige' was rather dissipated when Charles overplayed
his hand.
34	Despite the post between London and Edinburgh usually
taking at least six days, 35 within four days of the taxation being
voted, Chancellor Hay was elaborating to the Convention the desire of
the king that the Estates should provide two thousand men and
sufficient shipping for three years to defend the country from foreign
invasion.	 In return, Charles would discharge all taxation already
awarded, except so much as would suffice to cover the costs of his
forthcoming coronation.	 The short-lived constitutional honeymoon was
terminated by the Estates' rejection of the king's peremptory financial
amendment on the grounds that 'the knawne povertie of the cuntrey by
the calamitie of some hard yeiris could not in their opinione afforde
ony grittar sowmes than the taxation praesentlie grantit'. 36
Furthermore, as well as ameliorating royal finances Charles
was, with the compliance of the Estates, intent on reviewing the
structure of government within Scotland. 	 Simultaneously he was to
expose the main problem confronting his rule over Scotland, that of
his own personality.	 The antipathy of Charles to the events of his
father's dotage and in particular, the 'light and familiar way'
James VI dealt with his leading Scottish subjects, led him to
consciously conceive the reassertion of royal dignity at the expense
of such accustomed familiarity.	 Thus he deliberately 'forgot the
civilities and affability that the natioun naturally loved'.
37
	His
upbringing as well as his personality was to prove unsuitable.
Charles was the product of a narrow milieu in which the politics of
power were dominated by personal rivalry and factional intrigue.
Having been bred since infancy in the manners and fashions of the104
English Court, Charles possessed an unparalleled lack of understanding
of the mechanics of government and the underlying social structure of
Scottish politics.	 Indeed Charles set out to rule his Scottish
inheritance politically inequipped other than with an authoritarian
conviction of his own rightness which his subjects were dutifully
bound to obey.	 Such an implacable dogma meant that 'his conception
of kingship was never in accord with the actual shape of affairs in
Scotland'.
38
	With his message to the Convention, Charles, in
October 1625, formally ushered in an era of absentee kingship
inexperienced in the practices, expectations and sensibilities of the
political nation.	 Two instances will suffice.
Charles' proposal to the Estates that attendance at the
Court of Session be restricted to judges, lawyers and contending
parties, threatened to undermine that respect for the law necessary to
sustain the government of a decentralised kingdom.	 For, as the
Estates pointed out in a measured rebuke, 'it does not seem fit that
nobles or lairds of good standing should be debarred from the
instruction in the laws of their country which they might receive from
attending Court during the trial of cases'.	 The reply of the
Convention to his accompanying proposal, that the Lords of Session
should come to the Court on horseback, rather sarcastically exposed
Charles' ignorance of the social geography of Edinburgh.	 As many of
the Lords dwelt near the Court, some in narrow and steep closes, it
was thought inexpedient that they should be 'tyed to this necessitie
of ryding'.
39
Charles' insufficient grasp of the 'strategic control of the
currents of political and social life' within Scotland 4° was strikingly
and more durably exposed when he took over his father's scheme for the
colonisation of the nebulously defined Nova Scotia in North America.
The major incentive for the Crown in promoting this venture, conceived
as a Scottish counter to the English colony of Ulster, was the sale of
the honour of baronet for two thousand merks to each of the hundred
gentlemen willing to act as planters.	 This order of baronetcy was105
intended as an exclusive Scottish dignity for the heritable elevation
of the 'chiefest knights and gentlemen' who were to have precedence
over any other 'knight, laird, squire or gentleman whatsoever'.	 At
the Convention in October, however, a petition from the shire
commissioners, as the representatives of the gentry, against the
precedency to be accorded to this new order and the supplementary
elevation of knights over the rest of their estate, was carried by a
plurality of votes.	 Despite the claims of Sir William Alexander of
Menstrie, secretary at Court to the king and chief undertaker of this
venture, that the monarch's prerogative right to confer honours and
dignities 'wald not admitt ony sort of opposition', the shire gentry
successfully sought the suspension of a scheme which attempted to make
distinctions of rank derogate from their general status as lesser
barons and freeholders.	 Charles indeed regarded the petition and
opposition of the gentry to this new dignity at the Convention as a
hinderance 'so much derogatorie to our royall prerogative'.41
Nevertheless, he obstinately adhered to the project's confusion of
rank and status, seeing the sale of honours for Nova Scotia as an
alternative to grants of heritable jurisdiction. 42	He prolonged the
scheme by renewing the colonising commission on 25 July 1626, which
was to continue until one hundred and fifty gentlemen had enrolled.
Thereby, 300,000 merks was to be realised for the Crown through the
Nova Scotia Colonisation Fund.
43
	But a marked relunctance remained on
the part of the gentry to purchase a title which was patently intended
as a source of extra income for the Crown.	 By the end of 1626 only
twenty-eight Scottish gentlemen had purchased a Nova Scotia
baronetcy, though the number of subscribers did rise to one hundred
and thirteen by the late spring of 1638.	 This sale of honours
having yielded 126,000 merks for the Crown by 1629, took another nine
years to realise 120,000 merks.	 Furthermore the new order did not
remain exclusively Scottish with three French, four Irish and twelve
English gentlemen being enrolled from 1629. Not only did the order
fall short by thirty-seven subscribers from the quota set by Charles,
but the Scottish contingent of ninety-four failed even to meet James'
original target of one hundred baronets.44106
Charles, moreover f
,
rom the outset of his reign, proved
1-6t-
incapable of acknowledging tIcie political manoeuvring within
constitutional assemblies was not necessarily intended to obstruct or
reverse royal schemes.	 Despite the large attendance from all the
estates at the Convention of 1625, including the attendance of
commissioners from fifteen out of the thirty-three shires and from
twenty out of the fifty royal burghs, Charles did not share the
Convention's 'consciousness of a status as a less formal meeting of
parliament'. 45	Hence the capacity of the Estates to modify and
obviate the rigorous implementation of any royal policy, either to
suit Scottish circumstances or to accommodate native aspirations, went
unappreciated at Court.	 Indeed the initial enthusiasm of the Estates
in consenting to taxation in 1625 was probably engineered as an attempt
to stave off reforms which Charles was rumoured to be contemplating for
the government of Scotland.
46
	There was a notable gap in performance
between the Convention's assent to taxation and the individual response
by landowners to the collection of the taxes in the localities.	 The
basis of assessment for taxation was provided by rentals from estates.
Yet the attempts of the Exchequer to make compositions with individuals
who had either concealed or inaccurately disclosed their rents,
following both the ordinary and extraordinary levies of 1621 and 1625,
dragged on until 1634.
47
	Hence, the commissioners from the shires and
from the burghs, the representatives of the two estates most severely
affected, the former because of their relatively limited landed
resources, the latter as a major source of credit, petitioned the
Convention for both modification in the rate of exaction and moderation
in the process of collection. 48	The continuance of this sense of
grievance into the spring of 1626 ensured that the plea for 'som
ordour to be taken in the taxation' was to become a fertile channel
for dissent, particularly in the burghs.
49
	For Charles remained
adamant that he continue the practice inaugurated  by his father after
the voting of taxation in the parliament of 1621.	 He decreed, on
20 February 1626, that Edinburgh and the other leading royal burghs
were to advance, in anticipation of their share of the extraordinary
tax on annualrents, the same sum of money they were due to pay as107
their sixth part of the ordinary taxation.	 Thereby, the Crown could
take immediate advantage of the revenue readily available from trade
rather than wait on the seasonal returns from agriculture. 50
The Convention of 1625, however, not only recorded their
disquiet at the inconvenience and ill-judged nature of the king's
proposals for taxation, reforming the Court of Session and Nova Scotian
baronets, but the Estates seized the initiative to debate matters not
encompassed within the official programme.	 The Convention unanimously
voted that any intention of Charles to alter the existing constitution
of the Court of Session should only be undertaken 'be the advise of the
Estaittis of this kingdome in Parliament'.
51
	Although this debate was
inaugurated by a petition from the commissioners of the shires,
John Spottiswood, archbishop of St Andrews and a mainstay of the Privy
Council, who was in attendance at the Convention, attributed such a
manoeuvre to a general unrest for which the estate of the gentry acted
as spokesmen.
52	Spottiswood's attempts to built up a party for the
Crown in the wake of the Convention seem to confirm that opposition was
by no means confined to the commissioners from the shires.	 He
recommended to Charles that a particular diet be set aside for the
nobility and privy councillors, especially those who had been present
at the Convention, to explain the dissent of the Estates.	 The
rebuttal by the Estates of the king's amendment to taxation for the
purposes of national defence was to be subject to particular
investigation.	 More immediately, in order to promote royal reforms in
central government, such a meeting was deemed necessary to 'draw our
nobilmen together and turn away this common obloque of factioun amongst
the Scottish Lordis1.53
Thus, by the end of the Convention, on 2 November 1625,
battle-lines were being drawn for constitutional conflict,
consolidating at the outset of Charles' reign the divergence of
interests already apparent between absentee kingship and the political
nation in the last years of James VI.	 Significantly religion, though
undoubtedly contributing to the continuity of dissent within the108
Estates, was not the major or most pressing grievance. 	 In part this
was owing to James' assiduous use of the Court of High Commission to
intimidate and silence the chief opponents of the Five Articles of
Perth among the clergy.
54	Henceforth, the pulpit could no longer be
considered a haven for the propagandists of nonconformity.	 In part,
also, lay support for nonconforming ministers was essentially a local,
or even regional, issue.	 Observance of the Five Articles was not
universal throughout the country but depended upon the amount of
compulsion a bishop was able, or required, to exercise over each
presbytery within his diocese.	 Geographically, Scotland north of the
Tay tended towards conformity whereas resistance to liturgical
innovation was prevalent in the west and south-west, the Lothians and
Fife.	 The touchstone for a nonconforming congregation was the failure
to kneel for the elements of communion received solely from the hands
of the minister who had dispensed with the assistance of the elders in
the direct distribution of the bread and the wine.	 Each of the Five
Articles, moreover, enjoyed varying degrees of observance.	 Private
administration by ministers of the sacraments of communion and baptism,
and episcopal confirmation of children, were undertaken sparingly.
Easter, being linked to the main and often only season for the
celebration of communion, gained widespread acceptance whereas
Christmas and other holy days were widely ignored, unless they suited
local customs. 55	Above all, religion did not initially emerge as a
national issue because Charles had no desire to inflame within Scotland
the endemic Protestant hostility towards Roman Catholicism which was
most capable of transcending the particular outcry raised by
presbyterians over the implementation of the Five Articles.
Commencing with his attempts to marry Charles to the Spanish Infanta,
the greater leniency James VI had shown towards Catholics in the last
years of his reign had led to a relaxation of the recusancy laws.
Largely through the endeavours of Father John Macbreck, a Scottish
member of the Society of Jesus and confessor to the French embassy in
London, Catholics were given immunity from prosecution which, for two
years, amounted to 'almost complete liberty of conscience'.
Protestant sensitivity in Scotland, highly charged by the ascendancy109
of Habsburg imperialism and the Counter-Reformation on the Continent,
was further activated, following Charles' accession, by his marriage
to the French princess, Henrietta Maria.	 For the new queen's fellow
Catholics were reputedly to be tolerated throughout Britain as well as
at Court.
56
To offset remonstrances against toleration of Catholics from
the Kirk and to dispel rumours that he intended to disturb the faith
and the existing government of the Church of Scotland Charles, on
3 July 1625, rather gingerly issued a proclamation stating his
determination to maintain the Protestant profession of 'the true
relligioun' and to abide by his father's establishment of 'the onlie
true government whereby a Christeane Church can be weele reuled in
monarchies and kingdomes'.	 Although Charles promised not to make any
immediate innovation in the government of the Kirk or to seek changes
in doctrine, further liturgical reform was not specifically ruled out.
Calvinists, discomfited by the implementation of the Five Articles of
Perth, were hardly appeased by Charles ranking of both papists and
nonconformists as 'contempnaris of our authorite' for their aversion
to the existing establishment in the Church of Scotland.
57
For the next year, however, Charles studiously avoided taking
any ecclesiastical initiative which would increase support among the
laity for the presbyterian faction within the Kirk.	 Indeed, on
12 July 1626, he instructed the episcopafTeto mount a policy of
accommodation which would gradually eliminate nonconformity within the
ministry.	 Ministers admitted before the passage of the Five Articles
in 1618 were to be allowed their nonconforming scruples, particulariki vivet,,;-,e,	 owAtiAti414
against genufltctien, provided they neither preached nor wrote
invectives against the existing establishment in the Kirk; that they
did not encourage others towards nonconformity; and that they neither
refused communion to any parishioner who wished to receive the
sacrament kneeling nor celebrated communion with neighbouring
parishioners without testimonials from their ministers.	 An amnesty
was to be extended to all ministers exiled or suspended for their110
nonconformity who accepted such conditions. Ministers admitted since
the passage of the Five Articles were permitted no such indulgence but
were required to subscribe a common band of conformity which was to be
drawn up and enforced by the episcopa4.	 This attempt by Charles to
licenfe a limited toleration of dissent within the Kirk had been
t>bsko-ps
undertaken in response to a plea from the episcopacy to help check
local disorders occasioned by nonconformity.	 Yet Charles took no
supplementary action over their associated complaint against 'the
insolencie of the Romanists', thereby undermining the credibility of
his initial caution in ecclesiastical affairs.58
Moreover, the royal policy of accommodation was sandwiched
between two measures which served to remind not only the presbyterian
faction, but the whole Kirk, of the importance of the prerogative.
The renewal of the Court of High Commission, on 24 March 1626,
emphasised the judicial sting to which nonconformity was exposed.
The revival, on 25 August, under the supervision of Sir William
Alexander, the king's secretary, of James' project to review the
metrical psalms, confirmed that liturgical innovation had not been
abandoned but merely shelved to suit the convenience of the Court.59
It was not until 8 February 1627 that Charles demonstrated
to the clergy that he was prepared to take measures for 'the
repressing of Poperie'.	 He instructed the Court of High Commission
that all suspects cited for recusancy should be required to clear
themselves by oath, even although there was insufficient corroborating
evidence to substantiate the charge.	 Such a directive, however, was
primarily aimed at seminary priests and Jesuits, and open participants
at Catholic sacraments who aroused 'publicke scandall', not at the
Catholic laity who worshipped privately and lived peaceably within
the civil law.	 In effect, the special immunity from ecclesiastical
censure afforded by the Crown to prominent Catholic courtiers and
leading administrators was extended into a limited toleration for all
Catholics who did not publicly flaunt their faith.	 Despite Charles'
assurance to the clergy that their efforts against 'obstinat and111
contemptuous recusants' would have the backing of the Privy Council as
well as the Court of High Commission, his stated intention towards the
Catholic laity was to avoid prosecution, 'rather to save thair soules
than to ruine thair estaites'.
60
	Furthermore Catholics, unlike
nonconformists, enjoyed a political influence out of all proportion to
their position as a minority faith within Scotland.	 Though only	 a
few of the nobility on the Privy Council were Catholics, other
councillors were not unsympathetic to their interests.	 In addition,
most leading officials at the outset of Charles' reign saw no personal
advantage to be derived for their standing at Court in advocating
rigorous persecution of recusants.
61
	Moreover, as Charles had
studiously avoided the controversial exercise of his prerogative in
ecclesiastical affairs until after the Convention of 1625,
nonconformists in the Kirk lacked the constitutional forum to attract
sufficient support from the other Estates.	 At the same time, though
the legacy of resentment against the Crown among presbyterians was
undoubtedly aggravated by the continuing bias of Charles against
nonconformity, this ecclesiastical faction lacked the political muscle
within central government to alter the direction of royal policy.
The most damaging issue inherited by Charles which dominated
Scottish politics at the outset of his reign was not religion but the
commitment of the Crown to the escalation of the 'Thirty Years War'.
Admittedly Charles was not helped when the grand strategy, drawn up at
the Hague Convention of December 1625, proved a military failure.
The design of the anti-Habsburg alliance was a co-ordinated assault on
the territories of the Holy Roman Empire, principally featuring a
pincer movement.	 North-west Germany was to be conquered by Charles'
uncle, Christian IV of Denmark, while Count Ernest von Mansfeld
advanced on Bohemia and Moravia.	 Mansfeld's expeditionary force was
thwarted from crossing the Elbe and defeated at Dessau on 25 April 1626
by the imperialist 'generalissimo', Albrecht von Wallenstein.	 Four
months later, on 27 August, the Danish army was routed at Lutter by
Johann von Tilly, general of the Catholic League of imperial princes.
Thus by the time Charles commissioned the earl of Nithsdale to raise112
and command a Scottish contingent of three thousand men in
February 1627, for service under the Danish king, the Danish army had
been forced to retire (Drip the Jutland peninsula.	 Thereafter, despite
the fitful arrival of British reinforcements from the summer of 1627,
the Danish army was effectively contained outwith the Empire by the
imperial forces until Christian IV withdrew from the coalition of the
Hague after concluding, on 22 May 1629, the peace of Lubeck with
Ferdinand II•
62
	Charles, however, though he used the defection of
the Danish king as the excuse for his own withdrawal from the
coalition, had long ceased to make any meaningful contribution to the
anti-Habsburg alliance.	 Indeed, he was largely responsible for
initiating the diplomatic failure of the coalition of the Hague.
Following his marriage to Henrietta Maria, Charles left his commitment
to a full toleration for Roman Catholics within his realms unfulfilled.
He further antagonised his brother-in-law, Louis XIII, by expelling the
French attendants of the queen from England in August 1626.	 Open
hostilities between England and France, fuelled also by commercial
rivalry, commenced at sea from April 1627 and culminated in the duke
of Buckingham's abortive expedition in July to relieve the Huguenots
besieged in La Rochelle by the forces of the French Crown.	 No further
military campaigning followed the retreat of Buckingham in late
October.	 But the anti-Habsburg alliance was irreparably shattered by
the estrangement of two of the leading signatories to the Hague
Convention 63
Furthermore, Charles' regular demands for military and
financial commitment from Scotland to prolong an unsuccessful and
increasingly futile foreign policy, perpetuated opposition beyond the
Convention of Estates of 1625.	 In particular, the king's
pre-occupation with national defence cemented hostility towards an
absentee Crown not fully prepared to consult or respect Scottish
interests.	 Although regular levying of troops for employment in the
Danish army commenced from February 1627, the bulk of the Scottish
contingent, under the command of the earl of Nithsdale, did not begin
to embark for Denmark until October.
64
	Charles was so determined to113
boost recruitment from Scotland that he encouraged the Privy Council
to issue, from April, general indemnities to all undischarged bankrupts
and convicted criminals, other than traitors and murderers, who
volunteered to enlist.	 He also gave direct instructions to officers
in charge of recruiting that social undesirables, such as gypsies,
sturdy beggars, vagaboAds and masterless men were to be pressed into
the service of the Crown.	 However, as this haphazard policy of
social distillation amounted to a free hand for the recruiting
officers, general distress was occasioned within the localities by
their methods of enlisting, particularly by their use of press-gangs.
Indeed recruitment in the name of the Crown had got so far out of
control by 16 May, that the Privy Council was forced to forbid, under
penalty of death, forcible enlistment without the concurrence of
landlords or officials of local government in the shires, or
magistrates in the burghs.	 The activities and insolencies of
- press-gangs had reputedly reached such a height that 'no single man
darre travell in the countrie, attend thair labour in the fields, nor
keepe thair houss/is in the night1.65
Resentment over the methods of recruitment licensed by the
Crown, socially extended the discontent aroused by directives from the
Court to classes outwith the political nation.	 For as Melrose, the
Secretary of State, pointed out on 20 May, the number of soldiers
embarking for Denmark was small, but the disturbance occasioned by
recruitment was great, 'bypast leavies have beene uniust and hatefull
to the people'.	 In order to moderate, but continue, the royal policy
of 'disburdening the countrie of men that are unprofitable at hame and
may be useful abrode in his Maiesties service',
66 the Privy Council
instructed the justices of the peace in the shires and the magistrates
in the burghs to make, with the assistance of local ministers, a survey
in every parish of the idle masterless men fit to be drafted.
Very few localities had complied with this order by 15 June, the end of
the thirty days allowed for the preparation of the surveys.	 The Privy
Council complained on 28 June that so few returns had been made from
the parishes - less than one per cent of all potential returns from the114
parishes survive - that the intention behind the survey was 'verie
farre frustrat and disappointit, highlie to his Majesteis offence and
to the discredit of the countrie'.
67
	Thus, the social unrest
occasioned by recruitment meant that central government, in its
attempts to carry out royal policy, was confronted by sheer inertia on
the part of officials in local government.
Financially, Charles' foreign policy drained the funds
available to the Crown through the Scottish Exchequer.	 Of the
£400,000 voted as ordinary taxation by the Convention of 1625,
£108,600 12s 1d more than the tax collected in the first and second
terms had been advanced by March 1628, for the payment of Scottish
troops recruited to serve in the Danish army.	 Mainly to cover further
costs of Scottish involvement in the Thirty Years War , Charles
proceeded to authorise further disbursements of only £1,802 Os 11d less
than the money due to be collected in the third and fourth terms.
This excessive military expenditure of £106,798 11s 2d was eventually
almost covered by the £101,103 Os 6d raised by the tax on annualrents,
though final auditing of the taxation levied in 1625 was not
accomplished until July 1634. 68	Charles, therefore, created from the
outset of his reign a recurrent problem of financial mismanagement
which proved politically embarrassing to the Crown.	 As early as
21 July 1626, the earl of Mar as Treasurer had reported to the Privy
Council that 'his Majesteis cofferis wer so exhaustit' that no money
could be provided for the purchase of ships to guard the coasts.69
This was more a statement of financial liquidity, or rather the lack
of it, than of financial incapacity.	 For although a profit of almost
£65,000 had been recorded in the accounts of the Treasurer on 1 March,
this was based on the yearly audited accounts of officials in central
and local government, not on the cash readily available to meet royal
commitments.
70
 By the end of July, Charles was only able to have
sufficient money advanced, against the revenues to be collected in
taxation, to purchase three war-ships, two in England and one in
Scotland, for the defence of the Scottish coasts.	 Moreover, the lack
of readily available revenue to man and equip this fledgling Scottish115
navy led Charles to resort to financial expedients which threatened
vested Scottish interest, most notably in the burghs.
71
As early as 28 March 1626, Charles had approached the leading
royal burghs, specially assembled at a particular convention in
Edinburgh, not only to advance the same amount for the extraordinary
tax on annualrents as they collectively paid towards the ordinary
taxation, but also to forward their ordinary taxation to furnish ships
'for the publick defence of the realme'.	 Furthermore, the king asked
the leading burghs to consider what additional help they could give
for national defence, such as the erection of fortifications within or
near burghs.	 In reply, the leading burghs, at the next particular
convention in Edinburgh on 18 April, claimed that the 'povertie of the
maist pairt of the burrowis is so grit', that the limited involvement
of burgesses in annualrenting was insufficient to justify any
collective composition of the extraordinary taxation.	 The burghs also
declined to advance their ordinary taxation as 'thair meanes and
habilitie ar not answerable to thair hearts and guid affectiounes'.
They did agree to the expediency of erecting fortifications for the
defence of the burghs and expressed a willingness to participate, with
the rest of the political estates, in the provision of additional
revenue for defence, once the objectives of the king's foreign policy
were made manifest. 72
Clarification of Scotland's role and that of the individual
political estates in meeting Charles' financial demands was the crux
of the matter.	 For the attempt by the burghs to plead poverty was
financially disingenuous, amounting to a political finesse.	 By
March 1628 the royal burghs had advanced £39,700 as their collective
composition for the extraordinary taxation, just over a third of all
the revenue eventually collected for the Crown from the annualrents,
and forwarded a further £13,767 9s 4d from their contribution to the
third and fourth terms of the ordinary taxation. 73 The immediate
concern of the leading burghs in the autumn of 1626, however, was to
win recognition from central government that the mounting costs of116
national defence should be shared, rather than shouldered as their
exclusive burden.	 This point was forcibly made to the Privy Council
after another particular convention in Edinburgh on 21 August. The
leading burghs acknowledged the need for a Scottish navy, because of
the escalation of war, to defend the country and establish a 'sure and
saif commerce'.	 But the maintenance and manning of the navy was not
solely their responsibility, since the other political estates each had
a vital interest in ensuring peace and maintaining their living
standard through trade.	 Underlining the burghs' determination to
exact shared liability was the calculation disclosed at a particular
convention in Edinburgh on 1 November, that the monthly cost of
maintaining a war-ship of the class most suitable for national
defence - of three hundred tons with twenty-eight canons and ready to
sail with one hundred men - amounted to £2,500. 74
The qualified co-operation of the royal burghs meant that
Charles was faced with the alternative of summoning a constitutional
assembly, which would most likely subject the financing of the king's
foreign policy to close scrutiny, or to try and raise ready cash from
parties compliant to the dictates of the Crown.	 In November 1626,
Charles adopted the latter option.	 He attempted to persuade leading
officials, in association with any obliging nobles, gentlemen and
burgesses, to man and victual the Scottish fleet in return for
two-thirds of any profits of war gained by the three ships. 	 Despite
his threat that if insufficient adventurers could be found, £5,000
sterling (£60,000), was to be sequestrated from the readiest revenues
in the Exchequer - specifically from the pensions of courtiers and
leading officials - no company of adventurers was formed to finance the
Scottish navy.
75
	Charles was therefore forced to rely on the goodwill
of individual courtiers and officials.	 The most prominent in
forwarding private funds to finance not only the maintenance of the
three ships, but also the payment of recruits for the Danish army, was
Sir James Baillie of Lochend, receiver of the king's rents.	 On the
earl of Nithsdale being appointed commander of the Scottish contingent
which was to serve under Christian IV, Baillie, on 17 February 1627,117
took over as Collector-General of the taxation voted by the Convention
of 1625 - a move designed to enable him to recoup the money he had
advanced to the Crown.
76	However, the financing of Charles' foreign
policy remained thirled in Scotland to a crisis of liquidity. 	 In
March 1628, in order to fend off a naval mutiny and to discharge the
recurrent monthly debt on the three war-ships, Charles directed that
the money realised by the sale of the cargo of a shipwrecked vessel
should be used to pay his 'indigent and clamorous seamen'.	 Two months
later the political embarrassment caused by the size of Charles'
Scottish navy was partially ameliorated when James, third marquis of
Hamilton, at his own expense, agreed to provide and equip another five
ships.	 Thereby the fleet was augmented to eight war-ships.77
Compounding the Crown's financial predicament was the attempt
by Charles to institutionalise the direction and oversight of Scottish
government from the Court, which aggravated the existing inadequate
liaison between Edinburgh and London.	 By his distanced handling of
leading officials, Charles intensified tensions current within the
Scottish administration at the close of his father's reign.	 His
undoubted preference to advance the interests of courtiers neglected
the sensibilities and devalued the privileges of his most experienced
administrators.	 Chancellor Hay, Principal Secretary Melrose and
Treasurer Mar all had their respective offices renewed for life on
Charles' accession. 78	Nevertheless, on 28 January 1626,
Sir William Alexander of Menstrie was appointed Secretary for Scottish
affairs in attendance at Court.
79	Although Melrose was informed that
the appointment of a Secretary to channel all correspondence between
the Privy Council and the Court was not derogatory to his own position
of State, Charles insisted on his right to create places of trust
through 'the gift of a domestick office in our service'.
80
	The
following month Nithsdale, rather than Mar, was appointed
Collector-General of the taxation voted by the late Convention.81
Though the king thereby demonstrated the power of his prerogative in
selecting his own officials, by failing to realise that the
establishment of trust was a two-way process, Charles severely118
prejudiced the chances of amicable working relations between his
principal agents at Court and in Edinburgh.	 Hardly had a month
elapsed since his appointment as Secretary before Alexander was
complaining directly to Melrose for 'showing so much unkyndnesse and
distrust' in delaying his acquisition of the signet, the seal of his
new office. 82	By the summer, Nithsdale was accusing Mar, who had
been charged with the responsibility of colating the taxation of
1621, of wilfully failing to make up accounts despite the lapse of more
than a year since the last termly payment.	 Furthermore, he contended
that Mar, with the connivance of Chancellor Hay, sought to effect such
delays in auditing the ordinary and extraordinary taxes 'that your
Majestie shal rype no benefite thairof'. 83
Nithsdale, indeed, was largely instrumental in persuading
Charles to undertake a structural overhaul of Scottish government which
ranged far beyond changes in personnel duties.	 Nithsdale, whose
influence at Court had been temporarily eclipsed on the death of
James VI, alleged that his former associates, the earls of Morton and
Roxburghe, acting in concert with Chancellor Hay, had resolved a
'Triumvirat of the Scotts estaitt' which was intended to exercise such
a dominance over the government of Scotland that 'all men should be
forced to bow to Baall'.	 Therefore, he sought to inveigle himself
into favour with Charles by persuading him that the confusion of
faction in the Scottish administration could be repaired  by a
separation of executive interests.	 Thus, instead of officers of
State being able to sit in the Privy Council, in the Court of Session
or on the Exchequer Commissions, all officers, as 'Judicatories',
were to be returned 'to the same estait they wer att, at their first
institution'.
84 The first step in this process was the supplanting
of Melrose as President of the Court of Session by Sir John Skene of
Curriehill.
85
The proposal to create a separate executive and judiciary
was adopted wholescale on 26 January 1626.	 Charles decided that all
ordinary judges in the Court of Session were to be excluded from119
participation in the Privy Council.	 All councillors were to be barred
from sitting as ordinary judges in the Court of Session.	 In total,
fourteen councillors were affected.
86
	In terms of personnel, the
seven gentry among the ordinary judges could most easily be replaced
on the Council, at the cost of losing their professional expertise.
The removal of noblemen and officers of state from the Session,
however, threatened to diminish the status of the former and prejudice
the life-interest customarily inferred in the appointments of the
latter.	 Indeed, Charles could only circumvent this difficulty by
stressing that the removal of judges at his pleasure was part of his
prerogative.
87	In adhering to this principle, which made his
father's appointments defunct by right of revocation, Charles
studiously ignored the opinion of Chancellor Hay that if ever, since
the reconstitution of the Court of Session as the College of Justice
in 1532, 'thaer was any Lord of Session chainged or depryved bott
upon ether deth, demission or commission of a fault, than I shall
quytt my judgement1.88
The reshaping of the Scottish administration was supplemented
by the creation of two conciliar bodies.	 By July 1626, Charles had
appointed a Council of War charged to provide sufficient militia in
Scotland and to administer all martial business in the kingdom.	 It
never aspired to superfede or even to act as a separate entity from
the Privy Council, being content to operate as a sub-committee for the
management of military affairs in general and for the supervision of
coastal defences in particular. 89	Yet as this council was composed
of six nobles and eleven gentry, Charles was demonstrating his
reluctance to rely predominantly on the traditional co-operation of
the nobility for the conduct of his government in Scotland.
Furthermore that March, appealing to the precedent of his father's
reign, Charles had reconstituted a Commission for Grievances to remedy
malpractice in government.	 This Commission, however, was more
explicitly designed to oversee all aspects of Scottish administration
and had full judicial power to enquire into the running of both the
Privy Council and the Exchequer.	 While the Jacobean model had direct120
power only over grievances arising out of commercial monopolies and
projects for private gain, this new Commission extended to abuse of
position by officers of state and members of the legal profession;
usury, which could include transfers of land by mortgage; public
declamations, private declarations, spoken or written, 'tending to the
reproche or sclander' of the Crown and royal government, coupled with
the misreporting and ministerpreting of royal directives.	 Moreover,
the Commission was empowered to deal with any other grievances when
warranted by the Crown.	 Most obnoxious, perhaps, was the king's
design to utilise sheriffs, sheriff-deputes and justices of the peace
to report on their own initiative and to collate submissions from
informers on all grievances within the localities. 90	In short,
Charles was effectively seeking to establish a prerogative court to
supervise the decentralised framework of Scottish government from the
executive down to the barony court.	 The threatening nature of this
Commission bred immediate fears of the introduction of English
practices. In particular, unflattering analogy was made with the
Court of Star Chamber, 'come doune heir to play the tyrant, with a
specious vissor one its face'.91
In order to offset criticism, Charles promised to direct any
fines imposed by the Commission towards his endeavours to improve the
naval defences of the country. He also commanded the Commission not
only to admit Sir John Skene, president of the College of Justice, but
to be receptive to the advice of persons 'skillful and long practized
in the lawis' of Scotland.	 Although royal directives continued to be
sent to the Commission until November 1626, records of its actual
operation terminate in July, after only two working sessions.
92
In no small measure this situation can be attributed to the
tumultuous lobbying of the Commission when it convened under the
auspices of the Privy Council.	 By August Charles was inferring that
blame for the non-functioning of the Commission generally rested with
the nobility.	 Already alarmed by rumours that the nobility were
using the Crown's appeal for recruits to serve in the Danish army as121
an excuse to build up levies to settle private quarrels, Charles
complained to the Council about 'those that should by thair cariage
haif gevin a goode example to otheris wer accompanied with
extraordinarie troupes'.
93	Strengthening his resolve that the
nobility should only be accompanied by their domestic servants when
attending the Council or any other public meeting, was the rather
exaggerated and uncorroborated report of Nithsdale of 'the danger
being more then eminent of a pitiful combustion, the forerunner of a
fearful insurrection'.	 Nithsdale went on to allege that
Chancellor Hay had deliberately failed to defuse the situation which
had been specifically engineered by Mar, Melrose and Roxburghe who, in
alliance with Border confederates, had encouraged the influx to
Edinburgh of 'such great numbers of rascallie people as was admirable'
for the execution of their 'malitious plots'. 94	Nithsdale undoubtedly
sought to maximise the disturbance to discredit his former factionary
associates within the Scottish executive.	 Yet the actual
establishment of the Commission for Grievances, though it soon
'evanished in itselffe', 95 had made a decisive contribution to the
declining effectiveness of absentee kingship, most notably in the
resort to violent picketing as a measure of political frustration.
The full cost of Charles' attempt to restructure Scottish
government must also be measured by its more enduring political legacy.
Although Charles claimed to have undertaken full discussions with his
leading officials and counsellors, 'and had heard all objectionis that
could be made to the contrarie',
96
 the implementation of his programme
for the overhaul of the Scottish administration could only be achieved
at the expense of a substantial dilution of the traditional political
leadership of the nobility.	 Yet it was this very strength that
Spottiswood, archbishop of St Andrews, in co-ordination with Nithsdale
at Court, was attempting to harness from the outset of 1626, both to
ensure a constitutional assembly 'fair for mending al erroris' of the
late Convention, and to facilitate the acceptance of reforming
directives from the Crown within the Scottish administration.97
Charles commended Spottiswood for his efforts to build up an interest,122
if not an actual party, favourably disposed to the Court. 	 But, at
the same time as the archbishop was being rewarded with precedency
over the Chancellor in the Privy Council on 12 July 1626, 98 his
initiative was being mounted against a background of censure and
condemnation by an opposition, able to draw on aristocratic
sympathies, which viewed the royal programme as 'unlawful and
preiudicial to the libertie of the kingdom'.
99
	Although this
opposition was not as yet a coherent group, there was a growing
inclination among the nobility to vote with their feet rather than act
as mere pawns to be manipulated by directives from the Court.
Scottish nobles, including those serving as officers of state,
comprised twenty-two out of the forty-seven royal nominees to the
reconstituted Privy Council which first met on 23 March 1626.100
However, the attractiveness of that body as a medium for the exercise
of political power was not enhanced by the king's reshaping of central
government.	 Thus, attempts to increase the quorum for the Privy
Council to eight ordinary members, in addition to the Chancellor or
the President and officers of state, had to be modified by
January 1627, to nine councillors inclusive of leading officials.
Thereafter a return was made to the Jacobean quorum of seven.
101
Indeed, it was only the administrative loyalty of the experienced
councillors, especially Melrose, that ensured a measure of efficiency
in the unenthusiastic conduct of royal business in Scotland.
102
Moreover, reform in the structure of government was not
accompanied by any corresponding change in administrative attitudes.
Hence, the cliquish mentality which fostered personal rivalry and lack
of co-operation was in no small measure responsible for making the
prospect of solidarity between the Court and the Scottish
administration unobtainable.	 Thus Archibald, Lord Napier of
Merchiston, the Treasurer-Depute, was to find himself such an obstacle
to the machinations of factions within central government that he
regarded himself - not without a measure of justification - as being
consistently victimised.	 His opinion of his own 'invincible
integrity' was matched by comtemporary testimony that he was123
exceptional in failing to use his office as a means of augmenting his
estates.
103	Napier, however, was regarded by 1630 as 'one willful
foole' by William Graham, seventh earl of Menteith, then Lord President
of the Council who, along with Chancellor Hay in Edinburgh and Morton
and Roxburghe at Court, headed a clique which attempted to monopolise
royal favour.	 Having already dispensed with the services of
Nithsdale, this clique sought to remove Napier from the Exchequer by
altering a defective warrant of six years standing to implicate the
Treasurer-Depute 41ma1administration!104
For the political nation the most foreboding aspect of
Charles' inaugural programme of reform was the rationalisation of the
Exchequer.	 The offices of treasurer and treasurer-depute were
retained, but effective control over their accounting, along with the
functions of collector, comptroller and treasurer of new augmentations,
was invested in a permanent supervisory commission of the Exchequer.
105
Presidency of this reconstituted body for the management of royal rents
and revenues was entrusted to Archbishop Spottiswood whose guiding
precept was 'we live under a Kinge, quho will command with reason, and
be obeyed in that quhich he commandis'. 106	Mar, as Treasurer,
regarded this reform as counter-productive. His case rested not only
on a self-interested reluctance to accept the diminished powers of his
office, but on the experience of the 1609 commission of the Exchequer,
also headed by Spottiswood.	 The effectiveness of this precedent for
Charles' reform of the Exchequer was marred by the commissioners'
negligence in attending at Edinburgh.	 On the one hand, if Charles
sought to secure the diligent attendance of commissioners by a generous
allowance of fees and pensions, Mar feared 'that the charge may excede
the fruittis arising of thair travellis'.	 On the other hand, without
such allowances, 'thair is small hoipe off thair residence'.
107
At a
time when Charles was actively considering the example set by James VI
in his short-lived, but rigorous, experiment of 1596, of entrusting
fiscal management to the Octavians,
108 Mar's observations went
unheeded.	 For Charles' overhaul of the Exchequer set the scene
financially for the pursuit of his major design on Scotland, namely the124
Revocation Scheme.	 Indeed, the Exchequer was not reformed simply to
ensure that the Crown revenues were 'weele governed'.	 Primarily, the
commission was established as the necessary precursor for the
restoration of property and revenues which the king conceived to be
'unjustlie withholdin from our patrimonie'.	 Although Charles claimed
that the Revocation Scheme would ensure 'that we may have less cause to
burden our subjects', the finances of the Crown were to be improved at
the expense of the landed interest. 109	 Within a year of his
accession, therefore, Charles set the scene politically for the next
twelve years by promulgating a scheme 'wich zoilded no better fruit
then the alienatione of the subiectis hartes from ther prince, and
layed opin a way to rebellion'.
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Chapter IV	 The Act of Revocation 
On account of the minorities which had bedeviled Stewart
kingship, it had become an accepted constitutional tenet that a
sovereign, between his twenty-first and twenty-fifth year, could
retrospectively annul all grants of royal property, pensions and
offices made by any regency government prior to his majority.
1
	An
act of revocation could be used acquisitively, as well as for purposes
of reclamation, to suit the interests of the monarchy. 	 Thus James	 V
in 1537, on attaining his twenty-fifth year, claimed the prerogative,
both by canon law and the statutes of the realm, to revoke not only
all grants made by regencies during his minority, but also all grants
made through 'evil and false' counsel since he effectively began to
rule in person eleven years earlier.	 In practice this act, which was
subsequently ratified by the parliament of 1540, did not seek to
terminate rights to lands and property granted from the outset of his
minority in 1513.	 Instead, it became a means of exacting large sums
of money, by way of compositions, from all proprietors obliged to seek
ratification of their landed titles from the Crown.	 Moreover, it
helped raise the political temperature of the relations between the
monarchy and landed society for the remaining five years of James V's
.gn 2
rei.
Being in his twenty-fifth year at his accession, Charles I
had, on 14 July 1625, rushed through the registration of his intent to
effect a revocation of all grants from the royal patrimony, 'in
detriment and harme to our soule and conscience, prejudiciall to the
priviledge and fredome of the Crowne of Scotland'. 	 However, a
regency government had never acted in Charles' name.	 Furthermore,
less than four months had elapsed since his assumption of personal
rule: hardly sufficient time for the patrimony of the Crown to have
suffered materially from prejudicial counsel!	 It was only by a
deliberate obscuring of legal and moral rights that Charles was able to
claim an initial entitlement to review all gifts of any kind granted
out of the property and revenues of the Principality of Scotland,
either by himself in his minority, or by James VI 'as Prince of
Scotland, or as father and laughful administrator to us', or by his132
late brother Prince Henry.	 Thus Charles was transferring the
principle of revocation, as applied to the royal patrimony, onto the
particular domain of the Prince as heir-apparent.	 On the one hand, he
was extending the scope of his revocation to cover all alienations from
the Principality at least to the time when Henry preceded him in line
to the throne, and possibly even to the birth of his father in 1566 as
Prince of Scotland.	 On the other hand, Charles was asserting that a
revocation which affected part of the royal patrimony could not be
dissociated from the whole.	 Hence specific grants, 'hurtful to the
Principalitie', were to be interpreted as generally inimical to the
Crown.	 It was therefore a 'General Revocation' of all grants from
the property and revenues of the Crown for an indeterminate duration
which Charles had enacted through the Privy Seal on 12 October 1625.3
The lack of financial substance, indeed the vacuous nature of
such royal manoeuvres, can be revealed from a comparison of the
revenues of the Principality with those of the Crown in the last year
of James VI.	 The Treasury accounts from 1 March 1624 to 1 March 1625
disclosed that Charles received £704 13s 2d as prince, mainly fixed
income from 1A-duties.	 This sum amounted to no more that 0.55% of
the £127,365 9s 10-1d which James VI derived from the Crown lands.
Moreover, the only major alienation of property from the principality
during his father's reign would appear to have been the lordship of
Dunfermline which yielded, over the same period, revenues worth
£11,764 1s for the benefit of his mother, Queen Anne. 4
Nevertheless, Charles continued his authoritarian action,
justified by tortuous logic.	 On 26 January 1626, in the preamble to
his manifesto for the reformation of Scottish government, a revocation
was deemed necessary 'because his Majestie, not comeing to the crowne
in his minoritie, and so not haveing hurt the patrimonie thairof
himself, behooved for keiping of his royall praerogative to revoke
what his praedicessouris had done to the hurt of the samyne'. 5	In so
doing, Charles ignored the remonstrances of his Privy Council.	 On
17 November 1625, Charles was warned that a general revocation of133
alienated Crown property, 'except so far as concernis the
Principalitie', threatened to undermine, even annul, that security of
landed title bestowed by charter.	 Indeed, it was felt that 'no right
heirafter to be maid in the majoritie of kings could be valid'.
Moreover, any projected gain to the Crown should be outweighed by the
consideration that 'the trouble of your Majesteis subjectis is more
than all that by law can follow'.
6
	The fears aroused by the
revocation in Scotland were reiterated in consultations between the
Crown and leading counsellors at Whitehall on 7 January 1626. 	 The
Treasurer, James, earl of Mar, forlornly advised the king of the
general alarm among proprietors in Scotland, not only that rights given
by previous monarchs might be called into question, but also 'that itt
vas nott possibill that his Majestie himself could mak any richt unto
thaem bott quhat micht be called in question efter his dissess'.
Therefore, 'thay thocht thay ver in a vars caess than any subjectts in
the varld'.
7
Charles was not devoid of political sensibility.	 He had
delayed publication of his General Revocation until the Convention of
Estates had ended in November 1625.	 Nonetheless the initial
registration and enactment of the revocation in Scotland undoubtedly
'bred great feare of a great alteration to come'. 8	In particular, the
unprecedented and indeterminate extension of Charles' scheme can be
said to have 'sinned against the principle that long possession is
entitled to consideration for the sake of persons totally innocent of
the original wrong'.
9
	Within the context of his whole reforming
programme, the decision to press ahead with a scheme of revocation
committed Charles to a political course of action which verged on the
incongruous.	 His conduct of Scottish affairs thereby transgressed
the cardinal precepts of government laid down by Archibald,
Lord Napier, the Treasurer-Depute.	 His move towards conciliar
government had generally hampered, rather than promoted, the flow of
'true information' necessary for the conduct of 'affairs of remote
kingdoms'.	 His reasoning in favour of revocation specifically and
completely negated the admonition that 'Princes' letters and laws ought134
to be clear and perspicuous, without equivocal or perplexed sense,
admitting no construction but one'.
10
	Regardless of the reservations
within his Scottish executive, Charles bound up the act of revocation
with the reformation of government as 'al matteris of his meere
pleasure', it being his prime concern 'more then them al, to look to
the good of the kingdom'.	 Moreover, as archbishop Spottiswood
perceived, Charles was disinclined to accept informed criticism, 'his
Maiestie cannot take it wel to heare that the libertie of the kingdom
suld be made a pretext of refuising his demandis or directionis'.11
The act of revocation, being intrinsically bound up with the
exercise of the royal prerogative, was to be of fundamental
constitutional and political significance.	 More immediately, as
Charles made no attempt to clarify the extent and duration of his
intentions for almost seven months, a favourable reception for his
scheme in Scotland was prejudiced by alarmist rumours.	 In an attempt
to explain the true purpose of his revocation, Charles registered his
intended course of action in two letters to the Privy Council on
9 February and 21 July 1626.	 The former proclaimed his general
motivation, the latter specified the properties and revenues which
were to be subject to revocation.	 Public confidence in the Crown was
hardly restored by the complexities of the scheme.	 The interests of
the political nation became focused on the rights of property which
were directly affected in four main areas - teinds, heritable
jurisdictions, feudal tenures and kirklands.12
Charles was determined to uphold the princely direction of
the Christian Commonwealth.	 He asserted that his first concern was
to be the advancement of religion: namely, the furtherance of the
ideals of the Reformation for the provision of ministers nationwide and
the extension, wherever necessary, of education and poor relief 'in a
reasonle manner'.	 Such a programme had to be financed from the
teinds as the most obvious source of revenue available to the Kirk
throughout Scotland.	 However, the creation and extension of lordships
of erection in the later sixteenth century, which heritably secularised135
property of the Kirk, had confirmed the permanent appropriation of
vast resources of teinds at the expense of ecclesiastical interest.
13
Rather than rely on the 'cumbersome but workable system of stipends'
which combined pensions and revenues from diverse benefices,
14
 the
Commission 'anent the Plantatioun of Kirks' established by James VI in
1617 had proceeded on the principle that the teinds of each parish
should maintain the minister of that parish.	 To accord with the
decreasing value of money, the Commission had set out to raise the
stipendiary range, which had basically remained unaltered since 1561,
at a minimum of one hundred merks to a maximum of three hundred merks.
.	 a.
None of the augmented stipeT actually reached the revised maximum of
one thousand merks or ten chalders of victual.	 There was a marked
reluctance among the landed interest to reaportion teinds for stipends
in excess of the new minimum of five hundred merks. 15	No attempt was
therefore made to comprehensively implement a revised structure for
stipends.	 Yet complaints from ministers about inadequate personal
provision from the resources of the parishes, which had characterised
the presbytery records of the early seventeenth century, had all but
disappeared by 1625. 16	Moreover, impoverished ministers were afforded
indirect maintenance through relief from taxation, though this benefit
did depend on favourable recommendation by an archbishop or bishop.
According to the final accounts of the 1625 taxation, £27,202 14s 9d
was discharged for this purpose, amounting to an exemption of more than
five per cent from the total sums ordinarily levied.	 This
concessionary rate was to be repeated by corresponding relief of
£24,929 5s 10d in the 1630 taxation. 17	Hence, Charles had little
political mileage to gain from his proposal to establish, in the
interests of uniformity, a national review of ministerial stipends.
Furthermore there was little scope to implement any proposal
for a national structure of social welfare.
18
The relative poverty
and environmental diversity within Scotland had dictated a piecemeal
parochial response to the problems of poor relief.	 The financial and
moral assistance given to the poor was designed merely to supplement
the family resources of those whom the kirk session deemed deserving,136
not to provide indiscriminate sustenance for the needy and the
destitute.	 However, the basic provision of adequate parochial
schooling was generally regarded as a matter of 'greit necessitie'.
Thus, the support of the king for this ideal could be upheld against
any refractoriness among landowners who, in their capacity as heritors,
were primarily responsible for meeting the educational costs in rural
parishes.
19
	Within the burghs, some chaplainry revenues had, since
the Reformation, been directed towards the provision of salaries for
the masters of grammar-schools.	 Yet this was often done at the
expense of parochial self-sufficiency, for such allocations could
include teinds drawn from lands in neighbouring parishes.20
Unfortunately, Charles offered no national guide-lines for the funding
of education to help unravel local priorities between town and country.
Charles' most contentious area of concern was undoubtedly his
determination to regulate the practical control and disposal of teinds.
As a result of secularisation of the property of the Kirk, lords of
erection had heritably acquired, from the later sixteenth century, the
right to exercise the same titularship over teinds as enjoyed by lay
patrons in parishes where the teinds had not been appropriated by
ecclesiastical foundations during the middle ages.	 Thus, the right of
patronage with the titularship of at least the parsonage teinds of any
parish could be transmitted as heritable property and indeed even
mortgaged. 21	Indeed, this association of patronage and titularship in
Scotland did not go unrecognised by Charles when an analogy was drawn
with the parochial influence exercised by English impropriators.22
Since the disposal of teinds was geared to suit the convenience and
profit of the titulars, the whole process of collecting the teinds of
a parish from the estates of other landowners was fraught with
difficulties.	 Intransigence was particularly generated among heritors
obliged to pay teinds to absentee titulars or to tacksmen who were
non-residents in the parishes where they farmed teinds.	 The most
flagrant cause of friction was undoubtedly the annual incursion of
titulars and tacksmen on to the lands of the heritors.	 This could
degenerate into a perennial source of civil disturbance, especially as137
considerable annoyance was occasioned for the tenantry by delays in the
23
annual leading of teinds at the harvests.	 James VI, however, had not
been oblivious to the problems of public order arising from the legal
obligation on the heritor to preserve his crop intact for twenty days
after cutting, until the titular or tacksman had collected the teind.24
James shifted the burden onto the tacksmen and titulars to collect
their teind before it rotted from exposure or was eaten in the fields
by straying animals.	 For in 1617, parliament enacted that the heritor
and his tenantry could, upon four days notice to the titular or
tacksman, separate the teind from the rest of the crop eight days after
it had been harvested.	 On storing his own crop, the heritor was only
obliged to protect the teind for another eight days. 25	Nevertheless,
Charles deemed it his duty, on social grounds, to terminate the
existing practice of leading the teinds which he considered to be 'the
cause of bloody oppressionis, enmities, and of inforced
dependencies'.	 He proclaimed his intention to 'free the gentrie'
from their thirlage to the titulars, who were mainly drawn from the
ranks of the nobility by ensuring that every heritor should have the
right to purchase control of his own teinds.
26	This policy had the
undoubted advantage of allowing the heritor to lead his teinds at his
own convenience.	 Yet, Charles failed to appreciate that much of what
he conceived to be 'the grite disordouris and incommodities ariseing
about teyndis', could be attributed to the low incidence of
commutation in the collection of teind.	 By this practice, the
heritor retained the right to lead his own teinds by paying a monetary
composition to the titular or tacksman for the amount of his crop
which was apportioned as teind.
The Revocation Scheme was also directed against regalities
and heritable offices in local government which Charles regarded as a
further source of bondage for the gentry.	 On the one hand, the
heritable annexation of royal offices, particularly that of sheriff by
leading aristocratic families, was an undoubted abuse which prevented
the impartial harmonising of divergent local interests.	 On the other
hand, the heritable delegation to magnates of regalian courts carrying138
the right to try all crimes except treason, demanded their responsible
co-operation with the Crown in the adminstration of justice.	 For the
holders of regalities had the judicial privilege of excluding
justice-ayres and sheriffs from their bounds and the right to repledge
from the royal courts.	 Again James VI had anticipated Charles in
seeking to remedy abuses. From 1587, James had withheld the power of
repledging from justice-ayres when conferring regalian jurisdiction on
lordships of erection, thereby removing aristocratic maintenance of
kinsmen, associates and tenants, in serioug criminal actions.
27
	In
1617, James had appointed an itinerant commission to deal not only
with the heritable sheriffs in the counties, but also to treat with
the stewarts and bailies who heritably exercised jurisdiction over
property which had been annexed by the Crown.	 'Ane competent
satisfactioun' was to be offered for the surrender of each office.
Although there was no immediate drive by James to provide money for
compensation, heritable officials were persuaded over the next eight
years to vacate their posts.	 Not all the replacements, who were given
yearly appointments, proved efficient. 28
	But the Crown was becoming
able to exercise an annual right of review over local government.
Moreover, both James' reforming initiatives had the advantage of
gradually phasing out judicial malpractices.	 Charles was not content
with the pace of change.	 Convinced that the realigned control of
teinds went hand-in-hand with the better administration of justice, he
failed to realise that his indiscriminate attempts at reform
threatened to rend the traditional pattern of local government in
Scotland asunder.
The only time-limit specified at the outset of the Revocation
Scheme was the king's particular determination to reverse all changes
in feudal tenures since 1540 which had converted 'the ancient tenour of
ward and relieff' to that of 'blenshe and taxt warde'.	 Charles was
thereby articulating his opposition to the replacement of incidental
casualties, from wardship, marriage and non-entry,  by annual monetary
compositions.	 The fuller implementation of a monetary economy in the
course of the sixteenth century - as manifested by the popularising of139
feu-ferme during the secularisation of the kirklands - had induced the
commercialisation of ward and relief on secular estates.	 In
attempting to put back the clock - presumably to the revocation of
James V, Charles was again demonstrating his bias against commutation
of landholding dues and discriminating against the attempts of
landowners to regularise cash-flow in the management of their estates.
Fixed compositions were of particular benefit to the gentry whose
inherited monetary obligations had been devalued by inflation in the
later sixteenth century.	 Therefore, although Charles claimed to be
promoting the emancipation of the gentry, his intended reversion to
ward and relief threatened to terminate the regularity and convenience
of taxed ward.	 In the case of blenche-ferme, whose dues were usually
nominal, Charles was imperilling a feudal relationship which was more
a form of patronage than a financial burden.
Charles was blatantly attracted to this policy of reversion
because of its financial potential rather than its social benefit.
Reliefs in Scotland, in contrast to England, were never set at definite
rates but were scaled to the current rental of individual estates.
Hence reliefs, unlike fixed compositions, tended to be adjusted to
monetary depreciation when the landlord raised his rents. 	 Once an
estate held in ward passed into the custody of the king during a
minority he, as superior, could retain as well as raise the rents to
suit his own interests until the heir came of age. 29	Furthermore,
the king had the right to sell or gift the wardship and marriage of an
heir.	 The sale of custody provided the Crown with a ready source of
income, though it could also aggravate local rivalries if the
purchaser was a neighbouring landlord seeking to exploit a minority.
For the tenure of ward and relief left the estate and marriage of an
heir open to detrimental management.	 Nor was the gift of custody any
guarantee against such an eventuality, being essentially an alternative
form of patronage to the award of pensions to royal favourites.
Although Charles in the first year of his reign increased the revenue
which the Crown derived from reliefs, from £1,783 to £4,875 6s 8d, this
amounted to no more than 2.2 per cent of his ordinary revenues from140
Crown lands and customs.	 Moreover, this rise hardly offset the fall
in the Crown rents of £35,948 11s 81d over the corresponding period, or
his inherited liability of £75,717 6s 8d for pensions. 30
However, feudal tenures, like heritable jurisdictions, were
but secondary particulars in Charles' act of revocation.	 In a bid to
make his scheme acceptable to his Scottish subjects, Charles stated
that the main benefits he intended to derive from revocation would not
require 'extending it ony further then onlie aganis the Erectionis and
other dispositionis whatsomevir of landis, teyndis, 4knageis,
benefices, formarlie belonging to the Churche and since annexed to the
Crowne'. Charles' immediate priority, therefore, was to equip himself
with the constitutional pretext to annex to the Crown patrimony as much
of the alienated and dispersed revenues of the pre-Reformation Church
as possible, kirklands as well as teinds.	 Charles claimed to find the
necessary authorisation in his father's Annexation Act of 1587 which,
he maintained, gave the Crown undoubted right to all property of the
Kirk as 'universal patron of all Abacies, Priories, and all other
ecclesiastical Benefices'. 31	In so doing, Charles studiously ignored
the spirit and operation of his father's act. James VI, in order to
compensate for the impoverishment of the Crown and his own reluctance
to resort to taxation, had associated the Annexation Act with his
revocation.	 The act claimed to recall that part of the patrimony of
the Crown which had been alienated to the pre-Reformation church and
had been found, 'since the prorogation of the true Religion, to be
neither necessary nor profitable'. 32
	Ecclesiastical temporalities
were thereby subjected to parliamentary annexation for the benefit of
the Crown.	 But the underlying significance of the act rested on the
exceptions to this general principle of annexation.	 Property of the
Kirk already erected into temporal lordships was declared exempt.
This position was merely modified by the Act for the Restitution of
the Estate of Bishops which James VI had passed in 1606. 	 The removal
of episcopal temporalities from the scope of the Annexation Act led,
most notably, to the cancellation of the erection of the estates of
the archbishoprics of St Andrews and Glasgow in favour of the dukes of141
Lennox.	 Lordships erected from the property of monasteries and
priories remained unaffected.
33
	Moreover, Charles laid claim to the
teinds as part of the revocable property of the Kirk, thereby
discharging the Kirk's own claim on the teinds as inalienable
patrimony.	 Yet the exclusion of teinds from the Annexation Act of
1587 had been tantamount to recognition by the Crown  4 the
longstanding claim by churchmen that the teinds formed the 'especial
patrimony of the Church'.
34	Thus Charles' appeal to the precedent of
the Annexation Act did more to demonstrate the true personal and
autocratic tenor of the Revocation Scheme than to confirm the legal
validity of his intentions towards the lordships of erection.
Nevertheless, Charles was determined to press ahead, and even
to extend, his appeal to legislative precedent.	 As early as
February 1626, he asserted that his Revocation Scheme was to conform to
the most recent model - his father's act of 1587.	 When his scheme
eventually received parliamentary ratification in 1633, Charles was
content with a broad affirmation that it was to be of 'als great
effect in generall and speciall as any revocatione maid by any of his
Majesties predecessors befor the dait heirof contenit in the bookes of
parliament which in all heades clauses land] circumstances thairof ar
holdin as heir repeated'.	 Yet detailed comparison with the act of
revocation of James VI reveals not only minor and unremarkable changes
in order, but also subtle shifting in format and significant
alterations in content.
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In the first place, Charles defined more comprehensively the
nature of the property disposed and alienated from the patrimony of
the Crown.	 Rents and patronages of kirks, which had been annexed to
the offices of justiciar and sheriff, were deemed suitable subjects
for revocation.	 Again, when dealing with property formerly annexed,
but now alienated from either the Principality or the Crown, Charles
expanded his father's reference to 'ony rents landis or heretages'
into the fuller ecclesiastical and secular categorisation of, 'ony
rents lands lordscipes baronies heretages teinds patronages of kirk142
offices priviledges and uthers quhatsumever'.	 This pre-occupation
with the property of the Church recurred in his final clause of blanket
revocation.	 Where James had made a general revocation of anything
prejudicial to the privileges and patrimony of the Crown which had
occurred during his minority, Charles sought to revoke anything done by
himself, his father or any of his predecessors, to the hurt and
detriment of both the Crown and the Church.	 Secondly, not only was
the patrimony of the Church to be claimed as his special sphere of
action, but Charles also asserted his right to review retrospectively
any patrimonial grant which he conceived to be contrary to
parliamentary enactment.	 Thus, even though the effective rule of his
grandmother had terminated in 1567, he retained the clause whereby
James had claimed the right to review and revoke alienations made from
lands unannexed to the Crown, but personally held by Mary, queen of
Scots.	 Thirdly, in keeping with his claim to judge the enactments of
his predecessors during their majorities, Charles specifically
introduced a clause to reinterpret parliamentary legislation in
accordance with his own intentions.	 He, in turn, was only to be
judged by his royal successors.	 Moreover, the divergent contents of
Charles' revocation had first been highlighted as early as
17 January 1626, when the royal scheme was outlined at Court before a
specially summoned conference of Scottish privy councillors.	 Having
compared, article by article, the draft of Charles' act with that of
his father, the councillors were of the opinion that 'thaer vas so
grett differens as no subjectt could be seur of any inheritance vithin
the kingdom of Scotland doun be any of his Majesteis predicessors sen
King Fergus the First' - from whom Charles was reputed to be one
hundred and forty-seventh in succession.	 Should the scheme be
enacted through parliament, neither could 'his Majestie or any of his
successor kings mak thaem any securitie in tym cuming'. 36	The
detailed enactment of Charles' revocation was not materially affected
by this advice from leading members of the Scottish executive.	 Nor,
indeed, was parliamentary approval deemed an essential prerequisite for
the implementation of the whole scheme over the next seven years.143
In keeping with Charles' general style of government,
parliament was relegated to the role of a constitutional cipher.	 The
act of revocation demonstrated Charles' conception of parliament as a
forum for royal propaganda, where his schemes could be expounded but
not critically examined.	 Hence, his particular assault on the
lordships of erection could be sanctioned but not questioned.	 Charles
was determined that parliament underwrite the initiative he had taken
on the strength of his prerogative; namely, to negate the prescriptive
rights, the aristocratic privileges, and even the social advancement
for royal administrators, which had accrued from the secularisation of
kirklands.	 Thus, his act innovated in revoking all grants of
abbacies, as well as prelacies, 'in whole or in pairt temporalitie or
spiritualitie', or any other benefice 'quhairof the presentatione
sould pertein to his Majestie if the same wer not erected in a temporal
baronie lordschip or leving'.	 He went to embrace within his
revocation, 'all actes, statutes and dissolutiones of any of the saids
erected benefices lands or teind', on the grounds that 'the same is or
may be fund and verrified to the contrarie to the generall lawes actes
of parliament and statuits of the kingdom'. 37
When first defining his Scheme, Charles had made it clear to
Treasurer Mar in March 1626, that he expected the willing submission
of the lords of erection to his 'purpois concerning the Abbayes'.	 He
dispelled all protests that the interests of the lords and their
families would be 'greatly damnified' as the revocation was to be
accomplished by 'lawful demand' and 'reasonable consideration' would
be given for loss of property. 38	However, both the implementation of
the act of revocation and the rates of compensation for the
expropriated were to depend no more on the co-operation of the lords
than on the authorisation of parliament.
By the beginning of June 1626, Charles was taking preparatory
action for the compulsory enforcement of his Revocation Scheme.	 The
Exchequer was ordered to scrutinise all transfers of property, stopping
those affected by the Scheme, though Charles went on to state his144
preference for amending such peripheral aspects as changed tenures,
concealed duties and appropriated patronages by negotiation rather than
by legal proceedings.	 The Session was informed that in all suits
involving property which might come within the scope of the revocation,
its decisions were to be qualified by clauses allowing for later
actions of recovery by the Crown.
39
	On 14 June, the Lord Advocate,
Sir Thomas Hope of Craighall, was instructed to instigate summons
against all lords of erection.	 Yet it was not until 1 July that
Charles required Hope to consult with other selected advocates as to
the best means of effecting the Scheme through the courts.
40
	The
king's advocates were given eclectic instructions on 25 August, 'to mak
diligent search' of the official records and to discover all
legislation against erections and heritable offices and all grants of
property which were liable to revocation.	 Simultaneously, Charles
unveiled his intention to resort to the legal process of improbation
and reduction to nullify, individually, the titles of Scottish
proprietors.	 Every person claiming right to an erected lordship or to
a heritable office, who refrained from co-operating voluntarily with
the king's Revocation Scheme, was to be proceeded against 'without any
exception'.
41
	On the one hand, Charles was intending to utilise a
private process which compelled the existing possessor to come into the
royal courts and prove his title.	 On the other hand, the requirement
that each defender produce relevant charters and infeftments of
property of the Church or of heritable office was tantamount to a
public inquisition.	 Thus Charles, in order to gain his own way,
deliberately compounded his personal interest with that of the public
good.	 Furthermore, his standing on the letter of the law to promote
his 'just and necessary' interests entailed the premeditated
forestalling of the authority of parliament, the one institution which
could provide the broad basis of consent and agreement necessary to
implement his Scheme.
Though Charles was determined to enact his revocation, he had
no coherent strategy for the implementation of his Scheme. 	 He
attempted to cover up his lack of resolve by making concessions to145
appease public apprehensions.	 At the same time he oscillated between
voluntary co-operation and legal compulsion.	 He alleged that the
public proclamation of his motives, on 9 February 1626, had been
undertaken in order to 'breed no terrour nor scruple' in the minds of
his Scottish subjects. Five months later, when defining his final
objectives to the Privy Council on 21 July, he offered to compensate
all who would make a voluntary surrender of their revocable property
before 1 January 1627, 'being loathe that any of our goode subjectis
who will within the tyme prefixt accept of reasoun sould haif caus by
our meanis to suffer or complayne'.	 Reasonable recompense was to be
equated with whatever decision a Commission, personally appointed by
himself, considered expedient. 42	By the end of July tentative moves
were reputedly made to formalise such a Commission, which was to
consist of sixteen members drawn equally from the four estates.	 The
forum for discussion between interested parties which resulted, served
only as a target for sermons exhorting the general surrender of teinds,
delivered by ministers of Edinburgh who were seeking augmented
stipends.
43	A Commission to implement the Revocation Scheme
subsequently and fitfully operated for the remainder of the year.	 It
would appear to have amounted to no more than a committee of the
reconstituted Exchequer, not an independent tribunal.	 Indeed Charles'
commitment to any meaningful achievement by this Commission was
questionable.	 For, on 25 August, he had instructed the episcopkte
that until 'some solid course' be taken concerning the tacking of
teinds they should, as an example to secular titulars, set to every
heritor his own teinds once existing tacks had expired.	 Moreover, on
the same day, Charles had already issued instructions to his advocates
to institute summons of reduction and improbation.	 Two months later,
to appease fears that his intentions were either 'above law or the
right of our prerogative', Charles had his act of revocation registered
in the sederunt books of the Court of Session.	 To offset concern that
he was exploiting the law to his own advantage, Charles also conceded
on 29 October, 'a reasonable long tyme' for proprietors affected by the
Scheme to produce their titles.	 Direct recourse to legal action was,
however, only temporarily suspended.	 Charles remained resolved that146
ultimately, all interested parties could be legally compelled 'to
defend ther titles against us as well as against any of our privat
subjects'.
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The interests which were to be defended were considerable.
A measure of the extent to which economic standing was threatened by
the Revocation Scheme may be gleaned from the levies of ordinary
taxation in 1625, 1630 and 1633.	 Just under half of the total charge
on each occasion, 42.6 per cent, was apportioned to the proprietors of
ecclesiastical estates - episcopal as well as temporal lordships.45
Furthermore, the Scheme, by specifically attacking lordships of
erection, threatened to constrict social mobility by undermining the
propertied interests not only of the nobility but of all members of
landed society who had profited from the secularisation of the
kirklands.	 Politically, leading Scottish administrators rewarded with
temporal lordships were particularly discomfited, while the goodwill of
the nobility was generally dissipated.	 Charles' Scheme was to be less
sustained than the systematic attempts at social engineering undertaken
by the seventeenth century Russian czars, who sought to perpetuate a
'service-state' by governing through landowners, of a similar status to
the gentry, whose holdings were bureaucratically regulated according to
rank. 46	Like the Romanovs, Charles was to make the political
miscalculation of underestimating the atavistic desire of the nobility
to preserve the privileges of their class.
The blatant personal interest manifested by Charles in his
• • 8ke 
precipit us attack on lordships of erection and landed privileges led
to a delegation from the nobility, composed of John, sixth earl of
Rothes, Alexander, second earl of Linlithgow, and John, Lord Loudoun,
being dispatched to the Court at the end of November 1626.	 Their
objective was to try to prepare the ground for an accommodation with
the king. 47	Charles was unwilling to accept the overtures of this
delegation, whether communicated personally or by supplication.	 The
nobles had the support of leading administrators, such as
Secretary Melrose, for their proposal that a parliament be summoned to147
resolve the contention aroused by the act of revocation.	 Yet Charles
negated this option as he considered 'our desyres so just and fair and
the means we use so lawfull'.	 While he did not necessarily wish to
resort to 'debateing our titles in Law', his pre-occupation with the
Scheme made him unwilling to adopt any new course which might pre-empt
the work of the Commission which had been established to implement the
revocation.	 The Commission, however, had made little impact in terms
of voluntary co-operation.	 Only five lords had made approaches for
the surrender of their right and title to erections prior to the last
appointed day for proceedings, on 1 January 1627. 	 None had finally
settled.	 Initial compliance was not without difficulties in two
instances.	 In Fife, the feuars and tenants of James, Lord Coupar,
used his impending surrender as an excuse to withhold payment of their
feus and rents.	 The offer to surrender Coldingham by
Sir James Stewart led to the Crown stopping the legal action which the
feuars of the Berwickshire priory had taken against his superiority.
On another occasion, Lord Loudoun actually claimed to be exempt from
the scope of the Revocation Scheme since all the feuars within his
erection of Kylesmure, Ayrshire, had consented to his superiority.
Thus it was largely as a face-saving exercise that Charles had decided,
by 15 December 1626, to prorogue the Commission until 1 March 1627, in
order to afford a longer time for voluntary surrenders. 48
Charles was, however, able to make it appear that his plans
to renew the Commission had been carried out in response to the wishes
of the nobility.	 On 17 December, two days after his decision to
prorogue, he informed the delegation of three nobles that they would be
allowed an audience instead of being sent home, if they craved pardon
for their erroneous conduct and revised their petition, which he had
found 'as nather agrieing with the duetifulnes of loveing subjects,
nor with the modestie of humble supplicants'.	 The delegation having
positively responded, Charles announced on 17 January 1627, that he
was willing, in accordance with their revised petition, 'to grant a
Commission of new' to implement the Revocation Scheme by negotiation
rather than by compulsion.	 Nevertheless, though he granted a six148
month moratorium on legal proceedings in declaring that 'summondis of
Reduction and Improbation may sleep' till 1 July, he reserved the right
to prosecute all proprietors who did not voluntarily co-operate with
the Commission.	 Moreover, the renewal of the Commission afforded
Charles not only an alternative to the law-courts but also to
parliament.	 For Charles considered that the calling of a parliament,
to resolve the contentious aspects of the Scheme, was a last resort in
the event of failure on the part of the Commission. 	 He therefore took
the opportunity to remind his leading administrators, especially
Secretary Melrose, that continuing royal favour depended on their
contribution to the success of the Commission which would make the need
for a parliament superfluous.
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Furthermore, this revised strategy provided Charles with a
breathing space to work out the detailed mechanics of implementing the
Revocation Scheme.	 On 3 February 1627, on the grounds that he wished
both to avoid the delay and expense to the Crown which would be
occassioned by his individual pursuit of right and title through due
process of law, and to allay the 'preposterous feares causeleslie upon
our late Revocation', he proclaimed his Commission for Surrenders and
Teinds.	 Charles thereby published, for the first time, the powers
which were to serve as the model for subsequent renewals of the
Commission.
50
	In essence, he was attempting to implement the Scheme
by a negotiated accommodation with all affected parties.	 The present
possessors of 'unlawfullie acquired' property were to be given
'reasonable compositions', at rates determined by the Commission.
Particularly with respect to kirklands, distinction must be drawn
between those possessors of revocable property.	 Lords of erection,
who, as superiors, exercised feudal control over other men's estates,
were to be expropriated.	 Their feuars who, as proprietors, directly
managed their own estates, were to be granted security of title and to
hold their estates directly from the Crown.	 In short, rather than
attempt the full-scale revocation of title to which he was, in
principle, committed, Charles was now seeking, in practice, to realign
and renegotiate select rights of property.	 Nonetheless, the scope and149
powers of the Commission manifest that his ultimate objective remained
the economic advancement of the Crown, to which all notions of public
good and social concern propagated by his Scheme were subordinated.
Of all the functions of the Commission for Surrenders and
Teinds, priority was given to the valuation of properties affected by
the act of revocation.	 Valuations of temporal lordships were to be
based on current rentals in order that superiors could be compensated
for expropriation and that proprietors could negotiate the purchase of
secure title.	 The actual compensation given to the temporal lords,
for the loss of their superiorities was to be in proportion to the
amount of duty annually paid to them by their feuars.	 The Commission
were to determine this specific ratio which, in turn, governed the
amount each proprietor had to pay for the privilege of a secure title.
For the amount of money available for compensation was to depend on the
willingness of feuars of kirklands to be quit of superiority.
Alternatively, if feuars did not desire to hold their property direct
from the Crown, the possibility was left open that the superiorities of
the temporal lords could be confirmed afresh, 'for a yearly increase of
rent to our Crowne'.	 As well as the surrender of superiorities, the
Commission was also to supervise the resignation of heritable
jurisdictions which were to remain permanently annexed to the Crown and
thereby suppressed.	 Compensation was again to be left to the
discretion of the Commission. In addition, the Commission was to
devise an indeterminate means of composition whereby feudal tenures
might be altered 'to the same estate [wherei]n they were before the
same were taxed and changed'.
Such a package - borne out of the Crown's desire to make the
most prominent aspects of the Scheme self-financing - was not without
its complexities.	 This situation is particularly borne out by the
lordships of erection.	 On the one hand, temporal rights over the
property of the Kirk were to be terminated.	 Yet the offer of
compensation to the lords of erection for the loss of their
superiorities was an admission that there had been a measure of150
validity in their prescriptive exercise of these rights.	 On the other
hand, lords of erection stood to have their resources decimated by the
expropriation of lands not directly held by them as property.	 Yet it
was also possible, becuase of deferential ties of kinship and local
association, that their feuars would not buy out their superiorities.
In such an eventuality, the lords would only be stripped of their
privileges of heritable jurisdiction. 	 But again Charles was primarily
concerned to terminate the public rights of justice exercised by
regalities, not to deprive the lords of their private rights of estate
management, customarily exercised through the barony court.	 Thus, the
temporal lords' rights of superiority and their baronial jurisdiction
were open to confirmation by the renegotiation of what had hitherto
been irredeemable and unalterable; namely the conditions of
hereditary landholding as specified by charter from the Crown.
Elaboration of the powers of the Commission failed to provide
final clarification of the potential ambiguity of royal intentions
towards the lordships of erection.	 In the interests of the gentry,
the predominant class among the feuars of kirklands, Charles stated
that he did not intend 'to quarrell or annull' any title or confirmed
feu of kirklands either set by 'the ancient titulars' - namely by
abbots, priors and even lay commendators, or subsequently bought over
or set by the lords of erection before 12 October 1625; the inaugural
date of the Revocation Scheme.	 Charles intimated that this concession
was to be made without any reduction in the yearly feu-duties.	 Thus
by holding directly from the Crown, 'without diminution of the
rentall', the feuars' rights of property were apparently to be
guaranteed at the expense of the superiorities of the temporal lords.
The lords, however, were to be allowed to retain their mansions and
immediate surrounds in return for nominal feu-duties to the Crown.
All demesne lands which had not been directly feued were to be
confirmed to them for 'reasonable feu deuties' at the determination of
the Commission.	 Thus the landed resources of the temporal lords,
outwith the demesne which they were to retain as property, were
apparently to depend on the desire of their feuars to hold directly151
from the Crown.	 The transfer of temporalities was limited to the
purchase of superiority, exclusively by the feuars, 'the present
possessors and to none others'.
The implementation of the Revocation Scheme, therefore,
committed the Crown neither to the wholescale annexation of kirklands
nor to the creation of an open market in temporalities. 	 Yet certain
vital questions remained unanswered.	 Did lack of inclination on the
part of the gentry and other feuars to buy out the rights of
superiority over their lands ensure the retention of these rights by
the lords of erection?	 Could the Crown claim that transfers of title
entailed the payment of new entry fees for the alteration of
proprietary rights in favour of the feuars as current possessors?
Finally, as Charles had intimated only that he would not decrease
yearly rentals, could he augment the feu-duties of those feuars who
came to hold directly of the Crown through the purchase of
superiorities?	 Thus by creating and leaving such incongruities
unresolved, Charles was politicising the traditional avenues of social
advancement for a society which regarded land as its main basis of
wealth and status.
Indeed, in creating such incongruities, Charles exposed the
real threat of his Revocation Scheme.	 Landholding rights, rather than
simply being sanctioned and legitimised by the office of monarchy, were
henceforth to be made attendant on the personal whim of the incumbent
king.	 Moreover, the revocation of the rights of superiority,
conceived mainly at the expense of the nobility, was intended to create
a source of revenue for the Crown.	 The gentry, as feuars, were not
only expected to pay a composite sum for their security of title which
would, at the least, finance the compensation for the expropriated
temporal lords.	 But the gentry were also faced with the possibility
of higher annual duties in return for the privilege of holding their
property direct from the Crown.	 Furthermore, the pervasive nature of
feuing throughout landed society, involving the distinction between
superiority and property, meant that any attempt at revocation, even if152
restricted to kirklands, would entail an onerous inquisition into legal
titles and contractual conditions.	 Since the gentry individually
lacked the widely based resources of the nobility, such an inquisition
could only serve to intensify their current fears about security of
tenure, especially among those whose landed status was primarily based
on secularised kirklands.	 Charles, therefore, was paying no more than
lip-service to the interests of the gentry. 	 Simultaneously, his
deliberate confusion of public interest and personal advantage provoked
a credibility gap which was ultimately to lead to the separation of the
office of monarch from the personage of the king.
The next major category of powers of the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds - in itself an indicator of the lesser priority
accorded to the welfare of the Kirk - was covered by the requirement
'to make sufficient provision' for the sustenance of the ministry and
of ecclesiastical services.	 An adequate basis for the implementation
of these objectives was to be ensured by the re-distribution of teinds
within each parish and, where necessary, by the re-drawing of
geographical boundaries between neighbouring parishes.	 Coupled to
this programme was Charles' desire to commence the dissolution of
titularships by encouraging heritors to purchase their own teinds.	 At
the same time, Charles sought to effect the proposal at which he had
first hinted in his edict to the Privy Council, on 21 July 1626, and
which was to become a besetting pre-occupation in his continued pursuit
of the Revocation Scheme.	 His intention to secure 'a competent
maintenance' for the Crown that 'we may be less burdenable to our
subjects
,
,
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 now materialised as an annuity from the teinds. Though
the rate of the annuity had still to be determined, the Commission was
authorised to take sureties that this royal benefit would be respected
by each heritor as the possessor of a permanent interest in teinds and
by all tacksmen for the duration of their current leases.
Because of its remunerative potential, the implementation of
the royal annuity from the teinds was of paramount importance.	 Should
the gentry and other proprietors, in their capacity as heritors, fail153
'to provyde themselves for the better buying of their owne teynds'
before the expiry of the Commission, the titulars were to have their
existing rights confirmed, 'for such a reasonable yeerely rent to our
crowne' as the Commissioners thought expedient.	 Failure on the part
of the titulars to ensure that their teinds were to be valued was to be
met by legal annulment of their rights of control - with expropriation
by parliamentary enactment an optional procedure.	 Inherently,
therefore, the establishment of machinery for the compulsory valuation
of teinds in every parish came within the scope of the Commission.
Such a proposition was more complex than the mere acceptance of
feu-duties and current rentals.	 For it was not an infrequent practice
that the annual dues paid to landlords, by both feuars and tenants,
had the teinds indiscriminately compounded with the other liabilities
of stock and crop.
Since the complexities of identifying teinds could only be
achieved by a thorough investigation of landholding dues in every
parish, for the purposes of assessment and comparison, no equitable
valuation could be accomplished without every titular and heritor
presenting their charters and rent-rolls before the Commission.
Charles' assertion, that landowners were neither bound to submit nor
comply with the valuations of the Commission, was therefore spurious.
The need to secure 'future voluntare aggrement or approbation' for
parochial valuations from landowners was merely an excuse to justify
his restriction on the Commission, that no final conclusion, for
either surrenders or teinds, was to be made until royal approval had
been given.	 This reservation was hardly conducive to the fostering of
administrative confidence or initiative, especially as Charles'
creation of the Commission had sufficed as a means of devolving
opprobium for the implementation of the Revocation Scheme.	 Charles
had equipped the Commission with the machinery to overthrow, in the
interests of uniformity, a system which had evolved by long use and
practice for the sale and transfer of kirklands and teinds.	 Thus the
scope of the Commission served only 'to disturb and confound the whole
business', for his officials as well as his subjects. 52	In154
particular, compulsory valuations and supervision of compacts between
titulars and heritors helped crystallise dissent within the Scottish
localities to the actual operation of the Commission.
Although the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds, issued on
3 February 1627, was intended as a practical demonstration of Charles'
authority at the expense of aristocratic interests, its initial
composition did not seek to discriminate against the nobility. 	 Of the
sixty-eight persons drawn from the four estates, the nobles and gentry
dominated, with twenty-two and twenty-four nominees respectively, the
latter consisting of a greater proportion of royal officials. 	 Ten
bishops, as ecclesiastical agents of the Crown, represented the clergy.
The burgesses were in their accustomed subordinate role with ten	 t
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commissioners. 53	The Commission's authorisation to sit -permanently 
for at least five months implies that Charles had conceived it as
another aspect of conciliar government. 	 As a deliberate and executive
body it was to work with, but independent of, the Privy Council.	 The
Commission and the Council had only twenty-seven members in common.
However, the Commission's requirement for a quorum, of no more than
three from each estate to be present, seems to indicate declining
confidence at the Court in the practicability of this separate
conciliar objective.	 The provision that the Commission's proceedings
be given final ratification in parliament amounted to no more than a
routine courtesy, formalising whatever royal policy had decreed.	 As
a further inexpensive concession to constitutionalism, parliament
retained the right to sanction any alienation from the reconstructed
patrimony of the Crown.
While Charles' act was exclusively applicable to Scotland,
the principle of revocation was not unique within the broader
perspective of Europe.	 A direct contemporary parallel with his Scheme
was the Edict of Restitution issued in 1629 by the Holy Roman Emperor,
Ferdinand II, which decreed that all property sequested by Protestant
princes or cities since 1552 be restored to the Roman Catholic Church.
This was not simply a religious issue, but a vast financial transaction155
from which the emperor sought a remunerative return.	 Indeed it was
tantamount to 'an unprecedented assault' on the political structure of
Germany.	 For Ferdinand, on behalf of his imperial prerogative, sought
to establish his right to interpret and revise the acts of the imperial
diet, untramelled by any need to consult that legislature. 	 His
attempt to seize authoritarian powers, which went against the grain of
the inured particularism of the German princes, led to their immediate
formation of a common-front regardless of religious affiliations. 	 By
1630, Ferdinand was forced to abandon his claims completely, though the
potential catastrophic consequences to landholding within the Empire
undoubtedly helped propel the Thirty Years War . , 'into its bitterest
and most destructive phase1.54
Charles, therefore, was not alone in his preference for
revolution by decreet rather than evolution by prescription.	 The
promulgation of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds, on the
strength of his prerogative, was consistent with the whole tenor of
the Revocation Scheme.	 For Charles stressed that the work of
implementation was to progress solely on royal authority.	 In so doing
he, as an absentee monarch, critically underestimated the vested
interests of the nobility in seeking to retain the 'status quo'; the
constitutional frustrations aroused by his failure to seek a broad
parliamentary basis of agreement and consent; and above all, the
political dynamite inherent in the threat or rumour of wholescale
expropriation.156
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Chapter V	 The Implementation of the Revocation Scheme: 
The Promotion of Class Antagonism, 1627-29 
The Covenanting Movement was directly precipitated by the
riotous reception accorded to the reading of the Service Book in the
churches of Edinburgh on ?3 July 1637.	 Yet opposition to liturgical
_.ttl_e—r1U1An innovation was	 a rallying cry for Scots discontented
with the personal rule of Charles I. By promulgating the Revocation
Scheme and then attempting its implementation through the Commission
for Surrenders and Teinds, Charles was to lose the confidence of the
landed classes: an occurrence of critical significance in a society
in which political leadership was customarily deferential to social
position.	 Indeed, Charles himself came to realise that the
inauguration of this commission, following his act of revocation, was
the next occasion for 'sowing the seeds of sedition and discontent'.
1
From its first meeting on 1 March 1627, the Commission for Surrenders
and Teinds was to prove a major determinant on Scottish politics for
over a decade.	 Final notification of its suspension, on Charles' own
initiative, pre-dated the riots in Edinburgh by only eleven days.
2
The most salient aspect governing the fitful and intermittent
working of this Commission was the 'reluctance and dilatoriness of all
parties connected with its administration'.
3
	Charles launched the
Commission on the assumption that its role was to supervise a
systematic national valuation of superiorities and teinds and to
oversee their subsequent sale and redistribution.	 Not only did the
Commission fail to establish promptly its own ground-rules for the
conduct of either valuations or sales,
4 but Charles took two and a half
years before specifying the financial rates at which the Revocation
Scheme was to be implemented.	 It was not until 18 September 1629,
when four separate determinations were combined in a legal decreet,
that public proclamation was made of the composition and satisfaction
to be given to the lords of erection for the surrender of their
superiorities and teinds and the competent rate and price to be paid
by heritors, 'desyrous to have the right and title of thair awin
landis'. 5	The reasons for this particular hiatus must be sought in
the fundamental weakness of absentee kingship as well as Charles'
desire to capitalise on divergent interests within landed society.161
From the outset of his reign Charles had failed to compensate for the
loss of the Scottish Court and his own unfamiliarity with Scottish
affairs by the assiduous promotion of a royal interest among the
political nation.	 He was not readily prepared to dispense patronage.
He neglected public opinion.	 Above all, his aversion to pragmatism
militated against the achievement of a Scheme which amounted to the
sponsorship of class antagonism by the Crown.
The lack of any clear sighted royal strategy to secure the
co-operation of all parties affected by the Revocation Scheme was to
remain the foremost defect to the operation of the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds.	 Not only was the principle of revocation
inherently contentious, but the scope of the Commission's inquiry into
landed title was both fractious and fraught with legal complexities.
Yet Charles did not see fit to instruct his advocates to retain a
watching brief over the Commission to ensure its harmonious working
until 11 April 1627 - six weeks after the examination of revocable
title had formally commenced.	 A further three weeks were to elapse
before Charles established an official channel of communications
between the Court and the Commission.	 Sir Archibald Aitchison of
Glencairny, a senator of the College of Justice and recently created
remenbrancer of the Exchequer, was appointed to the Commission as the
king's liaison officer on 3 May.
6	In the meantime, however,
dissension among the membership, based on antagonism between the
constituent classes, was visibly prejudicing the working of the
Commission.
From the outset of the Commission the gentry and the clergy
mounted a combined assault on the interests of the nobility.	 By
6 March 1627 - before the Commission had been operational for a week -
the earl of Melrose, a prominent lord of erection as well as the
Secretary of State resident in Scotland, was articulating the fears of
a nobility on the defensive.	 Class antagonisms threatened to make
'the commissioners exercise turne to passionat contention, stirre up
dislikes and emulations, and dissolve the commissioun'.	 For the next162
two months he lobbied the earls of Roxburghe and Morton to use their
influence at Court in the interests of their class.
His immediate objectives were twofold. 	 Heritors were not to
be allowed to gain the teinds of their own lands without giving full
compensation to the titulars.	 Commissioners for the gentry had
suggested that teind-buyers offer partial compensation to the titulars,
'paying onlie of the teind of the frie rent': that is, the teind
remaining for the heritors' own use after payment of the ministers'
stipends and the king's annuity.	 Such raising of expectations among
teind-buyers was deemed to be in keeping with the unwarrantable
activities of the commissioners of the gentry.	 Although the
traditional solidarity of landed society was threatened  by their
'indiscreet renting', Melrose remained confident that the nobility
'will ever be the head under the king in this Monarchie'.	 His next
priority was to ensure that no preferential treatment was accorded to
the clergy, especially in the disposal of teinds.	 The financial
burden on both titulars and heritors was not to be increased by the
Commission liberally augmenting stipends or by dividing large parishes
or even by disjoining parishes united by the Commission for the
Plantation of Kirks in 1617.	 He was determined to resist all clerical
endeavours to have the lands and teinds which they retained in their
own hands exempted from the remit of the Commission for Surrenders and
Teinds. He considered it imperative, 'for the gentreis ease', that
heritors were to have unimpeded access to the bishops' superiorities
and teinds, even if, in the case of teinds, this only amounted to a
right to commute payments in kind.	 As regards the disposal of
superiority, he maintained that it would not be 'equetable if the
bishops sall remaine superiores, and noble men declared uncapable to
possess superioriteis'.	 He was confident, however, that the alliance
between the gentry and the clergy would prove transient.	 Not only
were the clergy suspected of seeking to destroy the temporal lordships
created by James VI, but their commissioners were patently unwilling
to grant the heritors rights to their own teinds or, indeed, concede
that any but churchmen had rights to such spirituality, 'which may163
sometime make our gentlemen repent too late to have rent their own
bodie to Joyne with the Churchmen who being ever thought greedie when
they were single and without burding, what liberalie may be expected
from them to any but to ther wyfe and children'.
7
Another nobleman, Lord Loudoun, was no less vituperative in
attributing sole responsibility for obstructive behaviour to his ten
episcopal colleagues on the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds.	 He
informed Morton on 7 April 1627 that the king's right to an annuity
from the teinds and the heritors' right to the teinds of their own
lands had only passed by a plurality of votes although the
commissioners for the nobility and the gentry had unanimously consented
to both measures.	 He and the other representatives of the landed
classes were prepared to concede that the royal patrimony should be
increased by a yearly - albeit unspecified - return from the teinds.
Likewise, though he was sceptical of the need to liberate the gentry
from the 'alledgit bondage of the tithes', he was not averse to
heritors acquiring a perpetual entitlement to their own teinds in
return for a reasonable satisfaction to the existing titulars.	 The
bishops, however, had contended that the king's annuity should only be
exacted from the teinds of temporal lordships and they continued to
oppose the sale of teinds to heritors by churchmen. Indeed, the
bishops were reputedly determined that 'gentrie haldeing of thame
should still remane subject to thair rigorous teinding and forced
dependencies'. Thus, Loudoun beseeched Morton to use his influence
at Court to ensure that the bishops 'prevaill not in vilipending our
richtis and pas frie thamselfis'.
8
The nobility were further discomfited by the discriminatory
treatment meted out to them by the Crown.	 Unlike the gentry, the
nobility were not licensed to convene together during the first session
of the Commission to formulate a common policy towards the Revocation
Scheme and to elect representatives to promote their interests at Court
through a personal audience with the king.	 Moreover, as Melrose
pointed out to Morton on 21 April 1627, the episcopacy could treat164
together at will and appoint synodical assemblies, in addition to the
twice monthly presbyteries, to consult with the rest of the clergy.
Charles was also prepared to receive personally formal lobbying by the
bishops on behalf of the Kirk. 9	Charles, however, saw no immediate
need to accommodate the separate interests of the nobility, even though
they were the class most materially disadvantaged by the Revocation
Scheme.	 On 3 July, he informed Chancellor Hay that only those nobles
whose interests in teinds lay more with the gentry, as buyers, than
with the titulars, as sellers, were to be allowed to convene and
consult with other heritors to facilitate the purchase of their own
teinds.
10
Nevertheless, Charles was obliged that same day to extend
indefinitely the first session of the Commission for Surrenders and
Teinds beyond its initial deadline of 1 August 1627. Only eight -
about a quarter - of the temporal lords had voluntarily submitted their
superiorities and teinds to the determination of the Commission.	 Of
these lords, five were already commissioners and John Maitland, first
earl of Lauderdale was duly appointed orito the Commission after his
submission.
11
These volunteers did not compose a vanguard of
courtiers or a concerted king's party resolved to set an example to
other nobles.	 They were individually seeking to achieve favourable
terms by prompt submission.	 Lauderdale had initially appeared willing
to accept compensation at the rate of £1,000 for every MOO of feu-duty
itemised as rental from his superiority.	 Melrose complained to
Roxburghe on 7 April that this proposed rate not only prejudiced his
own submission but would also prove 'a hurtfull example' to members of
their class 'who may not so well sell cheape'.
12
	Nonetheless, the
Commission reaffirmed on 29 June that the rate of compensation was to
be one thousand merks for every one hundred merks of feu-duty: that
is, superiorities were to be purchased by the Crown at a price
equivalent to ten years rental. This was the same purchase price
originally offered to Lauderdale, though the monetary denominations
were altered from pounds to merks.
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During the summer of 1627, while the purchase for
feu-duties awaited royal ratification, the quantification and costing
of the Revocation Scheme's directives for the redistribution of teind
were debated but not resolved by the Commission.	 In order to
harmonise the divergent interests occasioning such irresolution,
Charles held discussions at Court not only with deputations from the
clergy and the teind-buyers, but also with representatives from the
teind-sellers - namely, Lord Balmerino and Sir John Stewart of
TraquKair (later lord then first earl thereof).	 Neither had made a
voluntary submission of their superiorities and teinds to the
determination of the Commission.	 Moreover, Traq0'air, though a
commissioner, had been censured by Charles I in March 1626 for
organising opposition among the gentry to the precedence accorded to
the knight-baronets of Nova Scotia over the rest of their class.
Traquplair, along with Balmerino, was again censured on 4 August 1627.
Charles considered that their mandate from the teind-sellers was
inadequate, criticising them for their personal incapacity to make a
collective submission on behalf of the titulars that all unresolved
quantification and costing of teind be left to the arbitration of the
Crown.	 A deadline of 1 September was set for Balmerino and Traq4P(air
to acquire the requisite authorisation from the teind-sellers.	 As no
provision was made for a convention of teind-sellers, the titulars had
to give their assent individually.	 The only temporal lords who
promptly assented were Lauderdale, Melrose (now earl of Haddington) and
Roxburghe (though he still had not made a voluntary submission of his
superiorities and teinds to the determination of the Commission).
Other titulars did apparently communicate their willingness to submit
to royal arbitration throughout September.	 Thus, Traq4Wair
successfully rehabilitated himself at Court by his endeavours as an
intermediary.	 The teind-sellers did have a financial incentive to
concur with royal wishes.	 On 10 August, Charles had placed an embargo
on the leading of teinds from that year's crop, a reward for the
teind-buyers since their deputation to Court had 'absolutely submitted
themselves' to royal arbitration'. 14166
The Commission for Surrenders and Teinds having been
prorogued since late summer, Charles instructed his advocates on
30 September to draw up a general submission to which all interested
parties were to subscribe their assent to royal arbitration. 	 Failure
to comply by 1 December 1627 was to be met by individual prosecutions
at the instigation of the Crown.	 Charles' resort to a policy of legal
compulsion to implement the Revocation Scheme was publicly proclaimed
by an edict of 9 October. The titulars, as designated teind-sellers,
and the heritors, as prospective teind-buyers, were both instructed to
appoint advocates to negotiate the format of the general submission
with the king's advocates by 8 November.	 The general submission was
to be reinforced by 'ane legall decreit or declaratioun' publicising
the outcome of the royal arbitration for the redistribution of teinds
as well as the surrender of superiorities.	 There was, however, no
apparent prospect of prompt arbitration as Charles directed that the
format of the decreet should leave 'ane blanke for suche things as ar
intruisted to be filled up by us'.	 Furthermore, the Commission, when
recalled, was not 'to meddle' in anything other than the 'tryell of
rent'.	 The Commission was thus debarred from costing as well as
quantifying the redistribution of the teinds and, indeed, from
compensating prescriptive rights of property. 	 Its functions were
relegated to those of a debating chamber and a valuation agency.
Hence, Charles was again stressing the ultimate dependence of landed
title upon the discretionary powers of his prerogative. 15
When the Commission was recalled on 16 November 1627, its
sittings were largely taken up with the format of the general
submission, deliberations lasting well beyond the deadline for
subscriptions on 1 December.	 For it was not until 17 January 1628
that Charles had determined upon a suitable format which would 'stand
with law and justice'.	 The lords of erection were charged to appear
before the Privy Council in Holyrood on 20 February and, by their
subscription, submit the surrender of their superiorities and the
redistribution of their teinds to royal arbitration. 	 The king did not
dispatch the general submission to Scotland until 12 February, after167
select lords and other interested courtiers had made their
subscriptions in his presence.	 At the same time, Charles was
attempting to stage an 'effectual' submission within Scotland by
managing the compliance of 'some noblemen cheefly interested' -
including such royal favourites as the marquis of Hamilton, then in
self-imposed exile from the Court - who were to subscribe the
submission before it was formally lodged with the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds.	 Charles' main agents for this purpose were
William Graham, seventh earl of Menteith, president of the Privy
Council, and the earl of Haddington (formerly Melrose), now regarded
by the king as his chief instrument on the Commission and the leading
example to others 'not so deiplie interested' in the work of
revocation.	 However, despite Charles' assurance that arbitration
would proceed 'so fairlie and equitable as no man sail have cause to
compleane'; despite his managerial efforts to effect a fulsome
subscription; and despite his lack of tolerance for defaulters, 'we
will not any longer defer in causing all diligence for tryeing our
title in a legall maner'; there was no rush to make submission on the
part of the nobility. 16
Charles, therefore, decided upon a further tactical
variation by 28 February 1628.	 On the excuse that the centralised
collation of subscriptions in Edinburgh would be 'verie fashous and
expensive', select noblemen were commissioned as royal agents within
the shires to receive the subscriptions of the teind-sellers to copies
of the general submission.	 By 22 April, however, when the subscribed
copies were due to be returned to the Privy Council, only nine out of
the twenty-two commissions were produced from the shires and of these,
only three contained unqualified submissions.
17	Thus, reports that
the great majority of the nobles submitted to royal arbitration cannot
be substantiated - other than as the product of wishful thinking at
Court during the spring of 1628.
18
Nonetheless, the reserved response of the teind-sellers in
subscribing copies of the general submission did serve to divert168
attention from, as well as reflect on, the Crown's inability to settle
on the format of the legal decreet which was to publicise the royal
arbitration.	 Indeed, Charles had few positive notions on how teind
liable to redistribution was to be costed and quantified or how
surrendered superiorities were actually to be compensated. 	 On
29 December 1627 he had deemed it unnecessary that a clause be inserted
into the decreet prescribing a timescale for heritors to complete the
purchase of their own teinds.	 Until the purchase rate eventually
decreed by arbitration was fulfilled, the titulars' profitable control
of teinds was to continue.	 Moreover, though Charles agreed in
principle on 19 February 1628 to the earl of Linlithgow's proposal to
relinquish his titularship, he expressed concern lest the general
process of arbitration be prejudiced by any freelance sale of teinds to
heritors. In the hope of co-ordinating the conclusion of arbitration
to the revised deadline for compulsory subscription, the teind-sellers,
as well as the teind-buyers and the clergy, were invited on 27 March to
send representatives to Court to advise on the final drafting of the
legal decreet prior to publication on 23 April.	 Again, no significant
progress resulted.
19
Indeed, the cumulative impact of class antagonism, the resort
to legal compulsion and the tardiness of royal arbitration contributed
to the spread of disillusionment about the whole course of the
Revocation Scheme within central government as well as the political
nation.	 Thus, a meeting of the Commissioners for Surrenders and
Teinds summoned for 4 June 1628 proved inquorate and had to be
postponed until 14 July.	 In the interval, advice filtering through
to Court from leading Scottish counsellors, persuaded Charles on
30 June to prorogue the implementation of the general submissions until
31 December 1629.	 This eighteen month moratorium on the surrender of
superiorities and the redistribution of teind was conceded to afford
Charles more time for serious consideration of the actual format and
specific contents of his legal decreet. Yet it was also an admission
that the king had underestimated the complexity of the issues referred
to arbitration, a process 'of soe great weight and consequence, and to169
concerne so neirlie the privat estate of the most parte of our
subiectis in particular, and the publique good of that our antient
kingdome in generall'.
20
Although the moratorium meant that the implementation of the
general submission was prorogued for eighteen months, the requirement
that all parties affected by the Revocation Scheme should subscribe
copies of the general submission was not prorogued.	 At the end of
June 1628, the earl of Menteith had delivered to the Crown the
subscribed copies of the general submission, together with a list of
those who 'ather by absence, infirmitie or some other excuse' had not
yet subscribed.	 Despite Charles' claim that the copies had been
subscribed 'by the most and greatest nomber of our subjects', he
continued to insist on compulsory subscription.	 Defaulting
teind-sellers were charged on 14 July to subscribe the general
submission in the presence of the Privy Council before 10 September,
or face prosecution at the instigation of the Crown.	 Moreover, this
threat of prosecution was reiterated on 26 August against all who had
subscribed but had qualified their submission.	 Again, there was no
rush among d
-
efaulters to comply with this revised deadline.	 Thus,
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the earl of Loudoun was threatened with prosecution by Charles on
16 September for having reserved his rights of superiority over
kirklands in Ayrshire when subscribing the general submission.	 On
11 November, the king instructed the Lord Advocate, Sir Thomas Hope of
Craighall, that he 'persew be course of law' all who had refused to
subscribe or had qualified their submission.	 Simultaneously, the
royal agents commissioned to receive subscriptions within the shires
from tne teind-buyers were ordered to ascertain the names of all
defaulting teind-sellers. It would appear, therefore, that there was
still a widespread antipathy towards compulsory subscription among the
nobility. 21
Charles had become particularly conscious of antipathy to
the course of the Revocation Scheme during the summer of 1628.
Notwithstanding their subscription to the general submission, lords of170
erection were threatening action through the courts to dispute the
validity of their feuars' titles.	 If the feuars could be expropriated
judicially, their kirklands would come under the direct management of
the lords of erection.	 In the process, the lords' rights of
superiority would be converted into rights of property which were not
subject to revocation and, therefore, outwith the scope of the general
submission.	 Understandably, Charles regarded such technical
manipulation of landed title as an attempt to defraud the Crown. 	 Yet
the process which the lords of erection were seeking to implement -
the summons of improbation and reduction - was the same which Charles
was threatening to use to enforce their compliance with the Revocation
Scheme.	 Nevertheless, when Charles debarred the lords of erection
from such a recourse to law for their own private advantage, he finally
clarified the feuars' future conditions of landholding.	 His
affirmation on 26 August that feuars were to hold their kirklands
directly from the Crown, 'without ether bettering or imparing of thare
rightis', was the first clear admission that their feu-duties were not
to be renegotiated following the lords',surrender of superiorities.
re.th.011.143
On 20 October he placed further strictures on the contesting of title,
declaring that all who had subscribed copies of the general submission
were not to have their interests to teinds prejudiced by private legal
actions.	 Though this measure would appear to benefit the lords as
titulars no less than their feuars as heritors, it underlined Charles'
determination to retain judicial expropriation as the special preserve
of the Crown. 22
In the meantime, Charles continued to exert pressure on the
lords of erection to enforce their compliance with the Revocation
Scheme.	 Having invoked the Commission's powers to conduct a fullscale
investigation into landholding, Charles reminded the lords of erection
on 30 October 1628, that they had two days to produce titles proving
their control over teinds, together with 'the just and trew rentalls'
of the feu-duties from their superiorities. That the response was
again limited can be inferred from the plea of the Privy Council on
2 December that there should be a 'production of all titular rights'171
by landowners in general, not just lords of erection.	 For no heritor
should be compelled to purchase his own teinds from any titular who
had not proved his 'undoubted right' to contract the sale. As no time
limit was specified for the general production of title, the suggestion
was patently a stalling measure - and was recognised as such by
Charles.	 Nevertheless, the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds went
on to recommend on 28 January 1629 that all teinds of lay patrons
should be valued, a measure which could not be effected without prior
production of title.	 As the nobility on the Council and Commission
undoubtedly realised, both these measures to expand the investigation
and evaluation of landholding affected all proprietors, threatening not
only to overload the work of the Commission but also to frustrate the
expectations raised among the gentry by the Revocation Scheme. 23
Above all, these measures would serve to expose to the political nation
what Sir William Alexander, the Secretary at Court, had already
disclosed privately to Traquair in the spring of 1627: that Charles,
despite his apparent preference for the interests of the gentry, was
'verie indifferently set' in disputes between parties affected by his
revocation.24
Having incorporated an appeal to the gentry as an integral
aspect of his Revocation Scheme, Charles came to rely on their support
to ensure its implementation.	 However, while he deliberately sought
to raise the expectations of the gentry, he persistently overestimated
his reliable support among that class. 	 Charles' inability to
differentiate between appeal and commitment was to prove a vital
contributory factor impeding the progress of revocation.	 In part,
this situation was attributable to the wishful thinking of an absentee
monarch - the hallmark of the whole Revocation Scheme.	 Yet Charles
was not totally deluded.	 In December 1626, the nobility had
petitioned Charles to set aside his proposal to implement the
Revocation by recourse to the law courts, suggesting either a
parliament, 'quhilk is the earnest desyre of all your people', or a
commission 'to convene and treate of all that may concerne your
majesteis profit and patrimonie and your subjects lawful securities'. 25172
In adopting this latter course, Charles was not simply exhibiting his
aversion to constitutional assemblies or his preference for a more
expeditious alternative to individual prosecutions.	 He was responding
to a counter supplication drawn up by Sir John Scot of Scotstarvit,
director of Chancery, and seven other gentlemen, 'shewing the great
oppression of the noblemen in leading the gentries tithes and having
their superiorities of kirklands over them craving his majesties favour
to be liberat therfrae'.	 This overture to Court from a militant
pressure group, who 'mett privatly for feare of the counsell whose
principall members were all lords of the erections', did suggest
grounds for the possible achievement of revocation with active support
from at least a section of the gentry.
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Once the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds had become
operative in March 1627, Sir James Learmouth of Balcomie and
Sir James Lockhart of Lee had emerged as the leaders of this group of
militants who were proposing further appeals to the Court for more
precise consideration of the interests of their class.	 On 16 March,
Balcomie intimated to Morton their resolve to petition the king,
requesting that he 'take no prejudice at our gude intentions' since
'they only crave an ease of there tythes', having no desire to meddle
with 'anything further concerning the erectiones or heretable
offices'. 27	Morton having made no move to block its passage, Charles
was again receptive to their supplication 'that a course may be taken
to prevent a too high estimation' in the quantification and costing of
teinds liable to redistribution, otherwise the royal design that
heritors purchase their own teind 'at a reasonable rate' would be
frustrated.	 Accordingly, Charles decreed on 11 April that instead of
leaving the gentry to bargain directly with the titulars, he himself
would act as an intermediary, buying out the titulars' control over the
gentry's teinds then selling each heritor the right to his own teinds.
For the gentry could have 'no perfyt right' as heritors unless their
control over teind was individually secured from the Crown.28
The appointment of Lee to join Balcomie on the Commission for173
Surrenders and Teinds on 12 April can be seen as a further attempt by
Charles to improve the political standing of the militants among the
gentry.	 In turn, the militants were deployed as the king's main
agents for managing support within the localities for the Revocation
Scheme.	 Balcomie and Lee had been licensed by Charles on 11 April to
organise a convention of the gentry estate, 'that by their joint
advices and counsell thay may uniformlie concurre to the furtherance
and advancement' of the work of the Commission.	 Yet it was not until
1 May that both were empowered by the Privy Council to write to 'weill
affected' gentry within every shire to convene meetings of 'the small
barons and freehalders' for the election of one or two commissioners
to attend the proposed convention of the gentry in Edinburgh. 	 The
Privy Council, however, was not prepared to acquiesce in a selective
version of parliamentary elections under the management of the
militants.	 Balcomie and Lee were required to specify tne names of
their associates in the shires as well as the times and places of the
electoral meetings.	 Moreover, once this information was received on
4 May, the Privy Council went on to fix a specific date - 29 May - for
all elections at the head burgh of each shire, inserting a special
provision that 'nane of his Majesteis subjects having interesse' in the
purchase of teinds 'sall be debarrit and secludit from presence and
vote in this electioun'.
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Nevertheless, as the Privy Council was no doubt aware, the
wording of its directive, though apparently encouraging open elections
on a parliamentary basis, was fraught with anomalies about the
electoral entitlement of subjects having an interest in teinds.	 In
the first place, those having an interest in teinds among the
enfranchised gentry included not only heritors as potential buyers, but
also some small barons whose interests, as lay patrons or tacksmen, lay
more with the titulars as designated sellers.	 Secondly,
unenfranchised freeholders and feuars among the gentry had an interest
in teinds as heritors, as did lesser proprietors or yeomen, and even
certain nobles who lacked titularships. 	 An adherence to parliamentary
practice did exclude all unenfranchised gentry and yeomen.	 However,174
the elections were marked by the intrusion of diverse nobles as
teind-buyers, tacksmen and small barons as teind sellers, which exposed
the enfranchised gentry to manipulation through deferential bonds of
kinship and local association, making them less amenable to management
by the militants. 30
The presence of such intrusionists at electoral meetings in
the shires did not prevent the convention of the gentry commencing in
Edinburgh on 12 June as designated.	 Indeed, elections in the shires
were affected less by intrusionists than by absentees.	 Some
enfranchised gentry had not thought fit to participate in meetings
organised by the militants and their associates 'for ther privat endes'.
Charles remained more concerned to encourage wider participation among
'the whole gentrey' than to prohibit intrusionists when, on 3 July, he
permitted further consultative meetings within the shires.	 The
enfranchised gentry were expected to participate directly, while the
attendance of noblemen, in their capacity as teind-buyers, afforded
virtual representation for the feuars among the unenfranchised gentry.
No effort was to be made, however, to reverse the election of the
existing commissioners from the shires.	 Although the militants
remained no less committed to the work of revocation, the commissioners
for the gentry, in their deliberations during the summer of 1627, were
unable to fulfil the remit of their convention, 'to consult and advise
and to make overtoures and make propositiouns in maters concerning
thair teinds, and to represent the same to the Commissionars' - for
Surrenders and Teinds.	 By 29 August, fresh elections were ordered in
the shires.	 The militants were again deployed as king's agents for
the management of these elections which were now to be conducted on a
more formal parliamentary basis.	 Thus, the king's letters to sheriffs
and influential gentry to ensure the election of royal nominees as
commissioners for the shires were mainly channelled tnrough Balcomie
and Lee.	 Yet no coniensus, far less a concerted programme of action,
would appear to have resulted from any convention of commissioners from
the snires.	 For Charles had to rest content with an open-ended
instruction to the Privy Council on 1 November that conventions of175
teind-buyers, attended by commissioners from most if not all of the
shires, were to be licensed for the duration of the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds. 31
This standing concession for conventions of shire
commissioners, together with Charles' willingness to receive their
deputations at Court, did more to promote the political education of
the gentry estate than to advance the work of revocation.	 Regular
consultations at electoral meetings within the shires were allied to a
national awareness, especially among the shire commissioners, of the
common interests of their class.	 The management of the gentry by the
militants and their associates could not guarantee compliant
conventions.	 Nor could this pressure group ensure concerted
co-operation from the gentry for the various administrative expedients
employed by Charles to implement the Revocation Scheme.
Charles' misplaced reliance on wholescale support from the
gentry was to be exposed once he accepted Lord Advocate Hope's advice
on 29 December 1627 that the heritors as well as the titulars should
subscribe the general submission.	 Included in his decree of
28 February 1628 requiring all titulars to subscribe copies of the
general submission, was an invitation requesting subscriptions from all
heritors 'desyrous to buy the teinds of thair awin landis'.	 In a move
designed to minimise direct contact between voluntary and compulsory
subscribers, royal agents were commissioned to convene meetings within
the shires of willing teind-buyers which, in order to maximise the
participation of the heritors, were to be proclaimed at the head burghs
and every parish kirk during Sunday morning services.	 However,
instead of requiring individual subscriptions from the teind-buyers to
copies of the general submission, the royal agents were to ensure that
'choise sall be made of twa famous gentlemen of eache shirefdome'.
Once they had acquired a warrant signed by all the heritors willing to
purchase their own teinds, the two delegates from each shire were to
appear before the Privy Council and subscribe the general submission on
behalf of these teind-buyers. 32	The royal agents commissioned to176
organise the election of these delegates were themselves all members of
the gentry estate - including, inevitably, such militants as Balcomie
and Lee for their respective native shires of Fife and Lanark.
Moreover, the royal agents' political management was not confined to
their own class.	 Indeed, their main function was not so much to
organise the election of delegates to make collective subscriptions on
behalf of the teind-buyers, as to act as a pressure group to promote
the compulsory subscription of all lords of erection and other titulars
among the nobility.	 For these royal agents were expected to glean
from their meetings with the heritors the names of all titulars within
every shire.	 Lists were then to be passed on to the corresponding
royal agent commissioned to receive individual subscriptions from the
titulars.
From the twenty-eight electoral meetings which the royal
agents were commissioned to organise in the shires, twenty-five had
dispatched delegates to Edinburgh by the end of April, warranted to
make collective subscriptions before the Privy Council on behalf of the
teind-buyers.	 While this appears almost a full complement, only the
enfranchised gentry among the heritors were entitled to sign the
warrants from the shires.	 Furthermore, over half the warrants from
the shires were found to be incomplete.	 Not all enfranchised gentry
were prepared, as heritors, to purchase their own teinds, having either
refused to sign or absented themselves from the electoral meetings.
Depending on the proximity of their shires from Edinburgh, delegates
were given until 25 July 1628 to complete their warrants or draw up
rolls of all enfranchised gentry who still refused to sign. 33	The
exertion of such pressure tends to undermine the reputed voluntarism of
the collective subscriptions on behalf of the teind-buyers and belies
the assertion that the willingness of the heritors to purchase their
own teinds ensured 'that the revocation went fast forward'. 34
Moreover, Charles was to complain to the Privy Council on
11 November 1628 that diverse royal agents commissioned to treat with
the teind-buyers had still failed to report the names of titulars who177
were refusing or delaying their individual subscriptions to copies of
the general submission.	 Such recalcitrant agents, who were not
confined to any particular region, were directed under threat of
outlawry to report by 9 June 1629 the names of defaulting
teind-sellers, the extent of their estates and their reasons for
non-subscription.	 Thereby, defaulters could either make belated
subscription or face legal proceedings instituted by the Lord
Advocate.
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The somewhat less than fullwme subscription of the gentry
as well as the nobility to the general submission was indicative of
landed society's growing restlessness with the Revocation Scheme.
Yet the involvement of the remaining lay estate, the burgesses, was
altogether less fractious.	 The claim of the Convention of Royal
Burghs on 5 July 1627, that the burgesses originally appointed to the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds had to be informed of their
appointment by neighbours, would seem to indicate little sustained
interest among their estate in the work of revocation. During the
original session of the Commission, however, the burgh commissioners
were regarded as a disruptive influence by the nobility, mainly for
their efforts to exempt the royal burghs from the scope of the
Revocation Scheme. 36	Although Charles was not willing to make them
exempt, he was prepared both to 'manteyn and corroborat' the
particular interests of the royal burghs following overtures from the
Convention.	 On 18 October he promised that the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds would pay special regard to their corporate
rights as patrons and titulars in the planting and provision of
churches within parishes which included, or lay adjacent to, royal
burghs and whose lands were laboured by the inhabitants of the burghs.
More specifically, Charles was adamant that the ecclesiastical
mortification of burgh lands and teinds should not be impaired: that
is, lands and teinds traditionally devoted by the burghs to the
sustenance of the ministry, schools and colleges, hospitals and other
pious and religious uses, should continue to be employed exclusively
for these purposes.	 Accordingly, he even modified his demand for a178
yearly return from the burgh teinds.	 On 20 June 1628, he conceded
that his annuity would only be exacted in the event of a surplus, when
the income each burgh derived from teind was greater than its
expenditure for pious and religious purposes.	 In turn, the Convention
of Royal Burghs agreed on 2 July that heritors would be allowed to
purchase their own teinds from the burghs - at rates to be specified in
the legal decreet due to be published by 31 December 1629 - once the
tacks of the teinds within the corporate titularships of the burghs had
expired.	 Having thus reached such an amicable settlement with the
Crown by the summer of 1628, the burgesses had effectively extricated
themselves from further legal involvement in the Revocation Scheme.37
By way of contrast, the clergy, though given the material
incentive of improved stipends, exhibited a marked reluctance to
participate amicably in the practical implementation of the Revocation
Scheme.	 The immediate priority accorded to stipends during the first
session of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds resulted in an
award to the clergy on 30 May 1627 of a revised minimum, '8 chalders of
victuall or proportionally in silver duties', to be allocated from the
teinds of every parish.	 Since the agricultural capacity of every
parish was by no means comparable, the Commission, when ratifying this
award on 26 June, inserted the provision that the revised minimum could
be waived wherever 'there shall be ane reasonable cause to goe under' -
notably, in large and remote rural parishes. 38	Nonetheless, although
this award was a distinct advance on the five chalders or 500 m,
provided in 1617 by James VI's Commission 'anent the Plantatioun of
Kirks', the clergy felt defrauded by Charles' determination to effect
a permanent redistribution of the teinds which they considered to be
'the true patrimony of the church'.	 Moreover, the success of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds would terminate 'all hope of
recovering the same in time coming , . 39
	Their ultimate goal of having
all teinds restored to the exclusive use of the Kirk could not be
compensated by the augmentation of their stipends, nor by the earlier
concession on 29 May that bishops' rents and ministers' stipends were
to be exempt from the king's annuity.
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That Charles underestimated the tenacity with which the
clergy were prepared to uphold their claims to the teinds, as the
spirituality of the Kirk, was in no small measure due to the
vacillating conduct of the clerical commissioners.	 The first session
of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was marked by archbishop
Spottiswood's attempts to avoid his responsibilities, both as primate
and as one of the named presidents.	 Usually he maintained a
diplomatic silence when present, but he preferred to absent himself as
often as possible. 41	Indeed, within aristocratic circles, the
clerical commissioners were accused of dissimulation, in that they
deliberately misrepresented the time necessary to complete the work of
the Commission.	 During the initial deliberations of the Commission,
the ten prelates who represented the clerical estate reputedly went
along with Charles' naive hopes for a termination of business by
1 August 1627.	 At the same time they were professing publicly that
the Crown should expect to derive no immediate benefit, since the
Commission 'cannot take any conclusion for the space of twentie yeirs'.
There was, however, a certain amount of truculence behind such
reporting as the clerical commissioners were unwilling to support any
proposal which offered to mitigate the impact of the Revocation Scheme
on the interests of the nobility.	 Thus, heritors who wished to
purchase their own teinds were summoned at the commencement of the
Commission in March to give notice of their intentions by 1 August, or
else the lords of erection and other titulars were to retain control
over their teinds.	 Patrick Lindsay, bishop of Ross (later archbishop
of Glasgow) promptly protested that this proposal was 'prejudicial to
his Majestie, Church and Gentrie'.	 Although his protest was
undoubtedly without warrant from the king or the gentry, and gained no
more than tacit approval from the rest of the clerical commissioners,
Lindsay was nonetheless regarded as the spokesman for the clergy since
'all the Bishop of Ross bolts are suspected to cume furth of their
common quaver 1 .42
James Law, archbishop of Glasgow, went on to make a more
general protest 'in name of the Church' on 6 April 1627, that 'anything180
done be the Lords of Commission shall not prejudge the Church 1 .43	By
the end of that month the bishops had written to Charles complaining
that the interests of the Church were threatened with 'utter undoing'
by lay members of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds, 'for under
a collour of increasing the rent of the Crown, some goe about to robbe
Christ of all his patrimony'.	 In reply, Charles rebuked the
episcopate on 3 May as 'men voyde of charity, bezond measure timorous
without a cause'.	 Nevertheless, a deputation, consisting of
Adam Bellenden, bishop of Dunblane and Mr John Maxwell, one of the
ministers of Edinburgh, was dispatched to Court to elaborate the
clerical estate's complaints against the Commission.	 Having been
outraged to learn that some ministers in Scotland had preached publicly
'that we nor no laick person could lawfullie injoy any benefitt out of
the Tithes', Charles' immediate response to the deputation was to send
off a reproof to the archbishops and bishops on 18 May affirming that
'it becumeth church men rather to judge chiritably than to be
suspitious without a cause'.	 However, another letter that same day
to all the commissioners maintained that he was still well disposed to
the interests of the clergy, though the deputation had been sent 'upon
needles fearres by mistakeing the meaneing of our Commission'.	 For
the Crown in no way intended 'to wrong or harme the Clergie in any
dignity or title which they lawfullie enjoy, or whereunto they have
good right'.
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Nevertheless, the clerical estate were less than content with
such an equivocal assurance which avoided any specific reference to the
teinds as the spirituality of the Kirk. Parish ministers converged on
Edinburgh through May to lobby the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds
and hold private meetings among themselves.	 This agitation was not
appeased until the king extended to the clergy a similar concession to
that already afforded to the gentry - namely, a convention.
Accordingly, select bishops and commissioners from the presbyteries
convened in Edinburgh on 17 July 1627. 	 Rather than meekly commending
the welfare of the Kirk to the Crown, their two-day deliberations
concluded by making tangible provision to support the continuance of181
clerical lobbying. The expenses of future as well as past deputations
to Court were to be met by the levy of twenty shillings on every 100 m
or chalder of victual from the rents of the bishops and the stipends of
the ministers.	 Thus, the clergy set aside 1.67 per cent of their
yearly income as a political contribution to promote the interests of
their estate during the implementation of the Revocation Scheme.
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Charles' switch of tactics to advance revocation by legal
compulsion brought no immediate compliance from the clerical estate.
Despite his instructions on 28 February 1628 that 'the whole teind
sellers within this kingdome' should subscribe copies of the general
submission, the Privy Council reported on 22 April that none of the
episcopa& 'hes as yet subscribed'.
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	Charles, however, turned this
situation to his advantage as it gave him the excuse to modify the
Commission's concession of the previous May exempting bishops' rents
and ministers' stipends from the king's annuity.	 By 14 June,
Patrick Lindsay, bishop of Ross, had been dispatched to Court to
communicate the willingness of the bishops - if not the rest of the
clergy - that the king derive a yearly return from any teinds within
the control of the episcopate, 'as shall not be thought fitt to be
applyed to pious uses'.
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	Nevertheless, the initial failure of the
archbishops and bishops to subscribe the general submission in the
spring had also provided an excuse for other defaulters within landed
society: a situation for which Charles had still not found an
effective remedy by the winter of 1628.
Despite this residual problem of defaulting subscribers,
Charles was more concerned to expedite the valuation of superiorities
and teinds, if not before the publication of his legal decreet, then
certainly no later than 31 December 1629, when the moratorium on the
implementation of his general submission elapsed.	 No comprehensive
surrender of superiorities or wholescale redistribution of teinds could
be accomplished without such necessary groundwork. Thus, in order
that 'the mater of valuationes may be speedlie brought to sum final
yssue', Charles resolved on 21 July 1628 to devolve a significant182
proportion of the work of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds onto
sub-commissions operating within the bounds of each presbytery.	 This
expedient - prompted, if not suggested, by Menteith, the Lord
President - enabled the Commission to concentrate its attentions on
lords of erection and other titulars, while the 'true worth' of
heritors' estates was ascertained by 'impartial and judicious
neighbouring sub-commissioners' 48
In effect, Charles was re-launching a modified version of a
project initiated in the spring of 1627, after the inception of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds.	 Moderators and ministers within
every presbytery had been instructed by the Privy Council on 11 April
to 'choose two or more sufficient persouns, heretours or inhabitants of
eache parish' who, with the local minister, were to assess 'the trew
estait of the parish 1 . 49	This remit involved a large area of inquiry.
A 'minute and authentic' return was to be made of congregational
circumstances within each parish - the number of communicants, the
patron and the provision of the minister's stipend; of ecclesiastical
services - the situation and state of repair of the churches, the
provision of schools and hospitals; of the value of the rents and
teinds at the disposal of each landowner.	 The present application of
ecclesiastical resources were thus to be aligned to the needs of each
parish according to the directives laid down by the act of revocation.
Since these local inquisitions amounted to a proto-type "Statistical
Account", it is perhaps hardly surprising that only about fifty
parishes - overwhelmingly from south of the river Tay and about
one-twentieth of the Scottish total - made the requisite, though not
always accurate, return.
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	When the Commission reviewed these local
inquests in June, their findings became a further source of dissension
between the nobles and the gentry, especially when attempts were made
to unravel the complex question of estimating the amount of free rent
when teind was intermingled with the general stock of landholding dues.
Because of the lack of unanimity to the proposal of 13 June for 'the
fourth pairt of the free rent to be teynd', the matter was referred to
royal arbitration sixteen days later.	 The king reputedly issued a183
directive to the clergy in October that they undertake a fresh and more
exact valuation of the rents and teinds within their parishes. 51
	Yet
no appreciable progress seems to have been made until the launching of
the sub-commissions which, though authorised in July 1628, did not
proceed for another six months.
Not only did the actual launching of the sub-commissions take
six months, but another five months were to elapse before
sub-commissioners were operating within every presbytery in Scotland.
This prolonged delay can be attributed to the difficulties experienced
in defining the relationship between the Commission for Surrenders and
Teinds and its sub-commissions; in establishing the ground-rules for
valuations by the sub-commissions; and in appointing willing
sub-commissioners.	 Indeed, despite official claims that 'the Kirk and
gentrie of the kingdome hes such speciall interesse' in the technically
exacting work of the sub-commissioners, there was a marked reluctance
within local communities to accept appointments onto the
sub-commissions.
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Although Charles originally authorised the sub-commissions as
devolved agencies of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds, the
actual nomination of sub-commissioners within every presbytery was
entrusted to the clergy.	 By 27 November 1628, Charles was
instructing the episcopate to exhort the ministers to 'use all
convenient diligence' in nominating sub-commissioners.	 If necessary,
archbishops and bishops were to intervene personally, lending their
weight to the process of selection within the presbyteries. 	 Once
sub-commissioners had been nominated, they were required not only to
accept their appointments under threat of outlawry, but to give their
oaths to execute their charge faithfully and truly before the moderator
and brethren of their presbyteries. 	 Moreover, although the Commission
retained oversight of the work of the sub-commissions, Charles was not
prepared to cede a right of appeal direct from the sub-commissions to
the Commission.	 On 10 November, he gave the sub-commissioners 'full
and absolute pouare' to evaluate the rents of heritors' estates, a184
concession which he reiterated on 15 January 1629, after overtures from
the Commission on 'the convenience of appellatione'. 	 Appeals from the
sub-commissions were seen as obstructionist.	 Such opportunities for
continuous review by the Commission would delay rather than expedite
the work of the sub-commissioners and undermine their integrity as the
'most honest men in everie part', selected to guarantee 'all fairness
and indifference' in the thorough prosecution of valuations.
Complaints, if ever warranted on account of mistaken or partial
valuations by the sub-commissions, were to be referred to the next
parliament, which would set up a commission of inquiry to take remedial
action as it 'shall find the cause in equitie to require'.
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These measures were disingenuous.	 Charles' referral of
complaints to parliament was not just to discourage obstructionist
tactics by elements unwilling to co-operate with the Revocation Scheme,
but was itself a stalling manoeuvre, since the next parliament would be
his first, timed to coincide with his oft-postponed Scottish
coronation.	 His prime concern was that the sub-commissions promptly
completed their valuations in order that their work could be ratified
rather than deliberated in parliament.	 For their remit, as finalised
by royal warrant on 2 February 1629, was inherently contentious both
with regard to scope and method.	 Sub-commissioners were to evaluate
firstly 'the true worth of the lands of each paroch, stock and teind',
where the teinds have been intermingled with the stock of landholding
dues 'in times bygone'; and secondly, 'the just and constant worth of
the teinds' which had been drawn separately from the stock of
landholding dues by titulars or their tacksmen for at least seven years
within the last fifteen.	 Thus, all heritors' estates were to be
subject to compulsory valuations.	 Moreover, valuations were not
merely on present or even customary rentals.	 Sub-commissioners were
to gauge the potential of each heritor's estate, 'what they may pay,
of constant rent of stock and teind in time coming'.	 In turn, the
establishment of ground-rules for these valuations did not win full
acceptance within the localities until subsequently upheld - albeit on
a piecemeal basis - by national decisions of the Commission for185
Surrenders and Teinds.
In order to complete the valuations within every presbytery,
sub-commissioners had to be prepared to convene at least twice weekly.
They were empowered to summon before them interested titulars as well
as heritors to finalise individual valuations.	 Interested parties
within the presbytery were given ten days warning to comply with their
summons and a further six days on a second summons; those outwith the
presbytery were respectively given twenty and ten days; and those
outwith the country, sixty and fifteen days.	 The absence of either
titulars or heritors did not postpone valuations indefinitely. 	 For
every sub-commission was required to appoint a procurator-fiscal 'to
pursue and follow out the probatione and valuation of the teinds
concerning those who delayes and refuses to insist'.
The proving of valuations, whether by voluntary agreement or
compulsory prosecution, was the most contentious and anomalous aspect
of the sub-commissioners' work.	 If both titular and heritor were
present voluntarily, the valuation could proceed 'without citation by
writ, witnesses, or oath of party'.	 In the event of dispute, either
party was at liberty to refer the valuation to the other's oath or to
seek corroboration from witnesses.	 Either party, however, could only
cite 'such as are known to be famous men, and worth a hundred pounds
of free gear': a measure which included not only the lesser barons and
freeholders, but also a substantial body of feuars, particularly of
kirklands, who, as unenfranchised gentry, had hitherto been excluded
from direct participation in the Revocation Scheme.	 Nevertheless, the
rest of the unenfranchised gentry and the yeomen, who had interest in
teinds as heritors, were prevented from citing neighbours of like
status, being thus thrown back on deferential bonds of kinship and
local association - a rather discouraging method of seeking
emancipation from the control of the titulars.	 When the valuation was
compulsorily pursued by the heritor, or by the procurator-fiscal in the
absence of both parties, witnesses of any status were permitted to
testify, provided there was no family or landed association with the186
party in whose interest they were cited. Nonetheless, any titular or
heritor who was party to a compulsory valuation was allowed to cite as
his witnesses kinsmen, feuars, removable tenants and domestic servants
of the adverse party who, in turn, was obliged to ensure their
attendance before the sub-commissioners.
Moreover, irrespective of the voluntary or compulsory nature
of the valuation, every titular and heritor could cite as many as ten
witnesses whenever the teinds were intermingled with the stock of
landholding dues and were thus to be valued conjointly.	 In arriving
at the 'most just' valuation of each heritor's estate, the
sub-commissioners were not necessarily to accept the majority
testimony, but 'to have respect to those witnesses who gives the best
and clearest knowledge', based on the customary payment of teinds over
the last forty years.	 Whenever teinds were to be valued separately
from the stock of landholding dues, the interests of the titular were
clearly to prevail according to 'the prerogative of the probation'.
Although the right of the heritor to cite ten witnesses was reserved,
if the titular had led the teinds of the heritor for seven years in
the previous fifteen his 'oath of verity' was all that was required to
uphold the accuracy of his valuation.54
The prospects of a technically exacting workload and
anomalous, as well as contentious, valuations hardly enhanced the role
of the sub-commissioner.	 Further problems were encountered in
promoting and sustaining operational sub-commissions.	 Indeed, the
Privy Council was moved to comment about this task on 24 February 1629
that 'the lyke thairof both in difficulties and nomber hes not fallin
out in the kingdome	 before'.	 Although sub-commissions had been
appointed in forty-four presbyteries by this date, fifteen presbyteries
had still failed to make nominations.	 It was not until 9 June that
every presbytery, except that of Banff, had 'reported thair diligence
anent the choise of sub-commissioners'. 55
The dilatoriness of the clergy in making nominations was more187
than matched by the reluctance of sub-commissioners to accept their
appointments.	 In practice, the sub-commissioners were drawn from the
ranks of the gentry, chosen for their local prominence - albeit on a
random basis within each presbytery, not from every parish.	 Usually
nine, and certainly no less than seven, lairds were appointed
sub-commissioners within each presbytery, five constituted a quorum.
At their initial meeting they elected their own convenor and - in
addition to the procurator-fiscal - appointed another local lawyer to
serve as their clerk. 56	However, instead of stimulating the willing
co-operation of local communities, the implementation of the
sub-commissions contributed in no small measure to the promotion of
local inertia, which impeded and eventually undermined the whole
progress of the Revocation Scheme.	 The Privy Council was again moved
to complain by 24 March 1629 that the sub-commissioners in diverse
presbyteries were neglecting their weekly meetings 'so that when maters
occures to be handled in these meetings if falles oftymes out that
throw laike of a nomber of the subcommisioners the dyets are
disappointed'.	 The imposition of fines of up to £4 for each
unwarranted absence did not make service on the sub-commissions more
attractive.	 For sub-commissioners in sundry presbyteries throughout
Scotland were chastised on 9 June for having 'undewtifullie and
unworthilie shunned' their employment.	 Likewise, procurators-fiscal
and clerks were admonished for having demonstrated a marked reluctance
to serve on the sub-commissions.
57
For Charles, the most unacceptable aspect of the difficulties
surrounding the establishment of operational sub-commissions was that
the groundwork for the king's annuity in particular, as for the
redistribution of the teinds in general, was 'verie farre frustrat and
disappointed'.	 Despite his claims that the welfare of his Scottish
subjects was bound up with the 'good and happie conclusion of so
important and necessary a work', his overriding interest throughout the
Revocation Scheme was to secure a yearly return from the teinds.58
Indeed, this pre-occupation had taken precedence over the augmentation
of clerical stipends during the first session of the Commission for188
Surrenders and Teinds.	 Thus, the Commission had been moved to
specify on 29 May 1627 that the Crown was to have 'yeerly furth of the
Teinds an Annuity': rated at ten shillings from each boll of wheat,
eight shillings from each boll of bear (bere), six shillings from each
boll of oats, pease, meal and rye. When oats were of the inferior
variety, the rate exacted was to be three shillings from each boll.
When teinds were not paid in victual, six merks money was to be exacted
from every one hundred merks of silver duty.	 The annuity was to be
paid by the current uplifters of the teinds, in essence the titulars or
their tacksmen not the heritors. The only concession to the gentry
and the rest of the landed classes was that lands feued before 1587,
whose teinds were intermingled with the stock of landholding dues, were
exempt from the annuity.	 Notwithstanding this concession - granted	 to
avoid unravelling a technical complexity of more than forty years
duration - Charles remained adamant that the priority accorded to his
annuity should prevail over the act of revocation's proposals to secure
heritors their own teinds. 59
Having on 17 August placed an embargo on the leading of
teinds from the crop of 1627, Charles went on to make special provision
to secure his annuity when he resorted to a policy of legal compulsion
to implement the Revocation Scheme.	 When instructing his advocates on
30 September to draw up the general format of his legal decreet, he
insisted that the rates established for his annuity by the Commission
were to stand whereas the costing and quantification of the remainder
of the teinds liable to redistribution were left blank pending royal
arbitration.	 Moreover, the moratorium on the enforcement of the
general submission, proclaimed by Charles on 30 June 1628, effectively
delayed the wholescale redistribution of teinds from sellers to buyers
for eighteen months.	 Nevertheless, asserting that he was 'bound in
honour not to defer or frustrat the expectations of our distressed
subjects' and of the gentry in particular, Charles decided that the
teinds which were to be drawn from that year's crop should be
sequestered 'into hands of persons indifferent'.	 Such a proposition,
however specious, was no more than an artifice.	 An indifferent panel189
could not be readily assembled since virtually the whole of the
political nation was affected by the act of revocation.	 Charles' real
intention was to commence his annuity at the harvest.	 For the panel
into whose hands the teinds were to be sequestrated had an immediate
task, 'deduceand alwayes aff the first end thairof our annuitie'.
Yet the heritors were only to be allowed to lay claim to their
sequestrated teind if the legal decreet had been published by
1 January 1629 and they had fully compensated the titulars at the rates
prescribed therein.	 Otherwise, the titulars were to retain their
control over teinds pending the outcome of royal arbitration.6°
The legal decreet was not published at the outset of 1629.
Indeed, soundings about its final format did not commence within
official circles for another six months.	 Accordingly, Charles decided
on 16 July that the most contentious leading of the teinds - that is,
by the tacksmen - should again be prohibited at the coming harvest to
uphold the peace among heritors, especially those willing to purchase
their own teinds (and pay the king's annuity) but 'opposing themselves
to such willful collectiones'.	 These manoeuvres were to prove
counter-productive, however, undermining the objective which was to be
upheld when his legal decreet was published: namely, the
identification, on the grounds of justice and equity, of the king's
financial advantage with 'the generall good of all our subjects'.61
Within the Scottish Exchequer, Charles' pursuit of a yearly return
from the teinds was not entirely regarded as an 'honourable' venture.
More demonstratively, 'among subjects it is counted base and called
. "brocage"' 62
Having set out to implement his Revocation Scheme by
appealing to sectional interests, Charles was to find this strategy
undermined in little over two years by the inherent incapacity of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds to mobilise active co-operation
from the whole political nation.	 His recourse to supplementary
administrative expedients to enforce submissions and valuations
resulted only in partial and reluctant compliance.	 Above all, his190
dedicated pursuit of self-interest was, over the next eight years, to
transform class antagonism within the political nation into that of
class collusion against the Crown.191
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Chapter VI	 The Implementation of the Revocation Scheme: 
The Forging of Class Collusion, 1629-37 
The legal decreet was eventually issued at Court on
2 September 1629, though its proclamation in Scotland had to await
another sixteen days.	 It was actually based on four separate
determinations following compulsory submissions by the lords of
erection, by the rest of landed society - that is, by the remaining
titulars (lay patrons) and tacksmen as well as the heritors - by the
bishops, and by the royal burghs.	 The legal decreet can be separated
into five major components affecting the future disposal of
superiorities and teinds under the general headings of compensation
for surrenders; costing of teinds; limitations on purchase from
corporate and clerical titulars; quantification of teinds; and
redistribution for pious uses.
1
The compensation to be given to the lords of erection for the
loss of the feu-duties which composed their superiorities was the first
aspect to be determined. 'Competent and reasonable satisfactioun' was
confirmed as 1,000 merks for every chalder of victual or one hundred
merks of free rent paid by their hereditary tenants, after deducting
the feu-duties which the lords themselves paid to the Crown. 	 These
latter duties, paid by the lords of erection in their capacity as
tenants-in-chief, were regarded as the king's 'proper rent' and were,
therefore, not eligible for compensation.	 In effect, the compensation
determined for surrenders was a general ratification of the contentious
offer made individually to Lauderdale during the first session of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds in the spring of 1627.
All heritors willing to purchase their own teinds in
accordance with the king's determination were to have 'full and perfyte
securitie' from that year's harvest.	 The 'just and reasonable pryce'
at which heritors could acquire control of their own teinds was costed
by Charles at nine years purchase for every one hundred merks of teind
paid annually in money: that is, a purchase price equivalent to nine
years rental.	 Where teinds were paid in kind, the same costing
applied once the valuations established under the auspices of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds were commuted into monetary sums -196
allowance having been made for regional variations in the quality and
quantity of crops designated as teind.
However, not every heritor was automatically entitled to
purchase control over teinds from the harvest of 1629.	 Charles
ratified his agreement of the previous summer with the burgess estate
that heritors could lead but not purchase their own teinds from royal
burghs until the tacks of the teinds within each burgh's corporate
titularship had expired.	 In like manner, heritors could not
immediately purchase their own teinds from clerical titulars (notably,
the bishops) until the expiry of existing tacks - which tended to be
long, usually no less than nineteen years duration.	 Nevertheless,
heritors were required to notify the bishops, as also the burghs, of
their future intention to purchase when leading their teinds at that
year's harvest.
Regardless of any intention on the part of heritors to
purchase their own teinds, no sale could proceed without the prior
valuation and quantification of teind on every heritor's estate.
Where the teinds were intermingled with the stock of landholding dues,
and were thus to be valued conjointly by the Commission for Surrenders
and Teinds or by the sub-commissions, Charles determined that the rate
and quantity to be assessed as teind 'sal be the fyft part of the
constant rent'.	 That is, each heritor's maximum liability as teind
resulting from a conjoint valuation was one-fifth of his total outlay
of rent.	 Where the teinds were assessed separately, Charles was
prepared to accept the valuations of the Commission or sub-commissions,
allowing a deduction of one-fifth of their estimated value to be
retained by the heritors for their 'ease and comfort'.	 That is, each
heritor's maximum liability as teind resulting from a separate
assessment, was the valuation established under the auspices of the
Commission from which one-fifth was to be deducted as a personal
allowance.	 Basically, this personal allowance was afforded to
heritors because teind assessed separately tended to carry a higher
valuation than that intermingled with the stock of landholding dues.197
Indeed, during the separate assessment of teinds within the localities,
sub-commissioners were required to accept the sole probation of
titulars who had led the teinds for seven out of the last fifteen years
prior to 1628.	 Hence, the personal allowance was a practical
corrective to prevent titulars profiteering from over-valuation.2
Moreover, the heritors' personal allowance had discriminatory
social connotations, verging on class distinction.	 Most heritors
whose teinds were assessed separately tended to be freeholders,
including in their ranks the leading gentry of the shires and a few
nobles.	 Whereas, most heritors whose teinds were valued conjointly
tended to be feuars, usually lesser gentry and yeomen, their titulars
being also their feudal superiors.	 The personal allowance, exclusive
to heritors within the former category, guaranteed them a minimum
share of their own teinds whether or not they exercised their option
to purchase.	 Indeed, this personal allowance was the only guaranteed
portion of the heritors' teinds not liable to financial inroads. 	 For
a significant portion of the teinds of every heritor was to be
redistributed to provide an annuity for the Crown, to augment
ministers' stipends and to supplement existing offerings from church
boxes for pious uses. The quantity of teind every heritor was obliged
to contribute towards the king's annuity was fixed on a national basis.
The quantity required to augment a minister's stipend to the national
minimum was settled within each parish.	 However, the contribution
towards pious uses was not limited by national guidelines but, in
keeping with a proposal enunciated by Charles at the outset of
January 1629,
3 was elastically geared to future local aspirations as
well as the existing needs of each congregation.	 In effect, the
inducement for heritors to purchase their own teinds was not so much
financial as managerial, namely the right to assume individual
responsibility for the redistribution of the teinds.	 Wherever
heritors chose not to purchase, their titulars remained accountable
for their individual contributions towards the king's annuity,
ministers' stipends and pious uses.198
Reflecting on his legal decreet on 24 October 1629, Charles
conceived that he had provided the necessary guidelines for the
surrender of superiorities and the redistribution of teinds 'in such a
just and indifferent maner that non of our subjectis interested can
have just caus to complaine'.
4	The actual mechanics of costing and
quantification, however, had been left to the empirical discretion of
the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds.	 Moreover, Charles had
accepted the advice tendered by Lord Advocate Hope on 18 September,
that the Commission's existing membership and composition should be
continued rather than renewed so that the Commissioners could complete
their consideration of the detailed points of the legal decreet before
the coronation parliament.
5	Nonetheless, the most pressing task of
the Commission was, and remained, the completion of the valuations of
superiorities and teinds: a slow and technically complex process
which was by no means concluded prior to Charles' coronation in the
summer of 1633. 6	Thus, by adding to the workload of the Commission,
the legal decreet was to delay rather than expedite the practical
implementation of the Revocation Scheme. 	 In turn, the frustrated
expectations of titulars and heritors caused class antagonism to give
way to class collusion, which eroded rather than enhanced the political
credibility of the Crown.
Charles, moreover, was still faced with the outstanding
problem of incomplete subscriptions to the general submission.
According to Lord Advocate Hope on 18 September 1629, many of the
nobility had made no effort to subscribe.	 However, he was loath to
instigate any individual prosecution before the Lords of Session since
he considered that if action was taken against one temporal lord, 'all
will run togither for preventing the comon perrell'.	 He preferred
the alternative of administrative and judicial sanctions, prohibiting
non-subscribers from acquiring or transferring lands or seeking
compensation for the spciA!tion of teinds from that year's crop.
7
Charles' instruction to Hope on 18 September that a roll of leading
defaulters should be sent to Court reaffirmed that non-subscribers
would ultimately be prosecuted.	 Nevertheless, sanctions were not only199
pressed but, with the co-operation of the bishops, were extended
ecclesiastically to prevent non-subscribers exercising their rights of
patronage after 3 November.8
Furthermore, Charles was prepared to utilise his prerogative
to suspend a parliamentary enactment of 1617 which guaranteed
landowners heritable rights to property possessed continuously by
themselves or their families for forty years.	 His father's act of
prescription laid down a period of thirteen years for the questioning
of such customary rights of possession in the law courts.	 Since this
period was due to lapse in June 1630, landowners who withheld their
subscription to the general submission were afforded a statutory
defence against Charles' recourse to law to implement his Revocation
Scheme.	 On 29 December 1629, Charles drew up a proclamation at Court
affirming his right to interrupt and thus suspend this act of
prescription which, after review by the Lord Advocate in the new year,
was presented to the Lords of Session for formal ratification on
30 March 1630.	 However, in giving their assent to the king's right of
interruption, the Lords added the provision that the suspension of
prescription applied to all property claimed by the Crown since 1455.
In effect, by associating Charles' act of revocation with that of his
ancestor James II one hundred and seventy five years earlier, the Lords
placed the first retrospective time-limit on the whole Revocation
Scheme.
9
On 13 May 1630, instructions were sent to the Lord Advocate
to ensure that non-submitters did not attempt to use the act of
prescription of 1617 to retain property which came within the scope of
the Revocation Scheme.	 Charles went on to affirm on 14 July that it
was 'best for the public good' that the Crown 'oght no way be
prejudiced by the Act of prescription'. 10	Charles' right to take
action to compel the subscription of the temporal lords and other
titulars to the general submission was to be supported by the
representatives of the gentry at the Convention of Estates held in
Edinburgh between 29 July and 4 August.	 At the same time, the shire200
commissioners were to voice not only their own, but the rest of the
political nation's reservations about the methods Charles utilised to
implement compulsory submission when moving that the whole Convention
petition the Crown, 'to consider of the great feare the hedges hes
conceaved, anent his majesties revocation and sumonds alreddy raisd'.
11
Although the Estates went on to ratify formally the king's
legal decreet, the Convention of 1630 did mark a turning point in the
implementation of the Revocation Scheme.	 Class antagonism, brought
about by the advocacy of separate interests - of superiors and feuars
in the case of superiorities, and of titulars and heritors in relation
to teinds - was gradually giving way to a common awareness of
constitutional unease coupled to frustrated social expectations.
Ostensibly, antagonism between the nobility and the gentry
was evinced by the exhortations of the shire commissioners that the
process of valuation be hastened.	 For the lords of erection and other
titulars had been noticeably dilatory in complying with the terms of
their subscription to the general submission.	 Only four temporal
lords had made a prompt response to the directive from the Commission
for Surrenders and Teinds on 21 March 1630, requiring the production of
all rentals specifying the feu-duties which accrued as superiority to
eacn lordship of erection south of the Firth of Forth. A fifth, John,
Lord Loudlt, was claiming exemption on the grounds that he was already
negotiating compensation for his kirklands in Ayrshire with the
Lord Advocate.	 After two months, only John Elphinstone,
Lord Balmerino and his brother, James, Lord Coupar, had responded
positively to a similar injunction for temporal lords north of the
Forth.
12
	The compliance of Loud0 and Balmerino, who were to emerge
as leading opponents of the influ6ce the Court exercised in Scottish
affairs, illustrates that there was still no outright rejection of the
aims of Charles' revocation by the summer of 1630.	 In the Convention,
however, both were prominent critics of the means deployed by Charles
to implement his Scheme.13201
Indeed, within the Scottish administration there was a
growing realisation that the strictures of the shire commissioners on
the methods utilised by Charles shared common ground with criticisms
voiced by the lords of erection.	 According to Archibald, Lord Napier,
the Treasurer-Depute, in a tract written three years after the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds came into operation, the lords of
erection were becoming disaffected not just because they were the main
victims of the Revocation Scheme.	 They considered that the
parliamentary ratifications of their rights during the reign of
James VI were being subverted which, in turn, amounted to a breach of
'the fundamental law whereby the subjects possess anything in
property' 14
Charles, however, was unreceptive to any constitutional
accommodation with the political nation.	 He remained steadfast in
his desire that the Revocation Scheme should be used for the purposes
of social engineering.	 His immediate concern was to ensure that
superiorities could be surrendered at minimal cost to the Crown.	 For,
if the Scottish Exchequer paid compensation directly to the temporal
lords at the rate specified in the legal decreet - a purchase price
equivalent to ten years rental - the resultant outlay would certainly
offset, and probably outweigh, the revenues which would directly accrue
to Charles from the feu-duties paid by the existing feuars of kirklands
and from the annuity which he could personally expect on the
redistribution of teind.
Minimising the cost of compensation for superiorities was not
simply a matter of expediency, but of financial necessity.	 In
addition to the compensation due to temporal lords for the loss of
their superiorities, they, along with other holders of regalities and
heritable offices in local government, were to be compensated for the
loss of their judicial privileges.	 However, the implementation of
both these aspects of the Revocation Scheme required a huge outlay of
capital, far beyond the existing resources of the Scottish Crown. 15
By the end of 1629, Charles had already committed his Exchequer to202
expenditure of around a quarter of a million pounds for the compulsory
purchase of four regalities and twelve heritable offices.
16
	Yet the
annual income ordinarily available to the Crown during the first four
years of Charles' reign had dropped by £27,321 14 31. 17	Furthermore,
the revenue raised from the land-tax of £400,000 levied in the
Convention of 1625, together with its five per cent tax on annualrents,
were mainly committed to the financing of British expeditionary forces
on the continent and the maintenance of the Scottish establishment at
Court and in Edinburgh.	 Although both these taxes were to be renewed
in the Convention of 1630, military and establishment expenditure still
retained priority in the Exchequer.
18
 Thus, proposals by Charles in
the summer of 1630, that the taxation levied by the Estates should be
used for the purchase of superiorities as well as regalities and
heritable offices, lacked financial viability. 19	Moreover, the
assertion that these purchases were to be accomplished by Charles' use
of the resurgent resources of the English Crown lacks contemporary
corroboration.
20
	The resurgence in the finances of the English Crown
had to await the late 1630s, when Charles was free from military
commitments on the continent.
21
Indeed, negotiations with individual nobles and gentry for
the surrender of regalities and heritable offices not only exposed the
continuing financial embarrassment of the Crown, but further eroded the
political credibility of the Revocation Scheme within Scotland. 	 When
Charles placed a temporary stop on surrenders on 15 October 1634, 22
merely one more regality and one more heritable office had become
subject to compulsory purchase since the Convention of 1630.	 Nobles
and gentry had remained largely unmoved by Charles' threat to withhold
their preferment to honours unless they denuded themselves of their
regalities and heritable offices.	 The individual negotiations that
were conducted with nine nobles and four gentry were rarely concluded
within a year.	 Furthermore, rather than make prompt cash settlements,
the Crown tended to set aside a portion of its future ordinary or
extraordinary revenues for the payment of compensation.23203
Most flagrantly, the surrender of the regality of Newtoun and
the bailiary of Kyle in Ayrshire by Sir Hugh Wallace of Craigiewallace
was still not finalised after a decade of negotiations.	 The surrender
of his judicial privileges was actually initiated in the reign of
James VI in return for an annual pension of 4,000 merks to be paid out
of the customs.	 However, as this arrangement was felt to create an
adverse precedent for surrenders, the Privy Council advised Charles on
25 May 1626 that Craigiewallace's pension should be exchanged for a
lump sum of £20,000.	 Such a payment would take into consideration the
long enjoyment of these judicial privileges by Craigiewallace's
predecessors who reputedly included William Wallace, 'so deservedlie
renowned' for 'his singular valour' in defence of the kingdom during
the Wars of Independence in the late thirteenth century!	 Yet, it was
not until 17 November 1629 that this award was finally ratified by the
Crown.	 Another five years were to elapse before compensation was
specifically apportioned from the taxation voted by the coronation
parliament of 1633.	 Even although the whole process of negotiation
had been reinforced by sympathetic lobbying at Court and the payment of
£20,000 compensation was deemed indispensable to the financial
goodstanding 'of that antient familie', Craigiewallace had still not
received satisfaction by 20 November 1634.
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In another instance - which served as a precedent for the
temporal lords' surrender of their superiorities - Charles allowed
John Gordon, fourteenth earl of Sutherland to retain his judicial
privileges even although compensation of £12,000 had been offered on
15 July 1627 for the surrender of his regality and sheriffship of
Sutherland.	 Having failed for over four years to make satisfaction,
Charles regranted Sutherland his judicial privileges under wadset on
14 September 1631: that is, they were mortgaged to Sutherland until
the requisite compensation of £12,000 became available through the
Scottish Exchequer.	 In effect, although the holding of judicial
privileges now became redeemable, the dispensing of justice within
Sutherland remained a matter of hereditary private enterprise.
Charles had to rest content with the redrawing of the jurisdictional204
bounds of the regality and sheriffdom of Sutherland at the territorial
expense of the shire of Inverness.25
Elsewhere in the Highlands, judicial privileges were actually
entrenched irrevocably.	 The office of Justice-General of Scotland had
been a heritable acquisition of the earls of Argyle since 1541. When
Archibald, Lord Lorne (later eighth earl and first marquis of Argyle),
resigned this office on 12 February 1628 he was allowed to retain the
heritable office of justiciar of Argyll and the Western Isles.	 The
Crown reserved specific rights to half the profits of justice, to
direct justice-ayres twice yearly within these bounds and to nominate
the Lord Justice-General or a depute to sit as an auxiliary justiciar.
In practice, this arrangement gave the house of Argyle judicial
competence over all cases, civil and criminal, except treason: a
privileged position unmatched on the western seaboard since the
forfeiture of the Lords of the Isles at the end of the fifteenth
century.	 Lord Lorne, moreover, was awarded compensation of £48,000 -
half of which was met over the next six years by allowing him to retain
all the profits of justice within the revised bounds of his heritable
jurisdiction.	 The remainder was to be raised by mortgaging the
feu-duties from the Crown lands in Kintyre and Islay and by allowing
Lorne to retain all other yearly rents which he owed to the Crown until
he was fully compensated. 26
Even when Charles did enforce the surrender of regalities and
heritable offices, the impact on the localities was more that of a
cosmetic alteration than a fundamental restructuring of government
throughout Scotland.	 Indeed, the removal of a heritable official led
only to the appointment of another prominent landowner in his place -
albeit on an annual basis initially. 27	Moreover, the suggestion was
being made within Court circles from around 1630 that there was a
distinct lack of sufficient men of calibre in Scotland to sustain
yearly appointments to the roll of sheriffs.	 Alternatively, if
sheriffs were appointed for three to four years, and their period in
office coincided with the collecting terms for taxation, the205
extraordinary revenue of the Crown could be collated more efficiently
in the localities under their auspices. 28	Accordingly, Charles was
persuaded by 23 September 1635 that it was administratively convenient
to retain the existing officials in local government during his
pleasure rather than by annual appointment.	 The financial attraction
of this arrangement, however, was not so much to improve the efficiency
of tax collation - which was still farmed out by the Exchequer
29 - but
to regularise the collection of the new sources of income which Charles
was determined should accrue to the Crown from the Revocation Scheme -
namely, the feu-duties of kirklands following the surrender of
superiorities and the annuity from the redistribution of the teinds.3°
The protracted delays and the financial embarrassment which
characterised the surrender of regalities and heritable offices and
resulted merely in cosmetic alterations to local government could have
been avoided.	 As early as 31 May 1627, Charles was giving serious
consideration to a proposal from the earl of Rothes that he be allowed
to retain his heritable sheriffship of Fife for 'a resonable
composition'.	 Nevertheless, Charles was not yet prepared to make any
such concession which could serve as a precedent for the political
nation that the principle of revocation was negotiable. 31	Charles was
eventually to realise that the continuing financial difficulties of the
Crown made strict adherence to this principle untenable.	 However,
when he actually made concessions - not only in the surrender of
regalities and heritable offices, but in all other aspects of the
Revocation Scheme - his timing was belated and his sincerity was
questionable.	 Concessions were brought about less by a pragmatic
desire for compromise than by a piecemeal search for expedients to
salvage some financial return to the Crown.	 Moreover, the
authoritarian manner in which the Revocation Scheme was implemented
undermined the political credibility of this search for expedients.
For there was no guarantee that negotiations, once initiated, would
promptly be concluded or that a settlement, once agreed, would not
be revoked by the Crown.	 Thus, Charles instructed the Lord Advocate
on 28 June 1630 to draw up a commission which was to be charged to206
negotiate with nobles whose landed interests were affected by the
Revocation Scheme.	 As Charles was then also proposing that the
taxation due to be levied in the Convention should be used for the
purchase of superiorities and judicial privileges, the commission,
which was to allow the nobles to renew their titles for reasonable
compositions, never became operational. 32
Given the lack of political inclination to put the commission
into operation and the prior commitment of revenues raised by taxation
to existing Crown expenditure, Charles was thrown back on an earlier
expedient which sought to accomplish the surrender of superiorities at
the sole expense of the feuars of kirklands.	 This expedient, which
was first hinted in a letter to the Lord Advocate on 10 November 1628,
had, on the initiative of Sir John Scot of Scotstarvit, director of
Chancery, become technically feasible by 21 May 1630 and was approved
by the Exchequer on 17 July.	 Feuars willing to advance money to the
Crown for the purchase of superiorities - according to the rate
prescribed in the legal decreet - would not only come to hold their
kirklands immediately of the Crown, but would be allowed to retain
their own feu-duties for as many years as was necessary to recoup the
money advanced to compensate the temporal lords.	 In effect, by
mortgaging the kirklands to the existing feuars, the temporal lords
could be compensated for the surrender of their superiorities at no
cost to the Crown. 33
Nevertheless, though Charles had initially asserted in
support of this expedient that sundry feuars would be willing to
participate, he was still striving to ascertain on 28 July 1629, how
many feuars were actually prepared to advance money for the purchase
of superiorities. 34  Moreover, the rate of compensation affirmed by
the legal decreet seven weeks later guaranteed each temporal lord -
after deduction of the feu-duty which he paid to the Crown -
1,000 merks for every 100 merks received by him as feu-duty.	 Thus,
each feuar of kirklands would have to advance a sum equivalent to his
share of ten years feu-duty to be quit of superiority.	 Not every207
feuar would have the requisite sum readily available.	 More
pertinently, not every feuar was prepared to advance the total
compensation required to strip the temporal lords of their
superiorities.	 Such a manoeuvre, therefore, was at best a partial
stratagem to engineer the surrender of superiorities.
Furthermore, such a manoeuvre was open to exploitation by
feuars who, on stating their intention to participate in the purchase
of superiorities, could suspend payment of their feu-duties to the
temporal lords.	 Hence, when this expedient 'anent superiorities of
kirklands' was confirmed in the coronation parliament of 1633, Charles
directed that the temporal lords who had subscribed the general
submission should retain not only the demesne lands which they held
from the Crown as property, but also the feu-duties which composed
their superiorities, 'ay and whyle they receaue payment and
satisfactioun'. 35
	Moreover, the Exchequer soon encountered
difficulties when charged to implement Charles' renewed invitation of
8 October, that feuars of kirklands advance the Crown money to purchase
superiorities.	 Although feuars were willing to retain their own
feu-duties for up to ten years, 'as in reason and equitie may compence
for the money to be advanced by them', not all were prepared to pay
their full share of compensation to the temporal lords. 36
Accordingly, the Exchequer ordained on 1 March 1634 that feuars were
not entitled to hold their kirklands directly from the Crown until
their temporal lords were fully compensated.	 In addition, some
feuars were attempting to be quit of superiority leaving their
feu-duties to the temporal lords in arrears.	 Henceforth, feuars were
not entitled to hold their kirklands directly from the Crown until they
produced documentary evidence from their lord or his factor to 'purge
sufficiently the payment of all bygone fewduties'. 37
	Nevertheless,
for the next two years the Exchequer was obliged to retain a watching
brief over title to kirklands to ensure that the interests of the
temporal lords were not prejudiced by opportunist feuars. 38
The opportunist enhancement of their title to kirklands was208
not, however, common practice among feuars.	 Indeed, only a minority
seem to have advanced money to the Crown for the purchase of
superiorities.	 In part, this lack of response from the feuars stemmed
from the reluctance of the temporal lords to surrender their
superiorities without recourse to law and, in part, to longstanding
ties of deference, which not only deterred feuars from seeking to
advance money to the Crown but also led to collusion with the temporal
lords for the retention of superiority. 	 Bands of suspension raised
between August 1632 and January 1634 reveal that only the most
prominent gentry among the feuars of kirklands had sufficient local
standing or independent resources to enforce at law their right to
purchase superiorities.39
Moreover, in the rare instances where a temporal lord was
willing to surrender his superiorities, his negotiations for
compensation with individual feuars did not always reach an amicable
conclusion.	 Thus, on 24 November 1632, James, Lord Ross of Hawkhead
and Melville opened negotiations for the purchase of superiority over
his kirklands in Renfrewshire held within James Hamilton, second earl
of Abercorn's lordship erected from the lands and property of Paisley
Abbey.	 In return for advancing the requisite compensation (specified
as 1,207 merks by the Exchequer), Lord Ross was to retain his own
feu-duties for seven years, although he had originally sought a wadset
of nine years.	 Since the legal decreet had laid down compensation
equivalent to ten years feu-duty, it would appear that Abercorn's
superiority was being undervalued.	 However, the Exchequer had the
discretion when feu-duties were paid in kind - as in this instance -
to alter the period the feuar retained his own feu-duties to make
allowances for annual variations in the future rates for commutation
of rents.	 In any event, because some other feuars within his lordship
were intent on exploiting this individual offer of compensation as the
basis for a general settlement, Abercorn decided to take legal action
to uphold his superiority over Lord Ross.	 By 31 January 1633, he had
instigated a summons of improbation and reduction before the Lords of
Session, the same individual process which Charles had threatened to209
deploy to nullify all lordships of erection.	 Nonetheless, Charles
remained unprepared to tolerate this private action which could serve
as a precedent for temporal lords to retain their superiorities,
thereby preventing feuars ever holding their kirklands directly from
the Crown as freeholders.	 Hence, after an initial attempt by the
Lord Advocate to overturn this action had been repulsed by the Lords of
Session, Hope was again instructed to intervene on behalf of the Crown
on 28 February.	 A month later, Charles imposed a stop on further
legal proceedings.	 Another year was to elapse before the entitlement
of Lord Ross to purchase superiority from the earl of Abercorn was
referred to the determination of the Privy Counci1.40
Although Abercorn was the only temporal lord who actually
instigated a summons of improbation and reduction, the Lord Advocate
had informed the Exchequer on 4 February 1633 to expect others to
follow suit.	 It was, therefore, a general prohibition which Charles
imposed on 27 March, as he remained apprehensive that the temporal
lords intended to use such proceedings for the legal harrassment of
feuars who attempted to purchase superiorities. For some defect in
the original charters granted to these feuars' predecessors prior or
subsequent to the annexation act of 1587, or, indeed, any failure on
the part of these feuars to confirm their own titles with their
superiors, would provide the temporal lords with the pretext to
quarrel their entitlement to kirklands and evict them from their
property.	 Once these feuars were expropriated, their kirklands came
under the direct control of the temporal lords who thereby converted
a right of superiority into that of property - which was exempt from
revocation.41
Conversely, active collusion with their feuars allowed
temporal lords to circumvent their obligation to implement their
subscription to the general submission and surrender their
superiorities.	 Indeed, by drawing upon deferential ties of kinship
and customary association, the temporal lords were able 'to ingrosse
agayne to them their superiorities'.	 This was accomplished by feuars210
resigning their entitlement to kirklands in favour of their temporal
lords.	 The temporal lords, having registered these new acquisitions
as their own property in the Exchequer, then proceeded to renew their
former feuars' heritable tenancy of kirklands.	 In an effort to
terminate the retention of superiority, either by legal harrassment or
by deferential collusion, Charles issued a directive to the Exchequer
on 8 October 1633 defining what was to be 'accompted superiority'
within lordships of erection.	 All entitlement of the temporal lords
to kirklands was to be equated as superiority, unless these lands were
directly held by their predecessors as property before the lordships
were erected by the Crown, or were subsequently inherited or acquired
by them as demesne lands prior to the issue of the general submission.
In effect, for their property to be exempt from revocation, the
temporal lords had either to have inherited or acquired direct control
over kirklands no later than 12 February 1628, the date Charles
dispatched the general submission to Scotland. 42
Although the superiorities which they were obliged to
surrender were now defined comprehensively by the Crown, the temporal
lords were still in no hurry to implement the requirements of the
general submission.	 The Commission for Surrenders and Teinds had
again to issue directives on 15 November 1633 for the production of
all rentals of lordships of erection.	 Generally, the reaction of the
temporal lords was that of marked indifference rather than prompt
compliance, a stance fortified by the discriminatory treatment meted
out to courtiers since the first issue of similar directives in the
spring of 1630.
43	Favourites such as William, earl of Roxburghe,
James, marquis of Hamilton and James Stewart, fourth duke of Lennox,
had been exempted temporarily from compliance with the Revocation
Scheme.	 During the periods in which they were exempt, Hamilton was
at least abroad leading the British force sent to aid the Swedish king,
Gustavus Adolphus; Lennox's continental sojourn was no more than a
grand tour for the formal completion of his education; while Roxburghe
was merely immersed in the affairs of the Court.
44
	The continued
reluctance of the temporal lords to surrender their superiorities led211
on 7 November 1634 to a recommendation, from the committee of inquiry
appointed by Charles to examine the running of the Exchequer, that the
feu-duties of the feuars of kirklands should be taken over unilaterally
by the Crown without payment of compensation. 	 Although Charles
prudently declined to act on this advice, the Exchequer itself was
moved to suggest on 28 November 1635 that temporal lords should be
threatened with the escheat of their superiorities. 	 Payment of	 the
lords' feu-duties to the Crown since the promulgation of the general
submission had been limited.	 In sum, instead of augmenting the
revenues which the Crown could expect to derive from kirklands, the
Revocation Scheme had led to the withholding of rents by temporal lords
for over seven years.
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Indeed, only eleven temporal lords - less than a third of the
total number - made any meaningful effort to negotiate with the Crown,
not so much to implement the Revocation Scheme in its entirety as to
win concessions which would enable them to continue their lordships -
albeit with their rights and privileges realigned. 	 Charles'
bargaining position with the temporal lords was essentially compromised
from the conclusion of a 32,000 merks package deal with John,
Lord Loudoun on 5 August 1630.	 After three years of intricate
negotiations, Loudoun was persuaded to surrender his heritable
sheriffship of Ayr for 14,000 merks - to be paid by the Exchequer in
ten annual installments.	 His regalian privileges over the lordship
of Kylesmure, which had been erected from the Ayrshire lands and
property of Melrose abbey, were downgraded to that of a barony rather
than terminated.	 As the amount of compensation forthcoming from his
feuars was deemed insufficient, his superiority over kirklands was not
surrendered but retained by him in wadset until redeemed by the Crown
on payment of 18,000 merks.	 In effect, this was a conditional but
indefinite retention of superiority, since the Crown lacked the
financial means necessary for prompt satisfaction and payment from
Loudoun's own yearly rent to the Crown would take one hundred and
eighty years to complete: for Loudoun's feu-duty was reduced to
one hundred merks - a third of its value prior to the negotiations. 46212
Thereafter, the temporal lords' negotiations with the Crown,
though not always following the same pattern, were designed to maximise
rather than minimise concessions.	 Since Charles did not wish to
acquire his creditors as well as his estates, Sir John Stewart, the
impoverished son of the vanquished late earl of Bothwell, was permitted
on 28 December 1635 to retain full benefit of the lands and property of
Coldingham priory under a wadset which was eventually settled at
£60,000 (90,000 merks).	 The reduction of his feu-duty by half, to
one hundred merks, confirmed that the redemption of this mortgage from
the yearly rent to the Crown was also an indefinite undertaking.	 In
the meantime, the Crown had accepted on 6 May 1635 the proposal from
James, earl of Abercorn that he would freely surrender his rights of
superiority and privilege of regality over every feuar paying above
five hundred merks yearly rent.	 In return, his lordship was to remain
effective over the remainder - that is, all but the most substantial
feuars.	 Another seven years were to elapse, however, before this
agreement was actually implemented. 47
Only two lords, both anglicised absentees, were prepared to
make unconditional surrenders.	 On 19 February 1632, James,
Lord Colville - subject of the celebrated case which established the
basis for common nationality after the Union of the Crowns - left
compensation for his lordship, erected from the lands and property of
Culross abbey, to the discretion of the Crown.	 On 15 October 1634,
James, duke of Lennox resigned his entitlement to the lands and
property of St Andrews priory.	 Other courtiers, however, were less
concerned to make exemplary surrenders than to exact concessions from
the Crown.	 Thus, five months earlier, negotiations spread over four
years between the Crown and William, earl of Roxburghe were concluded
on 21 May.	 Roxburghe's lordship of Halyden, erected from the lands
and property of Kelso abbey, was realigned not revoked.	 His regalian
privilege was downgraded to that of a barony, his rights of
superiority were contracted territorially and his rights over teinds
were reserved in a quarter of the parishes where he had formerly
exercised titularship.	 Another three years were to elapse before213
Roxburghe actually surrendered to the Crown his rights as patron in
twenty parishes, by which time his feu-duty for Halyden had been
reduced to one hundred merks - a quarter of its former value.
Although James, marquis of Hamilton was prepared by 23 May 1635 to
relinquish all entitlement to the lands and property of Arbroath abbey,
he was simultaneously securing his baronial interest over the lands and
property of Lesmahagow priory, even achieving a one-third reduction in
feu-duty 48
Only one temporal lord went so far as to seek the ultimate
concession - exemption from the Revocation Scheme.	 John Sandilands,
Lord Torphichen, presented a petition before the coronation parliament
of 1633 claiming that his lordship had not been erected from the lands
and property of any cleric, but from the estates of the
Knights Hospitallers of St John of Jerusalem ( incorporating the
Knights Templars), originally a Christian fraternity of noblemen and
gentry professing arms.	 His lordship was exceptional in that it had
been erected not in 1587 but as far back as 1564 from the preceptory of
Torphichen.	 Although Charles was prepared to refer the issue to the
determination of the Privy Council, he retained the right of final
decision which, when delivered on 14 July 1636, had the force of a
parliamentary enactment.	 In principle, Charles was no more prepared
to exempt from the scope of his revocation lordships erected from
preceptories than from monasteries or friaries.	 However,
Lord Torphichen was given special consideration to the extent that he
was allowed to retain not just all lands and teinds held directly  by
him as property, but also his superiority over lands in the
neighbouring parishes of Torphichen and Livingston i in the shire of
Linlithgow (West Lothian).	 He was obliged to surrender all other
superiorities incorporated in his barony of Torphichen; not necessarily
a sanction of great material significance as the lordship was already
truncated on account of the outright sale of templelands since its
,49 erection.
Conversely, Charles exhibited a marked reluctance to resort214
to wholescale revocation by legal compulsion. 	 In the one instance
where he deployed a summons of improbation and reduction, the process
against Sir William Forbes of Craigievar instigated on 29 April 1629
took almost six years to effect.	 Although the acquisition of the
lands and property of Lindores abbey on 29 April 1625 was prior to any
announcement of the king's designs for a revocation, Charles maintained
that the estate had been 'surreptitiouslie procured' at the outset of
his reign.	 He was, however, prepared to stay his prosecution if
Craigievar had complied fully with the terms of the general submission.
But Craigievar adamantly reserved his submission. Charles, therefore,
felt obliged to recommence proceedings to protect the interests of the
existing feuars who wished to hold their lands directly from the Crown
as freeholders and to prevent the general ends of the Revocation Scheme
from being 'exceedinglie prejudged1.5°
As a result of these protracted negotiations and legal
proceedings, no more than five lordships of erection had been wholly
revoked by the end of Charles' personal rule. 	 Moreover, those that
were revoked tended not to be annexed inalienably to the Crown, but
were gifted to enhance the resources of the Church.	 Thus, the lands
and properties of the abbacies of Holyroodhouse and Newabbey were
bestowed on the newly created bishopric of Edinburgh on
17 October 1633.	 The archbishopric of St Andrews was to be
compensated for the surrender of diocesan territory to Edinburgh by the
award of the estates of St Andrews priory in the summer of 1635.
51
In the same way that the continuing financial difficulties of
the Crown, allied to a marked lack of co-operation from landed society,
had tempered Charles' designs to abolish regalities and heritable
offices and had curtailed the surrender of superiorities, a third
aspect of the Revocation Scheme - that of reversing all changes in
tenure since 1540 from ward and relief to taxed ward or blench-ferme -
was to remain unfulfilled.	 Arguably, this was the least practicable
aspect of the Revocation Scheme in that the replacement of incidental
and variable casualties by regular and fixed duties had both reflected215
and responded to the growing commercialism of estate management.
Indeed, the unequivocal demands of the act of revocation for the
wholescale reversal of tenures had resulted in the technical evasion
of ward and relief, notably in the feuing of land for the benefit of
creditors.	 Some creditors acquiring under wadset, lands held by ward
and relief from the Crown, insisted that the nobles and gentry in their
debt made over all casualties in their favour, thereby pre-empting
Charles' use of casualties as royal bounty to reward officials and
favourites.	 Others, who acquired an irrevocable title to lands to
offset debts, insisted on holding by feu-ferme though their superiors
held by ward and relief from the Crown.	 Their feu-duties, though
prescribed, were discharged annually.	 In return, their superiors were
absolved from debt.	 During minorities, when their superiors' estates
were gifted in ward, they were only obliged to pay their prescribed
feu-duties and not make proportional contributions with other feuars
towards incidental reliefs for the benefit of royal officials and
favourites 52
These evasive practices notwithstanding, Charles was induced
to alter his design for the wholescale reversal of tenures by the
spring of 1628, following a lucrative proposition from a courtier,
Sir Alexander Strachan of Thornton, whose successful overtures to farm
Crown revenues were to make him a leading fiscal entrepreneur over the
next decade.	 As part of a project rather optimistically promoted to
treble the revenues ordinarily available to the Crown from feudal
casualties, Thornton proposed to exact at least £24,000 annually from
the casualties arising from tenure by ward and relief by exacting
compositions from all landowners who had defaulted on the payment of
reliefs for wardship, non-entry and marriage.	 These compositions were
to be exacted at fixed rates based on current variations - geographic
and social - in the payment of reliefs.	 Thus, the composition for
wardship was to be rated at one-third of current values; that for
non-entry at a half; while the marriage of an heir was to be satisfied
by one year's revenue from his estate.	 Where reliefs were already
fixed by taxed ward, a composition of three-quarters of their value was216
to be exacted.	 In effect, rather than reverse changes in tenure, an
evasion tax was imposed on all landowners unable to prove that their
tenure by ward and relief had been changed since 1540 with royal
approval.	 Despite quibbles in the Exchequer as to its feasibility,
the king that autumn commissioned the project to run for the next seven
years.	 However, Thornton's vigorous farming of revenues ignored
Charles' admonition 'that in the prosecution of your comission ye vex
nane of my subjects not deserving the same'. By the second year of
its operation there was 'so great contestatione' that the commission
was temporarily suspended on the initiative of the Exchequer, pending
scrutiny of its legality.	 In an effort to allay the apprehensions of
his leading officials, Charles proposed on 28 June 1630, that the
commission should be resumed subject to the strict supervision of the
Exchequer.	 Nevertheless, Thornton's commission was cited as a
significant grievance by the gentry in the Convention of Estates on
29 July.	 Thereafter, the commission was discreetly withdrawn,
Thornton being granted compensation of £3,000 sterling (£36,000) by
Charles on 13 February 1631.	 Thus, far from achieving any appreciable
gain to the Crown, the commission served to highlight Charles'
financial difficulties in Scotland - indeed, Thornton was still
awaiting compensation on 26 May 1634.	 Nonetheless, his commission did
provide operational guidelines for Charles' continuing endeavours to
secure a regular income from feudal casualties.53
For the next three years, Charles adopted a low profile on
teneurial change.	 No serious effort had actually been made from the
outset of his reign to hinder the transfer of lands held in
blench-ferme. 54
	From 1631, individual dispensations were given to
select nobles and prominent gentry to inherit or acquire lands in taxed
ward or to subinfeudate lands in feu-ferme which were held from the
Crown by ward and relief.	 Indeed, this latter dispensation, which
allowed superiors to raise the cash required to meet their most
pressing obligations to creditors, was elevated into a general
concession in the coronation parliament of 1633.	 On condition they
received the prior approval of the Crown, superiors holding by ward and217
relief were allowed to subinfeudate in feu-ferme. Thus, rather than
enforce a punitive control over the adoption of the tenures found most
convenient by landed society for the commercial management of estates,
Charles was seemingly content to exercise a right of supervision over
changes in landholding.55
Nevertheless, Charles remained extremely reluctant to make
any concession which would prejudice his right to reward his officials
and favourites with the casualties arising from wardship, non-entry and
marriage during the minority of all members of the nobility. 	 Thus,
the Exchequer was expected to retain a vigilant interest from 1634 in
the transfer of lands held by ward and relief. 56
	Charles was even
prepared to become further embroiled in legal actions.	 By
24 July 1634, he was 'seeking just grounds in law' to instigate a
test-case for the reduction of taxed ward after a claim on behalf of
Francis Scott, second earl of Buccleuch, that his holding by this
tenure invalidated the king's gift of his wardship, non-entry and
marriage to William, earl of Stirling, the Court Secretary for Scottish
affairs.	 Charles was also determined to ensure that his right to gift
casualties was not impaired by disputed succession to estates. 	 Hence,
the Lord Advocate had been instructed on 1 February to maintain a
watching brief over the succession to the earldom of Home, then being
disputed before the Court of Session.	 When the Lords of Session
rejected Hope's right to intervene in a case which did not directly
affect the interests of the Crown, Charles asserted adamantly on
26 February his right, as part of his prerogative, to instruct his
legal or financial officials to intervene in cases touching upon his
general as well as his proper interests.57
However, he was weaned away from protracted legal
entanglements in tenurial matters by a recommendation of
7 November 1634, from the committee of inquiry into the running of the
Exchequer, that the conversion of tenures on Crown lands from ward and
relief to feu-ferme would help regularise the flow of royal revenues.
In keeping with such a move towards commercial realism, the commutation218
of all payments in kind arising from feu-ferme were to be reversed,
since provender rents provided a better hedge against inflation than
fixed monetary duties.	 Nineteen days later, in the ingenuous hope of
reimbursing a debt of £36,000, a commission was issued to
Michael Elphinstone, a member of the royal household, to draw up a roll
of all landholders who had concealed their tenure by ward and relief
from the Crown prior to 13 May 1633.	 On the completion of this roll
by 1 August 1635, the exaction of compositions would be supervised by
the Lord Advocate.	 In effect, this was a return to the concept of an
evasion tax which had become firmly established as a financial
expedient by 12 June 1637, when the Exchequer was instructed that no
transfer of land formerly held by ward and relief but now by either
taxed ward or feu-ferme was to be accepted, without 'ane considerable
compositioun'.	 Thus, as part of the effort to increase the sources
of realisable income available to the Crown and, hence, improve its
financial credibility, the reversal of tenures was finally abandoned.58
The remaining and most pervasive aspect of the Revocation
Scheme, the redistribution of teinds, was neither abandoned nor
completed during the personal rule of Charles I.	 The continuing
financial embarrassment of the Crown had, however, no immediate bearing
on this situation.	 Given the reluctance to co-operate within landed
society, the redistribution of teinds was no more than partial.	 In
the same way that the surrender of superiorities had involved
protracted negotiations, the relinquishing of control over teinds by
the temporal lords and other titulars was characterised by
dilatoriness.	 Their reluctance, as teind-sellers, to comply with the
guidelines for sales laid down in the legal decreet was not just a
matter of financial dissatisfaction.	 For no monetary compensation
could adequately satisfy 'the more intangible benefits' which the
nobility derived from their control over teinds, as from
superiorities, in influencing the conduct of the gentry. 59 At the
same time, despite the avowed intention of the Revocation Scheme to
emancipate the gentry from such influence, the support of the potential
teind-buyers for redistribution was by no means wholehearted.	 This219
was not just a matter of the gentry opting for deference rather than
emancipation.	 The conditions prescribed in the legal decreet - which
subsequently required empirical elaboration at the discretion of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds - resulted in no marked drive
among heritors to purchase their own teinds.	 Moreover, the onerous
and technically complex task of evaluating teinds within the localities
did not stimulate the zealous participation of the gentry on the
sub-commissions in every presbytery.
Furthermore, Charles was personally wary of any pioneering
endeavour to sell or purchase teinds prior to the ratification of the
legal decreet in the Convention of 1630. 	 Although the earl of
Abercorn had already indicated his willingness to relinquish his
control over teinds at the prescribed rates, Charles instructed the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds on 4 June 1630, that all purchase
of teinds by heritors must be carefully supervised, 'least anything be
done that ether directly or by the consequence might hinder the
generall work that is intended for the good of that our kingdome1.6°
At the end of July, the specifications of the legal decreet for the
costing and quantification of teinds were presented before the
Convention by the Lord Advocate.	 The resistance encountered from all
estates was such that leading officials were averse from moving their
ratification, 'for feir of repulse'. Only an adroit intervention by
Menteith, the Lord President, recommending that it was best to ratify
the legal decreet as a whole package, ensured that the specifications
for costing and quantification were accepted 'with ane universall
applause' 61
Nevertheless, the political nation's agreement in principle
to the conditions prescribed in the legal decreet was soon dissipated
once negotiations commenced for the actual sale of teinds. 	 According
to the formal contract of sale issued from 1631 to implement Charles'
design that the heritors should have a perfect right to their own
teinds, prompt payment of a purchase price equivalent to nine years
rental entitled every heritor not only to lead his own teinds but also220
to assume individual responsibility for their redistribution.
However, the purchase of control over teinds did not absolve the
heritors completely from the ecclesiastical superiority of the
titulars.	 For the Crown, no less than the Exchequer and the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds, deemed that the retention of a
measure of ecclesiastical superiority was both financially and
administratively expedient for the operation of the parish as a
self-contained fiscal unit.	 Thus the titular of every parish remained
accountable for the contributions of all heritors towards the king's
annuity and ministers' stipends.	 Moreover, in parishes where they
continued to exercise titularship, temporal lords were still expected
to pay the Crown the same feu-duties for their ecclesiastical
superiority - even although the amount of teind directly at their
disposal was diminished by heritors purchasing control over teinds.
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Furthermore, once heritors opted to purchase their own
teinds, titulars could no longer recoup the sums expended on the king's
annuity, ministers' stipends or even feu-duties directly from the
yearly teind of the parish.	 Instead, titulars had to recoup this
expenditure through various individual reliefs, levied in proportion to
the amount assessed as teind on each heritor's estate.	 In turn,
heritors opting to purchase their own teinds were bound contractually
to recognise that a measure of ecclesiastical superiority was to
continue. Each heritor was obliged to pay a nominal feu-duty - never
more than one penny blench-ferme - as an undertaking to the titular of
the parish that he would pay his requisite share of the king's annuity,
the minister's stipend and, where applicable, his proportional relief -
usually less than a merk (13s 4d) - towards the feu-duty for the teinds
within a lordship of erection.63
The contractual binding of heritors to recognise the
retention of a measure of ecclesiastical superiority had a further
advantage for the crown.	 For teind, as a landed resource, was not
only liable for feu-duty but also for taxation.	 Moreover, where the
titulars were temporal lords, their estates were still incorporated221
with those of the clergy as 'the spirituall mens pairtis' for the
purposes of taxation.
64
	In turn, they were accountable for all
taxation levied on their estates, being obliged to seek proportional
reliefs for the sums expended from their feuars and heritors throughout
the numerous and not always contiguous parishes of their lordships.
By an enactment of the convention of 1630, temporal lords, despite
their pleas to the contrary, continued to be accountable for the
collection of taxes from former feuars of kirklands who, though coming
to hold directly from the Crown by their purchase of superiorities,
also remained part of the spiritual estate for the purposes of
taxation.	 Although the temporal lords were given the incentive of an
allowance of £100 out of every £1,000 collected, they could no longer
legally compel their former feuars to meet their proportional share of
taxes.
65	Over the next four years arrears of taxes were to accumulate
in several lordships of erection.	 However, defaulters were not so
much former or existing feuars as those heritors drawn from the ranks
of the leading gentry of the shires and the nobility who owed only
teind to the temporal lords.
66
	As the category most resentful of
titularship, they were the most likely to seek control of their own
teinds.	 While the contract of sale did not remove their obligation to
recognise ecclesiastical superiority, the influence of their titulars
was minimised to that of revenue collectors on behalf of the Crown and
the clergy.	 At the same time, the titulars were indemnified against
those heritors defaulting in the payment of reliefs, including the
requisite individual reliefs for taxation. 	 Nonetheless, despite such
contractual safeguards for their fiscal role, the piecemeal sale of
teinds eroded the influence exercised by the temporal lords as
titulars, threatening to reduce their position in every parish to that
of responsibility without power.
However, the temporal lords did manage to salvage their
customary ecclesiastical superiority in parishes where they retained
rights of patronage: that is, in parishes where their titularship of
the teinds complemented their position as the dominant baronial
influence.	 Charles had intended to strip the temporal lords of all222
their rights of patronage in favour of the Crown and the episcopate.
Accordingly, the bishops were instructed on 6 October 1633 to draw up
lists for every presbytery of all patronages of kirks claimed by
temporal lords.	 Seven months later, on 13 May 1634, the Lord Advocate
was served notice to instigate legal proceedings for the recovery of
these rights of patronage.	 The Exchequer was ordered to place a stop
on the passage of renegotiated charters for temporal lordships which
included rights of patronage 'unjustlie takin and deteyned from us and
from the Church'. 67	Nevertheless, the Commission for Surrenders and
Teinds had already extended the rights of patronage of a temporal lord.
On 29 July 1631 - in an award subsequently ratified by the coronation
parliament - the patronage of the kirk in the newly erected parish of
Muirkirk of Kyle (Kirk of the Muir) within the presbytery of Ayr was
granted, on the grounds 'of equitie and justice', to Lord Loud,
patron and titular of the teinds in the parish of Mauchline from which
Muirkirk was disjoined.	 Loud	 had provided a kirk at his own expense
for the inhabitants of the new'parish who had formerly found it more
convenient to attend and seek the sacraments in the kirks of
neighbouring parishes.	 He had also mortified the minister's stipend
for the new parish out of the rents of his own property. 	 In essence,
therefore, the Commission was prepared to uphold and enhance
Lord LoudyPs ecclesiastical superiority for the positive way in which
he exercised his dominant baronial influence, thereby creating a
precedent for retaining the association of patronage with
titularship.68
Lik
In effect, Loud9p's baronial influence in both Mauchline and
Muirkirk was analogous to l that of a lay patron; in that the territorial
bounds of his influence as a landlord tended to be co-termir
o
 with
those of the parishes over which he exercised ecclesiastical
superiority.	 In turn, the Crown came to concede that in parishes
which incorporated or lay contiguous to his demesne, where a temporal
lord was not just titular of the teind and a remote landlord but the
dominant baronial influence, he could retain his right of patronage,
especially when his customary exercise of ecclesiastical superiority223
was supported by kinsmen and local associates in their capacity as
heritors.	 Thus, the earl of Roxburghe, once the renegotiation of his
charter for the lordship of Halyden was concluded on 21 May 1634, was
able to retain meaningful ecclesiastical superiority in over a quarter
of the parishes where he formerly exercised patronage and titularship,
notably in the districts of Teviotdale and Etti&ick Forest, which
mainly consisted of 'his owin landis and some of his particular
freindis, with whome he has alreadie agried for the right of ther
tythis'. 69	Nonetheless, since temporal lords had not been noticeably
forthcoming in their support for the work of the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds, Charles was not yet willing to accept, as a
general principle, their continued retention of patronage in
association with titularship in parishes where their baronial influence
was analogous to that of a lay patron.
Moreover, having conceded in the coronation parliament that
he would not contest the transmission to lay patrons of rights which
authentically pre-dated the reign of Queen Mary, Charles was reluctant
to make further concessions which would dilute his efforts to promote
conformity in the Kirk.	 For the accumulation by Charles and the
bishops of parochial patronage, which included the right to present
ministers, was integral to the strengthening of episcopal authority at
the expense of nonconforming elements among the clergy. 70	Indeed,
despite a reaffirmation on 8 June 1635 of the validity of lay patrons'
rights which authentically pre-dated the reign of the king's
grandmother, such rights had to relate to specific parishes prior to
1561 for their current incorporation in charters to be authorised by
the Exchequer.	 By 16 January 1637, however, the Exchequer was
prepared to permit the passage of charters incorporating rights of
patronage whose authenticity was no older than 1587.	 Two months
later, on 20 March, all restrictions on the passage of any charter
incorporating rights of patronage were lifted, though the continued
exercise of ecclesiastical superiority by temporal lords was still open
to question by the Crown and the episcopate.
71	Ostensibly, this
action was motivated by the interests of commerce, since the224
Exchequer's restrictions on the transmission of the associated rights
of patronage and titularship were deemed to hinder the propertied
classes' acquisition - by way of mortgage or sale - of valuable landed
assets.	 Tacitly, the lifting of restrictions in the Exchequer was a
belated admission by the Crown of the need to reach an accommodation
with the temporal lords on the issue of ecclesiastical superiority.
In order to rectify the slow progress made by the Commission
for Surrenders and Teinds, Charles had been issuing periodic directives
from 22 November 1633, that priority was to be accorded to the
valuation and redistribution of teinds within lordships of erection.
Yet this work was by no means complete on 10 January 1637, when Charles
authorised the final session of the Commission during his personal
rule.	 Hence, these repeated directives composed not just a general
indictment of the Commission for its tardiness, but a specific
testimony to the reluctance of the temporal lords to relinquish their
customary rights of ecclesiastical superiority. 72
Moreover, despite Charles' persistent propaganda about the
oppression which resulted from the customary exercise of ecclesiastical
superiority, the response from the heritors to the opportunity to
purchase their own teinds did not evince a general desire for
liberation.	 Charles' exhortations to the Commission for Surrenders
and Teinds to hasten the process of redistribution were supplemented by
his willingness to instigate legal proceedings against obstructive
titulars, notably the temporal lords.	 Yet only two heritors have been
officially registered - both in 1634 - as having secured their own
teinds by compulsory purchase: 73 a statistic which lends weight to the
contention that Charles had 'somewhat exaggerated' the oppression of
the heritors. 74	Undoubtedly, social deference and a reluctance to
become entangled in legal confrontations with obstructive titulars
contributed to an aversion among heritors towards compulsory purchase.
Indeed, these essentially local pressures do much to account for the
failure of the heritors to mobilise, nationwide, to purchase control of
their own teinds.225
Nevertheless, sales did proceed by voluntary agreement
between titular and heritor.	 But even then, the heritor's quest for
control over his own teinds was liable to encounter the inertia which
had afflicted the administration of Scotland under absentee monarchy.
Although the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds had enacted on
21 January 1631 that titulars no longer needed to procure royal
approval for sales of teinds, heritors still required new charters to
their estates which incorporated their acquisition of their own
teinds.
75
	Thus, Sir James Lockhart of Lee, though a foremost promoter
of the interests of the teind-buyers, had to wait almost three years
from the valuation of his teinds in the parish of Lanark till their
incorporation in a new charter to his estates from the Crown. 	 Prompt
production of Lee's valuation having been requested from the
sub-commission for the presbytery of Lanark on 16 July 1630,
negotiations for the purchase of his teinds from the earl of Mar were
concluded under the auspices of the Commission on 25 March 1631.	 Yet,
a charter formally ratifying Lee's right to his own teinds was not
issued by the Crown until 15 March 1633. 76
However, inertia within official circles was a secondary
impediment to the restrictions on sales which followed the elaborations
on the legal decreet by the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds -
usually under royal direction, though occasionally at its own
discretion.	 According to the legal decreet, the right of every
heritor to purchase his own teinds from corporate or clerical titulars
was neither guaranteed nor immediate.	 Teinds assigned by the royal
burghs to educational provision and social welfare, as to ministers'
stipends, could not be sold.	 As a corollary, the coronation
parliament of 1633 confirmed that no heritor could purchase the right
to his own teinds from universities or hospitals, since the teinds of
these institutions were to be retained as permanent 'donationes to
pious uses'.	 Although the 'competent yearlie meanes' of each
institution was to be evaluated separately, both the Crown and the
Commission remained receptive to their interests, particularly to pleas
from the universities about the decay of learning which was likely to226
ensue from any diminution of their rentals.	 At best, therefore, a
heritor paying teind to such institutions could lead his teinds at his
own convenience and, perhaps, have his annual liability reduced
following re-assessment.
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Moreover, in the acquisition of teinds under the control of
clerical titulars, the interests of the heritors were subordinated to
those of the churchmen.	 According to the legal decreet, heritors
seeking to purchase their own teinds from clerical titulars had to
await the expiry of existing leases.	 However, Charles decided on
20 May 1634 that these leases to teinds, which were usually of long
tenure and held by lay tacksmen, composed a major obstacle to the ends
of his revocation and were to be respected no longer.	 The bishops
were empowered to convene the tacksmen in order to denude them of
their leases to teinds, the churchmen being given the 'first
prerogative' to secure the whole teinds of every parish under their
titularship for the permanent 'use of the church'.	 The heritors in
parishes under clerical titularship were also permitted to convene
meetings with tacksmen on their own initiative, but only in the
presence of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds.	 The bishops,
however, still retained the right to intervene and buy out the leases
of the tacksmen.	 Even if agreements were reached which allowed
heritors 'the buying of their awin tithes from takismen of bishopes',
no sales could be concluded until the teinds in each parish had been
re-assessed under the auspices of the Commission.	 In reminding the
Commission of its duties in such situations, Charles stressed on
20 October that sufficient teinds were to be redistributed to ensure
'good and competent means' for the ministers: that is, stipends
beyond the augmented minimum, the Commission being instructed not to
make 800 merks or eight chalders of victual 'the highest proportion
of competency'. 78
Furthermore, the need to provide ministers with competent
stipends became an excuse for eroding the rights of heritors to
acquire control of their own teinds from secular titulars (notably the227
lords of erection).	 For, the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds
confirmed on 18 June 1634, that no titular was compelled to sell any
heritor the right to his own teinds if he intended to assign the
heritor's portion of the parochial teind 'to the minister as part of
his stipend'.	 Indeed, less than three months earlier, the Commission
had deemed it apposite to qualify the rights of heritors emanating
from the Revocation Scheme.	 From 26 March, every heritor was to have
the leading, not the purchase, of his own teinds 'if the samen be in
ane laik mans hand'.	 This qualification on sales was specifically
elaborated on 24 January 1635, when the right of purchase was accorded
only to heritors whose teinds had customarily been drawn by titulars
or their tacksmen.	 In effect, heritors who held their lands by
subinfeudation were precluded from purchasing their own teinds.	 As
feuars, they held their lands from other feuars not directly from
superiors, paying teind not as a separate liability nor even as a
recognised component of their feu-duties, but merely intermingled with
the stock of landholding dues.	 Since these feuars were mainly drawn
from the ranks of the lesser gentry and the yeomen, their exclusion
from sales amounted to social discrimination.	 However, their removal
from the category of heritors entitled to purchase their own teinds
was part of an expeditious, if increasingly desperate, effort by the
Commission to unravel the technical complexities of valuation which
were impeding the work of redistribution.79
Not only were the heritors' rights to purchase from
corporate and clerical titulars conditional and their right to
purchase from secular titulars subject to erosion, but heritors were
still required to pay teinds to tacksmen with no immediate prospect of
leading, far less of purchasing, their own teinds until valuations
within lordships of erection had been concluded.	 According to the
legal decreet, existing leases of teinds were to be respected provided
they had been set to the predecessors of the present tacksmen prior to
the erection of temporal lordships and their validity had been
authenticated before the Lord Advocate by the end of May 1629.	 It
was only on their expiry that the valuation of heritors' estates could228
commence and the heritors be allowed to lead their own teinds.
Hence, the heritors' ultimate prospects for purchases were remote since
leases ran for considerable periods, were renewable each generation and
were even mortgaged to other landowners.
80	In 1634,
Sir James Lockhart of Lee was again to appear to the fore with a
proposal to remove the 'prejudice' sustained by the heritors from
long leases by a tripartite package for the leading of teinds currently
farmed by tacksmen.	 Prior to the accomplishment of valuations, the
customary rentals acknowledged both by tacksmen and heritors, 'by a
long continued constant payment of a definite dewtie for thair
tithes', were to be accepted as the authentic records for apportioning
each heritor's annual liability.	 Alternatively, each heritor could
authenticate his own annual liability by declaring under oath the true
value of his teinds, provided he made up any deficit should the
eventual valuation exceed his individual declaration.	 In either
event, the tacksmen were to receive ten per cent interest on the annual
liability of each heritor from the first leading of his own teinds till
the completion of their valuation.	 Charles duly recommended this
costly, if convenient, package to the Commission on 20 May. 81
Nonetheless, the Commission was resolved that the interests of the
secular titulars must also be accommodated before the heritors could
purchase, as against lead, the teinds currently farmed by their
tacksmen.	 A caveat was issued on 28 July that the participation of
the titular in the eventual valuation of the teinds was a necessary
prerequisite to their sale on the expiry of the tacksman's lease:
though the Commission did concede on 22 November, that the amount
assessed as teind in the presence of the titular should not exceed the
annual liability of the heritor currently recorded in the tacksman's
rental 82
While the right to purchase their own teinds was neither
guaranteed nor immediate for some heritors, it was not practicable for
others.	 In effect the right to purchase was not so much a standing
concession as a singular option.	 According to a directive from the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds on 13 March 1631, if any heritor229
refused an offer from a titular to purchase his own teinds, 'he and his
successors is secluded from all benefit therof in tyme comeing'.	 The
coronation parliament of 1633 went on to impose specific time-limits
on the option to purchase.	 All heritors whose teinds had already been
valued were obliged to make an offer to purchase at the rate prescribed
in the legal decreet by Martinmas 1635.	 Those heritors awaiting the
valuation of their teinds were given no more than two years to make an
offer at the prescribed rate once their annual liability had been
assessed by the Commission or sub-commissions.	 After this deadline
had expired, the titulars were not compelled to sell 'except they doe
it of thair awin good will and consent'.	 Indeed, because of a general
lack of readily available cash, few heritors outwith the ranks of the
nobility and the foremost gentry of the shires were able to exercise
their option to purchase within two years.	 The category of heritor
most adversely affected by these time-limits was that composed of the
feuars of kirklands.	 At the same time as they were being importuned
to advance the Crown a purchase price equivalent to ten years feu-duty
to be quit of superiority, they were also required to pay their
temporal lords a purchase price equivalent to nine years rental - that
is, nine times the sum assessed as their annual liability - to secure
control over their own teinds.
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Ironically, the secular titulars, especially the temporal
lords, were the main beneficiaries of the conditions prescribed for the
sale of teinds which most heritors found impracticable.	 For every
heritor not opting to purchase was authorised to lead his own teinds
once he had provided his titular with a written undertaking that he
would continue to pay the amount of teind assessed as his annual
liability by the Commission or sub-commissions. 	 In effect, the
provision of sureties, which actually came into operation from
6 August 1630, meant that the secular titulars' exercise of
ecclesiastical superiority could no longer be deemed to rest on
prescription but was an unequivocal right acknowledged formally by the
heritors and upheld legally by the Crown. 84	Moreover, the concession
to lead was not to be interpreted as a dispensation from the compulsory230
valuations of the teinds.	 Hence, the heritors not only had to provide
sureties but also had to seek authorisation from the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds before they could lead their own teinds.
Indeed, Charles decreed on 27 July 1632, that heritors who attempted to
lead their own teinds without this requisite authorisation were 'to be
callit, persewed and punished as disturbers of the publict peace and
quyetness of the kingdome'. 85
As Lord Napier, then Treasurer-Depute, had anticipated in
1630, the combination of restrictive and impracticable conditions
governing the acquisition of their teinds was a major cause of
disenchantment among heritors, 'most of them not being able to buy
there tythe, and the able not willing'. 	 The Revocation Scheme,
therefore, did not accomplish a comprehensive emancipation of the
heritors from the reputed oppression of the titulars.	 Instead, teind
remained an 'inherent dutie' on their estates which, though led
directly by the heritors themselves, continued to be exacted in kind or
in cash to suit the convenience of their customary ecclesiastical
titulars, many of whome insisted on provender payments as a hedge
against inflation.	 Even when their annual liabilities to the titulars
were commuted into cash, the frustrated expectations of the heritors
were seemingly little alleviated.	 The annual liability of each
heritor, though quantified permanently on the valuation of his estate,
still necessitated variable payments since the rates at which his
teinds were commuted fluctuated yearly according to the local fiars for
victual rents determined in the sheriff court. 	 Moreover, initial
valuations conducted under the auspices of the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds were universally decried by the heritors - for
estates being assessed above their worth not on their agricultural
capacity.	 Hence, the feeling spread among heritors that inflated
valuations begat fiars prices 'made exhorbitant by the commissioners,
whom they alledge for the most pairt to be pensioners to the titulers
for the purpose'.
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Although such allegations were more polemical than231
substantial, the expectations aroused among heritors by the Revocation
Scheme were steadily disappointed by directives for the conduct of
valuations issued by the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds.
Charles had exhorted the Commission on 14 June 1630 to remove the
impediments, ascribed vaguely to 'some indirect meanes t of assessment,
which had occasioned the 'slow progresse of valuatiouns'.
Significant, if not spectacular, progress was made over the next nine
months in the valuation of estates where the teind, as a distinct
liability from the feu-duty, was assessed separately.	 However, as the
Commission pointed out on 23 March 1631, the valuations most
susceptible to delay were of estates where the teind was intermingled
with the stock of landholding dues as a composite feu-duty.	 The need
to value stock and teind conjointly required proof of the composite
feu-duty from both titular and heritor: a method of assessment which
was 'mightily hindered' by the negligence of either party 'in
pursueing their valuations' and sometimes even fractious, 'leading to
contestation betwixt them'.	 Under constant pressure from the Crown to
conclude valuations - not so much to accomplish the wholescale
redistribution of the teinds as to secure meaningful contributions to
the king's annuity - the Commission began to defer more to the vested
interests of the titulars, particularly in conjoint valuations where
the heritors involved were drawn mainly from the ranks of the lesser
gentry and yeomen.
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As a counter to the negligence of the titulars who failed to
comply with summons from the sub-commissions, the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds had directed on 21 January 1631 that if only the
heritor had attended a conjoint valuation, his oath as to the worth of
his own teinds required no further corroboration.	 Yet by 19 December,
the Commission was prepared to allow the heritor's 'oath of verity' to
be challenged by the titular if he could produce witnesses to justify
the sub-commission re-examining the conjoint valuation - hardly a
measure to hasten valuations or eliminate local friction.	 Indeed, the
Commission continued to complain about the 'very small progress' in the
valuation of teinds.	 Nevertheless, though delay was attributed to232
'the slowness and unwillingness of the titulars and heretours', it
became the excuse for further social discrimination. 	 By
19 February 1634, the Commission had issued more enactments to
discourage heritors from contesting conjoint valuations.	 Only if
the heritor could furnish documentary proof of the amount of teind
specified in his domposite feu-duty was he allowed to challenge the
titular's estimate of the worth of the teind intermingled with the
stock of his landholding dues - previously, sub-commissions had been
prepared to accept the heritor's oath and its verbal corroboration by
witnesses.	 Moreover, even if the heritor's challenge was upheld,
the amount specified as teind was to be revalued as a quarter of his
total outlay of rent - as against the fifth of his composite feu-duty
prescribed in the legal decreet. 88
In the meantime, social discrimination in the conduct of
valuations was proving a regressive influence on the efforts of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds to implement a comprehensive
redistribution of the teinds.	 The heritors most vulnerable to
discrimination, on account of their lesser standing within landed
society, were the category most susceptible to dominance by the
titulars who were also their feudal superiors.	 By 15 August 1632,
when the Commission was instructed by Charles to take corrective
action against the undervaluing of teinds, the contesting of conjoint
valuations was giving way to active collusion between titulars and
heritors in devaluing the amount of teind, as against stock, in
composite feu-duties.	 In affirming the powers of the Commission to
rectify the deliberate undervaluing of teinds, the coronation
parliament of 1633 declared collusion to be evident 'quhair the
valuatione is led with diminutione of the thride of the just rent
presentlie payit': that is, the heritor's composite feu-duty remained
unchanged, but the amount specified as teind, instead of the fifth of
the composite feu-duty prescribed in the legal decreet, was diminished
by as much as a third. 89
Moreover, the titulars and heritors were not the only233
parties suspected of collusion.	 The legal officers to the
sub-commissions, the procurators-fiscal, were also liable to
prosecution by the Lord Advocate for permitting the corroboration of
composite feu-duties in which the amount of teind was deliberately
undervalued.	 Indeed, collusion had been made flagrantly obvious by
the enactment of 9 March 1631 that prohibited sub-commissions ratifying
conjoint valuations which did not refer to the amount of stock and
teind currently paid as composite feu-duty. 90	In turn, the connived
devaluation of the teind by as much as a third required the tacit
approval, if not the open encouragement, of the foremost local gentry
in their capacity as sub-commissioners of the presbyteries. 	 Thus, far
from being a covert activity confined to titulars and heritors,
collusion was a community enterprise designed to diminish the amount of
valued teind available for redistribution to the Crown - for the king's
annuity and to the Church - for augmented stipends and pious uses.
By 1 July 1635, collusion had become such an endemic practice
that the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was itself censured by
Charles for its routine acceptance of valuations from the
sub-commissions in which the amount of teind in composite feu-duties
had been diminished by a third. 91	Collusion, therefore, was
tantamount to mobilisation from "the grass-roots" against the
Revocation Scheme to ensure that the teind remained essentially a
propertied resource at the disposal of the landed classes. 	 Indeed,
the gradual replacement of class antagonism by the growing cohesion of
class interests was sanctioned by the complicity of the
sub-commissions.	 As a community enterprise, the connived
devaluation of teind was practised nationwide, on a scale which far
outstripped the private endeavours of the nobility to retain their
regalities and heritable offices, and more than matched the local
compacts whereby temporal lords drew on their Oferential ties with
feuars to minimise the surrender of their superiorities.
Moreover, the endemic spread of collusion mirrored the nationwide
aversion among sub-commissioners to the compulsory valuation of every
heritor's estate: a task both onerous and technically complex which234
was in no way ameliorated by the imposition of punitive fines and
random deadlines to secure local compliance with central directives.
As a preliminary to the prompt and responsible conduct of
valuations along the guidelines prescribed  in the legal decreet, the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds had, on 24 March 1630, increased
the penalties for each unwarranted absence from the sub-commissions by
the conveners of the procurators-fiscal from £4 (six merks) to
forty merks.	 Notwithstanding this punitive increase and the
expectation that the sub-commissions should meet daily to conclude
valuations, the Commission was moved to minute on 27 January 1632, that
few sub-commissions had submitted reports of their diligence; 'bot ydle
and impertinent excuiss hes beene pretendit be some and others
disdainefullie slights and refuises ather to goe on in the service or
to make ane excuse at all'.	 Accordingly, each sub-commission in the
twenty-six presbyteries south of the river Tay was given until the
last day of February to submit 'ane formal and perfyte report'. 	 The
sub-commissions of the twenty-three presbyteries to the north were
given until 16 March.	 The conveners and clerks of fifteen
sub-commissions were duly put to the horn on 1 March for failing to
provide the reports required by the Commission.92
The Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was, however,
prepared to be more accommodating in its deadlines, particularly
towards sub-commissions in the more remote presbyteries. 	 On
25 July 1632, the sub-commissions in all presbyteries south of the
water of Dee were given two months to submit the requisite reports to
the Commission.	 Those to the north were given until 1 March 1633.
The former deadline again went unheeded.	 The sub-commissions, even
when valuations were completed within the bounds of their presbyteries,
were dilatory in forwarding the results to the Commission. 	 Thus, on
9 January 1633, the Commission made a general attack on 'the slouth and
negligence of the subcommissioners'.	 The 'cossenage of the clerks in
manie presbyteries' was specifically chastised by the Privy Council on
28 February.	 Of the reports actually submitted to the Commission,235
valuations in at least twenty-two presbyteries were deemed 'unformall';
those which were 'formall' were, for the most part, 'so farre
undervalued, that both his Majestie is prejudged in his annuity and
the kirks of sufficient maintenance'.	 Sub-commissioners in
presbyteries south of the Dee were allocated a final deadline of
25 December for the completion of accurate reports. 	 Finalised
submissions from the northern presbyteries were to be lodged with the
Commission by 1 March 1634.
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As well as ratifying these deadlines, the coronation
parliament approved the contingency of a two month period of grace for
sub-commissions, in presbyteries south and north of the water of Dee
respectively, to complete and submit accurate valuations. 	 Thereafter,
negligent procurators-fiscal and clerks were to be prosecuted.
Recalcitrant titulars and heritors were to be summoned to Edinburgh for
the compulsory conclusion of conjoint valuations before the Commission
for Surrenders and Teinds.	 The bishops were enjoined to instruct
select ministers to provide the Commission with the requisite local
information to correct incomplete or inaccurate valuations - namely,
the current amounts of stock and teind in composite feu-duties.	 In
effect, ministers were to act as the watchdogs of the Commission in the
presbyteries, supervising the diligence of the sub-commissions and
helping to rectify collusion.94
It would appear, therefore, that the clergy were now required
to demonstrate tangibly their appreciation of the benefits accruing to
their estate from the redistribution of the teinds. 	 Not only had the
legal decreet confirmed that the minimum stipend was to be augmented
to eight chalders victual or eight hundred merks, but the Commission
for Surrenders and Teinds, in a series of enactments from 11 February
to 30 March 1631, had upheld the entitlement of every minister to have
his stipend augmented and paid from the teinds of the parish in which
he exercised pastoral care.	 This augmented minimum was still to
prevail even if part of his parish was disjoined and erected into a
separate charge.	 If augmentation encountered obstruction, the titular236
and heritors were obliged to make a local designation of the minister's
stipend from the parochial teinds - a guarantee enforced by a decreet
of locality.
95	Indeed, as borne out by around thirty decreets of
locality enforced between 1634 and 1636, the Commission was by no
means reluctant to implement significant augmentations of stipend above
the prescribed minimum.
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Nevertheless, there was no uniform parochial provision, even
for ministers within the same presbytery. 	 The laxity accorded to
titulars intent on circumventing their parochial obligations was
lambasted vociferously in 1633 by William Guild, a minister in
Aberdeen.	 By having neighbouring parishes united, titulars minimised
the amount of teind requiring redistribution for ministers' stipends as
for pious uses: a practice reputedly pursued to such an extent 'that
we detested before Idoles in Churches, but we are making now Idol
Churches'.
97	An official committee of inquiry into the operation of
the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds reported that there existed,
by the end of 1636, 'ane inequality of provisioun in some churches of
lyke worth, some of them being far inferiour to others': a situation
largely attributable to the incapacity of the Commission to ensure the
systematic valuation of parishes in every presbytery and, more
especially, to dispensations granted by the Crown to favoured
titulars. 98	Furthermore, the enforcing of a decreet of locality was
liable to prove a protracted and fractious process, impairing the
minister's goodstanding within the local community.	 The augmentation
of his stipend to the prescribed minimum and its reallocation among the
estates of the parish could mean over a score of heritors, as well as
the titular and tacksmen, being summoned before the Commission in
Edinburgh and even the complete revaluation of the stock and teind of
the parish because of their lack of diligence in pursuing conjoint
valuations before the relevant sub-commission.99
In turn, the augmentation of stipends by decreet placed
legal constraints on the harmonious development of local relationships
between ministers and landowners which not only prejudiced further237
redistribution of the teinds for pious uses, but also voluntary stents
for the enhancement of congregational services, such as schooling and
social welfare.	 Thus, the realities of local interdependence tended
to outweigh heavily any inclinations among ministers to act as
watchdogs for the Commission of Surrenders and Teinds, either in the
submission of accurate valuations from presbyteries south and north of
the water of Dee during the respective periods of grace or
subsequently, on the suspension of the sub-commissions, in the
piecemeal work of correction and completion. 	 On 6 November 1635,
Charles felt obliged to continue the Commission beyond the three years
allocated by the coronation parliament since collusion was still
unchecked and there were yet 'many tithes unvalued and kirkis
unprovyded'.	 Indeed, when the Commission went on to promulgate an
act against collusion on 25 March 1636, ministers we implicated along
with titulars and heritors in the deliberate undervaluing of teinds in
composite feu-duties.	 Thus, collusion could now be deemed a community
enterprise drawing support from every estate in the political nation.
That year's official committee of inquiry into the operation of the
Commission reported that 'the great ill of undervaluing' was the
foremost impediment to the comprehensive redistribution of teind: 'the
tythes were undervalued almost universally, and often by collusion'.
Moreover, as 'the farr greater sort' of the teinds were 'not yet
valued', the Commission entered its last session during Charles'
personal rule on 10 January 1637, still committed, albeit forlornly,
to the work of rectification and completion.100
The slow progress in the completion of accurate valuations
not only impeded the redistribution of the teinds in general but, as
Charles remained acutely aware, prejudiced the exaction of the king's
annuity in particular.	 Charles had intended that his annuity would
commence at the harvest of 1628.	 Yet, the Commissioners for
Surrenders and Teinds were obliged on 14 July 1630 to request the
Exchequer to issue letters of horning to enforce payments of the
annuity for both 1628 and 1629.	 However, the threat of outlawry
brought no immediate response from titulars and heritors, either to238
clear off arrears or to commence payment of the annuity at that year's
harvest.	 Accordingly, the Commission issued directives on
23 March 1631 for the compulsory exaction of annuity from unvalued as
well as valued teind.	 Where conjoint valuations had not been
completed by 1 August, a fifth of the heritor's current composite
feu-duty was to be taken as 'the just teind' from which the annuity was
to be exacted, 'until the constant rent be knowen be ane formall
valuation'.	 Where separate assessments of teind had still not been
concluded, the annuity was to be exacted from the current annual
liability after a fifth had been deducted as the heritor's personal
allowance.
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Nevertheless, the optimism within official circles that a
comprehensive exaction of the king's annuity would now commence at that
year's harvest proved unfounded. 102
As the Commission for Surrenders
and Teinds revealed on 21 December 1631, attempts to uplift the annuity
from unvalued teinds had encountered not only consumer resistance but
also a technical difficulty - namely, the application of a uniform rate
of exaction from teinds paid in kind given nationwide variations in the
quality of crops.	 All payments in kind were to be commuted according
to local fiars prices for each crop.	 But, instead of exacting
annuity at the different rates prescribed in the legal decreet for each
crop of valued teind, the annuity was exacted from unvalued teind at
the same rate: that is, six merks from every one hundred merks of
victual, the rate prescribed in the legal decreet for teind paid in
cash.	 Provision was made that such a flat-rate exaction from unvalued
teind should not exceed the separate rates prescribed for each crop of
valued teind.	 However, widespread discrepancies arose within the
localities over the amounts exacted as annuity from unvalued as against
valued teind. 103	It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the
co-operation of the titulars and heritors was somewhat less than
wholehearted.	 Indeed, the general issuing of letters of horning for
the non-payment of annuity since 1628 was resumed in the Exchequer on
25 June 1632.1"239
Yet, no forthright appraisal of the king's limited prospects
of deriving a regular income from the teinds emanated from his
Scottish administration.	 While Lord Advocate Hope cautioned Charles
on 28 July 1632 that the landed classes 'are muche walknit be exacting
from them of the annuitie', he affirmed that the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds were making such good progress that the
conclusion of their work could be expected shortly, 'if the titularis
and heretors did not unhappilie lye out and delay the valuatiounes to
thair awin hurt'.	 Charles, for his part, was determined to ensure the
comprehensive exaction of his annuity, especially as he was seeking to
deploy 'all lawful and possible meanes to levy moneyis' for his
forthcoming coronation in Scotland.	 On 28 December, he instructed the
Lord Advocate to use his best endeavours in consultation with the
Exchequer, 'that all our annuiteis of Tythis, alsweill valued as
unvalued, due to us for all yeres and termes preceiding be brought in
to our use with the greatest expedition and convenience that may
be. 105 Nevertheless, the clearing of arrears, which had actually
begun that spring, was to be no more than a fringe activity in the
Exchequer over the next three years.
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Charles, however, did have sufficient foresight to prepare
for contingency action should his Scottish administration prove unable
to effect the comprehensive exaction of his annuity.	 Significantly,
he declined to have his annuity from the teinds annexed to the Crown
as heritable income by the coronation parliament, which was content to
leave its classification to the king's discretion. 	 Thus, the ground
was established for the flexible deployment of the annuity to secure an
immediate return for Charles if not a regular income for the Crown. 107
Hence, Charles decided that his annuity was to be used as a bargaining
counter in the Commission's negotiations with the temporal lords for
the reappraisal of their feu-duties following the surrender of
superiorities.	 The Exchequer was informed on 20 February 1634, that
Charles was prepared to dispense with the annuity due from the temporal
lords for the unsold teinds within their titularship should they make
prompt payment of their existing feu-duties to the Crown.240
Nonetheless, the temporal lords preferred a more precise reappraisal of
their liabilities, related specifically to the actual amounts of
superiority surrendered and teind purchased.	 Hence, a special
sub-committee of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was appointed
on 20 October to negotiate revised feu-duties in which the annuities
from unsold teinds were to be incorporated. 	 Since the temporal lords
had allowed their existing feu-duties to fall into arrears, their
negotiations with the sub-committee - which were usually protracted -
guaranteed Charles no more than a piecemeal return, certainly not a
regular income. 108
Simultaneously, however, Charles was pursuing an alternative
strategy, designed to yield a more immediate, albeit singular, return -
namely, the sale of his annuity to landowners 'disposed to buy it'.
The Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was authorised on
28 February 1634 to commence negotiations with landowners 'who desyre
to enjoy the annuitie of their Landis of all yeres bygane and to cum'.
Charles confirmed on 6 May that when sales were concluded, at a price
established by the Exchequer, the purchaser was freed from all legal
obligations to pay annuity in the future.	 As this was a heritable
concession, sales - which were to be completed by 1 August 1635 - were
restricted effectively to heritors who had already secured control over
their own teinds and to secular titulars who continued to exercise
control over unsold teinds.	 Moreover, as the purchase price was not
established in the Exchequer until 15 October, the period for the
conclusion of sales was cut from fifteen to less than ten months.
Teind apportioned as the king's annuity was to be sold to select
heritors and secular titulars for a price costed at fifteen years
purchase: that is, a purchase price equivalent to fifteen years
annuity from each estate.	 As a further stimulus to sales, Charles
conceded on 7 November that this purchase price was to include
existing arrears, amounting in most instances to seven years annuity.
Landowners qualified to participate who postponed or delayed purchase
were not guaranteed such indulgent terms, were liable to have 'no
favor in buying ye same heirefter' and were open to prosecution for the241
non-payment of arrears.	 Thus, the Exchequer issued letters of horning
on 21 November intimating to all landowners qualified to purchase their
share of the annuity, but still currently in arrears, 'yat they sail
have both for fifteen years purchase'.
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Nevertheless, only eight landowners had purchased their share
of the king's annuity by 1 August 1635, although another eighteen had
made offers to purchase.	 Because of Charles' unabated desire for an
immediate return from the teinds, the period for sales was extended on
6 November and was effectively to last until the end of his
personal rule, by which time another eighty sales were concluded.
Some landowners, on account of their belated decision to purchase and
their mounting arrears, were obliged to pay a purchase price equivalent
to sixteen years annuity.	 The total of eighty-eight sales - which
realised individual sums ranging from under £100 to over £2,000 - did
little to alleviate the financial burdens of the Crown, but much to
highlight the widespread lack of enthusiasm among the landed classes
for Charles' implementation of the Revocation Scheme to his own
personal advantage.
110
	Admittedly, the market for sales was
restricted to select heritors and secular titulars.	 The slow progress
of valuations had imposed a further restriction on sales since no
qualified landowner could offer to purchase until his teind was
evaluated and his share of the annuity specifically apportioned.	 Yet
the delayed conclusion of valuations was due less to inherent technical
complexities than to local inertia and, above all, to class collusion.
Indeed, Charles himself, by 30 November 1635, had already placed on
record his apprehensions about the 'great prejudice' he would suffer,
'if the said annuity be sold according to such valuatiounis as ar
wrongouslie undervalued' .
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Even before the initial period for sales had expired, Charles
had resorted to the farming of his annuity from 24 July 1635: a
manoeuvre tantamount to official recognition of the limited prospects
for an appreciable return from sales.	 Over the next twelve months,
Scotland was divided into six farming regions in which fiscal242
entrepreneurs were commissioned by the Exchequer, from one to three
years, 'for the speedy ingathering of the annuitie of the teyndis of
all lands alsweill unvalued as valued'.	 The fiscal entrepreneurs were
expected usually to collect other royal revenues, a farming process
which culminated in the commission granted to Sir Alexander Strachan of
Thornton over the re-cast north-eastern region on 3 August 1636.	 Not
only was he expected to collect the annuity from the shires of
Forfar (Angus), Kincardine, Aberdeen, Banff, Moray, Inverness and Fife,
but he was also licensed to sell the annuity to heritors qualified to
purchase for the payment of sixteen years annuity - a price which
included arrears.	 In addition, he was to collect all Crown rents,
including feu-duties of kirklands; the escheats of outlaws; the
judicial fines imposed in sheriff-courts and by justice-ayres as well
as all profits arising from contraventions of decreets issued by the
Court of Session.112
Nevertheless, the political discontent occasioned by the
farming of the annuity would appear to have outweighed the financial
benefit accruing to Charles.	 Indeed, the Exchequer was obliged to
legislate against overzealous exactions of the annuity by 15 July 1635,
when no more than two farming districts had been commissioned.
According to the guidelines issued from 1631 by the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds, the titulars were charged to collate all
redistributable teind in every parish, even though some heritors had
purchased their own teinds.	 Thus, when fiscal entrepreneurs began	 to
demand specific payments of annuity direct from the heritors, 'it
daylie occurres that quhen the heretors are chairged they suspend upoun
payment maid of thair teynd bolls to ye titularis'. 	 Instead of
providing fresh guidelines for the collation of redistributable teind,
the Exchequer still required heritors to meet in full their existing
obligations to the titulars as well as making specific payments of
annuity to the fiscal entrepreneurs.	 In return, the heritors were
granted relief from the annuity the following year. 	 However, each
heritor was left to make a unilateral deduction of his share of the
annuity from the total amount of teind paid to the titular. 	 Hence,243
rather than developing as a comprehensive and systematic return from
the farming districts, the king's annuity remained a fractional and
fractious undertaking.113
Moreover, the bulk of the teinds were still unvalued by the
time the last farming district was commissioned. 	 Heritors who paid
teind separately from their feu-duties were thus obliged to meet their
share of the annuity though not yet entitled to retain a fifth of their
own teind as their personal allowance.	 Most of the heritors so
affected were drawn from the ranks of the lairds, including the
foremost gentry of the shires, whose support the Revocation Scheme was
designed to encourage not alienate.	 Nonetheless, since the personal
allowance was regarded officially as a tactical concession to secure
the heritors' endorsement of the king's annuity, the Scottish
administration was not impervious to the rumblings of discontent
percolating through to Edinburgh from the localities by the end of
1636.	 Indeed, the committee of inquiry into the operation of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was moved to affirm on behalf of
heritors not yet in receipt of their personal allowances, that 'it will
be thoght a great iniquity to exact the annuity of them'.
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Although not the subject of an official inquiry until 1636,
the general conduct of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds had
long been a cause of public complaint.	 According to Lord Napier,
signs of 'a bissines miscaryed or ill managed' were evident as early as
1630, by which time the Commission was already beset by technical
complexities, 'like the heads of Hydra, no sooner one cut off but
another arises'.
115	The arduous, as well as the technically complex,
workload imposed upon the Commission as the co-ordinating agency for
the implementation of the Revocation Scheme led to collective actions
of avoidance by commissioners.	 From 8 January 1630, its inaugural
meeting after the publication of the legal decreet, the Commission was
afflicted periodically by the inclinations of lay and clerical
commissioners alike to exercise 'their ingenuity in shirking the odious
duty that has been imposed upon them'.	 Not infrequently, diets had to244
be deserted as inquorate.	 Although Charles was not averse from
censuring absentees as 'hinderers' of his service, his directives to
the Privy Council to enforce the compulsory attendance of commissioners
were of little practical remedy.	 For the process of putting to the
horn had been instigated so often that the threat of outlawry had
become universally devalued by 1633.
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Moreover, the Commission as a whole was by no means receptive
to administrative expedients which threatened to dilute and, perhaps,
supplant its powers.	 On 7 December 1631, the Commission received a
letter from Charles appointing a select committee.	 Its membership was
to consist of two commissioners from each estate who, together with
six leading officials, were to sit for six hours daily during each
working week from 16 December until 1 February 1632, 'for accelerating
and hastening of valuations'.	 Rather than implement this proposal,
the Commission on 21 December dispatched overtures to Court objecting
to the devolution of its powers to the select committee on the grounds
that it was authorised only to create committees to discuss and ratify
the valuations reported by the sub-commissions, not to appoint a
committee to determine and judge which would be 'destructive of
itself'.	 Furthermore, the Commission was convinced that the select
committee would not hasten, but retard and lengthen the process of
valuation, since contending parties would be unsure which was the more
appropriate authority to hear their suits.	 Indeed, the select
committee was regarded as an administrative diversion not an expedient,
which would nourish and increase the apprehensions of all affected
parties that the work of revocation 'was aimlesse and desperat'.
Faced by such collective resistance, Charles conceded on
14 January 1632 that the select committee should only operate under
the strict supervision of the Commission. 	 For the next seventeen
months, in a forlorn effort to conclude accurate valuations before the
coronation parliament, the select committee reported its discussion and
rectifications to the twice weekly meetings of the full Commission.
In turn, no less than three commissioners from each estate were
designated to attend the select committee every month, thereby securing245
the quorum of five for its daily meetings - though all commissioners
prepared to attend were admitted to its three hour sessions each
morning and afternoon.
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From the renewal of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds
on 1 November 1633, there was no attempt made to revive the select
committee.	 Instead, the Commission strove to fulfil its exacting
workload by remaining quorate and increasing its weekly meetings.
Every two months, four commissioners each from the nobility, gentry and
clergy, together with three from the burgesses and a leading official,
were designated to maintain the quorum of fifteen.	 On
17 January 1634, the weekly meetings of the full Commission were
extended from two to three - Mondays being utilised as well as
Wednesdays and Fridays.	 Nevertheless, the weekly attendance record
of the commissioners was not so diligent that the work of revocation,
especially of teind redistribution, went fast forward during the
remainder of the personal rule.	 The Commission was still susceptible
to delays occasioned by absenteeism.	 Moreover, its progress continued
to be hindered by the lack of systematic valuations in the presbyteries
and by contested valuations in the parishes. 	 Above all, the
Commission was never able to rectify effectively the endemic spread
of collusion as a community enterprise.
The Commission for Surrenders and Teinds operated over a
decade as Charles' co-ordinating agency for the implementation of the
Revocation Scheme.	 On the one hand, because of its limited success in
effecting the work of revocation within the localities, the proceedings
of the Commission serve to monitor the gradual groundswell of opinion
from the "grass-roots" against the accomplishment of the Scheme. On
the other hand, the commissioners charged to carry out the directives
of an absentee monarch were not mere cyphers, but representatives of
and responsive to the interests of their respective estates.	 Thus,
the proceedings of the Commission also monitor the growing estrangement
between the Court and the political nation.
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Since the Revocation Scheme amounted to a frontal assault on
their vested interests, threatening not just their judicial privileges
and landed resources but their social status, the nobility were never
more than grudging participants on the Commission.	 Support from the
gentry could no longer be relied upon once that estate came
progressively to realise that the opportunities to be quit of
superiorities and to control teinds were hedged severely by technical
restrictions and exacting financial qualifications. 	 The burgesses,
who took little interest in the work of revocation after their
accommodation with the Crown was confirmed by the legal decreet,
manifested their marked indifference by conspicuous absenteeism.	 The
most truculent element during the span of the Commission was the
clergy.	 The determination of the bishops to uphold the Kirk's claim
on the teinds as spirituality had even led them to object to the
Lord Advocate's proposal to the Convention of 1630 that non-subscribers
to the general submission should 'be tyed to quyt ye teynds of uther
mennis landis'.	 Hence, they remained adamant, if isolated, in their
conviction that the teinds were 'the proper patrimony of the Church'
and that the scope of the Commission should have been limited to
lordships of erection, not extended to the redistribution of teinds in
every parish of the kingdom.
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Despite their poor attendance record as commissioners,
Charles was forced increasingly to call upon the support of the bishops
to ensure that the Commission adhered to its exacting workload.	 For
Charles' remorseless pursuit of revocation, his willingness to resort
to legal compulsion to effect all aspects of his Scheme and his
determination to make his annuity from the teinds remunerative, forged
a concerted opposition among the landed classes. 	 In the country,
piecemeal local inertia gave way to widespread active collusion.
Among the lay commissioners, separate antagonisms gave way to a common
accord against authoritarianism and the upholders of the prerogative.
The frustrated expectations of the gentry were fused to the offended
interests of the nobility, even the apathy of the burgesses was
transformed by this lay reaction.	 The clerical commissioners were247
explicitly identified as the common target for constitutional
opposition from 21 December 1631, when the king's proposal for the
select committee 'craved be the bishops' was rejected by the rest of
the commissioners.	 The suggestion by the bishops that the powers of
the Commission be devolved, to correct the 'unjustness of valuations',
had actually been taken up by Charles six months earlier on 14 June.
The bishops' selection as the common target was confirmed when they
went on to object to the commissioners nominated to the revised version
of the select committee after it became operational on
14 January 1632.120
No attempt was made in the coronation parliament to appease
the constitutional apprehensions raised by the Revocation Scheme.	 As
that elder statesman Haddington pointed out pertinently to the Court on
17 June 1635, the principle of revocation had merely been affirmed not
proved.	 As yet, there had been 'no cognition taken (as wes ordained)
what right his Majestie hes to teinds. 	 Nor is their tryall taken (as
wes injoyned) what were the causes why erections were given'.
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The
bishops were specifically implicated as barriers to the parliamentary
redress of such grievances after Charles suspended the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds on 16 October 1636, to await an official inquiry
into its tortuous proceedings.	 The seven bishops appointed to the
official committee of inquiry had an absolute majority of one over the
remaining lay members. Undoubtedly, therefore, they had a decisive
influence on the committee's recommendation - accepted by Charles on
10 January 1637 - that the Commission should be renewed rather than
extinguished.	 The redress of grievances arising from the Revocation
Scheme 'must neids be done by the autority of the present Commissioun,
for ane other way there is not, unless his Majestie shuld be pleased to
call a new parliament which will have the owin difficulties and ane
uncertane event' 
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In retrospect, given the decade of wrangling occasioned by
its implementation, the political castigation of the act of revocation
123
as 'a dangerous nonsense' may appear justified.	 Yet, the most248
unacceptable aspect of the Revocation Scheme was neither its aims nor
even its promotion through the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds,
but Charles' unstinting resolve to impose and accomplish his
revocation, if necessary by legal compulsion, solely on the strength of
his prerogative.	 Although the political nation did indeed reject this
imposition of social engineering from above, the substance of the
Revocation Scheme was to find support from the Covenanting Movement.
Thus, the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was to be resurrected in
1641 as the Commission for Plantation of Kirks and Valuation of Teinds,
and was to continue as the co-ordinating agency for teind
redistribution over the next nine years; every heritor being guaranteed
the right to purchase his own teinds.	 The right of every feuar to be
quit of superiority and hold his kirklands directly from the Crown was
to be reiterated in 1649: simultaneously, regalian privileges and
heritable offices created since 1641 were to be rescinded and future
creations proscribed.
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	That the Revocation Scheme should be
postponed rather than terminate‘in 1637, indicates that opposition
Ace-- cx,IA	 ct
from the political nation was no  a fiformrconservative reaction
0-toultk
against social engineering, buto co lective vote of no confidence
in Charles I.
Charles' inability to accomplish his revocation during his
personal rule was largely the outcome of his monarchical style.	 'A
measure of Charles' incompetence as a politician' can certainly be
discerned from the little gratitude he received from the classes his
Scheme was propagated to benefit. 125
	His remorseless pursuit of
revocation succeeded only in forging an accord among the landed classes
to resist and frustrate its achievement.	 His ignorance of the
structure and aspirations of the political nation made him ill-equipped
to attempt social engineering, especially as the work of revocation
necessitated a frontal assault on the vested interests of the Scottish
nobility.	 The atavistic determination of this estate to retain rather
than surrender or redistribute their customary spheres of territorial
influence was, probably, unmatched in contemporary Europe outwith
Russia, where the Romanovs' efforts to engineer a 'service-state'  by249
the systematic regulation of lay benefices was undermined steadily by
the conveyancing of landed resources in wills and dowries to camouflage
acquisitions by inheritance, sale or mortgage.126
Admittedly, Charles was also confronted by a problem of
government which had afflicted absentee monarchy since 1603: namely,
the maintenance of effective channels of communication and
administration between the Court and Scotland, a situation which
required political flexibility on the part of the monarch and a
resolute political will to uphold royal authority on the part of his
Scottish administration.	 Nevertheless, although Charles' promotion of
his revocation did not lack flexibility, his pragmatism was confined to
administrative expedients. Hence, the authoritarian manner in which
he strove to impose and implement his Revocation Scheme, making scant
allowance for either its technical complexity or its exacting workload,
provoked a critical reaction from the political nation. 	 Ultimately,
this reaction raised issues of constitutional significance, having
initially found expression in the widespread reluctance within the
localities to fulfil central directives which, in turn, brought about
the gradual erosion of the political will of the Scottish
administration to uphold the king's prerogative without equivocation.
In sum, the implementation of the Revocation Scheme at the behest of an
absentee monarch, instead of engineering a transformation of Scottish
society, helped manufacture a movement of widespread dissidence among
the political nation.250
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Chapter VII	 The Ramifications of the Revocation Scheme: 
Central Government 
The Revocation Scheme did not directly precipitate the revolt
against the personal rule of Charles I. 	 Although the political nation
shared a common apprehension about the authoritarian manner of the
Scheme's imposition and implementation, the wideranging scope of
Charles' revocation raised diverse grievances among the different
classes which inhibited the formulation of any party programme of
constitutional redress.	 Promoted and initially sustained on a basis
of class antagonism, the Scheme was not an issue to unite the political
opposition.	 Neither its undermining of vested interests nor its
frustrating of social aspirations were apposite rallying cries for
harnessing sectarian dissent into concerted opposition to royal
authoritarianism.	 Even when antagonisms among the estates gave way to
class collusion, connived action against the accomplishment of
revocation was localised and unco-ordinated, being denied a national
forum by the infrequency of constitutional assemblies. Nevertheless,
the Revocation Scheme was of profound political significance: notably,
in the permeation of a climate of dissent within the political nation
which made the management of Scottish affairs by an absentee monarch
increasingly untenable.	 Indeed, because its impact was diffuse rather
than concentrated, the political ramifications of the Revocation Scheme
can primarily be held to account for the continuous disruption of the
channels of communication and administration - not just between the
Court and Scotland, but between Edinburgh and the localities. For,
the Revocation Scheme was conceived and received as a project of the
Court, promulgated solely on the strength of the king's prerogative,
imposed unilaterally on a reluctant Scottish administration and
implemented cavalierly with regard to the social sensibilities of the
political nation.
During November 1625, the king revealed to the Court that his
Revocation Scheme had not been suggested by his leading Scottish
officials.	 That this situation should be a matter of comment for
Charles speaks volumes about his political naivete, most notably
with regard to the social composition of the administration charged to
implement royal policy in Scotland. 1	Over a fifth of his father's265
last Council were temporal lords, a proportion actually increased to
thirteen out of forty-eight when his own reconstituted Privy Council
became operative on 23 March 1626.	 Of the three leading officials at
the outset of his reign, only the Secretary, Thomas Hamilton, earl of
Melrose (later of Haddington), who took his original title from his
monastic estate, was actually a member of the new nobility of service
established by James VI.	 However, the Treasurer, John Erskine, earl
of Mar, had been granted the monastic estates of Cambuskenneth,
Dryburgh and Inchmahome, to supplement his standing as a member of the
traditional nobility.	 Moreover, although the Chancellor,
Sir George Hay of Kinfauns (later Viscount Dupplin and earl of
Kinnoull), had not been rewarded with a temporal lordship, he had
acquired extensive kirklands in Perthshire. 2
Not only this triumvirate, but the whole of the Scottish
administration felt demeaned by Charles' resolve to impose the
Revocation Scheme 'without the advyss or knauledge of his principall
officers' on the grounds that 'thay had not bein faithfull servants'.
When Charles eventually summoned his leading officials to Court at the
outset of 1626 to discuss the implementation of the Revocation Scheme,
their deliberations were but part of the king's reforming programme
designed to break up the triumvirate's influence over Scottish affairs
in order to make the executive and judiciary more responsive to the
dictates of the Court.	 Charles' conduct during the conference between
courtiers and administrators did little to allay fears about the
provincial relegation of Scottish government.	 Absenting himself from
the first session which commenced on 17 January, the chairing of the
proceedings was left to the foremost English courtier, George Villiers,
duke of Buckingham, alternating with the Anglo-Scot, James Hay, first
earl of Carlisle.	 Although the king was present when the agenda
reached the Revocation Scheme on 19 January, he attended merely as an
observer.	 His right to a revocation was propagated vociferously by
two anglicised courtiers, Robert Maxwell, earl of Nithsdale, and
James Stewart, Lord Ochiltree, who, in the eyes of the leading Scottish
officials, 'hes maed shipwrak of thaer awn esteitts, and vald now fish266
in drumlie vatters by shakkin all things bus that thay may gett sum
partt to thaem selfs'.	 Lord Ochiltree's perspicacity in fending off
the constitutional objections to the leading officials, both to the
nature and scope of the Scheme, drew forth this further acerbic comment
from Mar, 'His arguments var far mor vittie having any ground of treu
wisdom or judgement founded upon reson'.
3
From its inception, therefore, the Revocation of Charles I
was decried as a Court project, foisted onto an unreceptive Scottish
administration whose leading officials tended to follow their natural
inclinations as members of the landed classes in regarding the Scheme
as undermining fundamentally 'their inviolable title of inheritance1.4
Over the next eight months, the growing estrangement between the Court
and the Scottish administration was intensified by the insidious
circulation of rumour, manufactured mainly by Nithsdale, which
impugned the competence and integrity of the leading officials,
especially of Chancellor Hay.	 Charges that Hay and his foremost
associates were intent on the obstruction of the king's reforming
programme were not without foundation.	 Nevertheless, although Hay had
to account for his conduct before the Court during November 1626,
Nithsdale was generally considered to have overstated his case, even by
his informers and collaborators within the Scottish administration,
such as John Spottiswood, archbishop of St Andrews.
5
Moreover, these same sources were simultaneously cautioning
delay in the implementation of the Revocation Scheme, since not only
leading officials but other privy councillors, including courtiers not
party to Charles' original designs, found the initial versions of the
Scheme unpalatable.	 Like the nobility in general, few were inclined
to comply promptly with the directives of the Crown, particularly with
regard to the voluntary surrender of temporal lordships.	 Indeed, on
19 November 1626, Archbishop Spottiswood specifically advised
David Murray, Viscount Stormont to refrain from surrendering his
iuov
lordship of Scone, pending the outcome of negotiations then underwa*
' between the rest of the temporal lords - in groups of four - and the267
recently appointed Lord Advocate, Mr (later Sir) Thomas Hope of
Craighall.	 For his exemplary, but hasty, surrender as a courtier
could prove as detrimental to his individual interests as piecemeal
negotiations could prove for his class. 	 Furthermore, despite the
recurrent threat that Charles would resort to a policy of legal
compulsion to implement his revocation, the news from
Sir George Auchinleck of Balmano on 26 November also favoured
deferment.	 This recently appointed lord of session informed Stormont
that the nobility had met twice in Edinburgh during the past week to
formulate a petition requesting Charles not to proceed with actions of
reduction and improbation.6
Charles, however, was to prove far from receptive to either
the contents of the petition or the delegation bringing it south, which
consisted of three nobles - two members of the traditional nobility,
John Leslie, earl of Rothes, and Alexander Livingstone, earl of
Livingstone, the only privy councillor, and a temporal lord,
John Campbell, Lord Loudt	 On learning of their imminent arrival,
Charles debarred them from Court on 4 December 1626. 	 In imposing this
ban, which was to last a fortnight, Charles was undoubtedly influenced
by 'the perpetual confluens' of Scots to Court since his accession, a
practice which continued to perturb him throughout his personal rule.
7
Nevertheless, what stirred his ire most was the nobles' supplication
that the Revocation Scheme should not proceed further without
parliamentary consultation to placate the fears and jealousies of his
Scottish subjects.	 Charles was moved to rage on 14 December that this
request was 'of too heigh a straine for subjects and petitioners'.
Although the delegation was eventually granted an audience, Charles
continued to treat them as intrusionists meddling unwarrantably with
the exercise of his prerogative.	 He delayed his response until
17 January 1627, when he agreed to suspend for six months legal action
to enforce the Revocation Scheme. 8 He did switch tack to the extent
that he went on to establish the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds
as his main agency for the implementation of his Revocation Scheme.
Yet, he never renounced the option of legal compulsion.	 Nor was he268
prepared to concede a parliament to allay the special fears of the
nobility that the comprehensive implementation of the Revocation Scheme
would result in the 'irreperable ruin to an infinite number of families
of all qualities in every region of the land'.9
Through the concerted action of the nobility in drawing up
the petition for parliamentary consultation it is possible to discern,
particularly with advantage of hindsight, the origins of the movement
for constitutional checks on the monarchy during the personal rule of
Charles I.	 Moreover, the presence of Rothes and Loud 	 in the
delegation dispatched to Court affords similar evidence for the
continuity of leadership among the opponents of the Crown's unfettered
exercise of its prerogative between the parliaments of 1621 and 1633.
10
Nevertheless, opposition within Scotland was not yet formulated into a
cohesive grouping with a constructive party programme designed to
secure fundamental limitations on monarchical power.	 Opposition to
dictates from the Court was still conducted on a freelance basis,
characterised by desultory collaboration within the Scottish
administration to delay if not negate the reforming schemes of
Charles I.	 Occasionally, however, leading officials were prepared to
countenance - albeit covertly - more direct action which could result
in violent demonstrations.	 Thus, their more tempestuous associates in
landed society engineered the tumultuous lobbying which rendered the
Commission for Grievances inoperative by the late summer of 1626.
Fears at Court that this action was the forerunner to insurrection
were fanned deliberately by Nithsdale as part of his concerted campaign
to discredit the competence of leading officials, especially of
Chancellor Hay, to govern Scot1and.
11
Nonetheless, such lobbying did indicate that a vociferous
minority within the political nation was not prepared to accept
passively the authoritarian direction of Scottish affairs by an
absentee monarch.	 Indeed, George Gordon, first marquis of Huntly,
felt himself obliged to reassure Nithsdale on 13 December 1626, that he
was ready to mobilise those 'quha ar of my freindschip' to counter any269
who proposed 'to rebell againis his Majestie'.
12	Any immediate threat
of rebellion was no more than hearsay.	 Yet, Charles did undoubtedly
aggravate tensions between the Court and Scotland at the turn of the
year by his dismissive attitude towards the nobles' petition and his
cursory treatment of the delegation which bore it south. 	 On
22 December, he actually commended James Hamilton, marquis of Hamilton,
for absenting himself from the meeting of the nobles when the petition,
'which you conceaved not to be agreeable to our will', was formulated.
Six weeks later, Robert Kerr, earl of Roxburghe, could do no more than
express his wish to Hamilton that the 'tempestuous blasts' still
current in Edinburgh on 3 February 1627, 'may be calmit'. 13
That same day, the Privy Council had formally ratified
Charles' establishment of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds.
However, the first notification of the Commission had not passed off
without incident in Scotland.	 For the Commission was an
administrative expedient designed to circumvent the demand for
parliamentary scrutiny of the Scheme, not to appease vested interests
affected by the king's revocation.	 His authorising edict carried the
admonition that he would proceed with all rigour against those who
refused or neglected to co-operate with the Commission: a
reaffirmation of his readiness to resort to legal compulsion once the
moratorium had expired.
14	Moreover, his choice of Nithsdale to
communicate his revised plans to the Privy Council was particularly
inopportune.	 Although no documentary evidence has survived which
directly implicates Nithsdale in the Scheme's conception or
formulation, he was among the staunchest upholders at Court 1 pf Charles'
right to a revocation.	 He had been instrumental in actuàtin Charles
to overhaul the machinery of government in Scotland and he was still
the main rumour-monger at Court maligning the competence of the leading
officials.
15
	Despite his chronic debts and his uncompromising
Catholicism, he enjoyed royal protection from both civil and
ecclesiastical censure.
16	In short, Nithsdale was an apposite - if
not the prime - target for a violent demonstration of Scottish
antagonism towards the Court.270
News of Nithsdale's coming to Scotland had already occasioned
unrest in Edinburgh when his advance coach was held up by a mob in
Dalkeith, nobles with vested interests in kirk property being reputedly
behind such rabbling.	 Plans for further intimidation, including
personal violence to Nithsdale and his supporters on their arrival at
the Council chamber cannot be ruled out.	 However, allegations that
disaffected temporal lords and leading officials were prepared to
schedule his assassination as an extramural item on the Council's
agenda must remain unproven.
17	Nithsdale, indeed, did not attend the
Council meetings on 30 January and 1 February 1627, when Charles' edict
for the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds was first notified and
discussed.
18 Whether or not he made any effort to attend the Council,
his reception on reaching the capital seems to have proferred
sufficient warning about his unhealthy political prospects in Scotland.
By 17 February he had demitted office as Collector-General of the
taxation voted by the Convention of 1625 in order to devote his
energies to Charles' policy of direct intervention in the
Thirty Years War.	 On 22 February he was commissioned to raise and
transport a contingent of 3,000 men from Scotland for service under
Christian IV of Denmark.	 In return, he was to receive extended
protection from his creditors.
19
	In the meantime, the Privy Council
had instructed that the edict authorising the Commission for Surrenders
and Teinds should be publicised extensively - in every parish kirk as
well as the head burgh of every shire.	 As a result, the commencement
of the Commission in Edinburgh on 1 March was attended by a great
influx of 'almost the wholl countrey', thereby setting the seal for the
continuance of tumultuous lobbying.20
The situation now facing Charles I in Scotland was inherently
fractious, political tensions aroused by his general programme for the
reform of Scottish government being made especially taut by his
promulgation of the Revocation Scheme.	 Nevertheless, although the
stage was now set for tumultuous lobbying which could degenerate into
violent protest against agencies and agents of the Court considered
obnoxious to the Scottish establishment, no systematic preparations271
were in hand for armed revolution.	 Nor had relations between the
Court and the political nation deteriorated irretrievably towards
constitutional breakdown.	 Undoubtedly, the style, direction and,
above all, the lack of political competence which characterised
Charles' personal rule, strained the credibility of absentee
monarchy to the limits.	 His stress on his prerogative caused him to
disdain the promotion of coniensus in Scotland for his reforming
programme. As borne out by the implementation of the Revocation
Scheme, his determination that the royal will should prevail left
little room for pragmatic manoeuvre, far less for government attuned
to the sensibilities of the political nation.	 His treatment of
experienced administrators was dismissive.	 He preferred to rely on
the advice of courtiers, usually anglicised, whose influence on and
experience of the actual working of government in Scotland was as much
vacational as vocational: most notably, Sir William Alexander of
Menstrie (later earl of Stirling) whom Charles had appointed at the
outset of 1626 as his Secretary for Scottish affairs in attendance at
Court, had been in residence as a courtier since 1608.	 However,
since opposition to the personal rule was still relatively inchoate
during the opening years of Charles' reign over Scotland, it can be
contended that Charles was currently confronted by a more grave and
less tractable political situation in England, where the problems of
government, though not necessarily insuperable, were of greater order
and magnitude.21
Certainly, the English parliamentary tradition afforded a
more readily identifiable and procedurally sophisticated focus for
constitutional confrontation with the monarchy.	 Tensions between
central and local government were escalating since the late sixteenth
century, being largely brought about by the increased financial and
administrative demands of the Court at a time when the real incomes of
landed society as well as the monarchy were being eroded by inflation.
These tensions were compounded during the reign of James I. 	 The debts
inherited from Elizabeth and the rising expenditure of his own
government caused James to resort increasingly to financial expedients272
imposed without the consent of parliament.	 In turn, parliament, which
regarded itself as the representative element of the English
constitution, was concerned to maintain its status and privileges.
More especially, the Commons, the less socially static house, was
determined to debate any aspect of royal policy which encroached on the
subjects' liberties or inviolated rights of property. 	 James'
steadfast refusal to bargain about the scope of his prerogative
furthered the divergence of interests between monarchy and parliament
which led to the constitutional impasse of the late 1620s.
Ultimately, the tensions aroused by financial and administrative
demands on the localities were made critical by Charles I's commitment
to a policy of direct intervention in the Thirty Years War.
Parliament refused to vote supplies in 1625 and 1626. 	 But Charles
pressed ahead with the collection of tunnage and poundage and the
acck
levying of pundry impositions.	 Buckingham, the royal favourite,
impeached 	 acquitted in %parliament of 1626.	 Charles' right to
exact forced loans was  isiphdd  by the Five Knights Case in the following
year.	 Parliament countered in 1628 with the Petition of Right against
arbitrary taxation, arbitrary imprisonment, compulsory billeting and
the resort to martial law.	 However, this attempt to define the scope
of the king's prerogative was of little practical effect.	 Charles
continued to levy impositions aTIO quashed the support in the Commons
olcssoLtrtvg
for civil disobedience by prorognit/j  parliament in March 1629 and
embarking upon his eleven year personal rule in England.
22
Undoubtedly, the growth and frequency of English parliaments
since the late sixteenth century had contributed to the evolution of
sophisticated procedures to express constitutional dissent unrivalled
elsewhere in the British Isles.	 However, Scotland as well as England
was afflicted by inflation, subjected to the financial and
administrative demands of the Court and expected to contribute to
Charles' policy of direct intervention in the Thirty Years War.
Thus, the tensions between absentee monarchy and the political nation,
though lacking the readily identifiable focus afforded by parliament in
England, had a revolutionary significance no less potent though273
expressed more diffusely.	 Moreover, opposition to the Court in early
seventeenth century England did not necessarily amount to a sustained
policy of parliamentary aggression.	 Indeed, the constitutional
weighting of parliament's aims and achievements must not be
exaggerated, given the piecemeal and particularist nature of the
disaffected element.
In the first place, James I's exercise of his prerogative did
not threaten parliamentary enactment as the ultimate source of law in
England.	 He was prepared to dispense and suspend, but not replace
statute. The exercise of the prerogative only became suspect after
1625 because of Charles' temperamental incapacity to promote through
parliament a broad basis of consent and agreement for royal policies.
Neither the Commons nor the Lords had any notion that the king's power
should be limited by a written consitution.	 The Petition of Right,
which was largely motivated by the unequal burden of billeting and of
impositions levied on the localities, sought to establish the supremacy
of the peace commissions over martial law in the shires and to prevent
the establishment of a standing army at parliament's expense. 	 The
Petition did not attempt a comprehensive definition of the king's
prerogative.	 Nor did it even provide the machinery to enforce its
limited objectives.	 Secondly, the leading procedural manoeuvres of
the opposition after 1625 - such as the appropriation of supplies and
the impeachment of ministers of the Crown - were prompted from within
Court circles.	 Counsellors temporarily out of favour viewed
parliament as an alternative, but secondary, forum for the provision
of correct advice: a situation not totally dissimilar to that which
prevailed in Scotland where the opposition led by nobles was most
potent when supported by leading officials.	 Thirdly, since the powers
which accrued to parliament depended more on its capacity to persuade
than to coerce, the constitutional impasse of the late 1620s was as
much a commentary on the political incompetence of the parliamentary
opposition as of Charles.	 For the opposition generated by the
dissenting element in the Commons was only effective when support was
forthcoming from the Lords.	 By 1629, however, the Commons had274
overreached themselves in their unconstructive and conspicuously inept
efforts to stop forced loans and the levying of impositions.
Moreover, the assassination of Buckingham in August 1628, and the
subsequent ending of the lavish distribution of honours which had both
diluted and distressed the traditional nobility, removed the main
grounds for dissent in the Lords.	 Thus, faced by divided and
diminishing opposition, Charles was able to dissolve parliament and
retain the political initiative throughout the 1630s.	 He continued
to exercise control without accountability and to subsist by financial
expedients. Hence, far from being a strong or thriving institution
as a result of its articulation of constitutional dissent, parliament
was only to be rescued from its political impotence by the intrusion
of the Scots into English affairs during the Bishops' Wars.
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Despite its lack of accomplishment in placing checks on the
suspect exercise of the monarch's prerogative by 1629, the
parliamentary opposition, if only for its persistence throughout the
1620s, cannot be discounted entirely in terms of constitutional impact
or political principle.	 The disaffected element in both Commons and
Lords was not merely a faction of outsiders in search of office, in
central or local government, at the expense of the existing incumbents
favoured by the Court.	 The frequency of parliaments during the 1620s,
which afforded a regular forum for the blending of local grievances and
their propagation nationwide, ensured that these same grievances and
their proponents acquired a constitutional weighting which transcended
their particularist origins.	 Moreover, that there was an ideological
- as distinct from a social - gulf between the governing and the
governed may be attested from the currency of the rival polemical
labels "Court" and "Country" during the 1620s. 	 Undoubtedly, the
"Country" was little more than a loose collaboration of the
disaffected, lacking the consciousness or the formalised mechanisms of
leadership, discipline and propaganda of an organised political party.
Nevertheless, the label served as a rallying point for opposition to
the Court within the localities as within parliament.	 Adherence to
the "Country", however, was but one aspect - along with puritanism,275
legalism and even scepticism - which was undermining traditional
values and habits of obedience such as familial or territorial
attachment to magnates and deference towards the dictates of central
government.	 Nonetheless, support for the "Country", based
fundamentally on loyalty to the local community, represented the
permeation of a mentality - a distinctive ideology, culture and
lifestyle to that affected by the "Court".	 Although the "Country"
never formulated a national political programme, it did mobilise local
particularism in support of a national ideal.	 Its aim was to achieve
the harmonious redefinition of the relationship between local and
central government: not for parliament to share or wrest power from
the Court-dominated executive, but to restore the equilibrium of the
ancient English constitution.24
Given the decentralised orientation of government north of
the Border, the familial and territorial deference accorded to the
nobility within the localities and the relative infrequency of
parliaments or conventions of estates, analogy between England and
Scotland on opposition to the Court may at first sight seem tenuous.
Nevertheless, local particularism also conditioned the mentality of the
disaffected element in Scotland which was able to bring into play
against the Court a more enveloping and more immediately potent message
than adherence to the "Country".	 For opposition to the directives of
absentee monarchy could be projected as a defence not just of a
retrospective - and nebulous - constitutional equilibrium, but of the
immediate national interest - even future national identity.	 The
Union of the Crowns had made the Scots acutely conscious and
apprehensive of their country's status as a political satellite of
England.	 Ever since 1603, the spectre of provincialism had haunted
and slighted the political nation.	 Furthermore, leading officials as
well as disaffected members of the estates were prepared to deploy the
resentment aroused by provincial relegation as a political weapon
against a monarchy which was becoming less respectful of the separate
customs and conventions of the Scots and more inclined to subordinate
the welfare of Scotland to that of England. 25	Thus, at the outset of276
the reign of Charles I, successive Venetian ambassadors recorded sharp
divisions between the desires of the new king and the pretensions of
the Scottish nation.	 The grounds for the dispute were essentially
threefold: Charles' coronation as king of Scots, his defence policy
and, above all, his Revocation Scheme.
Charles' disinclination to be crowned first in Scotland was
jElhAnts
regarded as a slight to the house of Stuart- Ls-native kingdom.	 Albeit
a symbolic rather than a substantial grievance, Charles' repeated
deferral of this ceremony until 1633 made his coronation a running sore
in Scotland for over eight years.	 A more flagrant illustration of
provincialism was afforded by Charles' defence policy, which was but
part of his programme of direct intervention in the Thirty Years War:
a programme initiated and implemented without consultation north of the
Border, though the Scots were expected to contribute financially and
militarily to its success.	 Charles proposed to renounce the
subvention for military expenditure which he was to receive from the
taxation authorised by the Convention of 1625 should the Scots
immediately provi
d
si
c
on  a defence force whose requisite strength was
tentatively estimated at twenty ships, eight hundred sailors and
two thousand soldiers. In turn, Charles' offer to dispense with
subsidies - which were subject to periodic revision - was open to
interpretation as an attempt to commit the estates in principle to the
maintenance of a navy and a standing army.	 Yet this defence policy,
which amounted to little more than kite-flying, proved only a
temporary irritation.	 For Charles' whole military programme was
generally discredited by the lack of success which attended the British
expeditionary forces on the continent.
Lack of consultation was also the root cause of
dissatisfaction with Charles' Revocation Scheme, undoubtedly the most
persistent source of contention in Scotland during his personal rule.
More especially, Charles' failure to introduce his Scheme through a
parliament was deemed prejudicial to the privileges of the landed
classes, a view not abated by his aversion to its parliamentary277
ratification prior to his coronation visit.	 Despite his establishment
of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds as a mark of appeasement at
the outset of 1627, the nobility remained particularly perturbed.
For not only did the Scheme undermine their security of title,
collectively and severally, but the continuing penury of the Crown -
prolonged by Charles' military programme - afforded little prospect
that their voluntary surrender of superiorities and heritable offices
would be compensated with ready cash.
26
Although nobles in as well as out of office argued
consistently that Charles' interpretation of the principle of
revocation lacked parliamentary sanction, they remained reluctant to
promote a constitutional confrontation with the king over his
implementation of the Scheme.	 Their prospects of success in such an
eventuality looked especially bleak during the summer of 1627.
Indeed, Sir John Stewart (later earl) of Traqugir was to commend the
titulars in particular and the nobles in general to submit voluntarily
to the directives from the Court lest the king resort to a policy of
legal compulsion.	 Speaking on 13 August in his capacity as a
negotiator on behalf of the teind-sellers, he was unconvinced that a
parliament could adequately safeguard their interests.	 For, 'a
Parleament will condiscend to anything of quhat is now in question
that his Maiestie sail requyr'.	 Admittedly, Traq4Kair at this
juncture was seeking to ingratiate himself at Court.	 Nevertheless,
his counsel on this occasion was not that of a timeserver, but of a
realist.
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On the one hand, the opponents of the Revocation Scheme had
neither the parliamentary experience nor the opportunities to express
their dissent through the parliamentary channels available to the
disaffected element in England.	 On the other hand, the contentious
first session of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds had left the
nobles apprehensive about their ability to mobilise the other estates
in support of their class interests.	 The bishops were deemed beyond
the pale.	 Not only was their conduct regarded as dissimulating when278
not obstructive, but their motives were suspect - to destroy the
temporal lordships and to engross the teinds for the exclusive benefit
of the clergy.	 The burgesses lacked both the political clout and
sufficient interest in the Revocation Scheme to make effective allies.
The position of the gentry was ambiguous.	 Their traditional deference
to the nobility could no longer be relied upon, yet not totally
discounted.	 The militant pressure group of lairds, fronted by
Sir James Learmouth of Balcomie and Sir James Lockhart of Lee and
prompted from within the administration by the director of Chancery,
Sir John Scot of Scotstarvit, seemed to have the ear of the king.
That these militants were merely a vociferous minority,
unrepresentative of the gentry as a class, still awaited
28 confirmation.
Over the next two years, the promotion of the Revocation
Scheme on a basis of class antagonism underwent a distinct shift - if
not a dramatic transformation.	 For not only the nobility, but the
whole of the political nation were required to subscribe the general
submission, whereby, the costing and quantification of teind liable for
redistribution as well as the rates of compensation for surrendered
superiorities were remitted to royal arbitration.	 The general
submission, together with the legal decreet which was to publish the
actual outcome of royal arbitration, relegated the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds to a mere debating and valuation agency.	 In
practice, therefore, Charles' resort to the general submission and the
legal decreet confirmed that landed title depended ultimately on the
discretionary powers of his prerogative, not on the security of
charter.	 Moreover, the gentry were expected to carry the main burden
of service on the sub-commissions within each presbytery from the
outset of 1629: service which involved a technically exacting workload
as well as anomalous and contentious valuations.	 Such administrative
expedients did little to endear the Court to the political nation.
Thus, Haddington was to record on 7 April, that great numbers were
amassing in Edinburgh in anticipation of a parliament.	 The management
of these lobbyists was especially difficult because they were animated279
by rumours that royal government was being manipulated to the private
advantage of 'some great men of this countrie at Court'.
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Such claims reveal, at least within official circles, that
class antagonisms were not as yet attributed directly to Charles I but
to the machinations of a clique at Court. 	 Indeed, as was to be proved
during the Convention of 1630, the Crown was still in a position of
dominance in relation to the nobles and other disaffected elements
within the political nation.	 The attitudes and aspirations of the
four estates towards the implementation of the Revocation Scheme
remained largely divergent.	 Hence, the estates were open to
management to suit the interests of the king.	 Moreover, Charles was
mindful of the lesson from the Convention of 1625, when his
wideranging - but naive and ill-informed - proposals for economic and
social reform had been greeted with a general lack of enthusiasm which
occasionally verged on outright opposition.	 Thus, when authorising
the Convention for late July, he was resolved to minimise the
opportunities for dissent on the part of the Estates by limiting the
agenda to items of legislative endorsement.	 His objectives were
primarily two-fold.	 Firstly, he sought the renewal of the ordinary
and extraordinary taxation voted in 1625.	 Secondly, he expected the
formal assent of the estates to his legal decreet of September 1629 in
order to expedite the valuation and redistribution of the teinds and
the surrender of superiorities as well as heritable offices. 30
Furthermore, Charles required his leading officials, councillors and
bishops to demonstrate at the Convention to the best of their
endeavours, 'thaire reddiness in furthering my services'.
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Charles' efforts to manage the Convention solely to further
his own affairs were successful.	 Nevertheless, the Estates met
against a background of mounting unrest in the localities aroused by
the king's direction of Scottish government in general and by his
implementation of the Revocation Scheme in particular.	 This situation
had been reflected in the election of shire commissioners during the
previous two years.	 To ensure the representation of the gentry in the300
event of a parliament or a convention, the sheriff was expected
annually at the Michaelmas head court in every shire to convene the
lesser barons and freeholders to elect commissioners - usually two, but
occasionally one - on behalf of their estate.	 From the outset of his
reign, Charles had not been averse to nominating gentry 'weell affected
to the weell of the church and commone weell' whom he wished elected as
shire commissioners.
32	Having proclaimed provisionally that his
coronation parliament would be held in Edinburgh on 15 September 1628,
Charles instructed the Privy Council on 24 July that the sheriffs were
to convene the lesser barons and freeholders in every shire to
countenance the retention of the existing commissioners should the
coronation parliament continue after Michaelmas. 	 Special dispensation
was given for the election of replacements in four shires - all
nominees of the Crown.	 However, the financial incapacity of the
Scottish Exchequer to meet the costs of this state occasion, together
with Charles' own reluctance to absent himself from his constitutional
embroilment with the English parliament, caused his coronation
parliament to be postponed initially for six months - thereafter
annually for the next four years. 33
Moreover, few sheriffs had made any effort to comply with the
king's electoral directives prior to the actual postponement of the
1628 parliament.	 Indeed, the Privy Council recorded on 30 October
that there had been 'some oppositioun made in sindrie of the
shirefdomes' which augured 'some contestatioun and disordour in the
tyme of the Parliament'.	 This recalcitrance was again in evidence	 the
following year.	 For on 31 December 1629, the Privy Council reported
that the routine Michaelmas elections had been neglected in six out of
the thirty-three shires.
34	This state of affairs was attributable
not just to a lack of inclination to co-operate on the part of the
sheriffs - usually members of the nobility - but was more a
demonstration of landed solidarity within select localities directed
against the Court, especially against the king's assault on legal title
and territorial privileges.	 For Charles was then attempting to
enforce in every shire the subscription of the gentry as well as the301
nobility to his general submission and imposing upon the gentry special
evaluation duties as sub-commissioners in every presbytery. 	 The
reaction against the Court's management of Scottish affairs was most
marked in those shires where the election of royal nominees had been
contested.	 In such instances, the lack of co-operation on the part of
the gentry was of a piece with their reluctance to act as a pressure
group on behalf of the Crown to coerce the nobility into prompt and
fullsome participation in the Revocation Scheme.
Furthermore, Charles frittered away potential support among
the gentry by his apparent lack of concern to extend the franchise
following the surrender of superiorities.	 Although some feuars of
kirklands had landed resources which more than matched the estates of
enfranchised freeholders, Charles was not prepared to enfranchise those
feuars to whom he became 'immediate superior' once the temporal lords
surrendered their superiorities.	 Despite representations from the
localities, which were taken up by the Lord Advocate in the summer of
1628, Charles made no effort to extend the parliamentary franchise to
this class of synthetic freeholders.	 Thus, a raw nerve of political
frustration was allowed to fester in the localities.	 Such
indifference on the part of the king contrasted starkly with his
Scheme's alleged objective - to emancipate the gentry.
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As borne out during the 1630s by the move from class
antagonism to class collusion, Charles was largely the architect of his
own downfall.	 His handling of the Revocation Scheme motivated the
gentry to make common cause with the nobility, bringing into play
within the localities the alliance that was responsible for
terminating his personal rule nationally.	 Indeed, his implementation
of the principle of revocation was the most pronounced manifestation in
Scotland of a style of government evident also in his economic and
religious policies throughout the British Isles.	 His emphasis on his
prerogative meant that 'he stood on technical rights when the question
at issue could only be solved by the broadest political wisdom'. 36
This lack of political nous contrasted sharply with the political302
pragmatism of his father, James VI.	 Charles had claimed in his
proclamation of 9 February 1626, that he was merely carrying out a
revocation 'formerlie intendit in our late deare fatheris tyme' - a
possibility not entirely discounted within official circles at the
inception of the Scheme.
37	James VI had in theory deplored the
passing of 'that vile Act of Annexation' which had authenticated the
creation of temporal lordships. 38 Yet, even in his latter years when
his rapport with his Scottish subjects was waning, he made no practical
attempt to reverse the privileges which he had confirmed and bestowed
on lords of erection since 1587.	 He was too much of a political
realist not to have appreciated that such a revocation would have
undone his isolation of the presbyterian extremists in the Kirk and
made possible the alliance of disaffected landowners to religious
dissenters.	 Again, it would seem that Charles was treating himself to
a generous helping of precedent to give a cloak of respectability to
his authoritarian actions.
Charles also chose to ignore a contemporary lesson in
political statecraft from Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal Richelieu,
chief minister to Louis XIII of France.	 Prior to his embroilment in
the Thirty Years War to check the Habsburgs' progress to European
hegemony - when the intense pressures for financial supply from 1630
expedited centralised and arbitrary government - Richelieu was resolved
to modify, if not reverse, the absolutist trend in royal government.
He appreciated the need for the Crown to conserve the privileged
position of the nobility in the social hierarchy as the most
efficacious means of forestalling reaction and rebellion.	 Thus, he
stressed not only the ideological ties which bound the nobility to the
Crown, but also that the nobles' route to military and financial
advancement was through service to the Crown.	 The greatest testimony
to his success came during the highly organised and English instigated
revolt of the Huguenots at La Rochelle in 1627.	 By the time Charles I
had dispatched a relief force under Buckingham, the Protestant nobles
had defected.	 Some even took service with the French Crown in forcing
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the withdrawal of Buckingham from the isle of Re in November.	 The303
venture ended in humiliation for Charles as well as Buckingham when his
fleet was repulsed in May 1628.	 The Huguenots were subsequently
forced to surrender - after heroic resistance - and Charles was obliged
to sue for peace in April 1629.
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Indeed, Charles' lack of political nous and his manifest
incapacity to learn from past and contemporary masters of pragmatism
meant that the monarchical position in Scotland prior to the coronation
parliament was maintained despite, not because of, the personage of the
king.	 That the specialised work of revocation made any headway
administratively and that government in Scotland continued generally
to function - albeit with stuttering competence - can largely be
attributed to the initiative and energy expended in the service of the
Crown by William Graham, seventh earl of Menteith. 	 His arrival on the
natjona) stage coincided with Charles' decision to institute the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds as an alternative to his impending
resort to legal compulsion.	 Menteith may even have suggested the
Commission as a means of defusing the unrest among the nobility
occasioned by the Revocation Scheme.	 In any event, Menteith was
appoiAted a privy councillor and also admitted ono the Commission of
Exchequer on 18 January 1627.	 In little over a year he had achieved a
meteoric rise to a position of influence within the Scottish
administration.	 Following the death of his kinsman, John Graham,
fourth earl of Montrose, Menteith was promoted to the presidency of the
Privy Council on 15 January 1628.	 Four weeks later, on 12 February,
he was nominated by Charles to take over the presidency of the
Commission of Exchequer during the frequent absences of the
increasingly infirm archbishop of St Andrews.	 Menteith was appointed
Justice-General of Scotland - on an annual basis - from 11 July,
Archibald, Lord Lorne, having already surrendered the house of Argyle's
heritable title to that office.
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At the same time as he was accumulating offices in Scotland,
ifte
his frequent liaising -t-e-Court won him the respect and confidence of
Charles who entrusted him with the general oversight of government in304
Scotland as well as a special watching brief over the operation of the
Commission for Surrenders and Teinds. In fact, Menteith reinvigorated
the system of shuttle diplomacy pioneered by the earl of Dunbar in the
aftermath of the union of the Crowns.	 By commuting regularly between
Edinburgh and the Court, Menteith kept Charles informed about political
developments north of the Border and, conversely, he explained to
officials and the rest of the political nation serving in government
the intent behind royal directives.	 Formal recognition of his
importance as an intermediary came with his appointment as a member of
the English Privy Council on 26 September 1630.
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Menteith was to claim on 18 September 1630, that 'my power is
small'.
42	This self-effacing assertion, however, should not obscure
the fact that he was then the most influential politician in Scotland.
The old guard within the Scottish administration had been eclipsed.
Hay, now Viscount Dupplin, though still Chancellor, was never able to
repair fully his reputation at Court following Nithsdale's aspersions
on his competence and integrity.	 Haddington had accepted the post of
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on 6 November 1627, an appointment
tantamount to demotion.	 As Secretary within Scotland, he had never
acknowledged the precedence accorded to Sir William Alexander of
Menstrie, the Secretary at Court. Although Haddington continued to
work assiduously in the service of the Crown, he was now, on his own
admission, a spent force, debilitated by age and infirmity from
attempting to regain his former political clout.	 Mar was also a
victim of age and infirmity, demitting his office as Treasurer in
April 1630 in favour of William Douglas, earl of Morton, a courtier.43
Moreover, despite the king's bestowal of offices and memberships of
commissions onto courtiers like Alexander of Menstrie and Morton,
Menteith remained the only politician with the capacity and the
commitment to sustain a working accommodation between absentee
monarchy and the political nation.	 For six years he endeavoured both
to moderate the authoritarian inclinations of Charles I and to contain
the spread of dissent among the estates.	 Two illustrations from 1630
will serve to attest his political capabilities.305
During the autumn of that year, rumours were circulating in
Scotland that Charles was intent on purging both the Commission of
Exchequer and the Privy Council because of unsatisfactory attendance
records - among ordinary members as distinct from officials. 	 Charles
actually remitted this matter to the consideration of Menteith with a
specific proposal to restrict membership of the Commission to royal
officials.	 As auxiliary president of the Commission as well as
President of the Council, Menteith was in a unique position to exercise
a restraining influence.	 Thus, Charles was counselled to avoid any
action which might promote disaffection, particularly among nobles then
serving in government but lacking office or inclination to attend
Court.	 In order to prevent 'any just caus of discontent', Charles
contented himself with an exhortation on 12 October to Morton, the new
Treasurer, and the rest of the officials on the Commission to ensure
that all future meetings in Exchequer were quorate. 	 Likewise, when
the Privy Council was eventually reconstituted on 30 March 1631,
Charles had been persuaded to make no drastic changes in personnel.
Instead, he issued a reminder to all councillors that they were
appointed solely at his pleasure.	 Henceforth, their conduct was
expected to be diligent and dutiful, especially as the President and
Chancellor were charged to hold frequent meetings of the Council for
the transaction of 'great and weightie maters of estait'. 44
The single outstanding contribution of Menteith to the
personal rule of Charles I was, perhaps, his masterly management of the
Convention of Estates held at Edinburgh between 28 July and
7 August 1630.	 Since its agenda was not prescribed by a committee of
articles, a convention afforded greater opportunities than a parliament
for the propagation of dissent about the central direction of Scottish
affairs from the Court.	 Moreover, the shire commissioners, as the
elected representatives of the gentry, had come to be regarded as the
spokesmen for the localities in constitutional assemblies: a practice
confirmed by their leading role as obstructors of the king's
ill-conceived proposals for administrative, financial and judicial
reform in the Convention of 1625. 45	During the intervening five306
years, the implementation of the Revocation Scheme and its direct
appeal for the support of their estate had served to sharpen the
political consciousness of the gentry.	 Thus, on the opening day of
the Convention of 1630, the shire commissioners felt sufficiently
assured to produce what was, in essence, a programme of reform from
below which sought not only the redress of itemised grievances but a
general improvement in the conduct of government on the grounds of
equity as well as efficiency.	 While the main thrust of this
initiative from the shires was to expedite the work of the Commission
for Surrenders and Teinds, the commissioners availed themselves of the
national forum provided by the Convention to articulate the widespread
apprehensions aroused throughout Scottish society by the king's
revocation.	 However, adroit political manouevring on the part of
Menteith ensured that the shire commissioners' programme for reform did
not become the preamble to constitutional confrontation between the
Convention and the Crown.	 The sporadic absence of the Chancellor
after the opening session - because of sickness - allowed Menteith to
exercise strict control over the subsequent proceedings of the
tonventim. Vurthempre, he utilised his presidency of the
Privy Council to maximum advantage, welding the majority of the
councillors along with the officials and courtiers into a cohesive
Court party which backed him resolutely in the crucial sessions of the
Convention.	 Thus, only the competence not the substance of
contentious issues - like episcopal handling of religious
nonconformity - were debated by the estates.	 Once assent had been
given to the renewal of taxation requested by the king, all proposals
for the redress of grievances or the improvement of government were
deferred to the consideration of a full parliament.
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At the conclusion of the Convention, Menteith submitted a
detailed account of its proceedings to Charles, recounting the daily
performance of all serving in government as well as the points of
contention raised by the disaffected element.	 Although Menteith was
not averse to the enhancement of his personal contribution, Charles was
undoubtedly 'much joyed with the success of the conventione' and307
unstinting in his praise for the way in which Menteith upheld the
interests of the Crown. For Charles required no reminder of the
constitutional impasse triggered off by the Petition of Right in
England and had certainly desired no repeat in Scotland.	 Accordingly,
Charles' euphoria lasted several months. 	 As Trayf air noted from
Court on 20 September 1630, the king was still 'wonderfully well
satisfied with ye cariage of the Conventione, and says to us all,
yat never thing was done more opportunlie and in a more seasonable
tyme'.
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Indeed, the Convention of 1630 marked the zenith of
Menteith's political career.	 Although his continuing dominance over
Scottish affairs seemed assured if not unrivalled, the inherent
vulnerability of his position was confirmed dramatically by his removal
from office and his enforced retiral from public life by the end of
1633.	 His downfall can be attributed partly to a lack of prudence in
promoting his own advancement and partly to political machinations
among his erstwhile allies at Court as well as his personal enemies
within the Scottish administration.	 Another, less obtrusive, factor
must also be brought into consideration.	 For his downfall cannot be
divorced from the antipathy aroused within the political nation to the
principle and practice of revocation.	 Although Charles laid down the
broad strategy for the implementation of the Revocation Scheme,
responsibility - and odium - for its tactical accomplishment was
bestowed on Menteith.
With the support of Sir Thomas Hope, the Lord Advocate,
Menteith in September 1629 had put forward a claim to the earldom of
Strathearn as direct heir-male of David, son of Robert II.	 This claim
involved not only the surrender of property held by the Crown since the
early fifteenth century, but also 'a clouding of the royal family
line'.	 David, earl of Strathearn, had been the eldest son of the
second marriage of Robert II.	 However, doubts about the validity	 of
the king's first marriage questioned the legitimacy of the current
royal house of Stuart.	 The delicacy of Menteith's claim to Crown308
lands appeared to have been settled deftly on 22 January 1630. 	 In
return for the dignity of earl of Strathearn and reasonable
compensation - materialising eventually as £3,000 sterling (i36,000) -
Menteith renounced all heritable claims to the property of the earldom.
This settlement, which was formally confirmed on 25 May, was viewed as
inexpedient by a faction within the Scottish administration headed by
Sir James Skene of Curriehill, president of the Court of Session, and
Scotstarvit, the director of Chancery.	 Playing upon the ambivalence
manifested by such leading administrators as Haddington, the
Lord Privy Seal, the faction were able to persuade Charles by
December 1632 to subject Menteith's claim to the earldom of Strathearn
to further scrutiny.	 At this juncture, collaborators at Court led by
Sir Robert Dalzell of that ilk (later Lord Dalzell and earl of
Carnwath), alleged that Menteith had boasted that 'he had the reddest
blood in Scotland'.	 The treasonable imputations of this boast were
mitigated by Menteith's own admission of its imprudence and by
intercessions on his behalf to the king from Chancellor Dupplin and
Treasurer Morton.	 Nevertheless, Menteith was obliged to withdraw from
public life.	 On 22 March 1633, he acceded to the king's request to
quit his title as earl of Strathearn in return for that of earl of
Airth.	 A prosecution for treason was subsequently initiated by
Skene of Curriehill but Charles had the charges dropped by 15 July,
Menteith having made a submission denying any treasonable utterances
of his having as good a right to the Crown as the king.	 He did
acknowledge that the allegation of Dalzell was not without substance,
but excused his boast as an intemperate slip.	 He was formally
stripped of his offices and his pension of £500 sterling (f6,000) on
8 November 1633.
48
The downfall of Menteith was undoubtedly the most celebrated
instance since the withdrawal of the Court from Edinburgh in 1603 of
the 'vexatiounes and divisiounes' which afflicted the conduct of
Scottish affairs.	 The pursuit of power and office by political
faction was aggravated rather than ameliorated by Charles' imperious,
but inexperienced, handling of central government. 	 As evident fron309
the less than scrupulous manoeuvring to displace Archibald,
Lord Napier, as treasurer-depute, Menteith was himself a grandmaster
of factional intrigue by 1630.
49	Ironically, some of his closest
associates in this episode were to be party to Menteith's own ousting
from office.	 Acting in concert with Chancellor Dupplin,
Treasurer Morton and Secretary Alexander, Menteith had Lord Napier
discredited sufficiently at Court to have TraqqVair, now the rising
star within the Scottish administration, appointed to share the post of
treasurer-depute from 6 November - pending the award of satisfactory
compensation to Lord Napier for his demission of office. 5°	 However,
by the time TraquAir was confirmed as the sole treasurer-depute on
9 May 1631, both he and Secretary Alexander were already airing at
Court their apprehensions about Menteith's continuing dominance over
Scottish affairs.	 Indeed, Traqupl air had taken it upon himself in the
immediate aftermath of the Convention of 1630 to admonish Morton and
Dupplin for their failure to submit a fulsome written account to the
king of the Estates' proceedings.	 Traqupl air was especially concerned
that neither his own nor Secretary Alexander's verbal accounts would
counterbalance Menteith's endeavour to monopolise credit at Court for
the smooth management of the Convention.	 In a subsequent plea for
collective responsibility among leading officials, Secretary Alexander
hinted prophetically that Menteith's engrossing of office and his
penchant to implement the king's policies unilaterally, 'may hazard
himself more than any other'.
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Thus, at the same time as Menteith was making imprudent
claims on the earldom of Strathearn, a climate of opinion was being
created within official circles which was to leave him increasingly
isolated and politically exposed.	 Hence, while Morton and Dupplin
were prepared to intercede with the king to prevent Menteith's
prosecution for treason, they did not seek to check his removal from
office nor to redress the efforts of the faction fronted by Skene of
Curriehill and Scot of Scotstarvit to force Menteith's retiral from
public life.	 In short, the factional intrigue to oust Menteith could
not have succeeded without the tacit approval of his erstwhile allies.310
As TraquKair admitted to Morton on 16 March 1633, 'we have hade many
odde passages in the business quhilks I dare not entrust to paper'. 52
In seeking to exploit the ambivalence and growing antipathy
among leading officials and courtiers to the further advancement of
Menteith, the faction fronted by Curriehill and Scotstarvit were
motivated primarily by personal considerations not issues of
political principle.	 Curriehill was fired by personal resentment, his
judicial position as president of the Court of Session having been
overshadowed by Menteith's annual appointment from 1628 as
Lord Chief-Justice of Scotland.	 Scotstarvit's motives were more
complex.	 In general, his interests as an administrator tended to
colour his political attitudes, usually because he had a personal
stake to assert or lose.
The shire commissioners at the Convention of 1625 had taken
particular exception to the fees which Scotstarvit exacted for the
ratification of official documents in the Chancery. 	 The resultant
censure of the director was not reported formally to the king, the
Privy Council being reluctant to convey the impression that the Estates
were encroaching upon Charles' right to appoint and discipline his
officials.	 Scotstarvit, however, dispatched a protest to the Crown
that he was being publicly pilloried for charging the accustomed fees
of his directorship.	 His demand for an official inquiry, though
upheld by the king, was not well received by the Privy Council.	 As
Scottish officials were not generally noted for abstinence from
peculation, the Council preferred to deal circumspectly with
administrative abuses.	 In turn, when the Convention of Royal Burghs
repeated the allegations of extortion against Scotstarvit in
February 1627, the Council, much to Scotstarvit's chagrin, took no
positive action to clear his name.	 It was not until February 1634,
that Scotstarvit achieved public vindication.	 Having petitioned the
coronation parliament to ratify the accustomed fees of Chancery and his
entitlement to charge them, the matter was referred back to the
Privy Council for final determination.	 The report of the official311
inquiry cleared Scotstarvit of all charges of extortion and confirmed
that he was merely reverting to the scale of fees for the Chancery -
half that of the great seal, double that of the privy seal - which had
been laid down by the Privy Council in 1606, but had subsequently been
lowered by the 'silence and negligent connivance' of his predecessor.
Not only had it taken the Privy Council seven years to exonerate
Scotstarvit, but Menteith, whose rise to political dominance
Scotstarvit had helped to sponsor, had taken no action on Scotstarvit's
behalf during his six year presidency of the Counci1.53
Scotstarvit felt further aggrieved about Menteith as his
/.
ungenerous prot
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ege because of their respective stances towards the
implementation of the Revocation Scheme.	 Again, contemporary
suspicions about Scotstarvit's grasping nature were not diminished by
his open association with the pressure group of militant lairds from
the outset of 1627.	 The future Lyon King-at-Arms had already observed
with respect to Scotstarvit's administrative work on the more abstruse
aspects of revocation - such as the reversal of land tenures altered
since 1540 from ward and relief - that the director of Chancery was
'a bussie man in foule weather and one whose coveteousness far exceidit
his honesty'.
54	His promotion of the interests of the gentry,
especially against the temporal lords and titulars of teinds, was far
from altruistic.	 Pending payment of the requisite compensation, the
surrender of superiorities by temporal lords afforded no foreseeable
financial benefit to the Crown.	 In turn, the king's annuity from the
teinds could not be realised fully until the completion of valuations.
The director of Chancery, however, would profit immediately from the
increased incidence of registration fees once kirklands were feued
directly to the gentry and heritors began purchasing control over their
own teinds.	 Despite his vigorous pursuit of these interlocking
political and administrative interest, which was to continue throughout
and beyond the personal rule of Charles I, Scotstarvit could not rely
on uncompromising support from Menteith.
55
	For Menteith, as overseer
of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds, remained ever-conscious of
the interests of the nobility, seeking to conserve their estates and312
resources against untoward pressures from militant lairds no  less than
from meddling bishops.
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Menteith's integral involvement in the implementation of the
Revocation Scheme suggests that his ousting from office was not
entirely the product of factional intrigue.	 More specifically, his
downfall cannot be dissociated from the discord occasioned within the
political nation by the king's introduction of the principle of
revocation, particularly as Menteith's projected recovery of the
earldom of Strathearn from the Crown was to invoke the same principle.
Initially, not only was Charles I willing to transfer the superiority
of the earldom to Menteith, but the king was also prepared to support
Menteith's prosecution of his right to the whole property of the
earldom at the expense of the existing hereditary tenants of the Crown.
Whereas Charles in his Revocation Scheme was promising to emancipate
the gentry, he was now licensing Menteith's use of the legal process of
improbation and reduction to emasculate all freeholds within the
earldom of Strathearn.	 The widespread alarm, notably among the
gentry, aroused by this threatened resort to legal compulsion was used
by Scotstarvit as an argument for denying Menteith the earldom.
Indeed the outcry, nationally as well as locally, persuaded Menteith to
renounce his claims to the property of the earldom while reserving his
rights to the dignity of Strathearn.
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Arguably, the most critical revelation from the downfall of
Menteith, however, was not the extent of factional machinations within
the Scottish executive, nor even the discord occasioned within the
political nation by the principle of revocation, but rather the
manifest incapacity of Charles I to protect his leading Scottish
administrator when personal imprudence embroiled Menteith in serious
political difficulties.	 Indeed, the enforced retiral of Menteith from
public life threw into stark relief the growing cleavage between the
Court and the Scottish administration in terms of personnel management.
Although Menteith was the only leading official to be removed from
office on account of treasonable allegations, he was not the only313
counsellor to be maligned by such allegations during the personal rule
of Charles I.	 But the other celebrated victim, James, marquis of
Hamilton, was a courtier and a royal favourite not an administrator
based in Scotland.
During the spring of 1631, the marquis of Hamilton was
accused of being the prime mover in a conspiracy with the earls of
Haddington, Roxburghe and Buccleuch, to imprison the king and the young
prince (later Charles II), to cloister the queen and to execute the
leading royal advisers in Scotland and England. 	 Reputedly, these
objectives were to be accomplished by the troops then being recruited
throughout the British Isles to fight on the side of the anti-Habsburg
forces under the banner of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus. 	 That
is, the expeditionary force which Charles had appointed Hamilton to
command in a final British attempt at intervention in the
Thirty Years War was to be directed against the Crown and the political
establishment in both Scotland and England.	 Hamilton's leading
accuser was James Stewart, Lord Ochiltree, a courtier much given to
malicious gossip and already regarded as a malignant influence by
leading officials for his vociferous advocacy of the king's revocation.
In part, Ochiltree's accusations, which sought to play upon Hamilton's
position as the leading claimant to the Scottish throne outwith the
royal house, revived the hereditary malice between the Stewart and
Hamilton families.	 For Lord Ochiltree's family had temporarily gained
the earldom of Arran from the Hamiltons in the late sixteenth century.
More pertinently, since Hamilton's influence at Court was tending to
eclipse that of all other Scotsmen, the accusations were motivated by
personal jealousy, the outcome of factional intrigue among courtiers
carried to fantastic lengths - 'a madness only incident to those of
Bedlam'.	 In contrast to the Menteith affair, however, Charles was
able personally to investigate the allegations of treason within the
confines of the Court and to pronounce the accused on 29 June 1631,
'altogidder innocent and cleare thairof'.	 That same month, Ochiltree
was himself indicted and examined on charges of treason and brought to
Scotland to stand trial for leasing-making.	 Ironically, Menteith, in314
his capacity as Lord Justice-General, was declared the  fittest judge to
determine the competence of the accusations against Ochiltree.
Although proceedings were instituted formally against Ochiltree  on
22 November, there was no recourse to trial by assize over the next
eighteen months.	 After frequent postponements - to secure royal
ratification of the proceedings - the diet was eventually deserted on
5 June 1633.	 Solely on the strength of the royal warrant, Ochiltree
was duly sentenced to life imprisonment in Blackness Castle on the
Firth of Forth.
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The charges against him having backfired, Hamilton retained
both his military command and the favour of the Crown as evident from
his award of all customs and imposts on wines imported into Scotland
for a sixteen year period commencing on 1 August 1631. 	 This tack of
the wine imposts, which was to recompense Hamilton for his financing of
the British expeditionary force, was not rescinded despite persistent
efforts at Court to malign his military performance during his fifteen
month engagement on the continent.	 Moreover, the financial standing
of his house and his estate continued to enjoy the protection of the
Crown during his absence abroad. On his return, the escalating costs
of the expeditionary force were further compensated by his appointment,
effective from 31 July 1633, as Collector-General of the taxes recently
conceded by the coronation parliament.
59	Menteith, on the other hand,
having been obliged to demit office and retire from public life, was
left vulnerable to legal action by his creditors for debts accrued
largely in the course of his public service. 	 By the spring of 1634,
Menteith (now Airth) was in such dire financial straits that it was
deemed propitious by Charles to respond generously to his former
counsellor's overtures to relieve 'the distressed estait of the hous of
Airthe'.	 Accordingly, Charles made out an order on 5 November to
advance Airth in installments a sum amounting to £120,000 and, in the
meantime, to restore his pension of £500 sterling (£6,000) - in the
guise of a yearly payment to meet his most pressing arrears.	 For the
remainder of his personal rule, Charles was obliged to prorogue and
even suspend legal actions raised by Airth's creditors since the315
shakiness of royal finances usually prevented the timely payment of the
installments for Airth's relief.	 Furthermore, even although the
actual value of Airth's estates far outstripped the debts which he was
striving to honour from his rents, some of his creditors were intent on
legal action to ensure the reversion of Airth's estates into their own
hands.	 The leader of this acquisitive groups was John Campbell,
Lord Loudon, a *inent member of the disaffected element opposed to
the Revocation Scheme as to the whole authoritarian tenor of Charles'
conduct of Scottish affairs.60
Although Charles did seek to redress the financial
embarrassments endured by Menteith out of respect for his past public
service, the charge can undoubtedly be levied against Charles that he
showed his 'utter lack of understanding' of the importance of that
servi ce. 	 his failure to find a successor willing to undertake a
similar style of shuttle diplomacy on behalf of absentee monarchy
produced a hiatus in the management of Scottish affairs. 	 In turn, the
downfall of Menteith served not only to aggravate the growing
estrangement between leading officials and the Court, but to make
government within Scotland less amenable to central direction: a
situation made especially crucial by the spread of class collusion
within the localities in opposition to the Revocation Scheme. More
immediately, the eclipse of Menteith from public life led Charles to
resort to managerial overkill with respect to the composition, agenda
and proceedings of the coronation parliament.
Admittedly, the groundswell of unrest occasioned by the
king's direction of Scottish government in general and the
implementation of the Revocation Scheme in particular meant that
Charles could not be guaranteed the wholescale compliance of the landed
estates without vigorous management of the coronation parliament.
Political frustration had been mounting among the nobility over the
king's longstanding refusal to licence any meeting to discuss,
formulate and publicise the interests of their estate.	 Such treatment
was discriminatory.	 For, not only had the gentry and clergy been316
encouraged to hold separate conventions following the first session
of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds in 1627, but the gentry had
met to co-ordinate grievances of the localities prior to the Convention
of Estates in 1630 and no restraint had ever been placed on meetings of
the episcopate to articulate the collective viewpoint of the clergy.
Notwithstanding the occasional convention of their estate, political
frustration was also prevalent among the gentry.	 Although their
grievances were noted by the Convention of 1630, central government
made no concerted effort to effect a remedial programme.
62
 More
especially, aversion to the special evaluation duties imposed on the
sub-commissioners in every presbytery was reflected in the growing
reluctance of the gentry to accept the king's annual nomination of
shire commissioners.	 Commissioners for parliament were not chosen  in
many sheriffdoms in 1631 and where the routine Michaelmas elections
were observed, some of the commissioners chosen - in defiance of
missives from Court - were not those elected the previous year. 	 By
22 January 1633, thirty sheriffdoms, almost the full Scottish
complement, had to be ordered to rectify, within six weeks, their
failure to hold electoral meetings at Michaelmas 1632. 	 Elections had
still to be concluded or the choice of commissioners validated in
eighteen shires when the Council conceded on 24 April, less than two
months before the scheduled opening of the coronation parliament, that
the collective liability of the gentry in every shire to meet the
parliamentary expenses (hitherto unspecified) of each of their
commissioners should not exceed three hundred merks (i200) and 'ane
footmantell of velvet'.	 In the event, nine shires entitled to send
two commissioners sent only one and six shires declined to send any
commissioners to the coronation parliament.
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Arguably, alt hough14' he composition of the coronation
ly4 rckti"
parliament was to be almost	 rca cr than the total number of
each estate in attendance at the Convention of 1630 (and nearly] double
pu-solvkft
the number attending the Convention of 1625)i'-the task oftmanagement
was not to appreciate correspondingly. 64	While the voting strength of
the burgesses was increased from thirty-one to fifty-one, the317
additional twenty commissioners attending on behalf of the royal
burgt6merely marked an increase in numbers not political influence.
While thirteen more shire commissioners were in attendance, the
incomplete nature of the elections in the shires, returning only
forty-five commissioners out of a possible sixty-four, served more as
a testimony to local inertia than to grass-roots militancy.	 Even the
most pronounced increase, that in the composition of the nobility from
forty-seven to sixty-five, did not represent a more potent challenge to
the Crown from the leaders of the political nation.	 For the rise in
their number by eighteen can be entirely accounted for in terms of
proxy votes, of which at least thirteen were in the hands of leading
officials and courtiers.	 Of the remaining five proxies, the
disaffected element could only count on two.	 Moreover, the twelve
bishops who represented the clergy - their number in attendance having
increased by two, including one proxy - provided a solid, if small,
phalanx of support for the Crown. 65
James VI having revived the medieval practice of proxy voting
for nobles and bishops in the parliament of 1617, Charles was
determined to extract the maximum advantage from this concession -
though no proxies had been conceded for the Conventions of 1625 and
1630.	 Hence, throughout May 1633, all nobles seeking to be excused
attendance at the coronation parliament came under discreet pressure to
place their proxies at the disposal of the Court.	 The weighting of
proxies in favour of the Court was further enhanced by plural voting.
Thus, four foremost upholders of the interests of the Court -
Traqupir, Morton, Stirling and Lennox - were warranted to exercise
eleven proxy votes between them.	 However, Charles overplayed his
hand.	 Like his father before him, Charles had, from the outset of his
reign, honoured Englishmen with Scottish lordships although they lacked
estates in Scotland.	 By summoning the five Englishmen with Scottish
titles to the coronation parliament, Charles breached the
constitutional convention that lords of parliament should have a
Scottish territorial qualification.	 While only one Englishman
(Walter Ashton, Lord Ashton of Forfar) actually attended the318
parliament, the proxies of the other four were divided between
Traq4Flair and Stirling.	 In the process, the concession of proxy
votes became not just a constitutional grievance but a nationalist
issue for the disaffected element.
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Charles was not prepared to appease Scottish sensibilities
by spending any considerable time in his native country.
67
	Since he
was intent on getting his coronation visit over as soon as possible,
meticulous preparation went in to the packaging of the parliamentary
agenda to minimise the scope for dissent.	 As early as
24 December 1632, Lord Advocate Hope had been assigned responsibility
for drawing up the legislative programme of the Crown.	 Having also
been instructed to take soundings from the Privy Council, especially
for 'the prosecution of that great work of the Tythes and Surrenders',
he was obliged to present his preliminary report to the Court at the
outset of February 1633.	 As the agenda was not to be restricted to
the Crown's own legislative programme, the intervening four months
before the scheduled opening of the coronation parliament were taken
up by the establishment of an elaborate vetting procedure to sift out
all bills and petitions presented by individuals, institutions or
estates critical of, or inimical to, the Court's direction of Scottish
affairs.	 Thus, the Privy Council was asked to publicise on 23 April,
that all bills and petitions presented for consideration in the
coronation parliament should, in accordance with constitutional
convention, be in the hands of the clerk-register at least twenty days
before the scheduled opening.	 But on 30 April, the Council was
advised to deliver to the clerk-register only those 'writts and
articles as wer fitt to be exhibited or motioned in Parliament'.
Hence, the role of the clerk-register was to carry out a second stage
of vetting prior to the final compilation of a composite agenda by a
committee of the articles once parliament opened.	 Although bills and
petitions to the Convention of 1630 had been channelled through the
clerk-register's office, the absence of a committee of articles had
enabled the gentry and lords of erection to make late submissions of
grievances, with the result that the Estates had been able to hold, if319
not sustain, open debates: the very situation which Charles' vetting
mechanism was designed to pre-empt.
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Adding a personal element of distrust and suspicion to the
king's managerial intentions was the current incumbent as
clerk-register, Sir John Hay of Lands (later of Baro), the blatantly
career-conscious, former town-clerk of Edinburgh, who had held office
for only five months when Charles initiated his vetting procedure.
By the time Hay of Lands reported directly to the king on the arrival
of the Court at Berwick, on 8 June 1633, his vetting of the
parliamentary agenda had proved markedly controversial.	 In
particular, Hay of Lands was deemed responsible for suppressing the
petition presented by Mr Thomas Hogg, who had been deposed from his
charge at Dysart for nonconformity by the Synod of Fife in 1620. 	 The
petition was resented on behalf of the faction among the clergy 'that
stood for the preseruatione of the purity of religion in doctrine,
worschipe and gouerniment'.	 Thus, the libel circulated among the
disaffected element that the clerk-register was 'a suorne enemey to
religion and honesty and a slaue to the bischopes and courte'. 69
The vetting role of the clerk-register notwithstanding, the
most crucial implement of royal control over the coronation parliament
was the committee of the articles.	 Traditionally charged to compile
a composite agenda for the approval of the estates, the committee was
elected after the roll-call on the third day of parliament - the first
two days since the opening on 18 June 1633, being taken up by the
verification of commissions, the notification of proxies, the ordering
of voting precedence among the nobility and the formal presentation of
bills and petitions.	 Having already followed his father's practice
in 1621 of bestowing proxies on Englishmen with Scottish titles and
ruling representations on behalf of nonconforming ministers out of
order, Charles built upon the selection procedure for the committee of
articles which James VI had established by his last parliament.
Despite composing the smallest estate, the bishops were deployed as
the lynch-pins of parliamentary management.	 Royal control over the320
composite agenda was assured when the bishops, on the recommendation
of the king, chose eight nobles who, in turn, chose eight bishops.
Regardless of the eight individuals selected (although both
archbishops were included), all the bishops owed their position to
royal patronage.	 The eight nobles selected were predominantly, but
not exclusively, courtiers.	 No noble associated with the disaffected
element was chosen for the committee.	 The eight nobles selected were
then joined by the eight bishops to choose commissioners from eight
shires and eight burghs.	 In the event, the selection of eight
commissioners from different shires provided the committee with a
representative cross-section of the Scottish localities.	 However, at
least two of the gentry selected (Sir James Lockhart of Lee and
William Douglas of Cavers) were active members of the pressure group
founded in support of the Revocation Scheme in December 1626.
Although there was also some effort to provide a geographic spread of
royal burghs on the committee, commissioners were primarily selected
according to the stent-roll, seven of the ten leading burghs being
represented.	 Only Elgin of the lesser burghs was represented on the
committee which actually included nine burgesses, since both
commissioners from Edinburgh were chosen.	 As added surety for royal
control, Charles designated the chancellor, the earl of Kinnoul
(formerly Viscount Dupplin), to preside over the committee. The
other eight officers of state present at the coronation parliament
were instructed to attend and vote during the eight days set aside
for the committee of the articles to compile the composite agenda.
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The inclusion of nine officers of state to bolster the
inbuilt majority for the Court on the committee of the articles not
only secured royal control over the composite agenda, but eradicated
the prospect of the Revocation Scheme being reversed or even modified
by the estates in the course of the coronation parliament.	 Indeed,
Charles had determined in the wake of the Convention of Estates in
1630, that the committee of articles would serve as an effective check
on members of landed society seeking concessions, whether individually
or severally, on any aspect of the Revocation Scheme.	 Accordingly,321
any private bill or petition for the ratification of landed titles and
privileges was not to be approved by the committee unless all the
officers of state in attendance testified that it was 'not
prejudicialle to the patrimonie of the crowne' and it was supported by
no less than two-thirds of the committee.
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Not content with his inbuilt majority on the committee of
the articles, Charles was resolved not merely to adapt but to range
beyond the managerial techniques deployed by his father to minimise
dissent in the parliament of 1621. Pending the compilation of the
composite agenda by the committee of the articles, James VI had
allowed the estates to meet separately to debate matters of common
interest) contentinghimself with instructions to his leading officials
to infiltrate these meetings to mobilise support for the Crown's
legislative programme, especially for the Five Articles of Perth, and
to identify the disaffected.	 Contrary to customary practice,
however, James 111 had not allowed each estate to peruse the composite
agenda twenty-four hours prior to its presentation in parliament.
Cbaries preferred more drastic censorship.	 All separate conventions
of the estates from the initial meeting of the committee of the
articles on 20 June 1633, until the conclusion of its deliberations
eight days later, were banned.	 Even the Convention of the
Royal Burghs, which customarily met when parliament was in session,
was suspended during this period.	 A meeting of the gentry to draw up
a remedial programme for the improvement of royal government - like
that presented on behalf of the shires to the Convention of Estates in
1630 - was interrupted in the king's name and dispersed.
Inter-communing between the three lay estates was also banned to
prevent the disaffected from coalescing. 	 Such bans, when allied to
the strict vetting of the parliamentary agenda, did pre-empt the
public formulation of common grievances by the estates against the
direction of Scottish affairs from the Court.	 Nonetheless, as
Charles, himself, eventually realised, the fears aroused  by the
direction of royal government in general and the implementation of the
Revocation Scheme in particular led to covert communing to bring322
together the disparate strands of dissent.	 But the aspirations of
the disaffected element for immediate constitutional redress were
frustrated.	 The bishops successfully blocked the lobbying of the
king by some noblemen, 'well affected to religion', in support of
Hogg's petition. A supplication presented by commissioners for the
shires and burghs, castigating the composite agenda concluded by the
committee of articles as 'an evident hurt both to Kirk and countrey'
was suppressed.
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Charles' management of proceedings following the
presentation of the composite agenda to the full parliament on
28 June 1633, was designed to overawe and, indeed, to intimidate the
estates into giving their assent to the legislative programme approved
by the committee of the articles.	 As in 1621, only one day was set
aside for the estate to approve the legislative programme. 	 But
Charles' packaging of legislation in 1633 far outdid that of his
father twelve years earlier.	 Although the Five Articles of Perth
and likewise, the ordinary and extraordinary taxations, were presented
as single enactments to secure their passage in the parliament of
1621, the estates were at least allowed to vote specifically for or
against them and the other one hundred and twelve pieces of
legislation.	 At the coronation parliament, however, the composite
agenda was presented for acceptance or rejection as a whole. 	 In
total, the legislative programme consisted of one hundred and sixty
eight measures - thirty-four public enactments; six commissions
deferring economic issues and diverse supplications to the
consideration of the Privy Council or the Exchequer; and one hundred
and twenty six private bills ratifying the rights and privileges of
individuals or institutions (in themselves, a useful means of ensuring
that favoured nobles, gentry and burghs supported the composite
agenda).	 No distinction for voting purposes was observed between
public enactments and private bills.	 Thus, any of the disaffected
element opposed to such contentious legislation as the ratification of
the acts touching religion or'the extension of both the ordinary and
extraordinary taxations or any of the thirteen enactments justifying323
and implementing the Revocation Scheme, was obliged to oppose such
innocuous measures as the final enactment approving the re-edification
of the kirk of Beith in Ayrshire.73
As in 1621, the voting procedure deployed in the coronation
parliament militated against any accurate assessment of the scale of
dissent.	 Instead of being recorded systematically from each estate,
votes were collated at random, each individual being asked to shout
out his assent or dissent to the clerk-register without giving reasons
for his vote.	 Debate was not encouraged 'so the conclusion might
pass by numbers, not by weight of voices'.	 Moreover, Charles
attended in person to reproach and even to note the name of
dissenters.	 Thus, the block-passage of the legislative programme was
secured by the opportune use of proxies and plural voting to bolster
support for the Court and by the dubious tallying of the
clerk-register and the intimidatory presence of the king to play down
dissent.	 Nonetheless, as the result in favour of the Court was
pronounced by Hay of Lands and verified personally by the king, its
veracity was challenged by the earl of Rothes, as spokesman for the
disaffected element, 'since the negative votes were thought by some
to have equalled the affirmatives'.	 Although Rothes was obliged to
retract on the king's threat to prosecute 'upon the perill of his
life', Charles had achieved a pyrrhic victory.	 Public rumour soon
reversed the final outcome in favour of the disaffected element on
the grounds that the tally of individual votes cast by persons
actually present at the coronation parliament went against the
Court.
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Undoubtedly, Charles' heavy-handed management of the
coronation parliament had intensified and extended the scale of
dissent within the political nation.	 In particular, his own personal
endeavours to secure the block-passage of the legislative programme on
28 June 1633, 'had left bitter inclinations and unruly spirits in many
of the most popular nobility'.
75
	While the leadership of the
disaffected element was not yet prepared to countenance direct324
criticisms of the Crown, Charles' reliance on the bishops to secure
control over the committee of the articles, their alliance with
leading officials to enforce rigorous vetting of the composite agenda,
and the obvious collusion between leading officials and courtiers to
manipulate voting procedures, had created a common constitutional
platform to protest against the leading of parliament 'by the
Episcopall and courte faction'.	 However, only with a generous
helping of hindsight can the king's management of the coronation
parliament be depicted as 'the fewell of that flame wich sett all
Brittane a fyre not longe therafter'.
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Albeit overdue, Charles' first visit to Scotland as
monarch - indeed, his first since his removal south as a toddler in
1603 - had afforded a fund of goodwill for the Crown which was by no
means exhausted when the Court departed from Edinburgh on
18 July 1633.	 Moreover, the leaders of the political nation, if not
all Scots, were well aware of the discordant events leading#upttto the
king's 4.44e4o-i-t-p4Qx444144.104,.-of the English parliament in 44ay 1629,
and had no wish to tarnish the coronation visit by provoking a
similar constitutional impasse in Scotland. 77	Furthermore, the
disaffected were served a timely reminder of the reservoir of military
support available to the Crown when the Council on 29 June, the day
after the conclusion of the coronation parliament, converted a royal
audience with island chiefs into a general muster of the clans 'in
their best array and equippage'.	 Primarily intended as a
diversionary spectacle for the English courtiers accompanying the
king, the muster 'of hielandmen in thair cuntrie habite and best
order', set for Perth on 8 July, served also to remind Charles that
the contingents of clansmen despatched systematically to the continent
in British expeditionary forces since 1626 could readily be deployed
at home.
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The political situation in Scotland in the aftermath of the
coronation parliament, while not imminently combustible, was
characterised by drift - no less fatal for the continuance of325
government on behalf of absentee monarchy.	 Arguably, the most
critical mistake of the king's visit in 1633, was not his heavy-handed
management of parliament, but his failure to restore clear and
effective channels of communication between Edinburgh and the Court to
compensate for the political eclipse of Menteith. 	 Yet, the
expectation at the outset of Charles' coronation visit was that James,
marquis of Hamilton, now established as the most influential Scotsman
at Court, would emerge publicly as the leading manager for Scottish
affairs.	 Among the English courtiers accompanying Charles to
Scotland was Edward Hyde (later earl of Clarendon), who claimed that
Hamilton was actually the king's 'sole counsel' for Scottish affairs
long before 1633.
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In fact, Hamilton had spent little more than four years of
broken service at Court since the English coronation of Charles I.
He had returned north in 1625 because of the financial embarrassment
occasioned by his father's 'magnificent Nobleness', which had made it
impossible for him to live at Court 'in the rank that became his
quality'.
80	Despite repeated solicitations from Charles for his
return and his own inclination to quit his 'obscure and solitarie
lyfe' in self-imposed exile on the isle of Arran, Hamilton for over
three years refused steadfastly to repair to Court and enjoy the
king's 'fatherly counsels' until he had accrued enough money to settle
with his creditors.	 It was only towards the end of 1628, on his
eventual acceptance of the king's 'royal bountie' as the alternative
to his sale of estates, that Hamilton was in a position to exercise
influence at Court. 81
 Thereafter, as confirmed by his availability
to command the British expeditionary force to the continent in 1631,
he was much less indispensable to the management of Scottish affairs
than Menteith.	 Admittedly, his return from his fifteen month
engagement on the continent in September 1632 antedated by three
months the factional clamouring at Court to have the allegations of
treason against Menteith opened to further scrutiny. 	 However, there
is no incontrovertible evidence to link Hamilton directly with the
faction seeking Menteith's disgrace.	 Indeed, he himself had returned326
to Court hardly covered in glory.	 His military command had been
beset by the common ravages of pestilence and land devastation which
had severely curtailed his supplies and communications.	 His
relations with his officers, particularly over pay and the deployment
of troops, had not been above criticism from Charles. 	 The objectives
of the British force and of the Swedish king had diverged
increasingly.	 Hence, Charles had used the expected refusal of
Gustavus Adolphus to relieve the Palatinate as the excuse for
Hamilton's disengagement.
82	In the intervening nine months between
his return and the coronation parliament, Hamilton was pre-occupied
with life at Court, 'meddling little in Scottish Affairs'.83
However, his continental engagement led him to retain a
watching brief over international relations.	 He retained the
confidence of the king's sister, Elizabeth, queen of Bohemia, keeping
her and her son (Prince Charles) informed about the diplomatic
manoeuvres concerning the Palatinate. 	 He collated the reports from
the British contingent left to serve with the Swedish forces.	 He
supervised the further mercenary recruitment for the Swedish Crown and
for the Scottish regiment in France.	 Individual Scots wishing to
enlist in the service of Spain sought his sponsorship.	 The export of
horses to Ireland and the continent was directed through him as
Master of the Horse.	 Even after the ousting of Menteith from office,
when Hamilton emerged publicly as the manager at Court for Scottish
affairs, he did not devote himself exclusively to the government of
Scotland.	 He continued to act as a broker for the recruitment of
mercenaries from the British Isles and as a confidant, if not
unofficial ambassador, for the queen of Bohemia.	 Moreover, from the
outset of 1635 he was directly responsible for the Venetian embassy of
his brother-in-law, Lord Basil Fielding - who seems to have been
dispatched to Venice as much to acquire art treasures as to report on
the affairs of that state and its Italian neighbours. 84	Thus, unlike
Menteith, Hamilton was based at Court and the management of Scottish
affairs was but one aspect of his duties there.	 Hence, Menteith's
liaising between Edinburgh and the Court was replaced by a one-way327
system of clientage for officials, councillors and, indeed, all
members of the political nation seeking royal favour. 85	Furthermore,
Charles' delegation of Scottish affairs to Hamilton was untrammelled
cos
-or--e4teci—c-auRteriae-i-s-ed byrconsultations with the English Privy Council.
For Charles, reputedly ever-conscious if not always responsive to
Scottish fears of provincialism attendant on absentee kingship, was
'so jealous of the privileges of that his native kingdom' that he was
determined 'it might not be dishonoured by a suspicion of having any
dependence upon England'. 86
Charles thereby isolated himself from
the developing realities of Scottish politics and their British
ramifications, creating no more than 'the illusion of being in touch
with Scottish feeling'. 87
The removal of Menteith from office did not trigger off
constitutional confrontation between the Crown and the political
nation.	 Nonetheless, his enforced retiral from public life was a
crucial aspect of the scene setting for the political denouement which
was to terminate the personal rule of Charles I in Scotland.
Menteith had been the one leading official based in Scotland dedicated
to the task of securing the voluntary co-operation of the whole
political nation to make absentee monarchy work.	 As a result of his
downfall, the heavy-handed maxim which had guided Charles' conduct of
government from the outset of his reign - 'itt is better the subject
suffer a lytill than all ly outt of ardor' - was less susceptible to
pragmatic counselling. 88
	Moreover, the king's efforts to retain a
measure of credibility for the Court's management of Scottish affairs
were not helped by Hamilton's manifest preference for a policy of
benign neglect north of the Border, tantamount to the pursuit of
quiescent provincialism.
With the withdrawal of Menteith from public life, however,
not only were the king's designs for social engineering shelved, but
Scotland was far from quiescent.	 The localities were becoming less
responsive to the directives of central government. 	 At the same time
as the promotion of the Revocation Scheme was being countered by328
endemic class collusion, the permeation of dissent within the
localities compounded the growing estrangement of leading officials
and privy councillors from the Court.	 Indeed, as Charles was forced
increasingly to rely on the bishops to uphold the managerial interest
of the Court in Scotland, estrangement gave way to rampant
anti-clericalism directed against the episcopal faction in both Kirk
and State.
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The general circulation of rumour, though by no means the
most accurate gauge of public opinion, affords the most damaging
evidence for the build up of anti-clerical sentiment since the
coronation vist.	 During his tour of Scotland in 1635, the much
travelled Englishman, Sir William Brereton, gleaned from conversations
with disaffected gentry and presbyterian ministers in Edinburgh on
27 June, that the episcopal faction was set 'to recover so much of the
land and revenues belonging formerly to the Abbeys, as that they will
in a short time possess themselves of the third part of the kingdom'.
In total, rumour asserted that forty-eight abbacies were to be
restored to the clergy - in effect, all of the fifty-four major
ecclesiastical foundations not in episcopal hands at the commencement
of the Revocation Scheme
90
 - an eventuality of momentous
constitutional as well as financial significance.	 For the restored
abbots and priors, once allied with the bishops as clerical
commissioners, would ensure that 'there will be always in the
parliament-house so strong a party for the king' that would certainly
suffice to cancel out votes of the disaffected among the nobility and
be able possibly 'to sway the whole house'.
91	Indeed, if the
clerical estate was so augmented, the disaffected were faced with the
prospect of not just the continuance of royal control over the
committee of the articles, for which the bishops were the lynch-pins,
but a permanent stranglehold being exercised over parliamentary
proceedings on behalf of the Court.
However exaggerated the suspicions of the disaffected
element, the rumours about a wholescale restoration of secularised329
property to the clergy were not groundless.	 Since late autumn 1634,
Charles' chief minister in England, William Laud, archbishop of
Canterbury, had been in regular contact with Scottish bishops with a
view to using the king's annuity from the teinds to buy up all
lordships of erection.
92
	More specifically, Charles himself, as a
follow up to his bestowal of surrendered temporal lordships on
bishops - notably, to endow the bishopric of Edinburgh from its
creation in October 1633 and to compensate the archbishopric of
St Andrews for its resultant loss of diocesan territory
93 - had
proposed to bestow the abbacy of Lindores on Mr Andrew Learmouth,
minister of Liberton within the presbytery of Edinburgh. 	 Although
this was not Charles' first grant of a major ecclesiastical foundation
to a minister, 94 his bestowal of Lindores abbey can be considered
crass politically, not least because the proposed beneficiary was the
son of Sir James Learmouth of Balcomie, an active member of the
pressure group founded in support of the Revocation Scheme in
December 1626. 95	Furthermore, Lindores abbey was the only temporal
lordship revoked by legal compulsion - albeit the process of reduction
and improbation against William Forbes of Craigievar took almost six
years to accomplish from its instigation by the king in August 1629.
In addition to the expropriation of Craigievar, the king's recourse
to law had abrogated the tack to the feu-duties of the abbey held by
the earl of Rothes, the emergent leader of the disaffected element.
96
Lindores was not only to be granted to Learmouth for life,
but his tack empowered him to reduce all grants of lands and teinds
made while the abbey was secularised.	 Writing from the political
sidelines, Haddington, the aged Lord Privy Seal, sent a caveat to
Hamilton on 17 June 1635, that the example of Lindores 'so affrights
all heritours holding lands and teinds of any erection to be plunged
on the like vexation', since their rights of property would be placed
'under the discretion of abbots who have but a lyfrent time to enrich
their wives and children'.	 Moreover, the revival of the term abbot,
'a woord abolished in reformed nihbour cuntreis and states and never
repented to be wanting among us but by papists', was of such emotive330
potential 'that the apprehension passes my expression'. 	 The king
must also be warned that the thousands of gentry to whom he had
appeaVed in his Revocation Scheme, by offering the prospect of
holding their lands direct from the Crown as freeholders rather than
from temporal lords as feuars, would have their expectations of
enhanced status frustrated should there be any systematic restoration
of secularised property to the clergy. Indeed, the resultant loss of
revenue to the Crown from feu-duties and other casualties would recall
the late medieval view of the major ecclesiastical foundations of the
twelfth century, 'that the king Saint David was a sore sanct to the
Crowne'.	 Furthermore, the threat of increased landed power in the
hands of favoured clergy was compounded by the current activities of
the bishops on the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds. The bishops
were now suspected of being prepared, once the valuation of teinds and
allocation of stipends for all parishes within temporal lordships were
concluded, to leave other ministers as well as heritors in the lurch.
As a result, 'publick rumours' were equating the progress of the
Revocation Scheme with an intent to undermine, if not reverse, the
Reformation settlement.	 No less damaging, as Haddington was only too
well aware from his long experience within the Scottish
administration, was the corrosive impact of adverse publicity. 	 The
printing of the royal commission (of 1627) and the legal decreet
(of 1629) for the implementation of the Revocation Scheme, likewise
the acts of the coronation parliament, had meant that criticisms of
the king's management of Scottish affairs would not be confined to his
native country.	 For, 'Englishmen can read them and understand Scots.
If they heare and sie what was pretended and promised and heare by
publick report how things now are like, they may perchance think more
nor they will speak'.
97
Notwithstanding these strictures against Learmouth's tack,
it was left to Traqupl air, without any direct guidance from the Court,
to appease the apprehensions of the landed interest by stopping the
grant of Lindores abbey passing through the Exchequer.	 Much to the
chagrin of the bishops, the approval of his initiative by Charles on331
24 June 1635, effectively terminated the prospect of secularised
property being restored to the clergy.
98 That the Court should have
failed to anticipate the furore provoked by the Lindores episode and
then taken no prompt action to defuse the situation, not only summed
up its distance handling of all aspects of the Revocation Scheme, but
typified its lack of political touch in governing Scotland.	 Indeed,
as the general political situation continued to degenerate over the
next two years, the king insisted on according priority to the orderly
conduct of business within the Scottish administration - that correct
precedence in sitting, rising and voting be 'inviolable keipit' by
officials and councillors.
99	His failure either to contemplate or to
countenance remedial action to head off dissent reveals him as a
monarch more concerned with the seemliness than the substance of
government.
Denied a responsive hearing at Court and faced with mounting
dissent at home, the will of lay officials and councillors to sustain
absentee monarchy was being progressively sapped.	 Rampant
anti-clericalism within the Scottish administration occasionally
found expression in blatant obstruction as lay officials and
councillors connived with the disaffected element within the political
nation both to negate projects conceived at Court and to prevent the
provincial relegation of Scotland.	 For, the ascendant bishops were
becoming readily identified not just with the managerial interest of
the Court but with the proposals of William Laud, archbishop of
Canterbury, to ensure greater efficiency and uniformity in the
management of royal revenues throughout the British Isles.
Battle-lines were drawn up within central government over the control
of the Exchequer.332
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Chapter VIII	 Revocation and Revenue 
When Charles reconstructed the Privy Council on
30 March 1631, his councillors were reminded that they were expected to
attend dutifully and diligently to routine business as well as the
weighty issues of central government.	 Nevertheless, the councillors'
attendance records continued to deteriorate rather than improve.
Indeed, with the Council's quorum reduced from nine to seven, the
bishops became indispensable for the conduct of routine business.	 The
number of the bishops on the Council rose steadily from six  in the
spring of 1631 to ten by the outset of 1637.	 More significantly, the
attendance record of the episcopate actually exhibited a marked
improvement from 1633 with the gradual replacement of the 'feible and
disceased' elderly bishops, whose physical infirmities had restricted
their capacity as well as their inclination to make frequent journeys
from their diocesan dwellings to Edinburgh.
1
The most resolute of the episcopal old-guard was
John Spottiswood, archbishop of St Andrews, whose long devotion to the
service of the Crown reached its climax with his appointment as
chancellor on 23 December 1634.	 This appointment was 'thought strange
and marked be many' as consolidating the political aggrandisement of
his family.
2
	His son, Sir Robert Spottiswood of Dunnipace, an erudite
and much-travelled scholar as well as an eminent lawyer, had only the
previous year been elected to succeed the late Sir James Skene of
Curriehill as president of the College of Justice.	 Sir Robert was
elected by his fellow senators on 1 November 1633, on the
recommendation of the king who had appointed him an ordinary lord of
session in place of Haddington (then Melrose) during the restructuring
of central government in the spring of 1626.	 A loyal servant of the
Crown, Sir Robert was one of the few temporal lords to comply
unequivocally with the Revocation Scheme, his surrendered lordship of
New Abbey being bestowed on the newly created bishopric of Edinburgh
during the autumn of 1633.3
Nevertheless, the jealousy aroused within official circles by
the political aggrandisement of the Spottiswoods, was secondary to the343
public outcry occasioned by the appointment of a cleric as chancellor,
'the lyke whereof had not been seen since the Reformation of Religion .
John Spottiswood's appointment seemed all the more  galling for he
succeeded George Hay, first earl of Kinnoul, an irascible anti-cleric,
who had spent his last eight years resisting the precedence in Council
accorded to the archbishop during the government restructuring  of 1626.
Moreover, Spottiswood was deemed 'ane old infirme man and  very unmeet
for so great charges' in both Kirk and State.	 Hence, his appointment
as chancellor was seen as the precursor to further acquisitions of
civil office by the younger generation of bishops, whose assertiveness
wer-e,
and abrasiveness was 	 serving to magnify anti-clericalism among lay
councillors and officials.
4	Indeed, while Spottiswood was obliged to
relinquish his presidency of the Exchequer Commission on acquiring the
Chancellorship, the episcopal presence on the Exchequer continued to be
augmented whereas that of the nobility underwent a dramatic decline.
On the recasting of the Exchequer Commission during the summer of 1636,
four bishops and one noble were retained as against the two bishops and
eight nobles appointed in the spring of 1626.
5	Thus, Spottiswood's
appointment as chancellor was not so much a demonstration of the king's
'fatal capacity for giving offence in ignorance',
6 as a clear and
deliberate indication of Charles' determination to advance trusted
individuals: that is, those whom he regarded as well-disposed to his
reforming programme in general and to his Revocation Scheme in
particular.
Charles' doubts about the commitment of his lay councillors
and officials to his ongoing programme of structural reforms and social
engineering were not unwarranted.	 However, he found himself in a
political predicament largely of his own making.	 His authoritarian
style of kingship called for compliance and obedience, not critical
scrutiny or empirical revision, from his Scottish administrators.	 The
pace at which he expected reforms to be implemented took little account
of regional diversity within Scotland nor the logistical and technical
difficulties encountered by central government in its efforts to
achieve uniformity.	 Above all, the direction of Scottish affairs from344
the Court gave scant consideration to the nationally disparate agencies
of government between Scotland and England.	 Hence, the more Charles
placed his trust in the bishops for the running of central government,
the more he promoted anti-clericalism among his lay councillors and
officials.	 In turn, the more his Scottish-based lay administrators
became alienated from the Court, the more they became prepared to
resort to obstructive tactics, which occasionally led to active - if
covert - connivance with the disaffected element in the political
nation, to frustrate the reforming programme of the Crown. In the
case of the Revocation Scheme, active connivance verged on outright
subversion.
The principal protagonist, if not the initiator, of
connivance with the disaffected element was the Lord Advocate,
Sir Thomas Hope of Craighall.	 From his appointment on 29 May 1626,
Craighall had been entrusted with a watching brief over the
implementation of the Revocation Scheme, with a special charge to
effect the reduction of the temporal lordships; a task for which he
was eminently suited, as he was 'believed to understand the matter
beyond all the men of his profession'.	 Indeed, his capabilities as a
lawyer had secured his appointment even although his personal
inclinations in the affairs of the Kirk, towards presbyterianism rather
than episcopacy, were not in accord with current Crown policy.
7 	The
undoubted zeal and perspicacity he brought to his office was
complemented by the assiduous way in which he strove to carry out his
remit on the work of revocation.	 Nevertheless, Craighall was always
struggling to win acceptance as a principal actor in the affairs of
State.	 He felt that his personal integrity as well as the dignity of
his office was slighted by the conduct of proceedings in the Commission
for Surrenders and Teinds.	 From its inception in the spring of 1627,
preference in discussions was accorded to the viewpoints of
commissioners who were also members of the Privy Council or the
Exchequer Commission, 'during quhilk tyme I am castin lowse and putt to
ane back rowme to be ane idill onwaiter': a situation only partially
remedied by his appointment to both the Privy Council and the345
Exchequer Commission on 28 December 1628.
8	The award of an annual
pension of £2,000 sterling (£24,000) seemed a further mark of
appeasement to his offended sensibilities.	 This award, however, which
Charles had taken more than six months to ratify, became an added
source of political frustration for Craighall.	 For his pension was
allowed persistently to fall in arrears over the next four years
largely, he claimed, because of the machinations of Traq94ir, the
treasurer-depute. 9	In turn, his frustrations as an outsider, now
accentuated by his financial grievances, found expression in
administrative machination which afforded scope for his talents as
'a base follower of greatness and maliciously eloquent'.
10
More especially, dissatisfaction with his own standing in
central government was enhanced by the king's receptiveness to
solicitations from the bishops seeking priority in the payment of
allowances.	 His disenchantment with the Court was confirmed by
precepts in the bishops' favour granting gratuities for public service
out of the readiest revenues of the Crown.	 Thus, while Craighall's
pension had fallen inexorably in arrears by 1634, Patrick Lindsay,
translated from the see of Ross to the archbishopric of Glasgow in
1633, was being paid £5,000 sterling (£60,000) in instaL6ents from the
taxation granted in 1630. 11	Craighall's discontent when allied to his
aversion towards episcopacy resulted in rabid anti-clericalism: an
alliance which led him to deploy his legal subtlety and astuteness in
collusion with the temporal lords to exploit the Crown's notorious lack
of ready cash to compensate the lords for their surrender of
superiorities.	 Craighall covertly advised the lords that instead of
surrendering their rights irrevocably, they press for their retention
under wadset pending full compensation from the Crown. 	 Hence, the
Crown admitted its liability to make full compensation before
implementing the principle of revocation.	 Instead of being
surrendered, the superiorities of kirklands were mortgaged back to the
temporal lords.	 The legal circumvention thus devised by Craighall was
accepted and authenticated by the Exchequer during 1635 as the official
policy for the reduction of temporal lordships.	 In essence, this346
circumvention was a legal fiction which technically deprived temporal
lords of their irredeemable title to kirklands but offered them the
practical benefit of an indefinite, yet assuredly long-term,
postponement of revocation.	 Henceforth, the ultimate fulfiyi ment of
that principle was dependent on the Crown's financial recovery rather
than its authoritarian decreets.
12
That the Lord Advocate's legal circumvention won official
backing from 1635 was both a testimony to the closing of ranks by lay
administrators in reaction to the political aggrandisement of the
bishops and a confirmation of the polarisation within the Scottish
administration brought about by their 'unseasonable accumulation of
honours', which threatened to usurp the customary dominance of office
enjoyed by the nobles in particular and landed society in general.
13
Indeed, the polarisation of interests between lay administrators and
bishops, evident from the outset of the Commission for Surrenders and
Teinds in 1627, had become more pronounced in the wake of the
coronation parliament.	 Control of the Exchequer was the major
battle-ground.	 The enactment of 1633 'anent the Exchequer' had
bestowed on the Exchequer Commission control over the king's annuity
as over all property annexed or claimed by the Crown as a result of the
Revocation Scheme.	 However, this was not just a confirmation of the
Exchequer's management of the king's rents and casualties now extended
to include the anticipated - but increasingly unrealisable and
insubstantial - profits of the Revocation Scheme.	 For, the Exchequer
Commission was given power to authorise or block all grants of property
to ensure that charters conformed to, rather than infringed, the
Revocation Scheme.	 In effect - and, indeed, as borne out by
subsequent modifications to the remit of the Exchequer Commission
instigated by the Covenanters in 1640 - this act was open to
interpretation as an award of judicial powers formerly regarded as the
exclusive preserve of the Court of Session: namely, the right to
decide the validity or invalidity of charters, particularly to
kirklands.
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Behind this line of interpretation - if not the formulation
of the enactment - can be detected the influence of William Laud,
archbishop of Canterbury, a principled but rigidly dogmatic politician
whose expanding spheres of influence at Court were by no means confined
to English or ecclesiastical affairs.	 Moreover, his authoritarian
policies for restructuring in both Kirk and State were not
characterised by any marked sympathy towards the national diversity of
Scottish institutions.	 While still bishop of London, he, along with
eight other Englishmen, had been admitted orlro the Scottish Privy
Council during the king's coronation visit. 	 Essentially, their
admission was a courtesy gesture and was interpreted as such by the
other dignitaries, nobles and officials in the king's coronation train.
But Laud regarded his admission as a licence to intrude sporadically in
Scottish affairs, and, more especially, to experiment with Scottish
government in order to perfect authoritarian kingship in England.
15
Accordingly, Archbishop Laud, in concert with the Scottish episcopate,
had drawn up plans by the late autumn of 1634 to reform the Exchequer
through a new Commission in which few noblemen would be included.
Consequently, the king's annuity was to be placed at the disposal of
the clergy in order to buy out lordships of erection.	 This
restructuring, propagated as an attempt to make the financial
administration of the Scottish Exchequer 'conforme to that of Ingland',
sought to insinuate the principle of "thorough" into the running of
central government.
16
A principle born out of the constitutional impasse occasioned
by Charles' dissolution of the English parliament in the spring of
1629, "thorough" was as much a political as a financial programme to
sustain the king's personal rule during the 1630s.	 If the Crown had
no need to summon parliament to vote supply, the disaffected element in
England were denied a national forum to criticise Charles' exercise of
his prerogative.	 In essence, "thorough" sought to achieve greater
efficiency and probity in the management of royal revenues by
terminating the extension and exploitation of administrative
malpractices - such as the Jacobean practice of selling offices; by348
countering the dilatoriness of treasury officials and their
self-interest exercise of patronage; and, above all, by rigorously
pursuing centralisation, 'even at the cost of trampling on men's
customary legal rights'.
17
In seeking to insinuate and apply "thorough" north of the
Border, Laud, with the active connivance of the Scottish episcopate,
was embarking upon a programme of financial and political restructuring
which amounted to a policy of aggressive colonialism.	 Indeed, Laud's
closest lay associate in British politics, Thomas Wentworth,
Lord Wentworth (later earl of Strafford), was already demonstrating
that "thorough" could be exported successfully. 	 From his appointment
as Lord-Deputy of Ireland in 1632, Wentworth had instigated a drastic
overhaul of the province's financial administration which doubled the
income of the Crown from £40,000 to £80,000 sterling, wiped out a gross
debt of £76,000 sterling and turned a £20,000 sterling annual loss into
a modest surplus - all within six years and without recourse to the
Irish parliament to vote supply.	 More pertinently, Wentworth's
rigorous pursuit of centralisation and greater efficiency in financial
management afforded him freedom of action to implement the Court's
political and religious policies in Ireland despite their unpopularity
throughout that country.
18
At first sight, conditions for the importation of "thorough"
into Scotland were less favourable.	 Unlike Ireland, Scotland was not
formally designated an English province.	 There was no lord-deputy or
governor to promote and impose "thorough" at the behest of the Court.
Moreover, Laud lacked influential lay associates within the Scottish
administration prepared to adopt this policy - the tortured
implementation of the Revocation Scheme having generally dissipated the
inclinations of lay administrators to undertake further restructuring.
Nevertheless, there was definite scope for promoting greater efficiency
and probity in the management of royal revenues within Scotland.
Although there was no regular practice of selling posts in central
government, there were other manifestations of administrative349
malpractice.	 The accounting and auditing of royal revenues were
characterised by procrastination.	 From the initial review of the
Crown's ordinary revenue a year after the death of James VI, no
systematic scrutiny of treasury accounts was actuated prior to
August 1634.	 The accounts for the ordinary land-taxes and the
extraordinary taxes on annualrents levied by respective Conventions of
Estates in 1625 and 1630 were not audited until July 1634. 	 Another
eighteen months were to elapse before the accounts for the arrears of
these taxes were finally cleared.	 The honouring of the Crown's
financial commitments was marked by dilatoriness, the most celebrated
and fractious instance being the protracted payments of compensation
for surrendered superiorities as for the loss of regalities and
heritable offices in local government.	 As further evident from the
selective and partial payments of pensions, fees and allowances to the
rest of the Scottish establishment, treasury officials accorded
priority to their self-interested exercise of patronage.
19
However, procrastination, dilatoriness and even partiality in
the management of royal revenues were but a reflection of a deeper
malaise: namely, the perennial shortage of ready cash to meet the
escalating expenditure of the Crown.	 The extensive feuing of Crown
lands since the fifteenth century, allied to the continuing impact of
inflation from the sixteenth century - which exposed the relative
inelasticity of royal revenues, had undoubtedly eroded the capacity of
the Crown to meet its routine as well as occasional expenditure out of
its ordinary sources of income.
20 Nonetheless, while fixed monetary
duties depreciated as commodity prices rose, the Crown was partially
cushioned by provender rents and by the increased customs and imposts
derived from the expanding volume of trade in the early seventeenth
century.	 But, the liberal - if not profligate - dispensing of
patronage by James VI in his declining years had further compromised
the capacity of the Crown to honour its financial commitments.	 Thus,
out of his first year's ordinary income of £223,930 7s 3id, Charles had
inherited a recurrent commitment of £159,091 11s 8d for pensions, fees
and allowances awarded by his father.
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Subsequent instructions to his treasury officials to retrench
proved of no avail over the next three years.	 With a view to
remedying excessive expenditure, particularly on pensions, fees and
allowances, prior to his impending coronation visit, Charles issued a
command on 26 November 1629, that Mar, as Treasurer, should conduct a
vigorous inquiry into the management and disposal of the king's rents
and casualties.	 Mar's investigation revealed that expenditure on
pensions alone had risen from £75,717 6s 8d to £87,060.	 However, the
most noteworthy finding on the financial management of royal revenues
was not this accredited rise of £11,342 13s 4d, but the steady
accumulation of arrears since the outset of Charles' reign - which in
the case of pensions amounted to £116,080 7s 6d.	 A sum in excess of
£51,000 was also outstanding for fees and allowances.	 Moreover, as
Charles was according courtiers priority in the payment of pensions,
fees and allowances, servants and administrators based in Scotland -
especially his leading officials - were expected to bear the brunt of
these mounting arrears with little immediate prospect of remuneration.
For, at the same time as the recurrent debts of the Crown were
accumulating, its ordinary income had fallen by 1629 to £196,608 13s,
mainly because of the losses in customs and imposts of wine occasioned
by the disruption to trade which followed Charles' declarations of war
against Spain and France.
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Indeed, Charles' resolve to intervene directly in the
Thirty Years War had necessitated an egregiously costly military
programme which made the Crown's perennial shortage of ready cash a
chronic financial problem.	 An interim audit of the ordinary land-tax
authorised by the Convention of 1625 revealed that £384,314 4s had been
assigned to meet the most pressing - largely military - commitments of
the Crown by 22 March 1628.	 Yet, the actual money raised through the
land-tax over the past two years amounted to no more than
/243,046 18s 7d, the deficit being in part offset by a subvention of
£53,467 9s 4d from the extraordinary tax on annualrents - 139,700 of
which was collected as the past two years' dues, the remaining
£13,767 9s 4d was advanced from the next two years' dues by the leading351
burghs.	 The rest of the shortfall was only met by borrowing £100,000
from William Dick (later of Braid), merchant-burgess of Edinburgh.
Moreover, although the complete audits of the taxation authorised in
1625 revealed that £579,863 10s 6d had accrued to the Crown from the
land-tax and the tax on annualrents, all but £6,060 17s had been
committed by July 1634, mainly to repay and service loans advanced to
cover the cost of the military programme which had continued to
escalated  since the interim audit.	 This audit had, in fact, been
gatMrby the resignation of Sir James Baillie of Lochend as
Collector-General of the taxation in November 1627 - after only nine
months in office - to allow his personal fortune to recuperate.
For, the escalating cost of the military programme had served only to
increase the financial liabilities of his office instead of affording
him prompt remuneration as the leading Scottish creditor of the Crown.
However, as he retained his post as receiver of the king's rents, he
was well placed to effect the bond promising him £9,150 yearly from the
readiest revenues in the Exchequer until his loans to the Crown were
repaid in full.23
Lochend's tribulations as Collector-General, coupled to the
partial payment of fees, pensions and allowances, demonstrate that
under Charles I officeholding in general, not just in the treasury -
where tenure was traditionally 'hazardous and unrewarding' 24 - was
becoming a financial liability.	 Indeed, Charles expected his leading
officials to finance both routine and occasional expenditure either by
borrowing the requisite sums individually or collectively standing
surety with their associates in landed society to underwrite loans from
merchants to the Crown.
25
 Moreover, given that the taxation
authorised in 1625 was largely committed to the military programme,
borrowing was intensified as Charles struggled to finance his Scottish
coronation.	 Thus, Mar, in his capacity as Treasurer, was obliged to
borrow 'great soumes of money' at the outset of 1629 to amend the state
of disrepair in which the royal houses and palaces were currently
languishing.	 Such was the cost of redressing their prolonged neglect
that repairs were still awaiting completion in the summer of 1632.352
In the meantime, Mar had relinquished office in the spring of 1630 with
no more than a promissory note from the Exchequer that the £10,000
sterling (£120,000) he had expended in the king's service would be
accorded priority over all pensions, fees and allowances. 26	In the
event, treasury officials were obliged to borrow a further £200,000
from merchants - principally William Dick - to finance the coronation,
although no funds were forthcoming until the king's visit was actually
under 41" in the summer of 1633.27
However, such reliance on borrowing proved an acute political
embarrassment as well as prejudicial to sound financial management.
The king's leading officials accorded a low priority to the systematic
recording of income and expenditure.	 Their main concern was to
indemnify themselves and their associates from debts contracted on
behalf of the Crown.	 In turn, leading officials were exposed to
sustained smearing - as much by their rivals within the Scottish
administration as by the disaffected element outwith.	 When Charles
afforded leading officials protection from their creditors until their
cash advances to the Crown could be recouped from the readiest revenues
in the Exchequer, they were open to slandering as bankrupts.
Conversely, when leading officials were able  IQ bring influence to bear
com.pvet-to
in the Exchequer to exact partial if not  fulsome repayments, they were
liable to defamation as fraudulent manipulators of the machinery of
government. 28	Indeed, Lord Napier retired as treasurer-depute in the
spring of 1631 firmly convinced that his post 'could never be
profitable to a man that had resolved fair and honourable dealing'.
His disillusionment with office was not just the product of factional
rivalries and a general lack of probity within the Scottish
administration, but can be traced to a clandestine manoeuvre in the
autumn of 1628 condoned by the king.	 By 5 November, Treasurer Mar, at
the behest of the principal Secretary, Alexander of Menstrie, had
removed £15,000 sterling (£180,000) from the Exchequer, 'unto a
borrowed name for his Majesties awin use', without the full knowledge
or approval of treasury officials, far less of the Exchequer
Commission.29353
With the king, himself, implicated in financial malpractices,
leading officials paid scant regard to reform or retrenchment prior to
the coronation visit. Despite repeated overtures from Charles on the
need to cut back on pensions, fees and allowances, Morton's first three
years in office, after taking over from Mar as Treasurer in April 1630,
witnessed a marked rise in recurrent expenditure.	 Pensions alone
increased in excess of £30,000 and the total debts of the Crown
accumulated to £852,870. 30	This accumulated deficit far outstripped
the ordinary revenues of the Crown.	 The audit of the treasury
accounts in August 1634 disclosed that the king's income had more than
recovered the ground lost since 1626 and had risen by £41,772 18s 2id
over the past five years to £238,381 11s 21d - largely because the
Exchequer fiars for commuting the Crown's provender rents were from
1631 rated relatively, if temporarily, higher than county fiars.
Nevertheless, as £260,164 3s Old was committed to routine expenditure,
£21,582 11s 11d was added to the Crown's burden of debts.
31	Indeed,
the Crown's accumulating deficit was only kept in check by annual
subventions of around £100,000 from the taxation authorised by the
Convention of 1630.	 According to the audits completed in July 1634,
treasury officials had received £403,269 Os 6d over the past four years
to meet the most pressing debts of the Crown from a total sum of
£592,411 18s 2d realised by the land-tax and the tax on annualrents.
Of the remainder, all but £15,138 7s 11d was committed to the repayment
and servicing of loans to the Crown.
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The commitment of so much taxation to the curtailment of
recurrent expenditure served not only to underline the financial
predicament of the Crown but also to undermine the political
credibility of Charles I.	 Although some tax was used to repay and
service debts arising from occasional expenditure, little was utilised
directly to fulfil the remit authorised by the Convention of 1630 -
namely, to fund the implementation of the Revocation Scheme and to
finance the king's coronation.	 By the following summer, leading
officials and councillors were warning Charles that the Estates would
have to be reconvened to defray the expenses of his coronation.354
Despite Charles' aversion to asking the Estates a third time to vote
supply for this purpose, the parlous state of his finances obliged him
to accord priority in the coronation parliament to the renewal and
extension of the land-tax and the tax on annualrents. 	 Both were to
run for six years from Martinmas 1634 - on the expiry of the levies
authorised in 1630.
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Charles also made use of his coronation parliament to drive
through a policy of retrenchment, a policy which had been germinating
since the appointment of Sir John Hay of Barro as Clerk of the Register
and Rolls on 31 December 1632, with the special brief to draw up lists
and inventories of all pensions, fees and allowances paid out of the
king's rents and casualties.	 Retrenchment was now to be accomplished
by the rigorous application of the principle of revocation to recurrent
expenditure.	 All pensions, fees and allowances were declared void
save for ten specified awards: a concession (worth around £54,000
annually) weighted heavily in favour of courtiers.	 The only leading
officials specified were Morton, the Treasurer (and sometime courtier),
and Sir James Carmichael of that Ilk, the Lord Justice-Clerk. 	 As a
mark of 'gracious favour', Charles did concede on 2 August 1633, that
'a few' pensions, fees and allowances were to be ratified and renewed
after their validity had been scrutinised by the Lord Advocate.
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However, the application of the principle of revocation to recurrent
expenditure served only to ease temporarily the crisis of liquidity
afflicting the Exchequer.	 Although no more than £109,973 of
expenditure on fees, pensions and allowances had been authorised by
August 1634, the Crown's commitment to such expenditure remained
around £256,511.	 Moreover, the application of this principle
generated much ill-will within the Scottish administration. Most
leading officials had to wait from three to seven months for their
pensions, fees and allowances to be confirmed and their current arrears
acknowledged.	 Indeed, the scrutinising process took almost two years
to conclude.	 In the event, the most tangible impact of the
application of this principle was not so much retrenchment as the
centralising of recurrent expenditure on the Exchequer by phasing out355
the practice of local designation much favoured by James VI for the
remuneration of lesser officials.	 Henceforth, all allowances were to
be paid out of the readiest revenues in the Exchequer rather than by
earmarking against specific rents or casualties.35
More immediately, however, the application of the principle
of revocation to recurrent expenditure had served as the precursor for
Charles' establishment of a committee of inquiry into the running of
the Exchequer.	 Its remit, as defined on 5 May 1634, was to report on
administrative abuses and to rectify unnecessary expenditure having
first ascertained the current state of the Crown's financial
commitments.	 In practice, the committee, whose investigations lasted
from 20 July to 26 August, were less intent on cataloguing malpractices
in the Exchequer than demonstrating how the principle of revocation
could be applied wholescale to the management of the king's rents and
casualties.	 For, not only was the Crown suffering from a chronic
shortage of ready cash, but its debts had accumulated to an alarming
extent.	 Although £256,511 was committed to pensions, fees and
allowances, recurrent expenditure actually stood at 035,159 because
£78,648 was required annually to service the debts of the Crown which
now totalled 022,087 (of which sum, £135,600 had been contracted since
the coronation).	 In order to augment the income Charles derived from
his rents and casualties, the committee did recommend systematic
collation of all dues - however archaic - in the Exchequer; greater
accuracy in accounting procedures and a more commercial approach to
estate management --a-s. through the promotion of feu-ferme tenure
coupled to provender rents on Crown lands. 	 Nonetheless, as drastic
action was deemed necessary to reverse the Crown's accumulating
deficit, the main thrust of the committee's recommendations was to
advocate retrenchment through revocation.	 Accordingly, maintenance
and entertainment allowances in royal houses and castles were to be
scrutinised and curtailed, unwarranted manpower was to be discharged
and appointments deemed superfluous were to be rescinded.	 In sum,
tenure of office within the Scottish establishment was not to stand in
the way of compulsory redundancy on financial grounds. 36356
Despite its emphasis on retrenchment and its advocacy of
greater efficiency in the management of royal revenues, the committee
of inquiry was not a Laudian agency for the insinuation of "thorough".
Its membership of seven nobles, two lairds and two bishops was drawn
from leading officials and councillors all but two of whom (Hope of
Craighall and Hay of Barro) were currently serving on the commission
charged to audit the treasury accounts and the accounts of the
taxations authorised in 1625 and 1630.	 This auditing commission,
which had actually been appointed on 9 February 1634, consisted of
fifteen nobles, three lairds and four bishops, all but four of whom
were based in Scotland.	 Moreover, the recommendations of the
committee of inquiry were based primarily on empirical evidence
presented by Traquyair, the treasurer-depute, and Hay of Barro, the
clerk-register, not as Laudians, but 'as persones best acquainted with
the estate of our Exchequer'.	 Nevertheless, the influence of Laud
became more perceptible after 12 October, when the committee's
findings were presented at Court and its proceedings were formally
ratified.	 Charles deferred the committee's final recommendation that
the Exchequer Commission be renewed to implement the other twenty-three
recommendations, even although the committee presented a draft - which
had the approval of the king's advocates - to enable the renewed
Commission to function as 'a Judicatorie' in accordance with the
enactment of the coronation parliament. 	 The existing Exchequer
Commission was instructed to commence prosecuting the other
recommendations of the committee. 37
The Exchequer Commission had given active consideration to no
more than twelve of the committee's recommendations by
12 December 1634, when Charles demanded 'ane exact accompt' of the
income he derived from taxation as well as his rents and casualties,
together with a detailed breakdown of the debts due to as well as owed
by the Crown.	 Charles was now intent on assessing the efficiency of
the officials entrusted with management of royal revenues.	 In effect,
this demand marked the overt beginnings of Laud's drive to insinuate
"thorough", a drive which became particularly evident on 22 May 1635,357
when Charles appointed a new commission - of eight nobles, eight lairds
and five bishops - to audit the treasury accounts and to implement the
recommendations of the committee of inquiry.	 Its membership, when set
against that of the auditing commission of 1634, reflected not only a
move away from the nobility in favour of the other two classes, but
also a distinct shift in favour of courtiers among the nobles retained.
Moreover, the appointment of five additional gentry betokened a greater
emphasis on legalism in financial administration: headed by their
president, Spottiswood of Dunnipace, all were senators of the
College of Justice.	 Of greatest significance, however, was the
dropping of Traqup/ air from the new commission.	 He had served on the
auditing commission of 1634 as well as the committee of inquiry and he
was currently instituting half-yearly treasury accounts to maintain
more effective checks on royal expenditure.
38	His dropping,
therefore, hardly supports the view that he can be regarded 'as the
exponent of "thorough" in Scotland'.
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Far from being an exponent of "thorough" dedicated to
structural reforms in Kirk and State, Traq4gl air was a pragmatist of
limited scruples.	 As evident from his manipulation of the patronage
at his disposal in the treasury, most notably his selective payment of
pensions, he was determined to exploit office for his own personal
aggrandisement.	 In particular, be was intent on establishing himself
as the leading official based in Scotland and second only to Hamilton
in counselling the king on Scottish affairs.
40	In the run up to the
coronation parliament he claimed not to approve of the lack of
diligence shown by his associates within the Scottish administration,
more especially by Treasurer Morton and Chancellor Kinnoull, in
preparing and presenting accounts.	 Yet he, himself, had made no
significant effort from his accession to office in the autumn of 1630
to promote regular audits.	 Instead, he was content to build up his
reputation at Court as an official adept at mobilising ready cash,
specifically by ensuring the prompt transfer into the treasury of money
collected as taxation.	 Moreover, he sought to make political capital
at Court at the expense of Kinnoull from the audits prescribed for the358
summer of 1634, the Chancellor having taken over from Baillie of
Lochend as Collector-General in November 1627 - a responsibility which
he retained for the taxation authorised by the Convention of 1630. 41
Despite TraquAir's malicious disparagement of the probity of
Kinnoull and his associates as tax-collectors, the audits of July 1634
did not support charges of peculation or even gross inefficiency -
merely that accounting procedures were slow and not markedly zealous
or precise.	 The Crown was held to have accrued 11,172,275 9s 2d from
the taxations authorised respectively in 1625 (f579,863 11s) and 1630
(1592,411 18s 2d).	 A nominal surplus of £21,199 4s 11d was declared.
Although unrecovered taxes, charged formally as income, ran to
1100,955 7s 3d (that is, 8.6 per cent of total income), steps were
already well in hand to effect a fugs.ame recovery.	 Albeit the
auditing of arrears was not concluded until January 1636, thirteen
months after the death of Kinnoull, 143,494 14s 1d had been recovered
by rectifying omissions in tax rolls and by threatening tax-evaders
with prosecution and outlawry.	 A further 125,863 5s 7d had been
recovered by the impositions of fines and compositions on those who had
attempted to evade the tax on annualrents by concealing inventories of
sums loaned and borrowed.	 Hence, the actual sum written off amounted
to no more than £31,597 7s 7d - less than three per cent of total
accredited income.
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In the meantime, Traquipiir maintaine0 his own goodstanding at
Court by his readiness to apply the principle evocation not just to
carry out a policy of retrenchment but to re cind and renegotiate
financial contracts, especially those involving the most lucrative and
accessible royal revenues.	 Thus, on 17 November 1634, Traq44ir was
instrumental in deploying the recently acquired judicial powers of the
Exchequer Commission to effect the reduction of the tack of the customs
granted six years earlier to a consortium of Edinburgh merchants and
their associates in Glasgow and Aberdeen. 	 Even although the tack had
actually helped stabilise royal income by ensuring an annual payment of
£54,000 into the Exchequer, its revocation was warranted on two359
grounds.	 In the first place, the customs were annexed inalienably 	to
the Crown by past parliamentary enactments - last ratified in 1597 -
and, as part of the royal patrimony, should not be farmed out to the
'evident hurt and prejudice of the Crown'.	 Whereas the customary
practice in the Exchequer was not to farm out the customs for more than
five years, this tack had been set for fifteen years on
28 November 1628.	 Secondly, having been set during the wars with
Spain and France, its yearly return was alleged to be as much as
£300 sterling (£3,600) below the going rate in times of peace.43
Accordingly, on 16 December 1634, the customs were set for
five years to William Dick of Braid for an annual duty of £60,000 - to
be paid in quarterly instalments - and an entry fee (or grassum) of
20,000 merks (£13,666 13s 4d).	 Despite the official attestation that
this tack had been set to the highest bidder, Tradair had been less
concerned to maximise royal income through competitive tendering than
to ensure that the customs were set to an individual of undoubted means
with a proven track record of advancing money to meet the most pressing
commitments of the Crown.	 The wealthy Edinburgh merchant was the
foremost creditor of the Crown based in Scotland.	 Thus, when his tack
was ratified a year later, Dick of Braid raised no objection to the
insertion of a clause giving the treasury formal powers to demand that
the quarterly duties - of £15,000 - to be paid up to a year in
advance. 44
More immediately, TraquAir was prepared to confirm Dick of
Braid as the leading farmer of royal revenues in return for the
latter's assent to elaborate financial negotiations, masterminded by
the treasurer-depute, to revoke the king's outright gift to the
marquis of Hamilton of the imposts of wines for sixteen years.
Dick of Braid was currently farming the imposts for a yearly return of
112,000 merks (£74,666 13s 4d), having been awarded a five year tack on
1 November 1629, which had been renewed by Hamilton for a full five
years after his gift of the imposts became operative on 1 August 1631.
As the imposts, like the customs, were part of the royal patrimony,360
Traquhair was adamant that their gift to Hamilton was no less
prejudicial to the Crown.	 However, Hamilton was prepared to make a
voluntary surrender once TraquiKair had convinced Charles that his gift
was financially imprudent.	 As Hamilton had been further favoured by
his appointment as Collector-General of the taxation authorised by the
coronation parliament, the basis was already laid for negotiating
compensation - although the actual negotiations were not concluded
until 12 July 1634. 45	Hamilton was authorised to uplift a sum
totalling £720,666 13s 4d from the readiest available taxes - £40,000
sterling (£480,000), half the outstanding balance, for surrendering his
gift of the imposts; £200,000 for taking over the Crown's coronation
debts to Dick of Braid; and the remaining £40,666 13s 4d for accepting
responsibility for clearing off arrears and paying pensions to leading
46
However, However, the improvement in royal revenues which resulted
from rescinding and renegotiating the tack of the customs and the gift
of the imposts was more immediately discernible in managerial rather
than financial terms.	 Since Dick of Braid was now directly
accountable for both the customs and imposts, the Exchequer Commission
was able to maintain strict oversight of his sub-contracting to local
mercantile consortia.	 The treasury also secured ready advances of
cash for the routine financing of government (albeit sums advanced were
offset against future annual dues).
47	Notwithstanding the easing of
cash flow, the deficit of £21,582 11s 11d recorded in the treasury
accounts in August 1634, had increased to £29,652 6s 10-id by
November 1635.	 Payments of pensions, fees and allowances were still
chronically in arrears.	 Indeed, Sir John Auchinmowtie, master of the
king's wardrobe, and his staff had even served notice on 10 July that
they were prepared to sell off furnishings and clothes from the royal
houses and palaces since they had received no fees for almost four
years. 48
Although the ordinary income of the Crown more than doubled
to £439,197 11s 2d by November 1636, this increase was attributable361
less to Traqtiair's application of the principle of revocation - or
even to his suggestion that the king should sell off as well as uplift
the Crown's annuity from the teinds - than to the legal ingenuity of
Hope of Craighall.	 The Exchequer Commission's acceptance of the
Lord Advocate's circumvention allowing lordships of erection to be
retained under wadset brought in arrears of feu-duty which had been
withheld for the past seven years.	 Nonetheless, expenditure continued
to outstrip income by £7,467 16s 9d.	 For the Crown was now obliged to
honour its contracts with the temporal lords for their partial
surrender of kirk property as with other members of landed society for
the loss of regalities and heritable offices in local government.
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Furthermore, since the reduction of the Crown's massive burden of debt
was accorded first claim on the taxation authorised by the coronation
parliament, Hamilton had to wait over two years before he could
commence recouping the sums promised to him in July 1634. 	 An interim
audit of 3 August 1636, disclosed a continuing deficit of
£124,181 12s 5d, even though 033,674 8s 9d had been gleaned from the
first year's levies supplemented by advances, principally from eight
leading burghs, for the remaining five years.	 Despite Hamilton and
his associates being commended by Charles for their unprecedented
diligence as tax-collectors, the marquis had to be content with a bond
promising an annual gratuity of 04,181 12s 5d pending fulfilment of
his contract with the Crown of 1634.
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Traquipfair had undoubtedly proved the most dominant influence
in the Exchequer since the king's coronation visit.	 Although his
office was subordinated formally to that of Morton, the Treasurer's
preference for life at Court had meant that his impact on the
management of royal revenues was incidental rather than integral: a
situation not noticeably altered after 5 March 1635, when Morton took
over the presidency of the Exchequer Commission following
Archbishop Spottiswood's acquisition of the chancellorship.51
Moreover, TraqudOir's application of the principle of revocation in the
Exchequer had demonstrated to Charles that the treasurer-depute was the
most adroit politician within the Scottish administration.362
Nonetheless, although Traq4Kir had succeeded in making substantial
inroads into the accumulated deficit of the Crown, his managerial
achievements in Scotland did not stand comparison with those of
Wentworth in Ireland.	 For, TraquPl air was unable to terminate the
king's dependence on taxation, far less to ensure that Charles could
live off his ordinary income - however much augmented.
Laud remained unconvinced about Traqu ir's reliability as an
exponent of "thorough". Thus, the decision of Morton to demit office
by the summer of 1636 set the scene for a major political confrontation
within the Scottish establishment which served to emphasise as well as
expose the polarisation between clergy and laity.	 Laud had already
secured that March the appointment of William Juxon, bishop of London,
as Lord Treasurer of England - a post not held by a cleric for over a
century, since the reign of Henry VII. 52	Morton's resignation as
Treasurer offered the opportunity for a similar key appointment in
Scotland to place the disposal of royal revenues in general and the
king's annuity from the teinds in particular under the control of a
churchman.	 Laud's candidate was John Maxwell, 'that proud and
haughtie piece', who had replaced Menteith as an extraordinary lord of
session on 4 October 1633, only six months after his confirmation as
bishop of Ross, and had sat on the Exchequer Commission since
6 May 1634. 53	However, by working in concert with the Scottish
nobility and by drawing on the support of influential courtiers, such
as Hamilton and Lennox, lay officials and councillors outmanoeuvred
Laud and secured the promotion of TraquXir on 24 May, 'as a bar to
hinder the innundation of our impetuous Clergie, which was like to
overflow all'.
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In the two months which passed between Traq air's
appointment as Treasurer and his actual assumption of office,
solidarity within lay ranks seemed further consolidated by his
accommodation with Hope of Craighall which was affirmed publicly on
2 August 1636.	 In keeping with his endeavours to consolidate his
standing at Court as the foremost politician based in Scotland,363
TraquSl air declared his intention to confide in the Lord Advocate as his
right hand man 'and communicat all that concernit his Majestie's
service'. 55
	Yet, there was no guarantee that this uneasy alliance
would be able to bolster the monarchical position in Scotland or even
prove more than a temporary check on the ambitions of the bishops given
the continuing reluctance of lay councillors to attend at Edinburgh.
Indeed, Traq46ir's unabated pursuit of personal aggrandisement was not
conducive to the maintenance of solidarity within lay ranks; nor an
antidote to the permeation of dissent within the localities occasioned
by the Revocation Scheme; nor ultimately, an effective counter to the
growing cohesion of the disaffected element in the wake of the
coronation parliament and the Crown's continuing pursuit of economic
and religious uniformity.364
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Chapter IX	 The Ramifications of the Revocation Scheme: 
Local Government 
The Revocation Scheme was not concerned exclusively with
social engineering.	 Associated with its implementation were plans for
the overhaul of local government.	 Charles' determination to terminate
regalities and heritable offices necessitated the restructuring of the
judicial process in the localities.	 The appointment of Menteith as
Justice-General, following Lord Lorne's surrender of the house of
Argyle's hereditary entitlement to that office, afforded Charles the
opportunity to impose a uniform system of judicial administration more
amenable to central control and conforming to current English practice.
Accordingly, in the summer of 1628, he resolved to reinvigorate the
commissions for circuit courts of justiciary according to the model
prescribed - but never activated -  by his father in 1587 (which was
itself based on the Elizabethan deployment of the judges of assize).
Although Scotland lacked a High Court of Justiciary (which was not
instituted formally until the late seventeenth century), the hearing of
serious criminal actions before the Justice-General had been centred on
Edinburgh since the early sixteenth century.	 In an age of poor
communications, such centralisation meant that people remote from
Edinburgh seeking judicial redress for criminal actions or for
negligence in local courts lacked usually the resources if not the
inclination to undertake the arduous journey.	 Charles' genuine desire
to improve judicial administration for the good of his subjects cannot
be discounted.
1	However, as was his wont when promoting reforms, he
was not averse to exaggerating the sufferings of those who, because of
remoteness from Edinburgh and the partial administration of justice in
local courts, 'have been forced long to groan under the burding of many
insolent injuries, crimes, oppressiones and extortiones'.
Accordingly, on 30 June 1628, Charles reinvigorated the
scheme for circuit courts as specified in 1587, quartering the kingdom
and commissioning justice-ayres for the shires of central Scotland
immediately to the south of the firths of Forth and of Clyde, for
central Scotland immediately to the north of the Forth-Clyde axis, for
the Borders and for the North of Scotland.	 Each commission, headed by
two senators from the College of Justice, was to tour no less than371
seven shires twice yearly that 'good subjects haveing just causes of
complaint sall have justice ministrat unto them'.	 The function of
each commission was essentially three-fold.	 To proceed against 'all
capital and odious crymes indifferentlie and without exceptioun', in
effect to try the four pleas of the Crown and all criminal cases where
conviction brought death or mutilation.	 To try and censure all
transgressors of penal statutes which the king or Privy Council thought
fit to put into execution and where conviction was met by the exaction
of compositions: the fines imposed on transgressors varying with their
social status as for the myriad of statutes transgressable.	 Finally,
since the commissioners on circuit were charged to oversee the
competence of local government officers - such as sheriffs, coroners,
justices of peace - obliged to assist them in the apprehension of
law-breakers, the accumulation of evidence and the warding of
prisoners, their duties were extended to the general supervision of
royal government within the localities.
2
	This later aspect in
particular conformed to Charles' current deployment of the judges of
assize in England.	 Indeed, as a conscious expression of his desire
for conformity of practice in both kingdoms, he instructed the
Exchequer on 11 July that all senators commissioned to hold circuit
courts were to be furnished with scarlet robes, 'made after the forme
and maner of the robbes of the Judges of Assise in England' in the
rather fetching belief 'that the decensie of thare robbis may breed
respect amongis our people and terrour to offenders'.3
Government within the localities was still essentially a
matter of hereditary private enterprise.	 Local officials, given to
deference towards the nobility in royal courts no less than in
heritable jurisdictions, were amenable to influencing the judicial
process in the interests of kinship and longstanding local association.
The most demanding task of the reinvigorated commissions for circuit
courts of justiciary was, therefore, to correct if not terminate legal
maintenance and the partial administration of justice. Such a task,
which required the reformation of customary attitudes as much as the
redress of ingrained legal abuses, was demanding both mentally and372
physically.	 Indeed, within six weeks of the promulgation of his
original commissions, Charles was obliged to modify his extensive remit
for the justice-ayres.	 Instead of requiring the commissioners to hold
courts in every shire within their prescribed quarters, priority was
accorded, on 8 August 1628, to the holding of courts in at least two
shires once each circuit commenced that October.	 Moreover, the plan
to hold biannual justice-ayres was never implemented.	 In 1629, the
commissions were renewed only once, on 21 July, priority being accorded
on each circuit to the holding of courts in shires not visited by the
previous year's justice-ayres.	 However, since the revised schedules
included shires not adequately covered by the commissioners on their
initial circuits, courts were not designated for every shire in the
prescribed quarters.	 Only the Borders were covered fully.	 In
central Scotland, there were at least two shires on each circuit for
which no provision was made.	 Seven out of the eleven shires remained
unprovisioned on the most demanding circuit, the North.
4
Technical complexities compounded logistical problems. From
the inauguration of the first commissions, concern was expressed within
official circles about the right of lords of regality to repledge from
the circuit courts.	 This was not just a matter of judicial privilege
but of financial expediency. Repledging, while accepted as competent
with regard to criminal offences punishable by death or mutilation, if
extended to penal statutes could mean delinquents defaulting without
punishment since the lords had no powers to fine transgressors.	 This
privilege, if conceded, would have proved expensive to the Crown for,
'if ye haill regalities and heritable bailzeis of Scotland be exemed,
the quarter of ye kinges subjectes salbe included therin and exemed
altogether'.
5	Furthermore, Charles himself was not insensitive to the
need for co-operation between the justice-ayres and the lords of
regality pending the termination of regalian rights by due process of
law and the payment of equitable compensation - hardly an immediate
prospect, given the lack of ready cash in the Exchequer.	 Hence, in
order to prevent the loss of income to the Crown as well as the legal
maintenance which could result from repledging, Charles instructed373.
Menteith, on 20 October 1628, that the lords or their bailies were to
sit with the commissioners on every circuit whenever their regalian
interests were affected.	 Thus, regalian rights were to be respected
rather than derogated by the circuit courts so that the lords and the
commissioners 'may concurre togither for administratioun of justice'.
6
Nonetheless, local interests were less harmoniously adjusted
to the actual dispensing of justice in the circuit courts. 	 The lack
of specification in the formal indictment of offenders, the uptaking of
the dittays, immediately proved a major area of contention. 	 For the
commissioners on their inaugural circuits in October 1628 adhered to
traditional practice for the accumulation of evidence and the
formulation of charges.	 Following a precept from the Justice-General,
the sheriff summoned 'a nomber of persouns of best fame, qualitie and
abilitie' within each shire to inform the commissioners of criminal
incidents and to identify law-breakers.	 On the basis of such
testimony, dittays were drawn up citing the reputed offenders to appear
before the circuit courts.	 However, the dittays did not inform
reputed offenders whether they were indicted on serious criminal
charges or for breaches of penal statutes.	 This lack of specification
was condoned as a means of encouraging the accused to attend court
rather than abscond.	 The commissioners also adhered to the
traditional practice of challenging 'great offendares even at the bar
albeit they wer never indytit to thes courts and being then fund
culpable to execute thame to ye daith for terror of uyeres'.
Adherence to such traditional practices did not enhance either the
reputation or the competence of the circuit courts. 	 Indeed, 'the
shortness or generalitie of sodaine citationes' occasioned widespread
discontent within the localities.	 The virulence of the local clamour
against the circuit courts did not go unheeded in the Scottish
administration.	 Voices proposing the rigorous, if not the draconian,
administration of justice by the circuit courts were stilled.	 Among
the remedies for 'ye oversightes committed in the circuit courts' now
shelved were the collation of evidence by all local government officers
from burgesses and husbandmen and even kirk sessions as well as landed374
society, and the exemplary use of the death penalty for negligent
officials to deter maintenance in royal courts.	 Charles again
demonstrated his sensitivity to the need for a more measured approach
when renewing the commissions in 1629.	 He instructed Menteith on
29 September that parties cited before the circuit courts 'have copies
of thair dittayes' and that the commissioners should dispense justice
'with such moderation as our subjects may not have just cause to feare
undeserved censure, nor yet to hope for impunity where they doe justlie
deserve punishment'.
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Although sudden indictments at the bar were now abandoned,
dittays to reputed offenders still did not cite specific charges.
Hence, the reception accorded in the shires to the renewal of the
justice-ayres in 1629 was far from favourable.	 In an effort to
restrain 'the unquyett and clamorous complaints of particular parties
agains the commissioners of the circuit courts' the Privy Council was
moved on 24 November to reaffirm its right to receive complaints
directly.	 This reaffirmation was intended in part to avert further
demonstrations against the circuit courts in the localities and, in
part, to check the flood of complaints from aggrieved parties to the
Court.	 The shire commissioners at the Convention of 1630 were to
endorse the Council's efforts, not because they were upholders of the
justice-ayres, but because the 'extraordinary concourse' of Scots to
the Court in search of favour and clientage, if not repressed,
threatened to undermine the whole judicial process, 'since such a
practice undoes the course of justice in the ordinarie courts and
judicatories of this kingdom'.	 Indeed, far from maintaining a special
brief for regular justice-ayres, the shire commissioners expressed
their preference for the dispensing of justice within the localities by
'ad hoc' commissions of justiciary.	 Such commissions, granted usually
to local magnates or prominent chiefs to suppress outbreaks of
disorder, were characterised by haphazard and partial administration of
justice verging often on gross abuse.	 Nevertheless, those
commissioned were at least well disposed towards ties of kinship and
longstanding local association when dispensing summary justice.8375
No less contentious than the uptaking of the dittays was the
commissioners' remit to prosecute transgressors of the penal statutes
in the circuit courts.	 In all, there were sixty-four categories of
offences liable to prosecution and the retrospective time-scale for
prosecutions extended, in most instances, to offences committed since
1621.	 Prosecutions (and the exaction of excessive compositions) for
breaches of penal statutes had proved a contentious issue virtually
from the outset of the personal rule - ever since Charles had referred
the prosecution of transgressors to the ill-fated Commission for
Grievances.	 Following its demise, Charles had been prepared to
concede that prosecutions should be abated if not abandoned.	 However,
the Privy Council pointed out, on 29 November 1627, that such a
concession would prove of 'great prejudice' to the revenues of the
Crown.	 Penal statutes had recently been enacted to prohibit smuggling
and to counter the concealment of 'lent moneyes' by requiring the
disclosure of inventories specifying loans and debts: the former to
augment the customs, the latter to maximise the extraordinary taxation
levied on annualrents.	 The Privy Council went on to make more
dramatic claims.	 Since James VI in his last parliament had conceded a
general indemnity for all past offences - except for the sporting of
firearms, exorbitant usury, the export of gold and silver, and poaching
from river or loch - any further prospect of exonerating transgressors
would 'in a short tyme shaik louse the whole frame of government of
this kingdome and the habituall custome of offending without punishment
will breed obstinacie against all future reformatioun of such
disordouris'.	 Charles sought to excuse himself by claiming, on
10 January 1628, that his intention had been merely to relax not
rescind the fines due for breaches of penal statutes.	 On 11 February,
the Privy Council was instructed to ensure that the prosecution of
transgressors was conducted with discretion as well as rigour once the
justice-ayres became operative.9
Because of its strictures against the relaxation of
prosecutions for breaches of penal statutes, the Privy Council, when
ratifying the remit of the inaugural commissions, had a rather limited376
interpretation of its own need to exercise discretionary control over
the trial and censure of trangressors in the circuit courts.	 The
Council was content to reserve final punishment in three out of the
sixty-four categories liable for prosecution - namely, for
counterfeiting money, forging writs and wilful association with rebels
'forfeited for odious crimes or denounced for slaughter'.
Nevertheless, the clamour occasioned within the localities by the
uptaking of the dittays brought an immediate and pragmatic switch of
tack.	 The commissioners were instructed - 'most wyselie' in the
opinion of Charles I - to refrain from prosecuting transgressors of
penal statutes.	 The Privy Council's conversion to a more measured
approach to the dispensing of justice in the circuit courts was further
evident on the renewal of the commissions in 1629.	 On 28 July, the
categories of offences liable to prosecution were reduced from
sixty-four to twenty-one.	 On 18 September, prosecutions for breaches
of penal statutes in the circuit courts were restricted to offences
committed since 31 August 1628.	 However, this injunction of the
Privy Council was not interpreted by Charles as a total prohibition on
the commissioners taking cognizance of offences committed before that
date.	 While conceding that the commissioners, in terms of their
direct responsibility to exact compositions, were now 'only concerned
with prosecutions for breaches between circuits', he was adamant that
their remit, 'to make diligent trial and inquisition of transgressors',
still extended to offences - especially the more heinous - committed
prior to 31 August 1628.
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Charles' ruling that the commissioners should take cognizance
of breaches of penal statutes prior to their inaugural circuits in 1628
not only ran counter to the growing support within the Privy Council
for moderacy in dispensing justice, but contrasted sharply, if not
crassly, with his apparent desire for a more measured approach to the
uptaking of dittays.	 Indeed, his ruling reveals that his professed
willingness to accommodate local interests in the administration of
justice was tempered by and subordinated to his perennial quest to
maximise the revenues of the Crown and more pressingly, to mobilise377
funds - including profits of justice - for his own immediate use. 	 For
on 18 September 1629, the same day that the Privy Council restricted
the time-scale for the prosecution of transgressors in the circuit
courts, Charles informed the commissioners that they were to assist
Sir Alexander Strachan of Thornton effect his administrative patent for
the recovery of the rents and casualties of the Crown. 	 Thornton was
to be in attendance when the justice-ayres resumed in October.	 The
commissioners were to hold and affix the circuit courts at his
convenience.	 Furthermore, Thornton was 'to receave the wholl fines
and compositions to be imposed upon whatsoever transgressouris' for all
breaches of penal statutes prior to 30 March 1628. 	 He was to retain
half of these profits of justice.	 In essence, Charles was
circumscribing the judicial powers of the commissioners in favour of a
fiscal entrepreneur.	 While every transgressor of penal statutes was
to be indicted before the circuit courts, the commissioners' remit to
prosecute and exact fines extended merely to all breaches since
31 August 1628, with a further five month extension for heinous
breaches.	 Responsibility for the collection of fines for such
offences prior to 30 March 1628 was transferred to Thornton.
Moreover, Thornton was empowered to compound for breaches committed
prior to the spring of 1628, thereby dispensing with the prosecution of
transgressors and the exaction of the prescribed fines for their
transgressions.	 However, the commissioners did retain full judicial
powers over transgressors of the penal statute first enacted in 1621 to
counter the concealment of lent money.	 Having already granted an
amnesty for past concealment on 3 October 1627, Charles was adamant
that anyone attempting to defraud the Crown of its novel tax on
annualrents, by falsifying or failing to submit inventories of loans
and debts, should be prosecuted publicly and locally to deter the
spread of tax evasion."
Notwithstanding this reservation, the wholesale transfer of
judicial responsibilities to Thornton by administrative patent was the
seventeenth century equivalent of the privatisation of public service.
The granting of administrative patents, on the rather specious as well378
as speculative grounds that the pursuit of private profit was
compatible with the equitable and efficient administration of justice,
had already achieved notoriety in England under both Elizabeth and
James I.	 Although the granting of patents was curtailed severely from
1624 by the statute of monopolies, Charles' "willingness to rely on
patentees to enforce legislation ensured that the practice remained an
important anti-Court issue.	 Grants of administrative patents not only
amounted to a licensed system of outdoor relief for courtiers, but also
cast aspersions on the competence and reliability of government
officials.
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While the granting of administrative patents was a less
contentious issue in Scotland, Charles undoubtedly stirred up
controversy not just within the localities but among his leading
officials by the way in which he imported the practice into Scotland.
His favouring of courtiers like Thornton was hardly conducive to
wholehearted co-operation from his Scottish based officials and
councillors.	 As early as 17 November 1625, at the same time as his
Scottish councillors were remonstrating with the king about 'the fear
quhilk is generallie apprehendit' by his proposed revocation, the
Privy Council was moved to protest that Thornton should play no part in
Charles' programme for the overhaul of Scottish government.	 Thornton
was deemed 'unworthie of ony place of judicatorie within the kingdom',
ostensibly because of his disreputable character and doubts about his
religious convictions, and less perceptibly, as an attempt to dilute
courtier influence on the impending overhaul of government.
Nonetheless, Thornton's appointment to the reconstituted Privy Council
was upheld.	 He served subsequently as a member of the ill-fated
Commission for Grievances and was selected for two other commissions,
of integral concern for royal finances - namely, that for the Exchequer
and that for creating baronets of Nova Scotia.13
The origins of Thornton's administrative patent can, in turn,
be traced to the vigorous reappraisal of current royal finances and
potential sources of income available to the Crown: a reappraisal379
initiated by Charles, on 2 April 1627, to complement his overhaul of
Scottish government and the rigorous investigation into landed title
necessitated by his Revocation Scheme.	 In keeping with Charles'
reluctance to rely on longstanding Scottish officials, this reappraisal
was to be conducted under the auspices of Sir Archibald Aitcheson of
Glencairny, whose estates lay mainly in Ulster.	 Accordingly,
Glencairny was appointed king's remembrancer to the Exchequer, given
access to all official records of central and local government, and
specially charged to scrutinise the Exchequer's management of the
Crown's ordinary and extraordinary revenues. 14	Glencairny's dramatic
rise up the official hierarchy testifies to the assiduous way in which
he strove to carry out his remit.	 By 6 November, he was a member of
the Privy Council as of the Commission of Exchequer.	 At the same time
his diligence in complying with royal directives was rewarded by his
replacement of Haddington as Secretary of State in Scotland, an office
held conjunctly with, but subordinated to that of Sir William Alexander
at Court, who was now unchallenged as principal secretary.	 Thus, when
Secretary Alexander suggested to Thornton at the outset of 1628 that
the latter revive his project to augment the income the Crown derived
from feudal casualties, Glencairny raised no objection.	 Indeed,
Glencairny, no less than Secretary Alexander, was determined to ensure
that Thornton received full judicial backing to prosecute his
commission.	 Moreover, Glencairny was prepared to use his access to
official records to assist Thornton effect his administrative patent.15
In essence, Thornton's commission, which Charles actually
ratified on 7 November 1628, was yet another project of the Court
foisted upon a Scottish administration which was largely unreceptive if
not downright hostile.	 Thornton had claimed that the grant of an
administrative patent would enable him not just to augment but to
treble the income currently available to the Crown from feudal
casualties.	 He was convinced that he could raise at least i5,000
sterling (i60,000) through the vigorous exaction of fines and
compositions for unpaid dues. Above 06,000 was to be realised from
compositions for escheated goods from persons outlawed.	 No less than380
£24,000 was to be exacted from all holding from the Crown by ward and
relief who had either converted their feudal tenures without royal
warrant or had defaulted in the payment of reliefs.	 Thornton went on
to claim that a further £10,000 sterling (i120,000) could be realised
from two sources - from negotiations with the heritable tenantry of the
Principality desirous to reinforce their security of tenure in the wake
of the Revocation Scheme; and from the exaction of selective, but
moderate compositions for heinous breaches of penal statutes.
Finally, a further £20,000 was to be raised by the exaction of
compositions from all who concealed or withheld Crown rents.
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As the total ordinary income available to the Crown had
dropped from £223,930 7s 31d at the outset of his reign to
£196,608 13s, Charles' enthusiasm for a project designed to realise in
excess of £200,000 was understandable. 17	Nevertheless, his
ratification of Thornton's administrative patent did not pass through
the Exchequer without comment.	 Although the Commission of Exchequer
had been reconstituted as an integral part of the king's overhaul of
Scottish government, it was not initially required to exercise strict
surveillance over Thornton's implementation of his commission.
Moreover, the retrospective but indefinite time-scale for Thornton's
exploitation of feudal casualties, which ranged back beyond the earl of
Mar's acquisition of the treasurership in 1617, impugned the competence
of all officials engaged on Exchequer business, not only for their own
handling of financial affairs but for allowing the errors and omissions
of their predecessors to remain unchecked. 	 Murmurings of discontent
within official circles gave way to more forthright criticisms once
Thornton began to exact compositions for unpaid dues.	 Thornton made
scant allowance for the technical defaults which occurred because
seasonal fluctuations in crop yields had forced landowners to defer
rather than conceal or withhold their dues to the Crown. 	 So zealously
did Thornton strive to implement his commission that by the conclusion
of the justice-ayres for 1629 the Exchequer was obliged to process
around five hundred compositions exacted under threat of prosecution.
Such was the outcry from the localities against Thornton's commission,381
that a disaffected element within the Scottish administration was
prepared to take direct action to prevent its continuance.	 After what
Menteith recorded as two to three days of heated debate in the
Exchequer, the disaffected went so far as to insist that
Lord Advocate Hope represent to the king the 'great errores' of
Thornton's commission in particular as of administrative patents in
general.	 Upon Hope's refusal, the disaffected consulted with four
advocates for a whole day 'to find out the illegalitie' of
administrative patents. 18
In effect, Thornton's administrative patent was suspended
following the conclusion of the justice-ayres for 1629 and discr	 y
shelved after the shire commissioners at the Convention of 1630 had
petitioned the Estates, 'be reason of the great feare that is
conceaved' among the king's subjects, should review Thornton's exercise
of his commission.
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	Undoubtedly, the aggravation of political
dissent had more than outweighed the financial benefits which Charles
had expected to accrue from Thornton's administrative patent.	 In
turn, the reception accorded to the implementation of Thornton's
commission made Charles wary of further proposals to augment the income
the Crown derived in Scotland from feudal casualties.	 In
February 1631, a Mr George Nicoll suggested that the £5,000 sterling
which Thornton had sought to realise through the exaction of fines and
compositions could be magnified into £30,000 sterling (£360,000)
annually if the casualties 'wer dewlie collected and compted for in the
Exchequer, as they ought to be, by the lawes and statutes of the
realme'.	 As Nicoll had been clerk to Glencairny during the latter's
scrutiny of the Exchequer's management of royal revenues, his 'breiffe
estimat of the King's casualties in Scotland' seemed plausible.
However, his estimate was accompanied by another paper, a 'trew
Relation' on the state of the royal revenues, which imputed gross
mis-management and peculation to the king's leading officials in
Scotland - with the exception of Glencairny. 	 After interviewing
Nicoll personally at Court on several occasions during 1632, Charles
found himself reluctant to disregard yet unwilling to trust the former382
clerk's submissions.	 Thus, the Privy Council were ordered on
17 October to assess Nicoll's claims with reference to the public
records.	 In effect, the leading officials accused by Nicoll were
entrusted with their own exoneration. Although Charles did summon
them to Court in December to face their accuser, the meeting merely
served to confirm the king's growing resolve that Nicoll should be
pursued at law 'for his false and malicious calumnies'. Nicoll was
then brought north at the turn of the year to be incarcerated in the
tolbooth of Edinburgh pending his trial before Menteith as
Justice-General.	 However, as Menteith was then facing removal from
office for his own intemperate outbursts and as Charles was finalising
preparations for his oft-postponed coronation visit in the summer, he
could not afford a further public scandal involving the rest of his
leading officials in Scotland.	 As a mark of appeasement to his
Scottish administration, Nicoll's trial before the Justice-General was
postponed on 23 February 1633.	 His censure and punishment was left to
the Privy Council, a ruling which was interpreted as the royal
presumption of guilt requiring no further trial.	 Accordingly, Nicoll
was sentenced on 5 March to be pilloried, whipped and banished for life
to the continent as 'ane false calumnator and liar'.
20
The censuring of Nicoll finally laid to rest all thoughts at
Court of reinvigorating Thornton's commission to exploit feudal
casualties.	 Henceforth, Charles had to look elsewhere for financial
expedients to supplement the ordinary income of the Crown in Scotland.
Nevertheless, Thornton's administrative patent provided a precedent for
Charles' endeavours to finance his personal rule in England during the
1630s when, much to the consternation of English landowners, he
utilised the court of wards to treble his income from feudal
casualties.
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	The implementation of Thornton's commission, taken in
association with the Revocation Scheme, also provided a broader
political perspective for the contemporaneous activities of
Thomas Wentworth (later earl of Strafford) as Lord-Deputy of Ireland.
For, not only did Wentworth use his authority 'to overbear common-law
titles to property' in order to effect the plantation of the province383
of Connacht, but so vigorously did he utilise both the court of wards
and liveries and the statute of uses to augment royal revenues that he
came to represent a 'threat to stability' for the colonial no less than
the traditional Irish landowners.
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More immediately, however, disaffection within the Scottish
administration caused Menteith at the outset of 1630 to despatch a
memorandum to Court, endorsed by Lord Advocate Hope, reaffirming that
the implementation of Thornton's commission had served to compound the
political discredit already accruing to the reinvigorated
justice-ayres.	 The circuit courts were deemed exceedingly
troublesome, 'a great burthen to the Cuntrie and makes the people cry
out'.	 Moreover, their continuance could prove counter-productive.
Given that the readiest profits from the circuit courts - which were
not siphoned off by Thornton - were earmarked to compensate Lord Lorne
for surrendering his family's heritable office of Justice-General, the
fines and compositions which were imposed and exacted were insufficient
to pay the fees of the commissioners, their clerks and sundry court
officials.	 Thus, in view of the king's proposed coronation vi 	 to
Scotland that summer, Menteith was moved to conclude that it was a
'most unfit tyme' to contemplate further justice-ayres and thereby give
his majesty's subjects 'any just cause of greevance1.23
Although Charles did not make his coronation visit in 1630,
Menteith's counsel of prudence still retained its validity for the
upholders of the prerogative seeking to restrict the scope for
disaffection among the Estates at the Convention summoned that summer
to vote further taxation to the Crown.	 Hence, on 28 June, Charles
ordered an act to be made at the Convention indemnifying all subjects
for past transgressions of penal statutes, excepting the heinous
breaches specified in the parliament of 1621 or subsequent concealments
of lent money - an indemnity which was to be reiterated and updated as
an aspect of the royal bounty in the coronation parliament of 1633.
Following the successful conclusion of the Convention, which renewed
both ordinary and extraordinary taxation at the same rates voted in384
1625, the Privy Council issued an injunction on 9 August, 'that the
holding of circuit courts for this yeere sail be forborne': a decision
which reflected the groundswell of opinion within official circles as
in the country at large against regular justice-ayres.24
While the circuit courts were to be revived - albeit
fitfully - in 1631, responsibility for prosecuting conceallers of "lent
money" was no longer left to the discretion of the commissioners.
Although £13,031 7s 8d had been raised for the Crown from concealiers
by the imposition of fines equivalent to triple the taxation owed, the
application of the full rigour of the law in the circuit courts had
proved of limited efficacy in curbing tax evasion.	 Given that a
substantial portion of the extraordinary taxation levied in both 1621
and 1625 was still in arrears, Charles, on 11 June 1630, had
established a select committee of eight leading officials, headed by
the chancellor, George Hay, Viscount Dupplin, to arrest the spread of
tax evasion through the exaction of compositions rather than by
prosecutions.	 Thus, compositions were exacted in the circuit courts
during 1631 at the rate of one-fifth the taxation owed.	 But as this
rate proved an inadequate check on the accumulation of arrears,
delinquent taxpayers were summoned to Edinburgh from 1632.	 Over the
next three years, compositions were exacted at the rate of half the
taxation owed if the evader made a voluntary submission and at
three-quarters the taxation owed if the evader proved unrepentant or a
recidivist.	 Nevertheless, after deducting charges in the circuit
courts, clerks' fees and messengers' expenses in serving summons, the
Crown was to derive no more than £12,820 15s 7d from the exaction of
compositions 25
Not only did the exaction of compositions prove less
rewarding to the Crown, but the curtailment of prosecutions for tax
evasion served as the precursor for the conclusion of the circuit
courts.	 Indeed, no courts were held in the North circuit during 1631.
Elsewhere, the courts were kept tardily in the shires and were
neglected by some commissioners.	 The hearing of serious criminal385
cases again came to be centred on Edinburgh from 1632, with special
'ad hoc' commissions of justiciary being granted occasionally to curb
flagrant, but localised, outbreaks of disorder during the remainder of
the personal rule.	 Charles' attempt at his coronation parliament to
institute a High Court of Justiciary, 'to restoir and reestablish the
said Judicatorie to its ancient dignitie and integritie', proved no
more than a pious hope.
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Undoubtedly, the termination of the circuit courts, no less
than the Crown's chronic shortage of ready cash to buy out regalities
and heritable offices, blunted the king's hopes of restructuring the
judicial process.	 Nonetheless, Charles did not abandon completely his
plans to make the localities more receptive to central direction.
Thus, he remained adamant not only that the peace commissions should be
revived in every shire, but that the justices of the peace should
assume greater responsibility in the running of local government.
Indeed, although no commissions had been issued since 1617 and although
justices were operative in no more than fourteen shires by 1625,
Charles was determined to make the peace commissions in Scotland as
effective as their counterparts in England.
From the outset of his reign, Charles placed less stress on
the judicial powers of the justices sitting in quarter sessions - to
oversee, prevent and try incidents which disrupted or threatened the
peace - than on their routine, but continuous, administrative duties.
The quarter sessions merely supplemented the heritable jurisdictions of
leading landowners.	 The administrative duties of the justices, which
ranged from the regulation of social welfare to the monitoring of
commercial activities, offered greater scope for intervention by the
Crown not just to re-orientate government but to promote stability and
order in the localities.	 Moreover, only three justices were needed in
each shire to make a decision on any matter within the administrative
remit of the peace commissions between quarter sessions.
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In his first flush of reforming zeal, Charles suggested to386
the Privy Council on 26 July 1625, that a role could be found for
justices as parochial magistrates, as secular enforcers of the
disciplinary censures of the Kirk: a role which he subsequently
elaborated in a letter of 22 October to the Convention of Estates,
proposing that the justices also assume parochial responsibilities for
the enforcement of the poor law.	 However, as less than half the
shires in Scotland had peace commissions still functioning and as the
existing commissions were generally undermanned, Charles' proposal for
parochial magistrates was quietly shelved on being remitted back by the
Convention to the consideration of the Privy Counci1. 28	Nevertheless,
Charles continued to impose further administrative duties on the peace
commissions in the erroneous belief that the justices, if not alone, in
small numbers, had a limitless capacity to administer as well as
adjudicate.
From the spring of 1626, the justices were expected to
monitor price fluctuations in local markets, ostensibly to aid the
Privy Council draw up guidelines for the mercantilist regulation of the
Scottish economy, but primarily to maintain social stability and help
defuse unrest among the lower orders in times of dearth.	 Indeed, the
Privy Council was moved to impose corn laws on 20 April - to
accommodate the relative scarcity or plenty of domestic grain
supplies - not just to sustain the buoyancy of landed incomes, but to
offset fears within official circles (as later evident in England
during the 1630s) that the recurrence of dearth on the scale of 1623
would occasion endemic disorder, even rebellion, among the poor.
Moreover, official fears about the rebellious inclinations of the poor
were fanned by the vociferous petitioning of the Convention of Royal
Burghs in favour of protectionist measures to preserve native
manufactures, notably woollens and leather goods.	 The parlous state
of native manufactures was linked to social dislocation, to the
swelling of the ranks of the able-bodied poor which would accompany
the loss of employment in processing industries.	 Hence, at the same
time as the Privy Council was undertaking extensive consultations with
landed and commercial interests with a view to imposing corn laws to387
conserve grain supplies, Charles suggested that the agenda be extended
to consider the advisability of restricting exports of livestock and of
staple commodities, such as wool and hides. 	 Accordingly, to provide
statistical information on current economic performance and to
facilitate an annual review of the need for protective measures, the
justices of the peace were required to notify the Privy Council by
20 August, and yearly thereafter, about the prices fetched for wool,
sheep and cattle at the markets held within their shires from the
beginning of May until the first Tuesday in August - the commencement
of the autumn quarter sessions. 29
The justices, however, were not enthusiastic monitors of
price fluctuations in local markets, a task requiring diligent and
detailed investigation.	 Nevertheless, the reports dutifully submitted
from ten shires during August 1626 did serve to confirm the temporary
embargo on the export of cattle imposed by the Privy Council on
13 June - on the grounds that unrestrained exports to England and the
forestalling of herds on their way to trysts had created a scarcity of
moderately priced beasts for restocking farms.	 Moreover, the reports
provided sufficient statistical information for the Privy Council, on
22 August, to impose a general prohibition on the export of wool,
sheep and cattle until the following May.	 Reports were submitted from
no more than eight shires in autumn 1627 (only five shires making the
requisite submission in consecutive years).	 Thereafter, the
continuance of restraints on exports - and the maintenance of the corn
laws over the next three years - had to depend largely on informal
soundings about the state of local markets.	 For no reports were
received from the shires in 1628, although the justices for
Aberdeenshire did at least petition to be excused.	 A marked lack of
success had also attended the Privy Council's consultations with the
justices in February 1627 on the expediency of relaxing the
restrictions imposed on the exports of hides imposed two months
earlier.	 Justices from only six shires responded to the circular
issued on 13 February requiring a reply within nine days as to whether
the country would suffer from the unrestrained export of hides and388
whether leather goods could be conveniently manufactured from native
stocks of salted hides.	 With the exception of Selkirkshire, the
reports submitted agreed in the affirmative to both questions.
Nonetheless, since the response was so limited, the Privy Council
continued existing restrictions, merely affirming on 15 March that
existing large stocks of hides surplus to the current capacity of the
leather industry could be exported under special licence.
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By the summer of 1627, as an extension of their role as
custodians of social stability, the justices of the peace were accorded
prime responsibility for 'enrolling the ydill and masterless men' into
the British expeditionary forces despatched to the continent to effect
Charles' policy of direct intervention in the Thirty Years War.	 In
essence, the justices were expected to accomplish a social distillation
of undesirable elements among the lower orders, 'that are unprofitable
at home and may be useful abrode in his Majesties service'.
Understandably, however, the justices were reluctant conscriptors given
the public disturbance occasioned  by indiscriminate recruiting by
press-gangs that spring.	 The reluctance of the justices was
financially motivated as well as politic.	 For the conscription of
undesirable elements into the expeditionary forces was but part of
Charles' military programme which was also designed to raise a militia
for national defence.	 Accordingly, the justices were expected to draw
up rolls of fencible men, all the able-bodied between sixteen and
sixty, within the bounds of every presbytery and then submit a
composite list of the most capable as well as the most dispensable
recruits from each shire, 'to the intent ordour might be given for
dreilling and trayning thame up in militarie exercise'.	 As the Privy
Council was then contemplating the revival of the 'weaponschawing' in
the shires, the justices were faced with the prospect of having to
organise local musters, not only to arrange military training for the
recruits but to ascertain local stocks of weapons and be held liable to
make up any shortfall.	 Thus, the submission of composite lists of
recruits threatened to become a collective assessment for the supply of
arms.	 A general aversion to further taxation - however indirect -389
would seem evident, in that the justices of only one shire, Fife, made
any effort to draw up rolls of fencible men and submit a composite list
of recruits by the autumn.	 Hence, when the Privy Council eventually
authorised a general muster on the east coast for 7 November,
responsibility was entrusted to the traditional officers in the shires
and regalities.	 Indeed, for the next six years, responsibility for
specific administrative duties was left to the traditional officers of
local government.	 Justices of the peace were included occasionally in
administrative directives - in the hope rather than the expectation of
31 co-operation.
Nevertheless, Charles remained convinced that the initial
resistance of the justices to further administrative duties could be
overcome by the infusion of new blood onto the peace commissions,
especially as many of the justices appointed by his father were either
dead or aged and infirm or had moved their domain to another shire.
Moreover, having propagated the Revocation Scheme as an appeal to the
gentry, giving them rights to purchase their own teinds and the
privilege of holding their kirklands directly from the Crown, Charles
not only sought but demanded greater co-operation from that estate in
running the localities.	 Thus, on 29 September 1628, at a time when
the gentry were being pressed into service on the sub-commissions
charged to conduct valuations of estates within the bounds of every
presbytery, Charles instructed the Privy Council to ratify and enlarge
the existing peace commissions, 'in the persouns of the most famous and
indifferent barouns and freeholders within each shirefdome'.	 But the
sheriffs made no apparent effort to send the Council the requisite
lists of eligible gentry within the shires. 	 A similar request the
following June, extended to the stewards and bailies of the heritable
jurisdictions annexed permanently to the Crown, again met with a
negative response.	 The gentry, however, were not as apathetic as the
local officials. For the shire commissioners at the Convention of
1630 petitioned in favour of the renewal and the enlargement of the
peace commissions and even went on to request that the justices take
over additional responsibilities - namely, as parochial magistrates to390
enforce the poor laws (as already suggested by Charles in 1625) and to
penalise breaches of penal statutes (as an alternative to Thornton's
commission).	 While these proposals won the formal approval of the
Estates, the shire commissioners made no discernible effort to take on
the task of submitting the requisite lists of eligible gentry to the
Privy Council. 32
In a determined effort to counter inertia as well as
resistance within the localities, Charles had the coronation parliament
ratify his father's enactment of 1617 detailing the judicial powers and
administrative duties of the justices 'for keeping of the king's
peace'.	 Furthermore, the estates consented to his proposal that the
Privy Council should be warranted 'to inlairge and amplifie the power
and autboritie of the saids justices of peace if they sail find it
rtececsarie and ex9edient'.
33 Accordingly, on 8 October 1633, as a
first step towards effecting the comprehensive renewal of the peace
commissions, responsibility for drawing up the lists of eligible gentry
was restored to the sheriffs, stewards and bailies. 	 However, less
than half the requisite lists had been submitted by 19 December, when
twelve sheriffs, two stewards and three bailies were held to have
'slighted and neglected' the Council's directive. Despite the threat
of heavy fines and even outlawry, six sheriffs and one bailie - as well
as the two stewards - were still in default on 18 September 1634, when
the Council eventually issued peace commissions for twenty-four shires,
two stewartries and three bailiaries. 	 Indeed, a further eighteen
months were to elapse before peace commissions were finally issued for
the shires of Renfrew, Kincardine and Clackmannan.	 There would seem
to be no extant record of the remaining defaulters submitting the
requisite lists.
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The Council's failure to achieve prompt or even universal
co-operation from the localities cannot just be attributed to
indifference or negligence on the part of sheriffs, stewards and
bailies.	 For the Council was to experience greater difficulties over
the next three years persuading gentry to serve on the peace391
commissions.	 Major weighting must be given to the adverse reception
accorded over the past five years to the sub-commissions conducting
valuations within the bounds of every presbytery.	 The task of
disentangling, quantifying and assessing stock and teind, which
commenced in the spring of 1629 and was not remitted until the spring
of 1634, was not only onerous and over-ambitious but politically
thankless.	 Indeed, the intensity of opposition as well as the
technical complexities encountered by the gentry serving as
sub-commissioners can be held to have prejudiced that class against
further participation in the restructuring schemes of the Crown.
Initial clashes of interests among the landed classes had gradually
given way to class collusion with the realisation that the gentry were
being manipulated by Charles to undermine the traditional privileges of
the nobility. It was a measure of the Court's remoteness from
Scottish affairs that Charles continued to take for granted the
willingness of the gentry to serve as the workhorses of central
government in the localities.	 In reality, the legacy of distrust
occasioned by the implementation of the Revocation Scheme meant that
Charles' promotion of the peace commissions appeared as yet another
design to use the gentry to undermine the traditional dominance of the
nobility within the localities.	 Suspicions about the king's
intentions were in no way dispelled by the guidelines emanating from
the Court during the spring of 1634, altering the composition and
redefining the remit of the peace commissions.
On 11 March 1634, the Privy Council was instructed to adopt
'the laudable custom of government' then current in England, of making
each bishop a justice of the peace within his own diocese.	 In effect,
the Scottish bishops were to exercise a watching brief over the peace
commissions, a role undertaken at the behest of central government by
the lords lieutenant in England.	 Whereas the office of lord
lieutenant was bestowed on trusted nobles to enhance their social
prestige within the English shires, the Court was not prepared to
dispense similar patronage in Scotland, given the heritable privileges
of the nobility and the pervasive influence still exercised by that392
class over the rest of the political nation.	 As the bishops were
already shouldering the main burden of routine administration in
Edinburgh, they were deemed the most reliable element within the
political nation to act as intermediaries between central government
and the localities.	 The gentry did not regard the traditional powers
wielded by the nobility in the localities as theirs by right. 	 Even
the militant pressure group which had emerged among the gentry to
promote the surrender of superiorities and the redistribution of teinds
were little concerned to revitalise the peace commissions. 	 The
burgesses had no evident designs on government outwith the towns and
cities.	 To expedite the Court's design to re-orientate Scottish
government at the expense of local particularism, every bishop was to
submit 'ane list of the most able and sufficient ministers within thair
dioceis' whom the Privy Council could regard as suitable for selection
as justices of the peace.	 Thus, the bishops were to be provided with
willing allies on the peace commissions to enhance the process of
centralisation.35
The appointment of ministers olto the peace commissions was
in keeping with the earlier involvement of the clergy in local
government - specifically, in the assessment of parochial sources
during the spring of 1627, which served as the pilot project for the
deployment of sub-commissions within the bounds of every presbytery.
Contemporaneously, parish ministers assisted the justices of the peace
draw up lists of undesirables fit to be conscripted into the British
expeditionary forces.	 Notwithstanding such past service, in which
clerical participation was hardly noted for its enthusiasm or
diligence, the major influence behind the inclusion of the clergy on
the peace commissions was Archbishop Laud.	 His authoritarian
aspirations, his administrative zeal and not least, his passion for
efficiency - which he identified with centralisation - had already led
Laud to instigate the overhaul of local government in England as
manifest by his sponsorship of the Book of Orders in 1631, which
initiated a decade of unremitting pressure by central government on the
shires.	 Ostensibly promoted to improve the administration of the393
poor law, but more immediately, to provide a higher level of
accountability in the general conduct of local government, the Book of
Orders underlined the obligations of the justices of the peace in every
shire to meet monthly between quarter sessions and submit detailed
reports of their activities to central government. 	 Laud intended that
the peace commissions were to be renewed in Scotland  in conformity to
the English model.	 In turn, Scotland was to serve as an experimental
area to correct English malfunctions, most notably the declining
commitment of the gentry serving as justices to meet Laud's required
standards of zeal and efficiency.	 Thus, ministers as well as bishops
were appointed to the peace commissions issued by the Privy Council on
18 September 1634, to serve as the Scottish vanguard for the pursuit of
"thorough" in lotal government. The appointment of episcopal
nominees, usually at least one and rarely more than five on each
commission, duly provided a precedent for drafting Anglican priests
onto the English peace commissions to expedite the rating of the shires
and the collection of Ship Money - the most contentious, but
remunerative, imposition of Charles' personal rule in England.
Indeed, from its inception in 1634 until its final levy six years
later, Ship Money was not only regarded as the most detestable task
forced upon local government officers, but proved such a socially
divisive influence within the shires that the whole working of local
government in England was threatened with paralysis  by 1640. 36
Although the Scottish peace commissions were not
traditionally as integral to the running of the localities as their
counterparts in England, their role in the re-orientation of local
government in Scotland had a more disruptive potential.	 For Laud's
application of "thorough", to local government as to fiscal and
ecclesiastical policies, was fundamentally imperialist as well as
authoritarian.	 His aggrerve sponsorship of centralisation was
identified with the promotion not just of efficiency but of uniformity,
which left little room for national diversity: a policy confirmed by
the directive from the Court on 26 May 1634, instructing the Exchequer
to block the passage of all charters conveying new baronial privileges394
with disciplinary powers of death and mutilation.	 Moreover, the
Exchequer was to recall existing baronial charters and rescind their
criminal jurisdiction.	 However, the Exchequer would seem to have made
no effort to implement this directive which would have restricted the
right of barony to that of estate management.	 Nevertheless, the
threat posed to baronial privileges by this directive, which was
publicised through the Privy Council, affected not only the nobility
but that element of the gentry traditionally most influential in the
localities, the lesser or untitled barons. 	 On the one hand,
therefore, Laud's application of "thorough" to local government served
to carry the anti-clericalism already prevalent within central
4
government into the localities.	 On the other hand, his aggreshve
F
sponsorship of centralisation aligned the retention of baronial
privileges with the defence of nationally disparate agencies of
government.	 In short, the successful implementation of "thorough" in
a Scottish context was tantamount to the provincial relegation of
Scotland.
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In an effort to assuage apprehensions with the political
nation, Charles, at the renewal of the peace commissions on
18 September 1634, again discounted any charge that he was an
innovator.	 He affirmed that 'the tennour of the commissioun for the
justices of peace' conformed to Jacobean precedent.	 Nevertheless,
designs at Court to make the peace commissions integral rather than
merely supplemental to the running of the localities were borne out by
the Privy Council's amplification of the justices' judicial remit and
by its enlargement of both the number and the composition of the
commissions.
Although no attempt was made to increase the administrative
duties of the justices, which were deliberately left unspecified,
particular emphasis was given to the justices' role as local informers
and watchdogs on behalf of central government.	 Thus, not only were
the justices expected to prevent, oversee and, ultimately, try breaches
of the peace by the unenfranchised masses, but they were required to395
assume responsibility for the cautioning of all who, by 'their
swaggering and ryotous' conduct were manifestly intent on making
trouble as for the apprehension and trial of 'all wilfull and
disobedient persons, authors, committers and fosterers' of criminal
behaviour - regardless of the offenders' social status.	 Moreover, the
justices were empowered to select as witnesses the 'faithful and
unsuspect', cognizant of the facts and to impanel the juries for the
trial of offenders - if necessary in Edinburgh when not in the shires.
In effect, in the aftermath of central government's failure to
reinvigorate the justice-ayres, the peace commissions were now charged
to promote the efficacious administration of justice in all royal
courts and, in particular, to counter maintenance and partiality in the
sheriff courts.	 Indeed, the justices' redefined remit severely
circumscribed the judicial role of the sheriff, thereby confirming the
advanced state of decline in which that office currently languished -
the sheriff being little more than an electoral officer for the shire
and a fiscal agent of the Crown. 38
The number of justices appointed for the shires, stewartries
and bailiaries afforded further testimony that the peace commissions
were renewed not just to circumscribe the office of sheriff, but to
eclipse the traditional role of heritable jurisdictions in local
government.	 Thus, in place of the mere handful of justices on the
peace commissions still functioning at the outset of Charles' reign, as
many as fifty and no less than twenty justices were appointed for each
shire.	 Moreover, since commissions were issued separately for
stewartries and bailiaries, the number of justices appointed in a few
large shires numbered around a hundred.	 In Ayrshire, instead of one
commission for the whole shire, commissions were projected for all four
bailiaries, though only three were actually issued since the bailiary
of Kyleregis was one of the districts from which no list of eligible
gentry was submitted. In addition to the archbishop of Glasgow, the
diocesan bishop, ninety-three people were nominated as justices of the
peace - specifically, three nobles, thirty-six gentry and one minister
for the bailiary of Cunningham; one noble and fifteen gentry for the396
bailiary of Kylestewart; and two nobles, thirty-four gentry and one
minister for the bailiary of Carrick.
The inclusion of nobles on most commissions was no more than
a courtesy gesture, a recognition of their traditional territorial
influence.	 Thus, some were appointed to more than one commission.
Some of the gentry with large scattered estates were also named on more
than one commission.	 All the convenerships were held by gentry, an
affirmation that this class was expected to bear the brunt of the
commissions' workload.	 In effect, since the number of gentry
appointed to each commission was more than sufficient to exercise
strict supervision over each parish in every shire, the peace
commissions resuscitated the role of the justice as the parochial
magistrate.	 Indeed, in some instances the ratio of justices of the
peace to parishes in the shire was almost 2:1.	 In the case of
Ayrshire, even allowing for the lack of a commission for Kyleregis, the
number of gentry appointed to the three bailiaries was eighty-five, the
number of parishes in the shire was forty-five (there being then
twenty-eight parishes in the presbytery of Ayr and seventeen in the
presbytery of Irvine).
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However, there is little evidence of close scrutiny being
given within official circles to the past record in local government
of those appointed justices or, indeed, the general willingness of the
gentry to serve as justices.	 Most of the gentry who had served on the
sub-commissions in the presbyteries were appointed justices of the
peace, including some actually removed from the sub-commissions because
of age or infirmity.	 Former conveners of the sub-commissions were not
generally called upon to extend their expertise as conveners of the
peace commissions.
40	In essence, the peace commissions would seem to
have been renewed on the presumption of service, not with the prior
consent to serve from those appointed justices.	 For on
13 November 1634, a select committee of five councillors headed by
Traquhair was appointed to revise the roll of justices.	 A fortnight
later, revised peace commissions were issued with drastically reduced397
numbers of justices in each shire.	 Thus, the total number of justices
of the peace for the three bailiaries in Ayrshire fell from
ninety-three to forty - two nobles, thirteen gentry and one minister
composed the revised commission for Cunningham; one noble and eight
gentry for Kylestewart; and one noble, thirteen gentry and one minister
for Carrick.	 Elsewhere, the number of ministers appointed tended to
remain constant, but the nobles tended to be dropped in most shires.
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The revised rolls reveal a massive vote of no confidence from
the gentry as well as the nobility in the Court's plans to re-orientate
local government in Scotland.	 Of necessity, the direct equation of
justices with parochial magistrates was all but abandoned.
Significantly, of the gentry who had served on the sub-commissions and
were appointed justices on 18 September 1634, most were absent from the
revised rolls issued on 25 November, indicating widespread disaffection
based on their earlier experience of government service implementing
the Revocation Scheme within the presbyteries. 	 Moreover, there
remained a marked reluctance to serve among those named on the revised
lists.	 Throughout 1635, piecemeal attempts were made to persuade
gentry to accept appointments as justices of the peace, mainly those
named on the peace commissions of 18 September 1634 being asked to
reconsider their decision not to serve.	 These endeavours of the
Privy Council usually added between two and nine justices to the peace
commissions, although in some shires - such as Ayr - no additions were
made until 1637.	 Furthermore, there was no appreciable improvement in
the willingness of the gentry to ensure that the peace commissions
actually functioned, either on a comprehensive or regular basis.
Hence, the Privy Council was moved to complain on 26 January 1636,
'that nombres of thir justices of peace throughout the severall
shirefdomes of this kingdome slights and neglects this service and hes
not accepted the charge upon thame nor keepes thair quarter sessions
nor other ordinarie dayes of meiting ,.42
In an effort to arrest this situation, the Council issued
letters to all appointed justices commanding them to serve on the peace398
commissions with care and diligence.	 Henceforth, statutory fines for
absence were to be imposed on justices attending quarter sessions
irregularly. Habitual absentees were to be summoned before the
Council and 'be exemplarie punished in thair persons and goods'.
Nevertheless, no marked improvement in the willingness of the gentry to
serve as justices resulted.	 The statutory fine for absence not
1 /auchfullie excusit' was £40.	 But the fine could only be imposed
upon an absentee if the justices present at the quarter session did not
accept their errant colleague's excuse for absence. Thus, central
government's threatened resort to systematic fining was ineffective
against collusion on the part of the justices to cover up
absenteeism. 43 	Indeed, the class collusion which was currently
undermining the Revocation Scheme was extended to constrict the working
of the peace commissions.	 In essence, faced by a choice between
politically odious and administratively onerous compliance with Court
directives or social acceptability and class solidarity within the
localities, the gentry voted with their feet to thwart the designs of
the Court.
From the outset of 1636 until the summer of 1637, piecemeal
additions continued to be made to the commissions in an effort to
sustain operational viability.	 However, the appointment of additional
justices betrayed the mounting desperation of central government.	 The
Privy Council was not only attempting to persuade gentry named at the
renewal of the peace commissions on 18 September 1634 to take up their
appointments, but was also resorting to the drafting of gentry from
outwith the ranks of the lesser barons and freeholders and even of
bailies from dependent burghs.	 At the same time, the burden of having
to carry out the Court's directives to local government was falling
increasingly on the clergy: a development which did little to promote
the acceptability of the peace commissions among the landed classes
and, indeed, aggravated disaffection within the localities.44
That the situation in the shires had continued to deteriorate
was affirmed dramatically by the Privy Council on 4 July 1637.	 Having399
reiterated its charges of negligence and derilection of duty against
the justices, a considerable number of whom were still refusing to
serve on the peace commissions, the Council went on to assert that on
account of their general carelessness and lack of diligence, 'that
service quhilk is so important for his Majesties honnour and for the
peace of the countrie, is in effect cassin louse'. 	 Thus, only
nineteen days before the whole structure of Scottish government was to
be put to the test and found wanting in the wake of the riotous
reception accorded to the Service Book in St Giles Cathedral, the
Privy Council, whose effectiveness depended upon local co-operation,
was all but admitting its incapacity to continue governing on behalf of
absentee monarchy.	 Moreover, the remedial efforts of the Council to
ensure the comprehensive working of the peace commissions were
counter-productive, being mainly directed against the gentry, the class
whose specific support Charles had cultivated in order to implement his
Revocation Scheme.	 The threat that all refusing to serve on peace
commissions would be denounced as rebels lacked conviction and muscle
since the disciplinary expedient of putting to the horn was long
devalued by overuse.	 The accompanying threat that negligent justices
would be declared 'unworthie of anie suche imployment and charge
heerafter' was tantamount to an invitation to remain negligent and
thereby avoid further public service at the behest of the Court.
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Thus, in Scotland as in England, a decade of unremitting
centralising pressures from the Court occasioned widespread
disaffection within the localities and brought about the collapse of
the royal agencies of local government. 46	The peace commissions,
whose renewal in 1634 culminated the process of re-orientation begun in
1628 by the reinvigoration of the circuit courts and the deployment of
sub-commissions in the presbyteries, were neither equipped to deal with
nor inclined to accept the burden of responsibilities foisted upon them
by central government.	 Undoubtedly, the peace commissions in Scotland
were relatively more underdeveloped agencies of local government and
less integral to the whole process of government than their
counterparts in England.	 At first sight, therefore, the breakdown of400
the peace commissions was less critical in Scotland than in England.
Nevertheless, the reluctance of the gentry to serve on the peace
commissions was as pronounced in Scotland as in England.	 Furthermore,
the point of breakdown between the Court and the localities was
attained three years earlier in Scotland.	 Indeed, the grievances of
the English shires only achieved a national forum in 1640 because
Charles was obliged to summon successive parliaments in an attempt to
contain and suppress rebellion in Scotland.	 It should also be borne
in mind, that the concept of peace commissions - as against the manner
of their renewal - was not inherently objectionable to the political
nation and never entirely lapsed on the demise of the personal rule.47
From 1640, the Covenanters were to revive and sustain the peace
commissions, shorn of their clerical component, their composition
strictly under the control of the gentry estate, and their
administrative and judicial remit responsive to the interests of landed
society in particular as to the Movement in general.
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In essence, the failure of the peace commissions to become
fully operational three years after their renewal must be placed within
the context of a nationwide rejection of Charles' authoritarian design
to re-orientate local government in Scotland.	 The, 4ctual breakdown of
Ce"-Poun4eAts
the peace commissions by the summer of 1637 .-1-i-m-axeci- a reaction against
the style of absentee monarchy as against the pace at which innovations
were introduced: a reaction, already evident in the local inertia and
resistance provoked by the Revocation Scheme, particularly on the
deployment of sub-commissions in the presbyteries, and consolidated by
the reinvigoration of the justice-ayres and the implementation of
Thornton 's commission.
Moreover, although the termination of Charles' personal rule
in Scotland was not triggered off directly by the reaction within the
localities against the peace commissions, Charles' efforts to
re-orientate local government helped promote a climate of dissent
nationwide in which the revolt against absentee monarchy could
flourish.	 Indeed, the reaction against the peace commissions entailed401
the rejection of the Court's directives on Scottish affairs, not just
the rejection of the style and pace of the re-orientation of local
government.	 For the renewal of the peace commissions in association
with the Laudian policy of "thorough" had endangered national
diversity.	 The imposition of uniformity evoked fears of
provincialism.	 In much the same way, the Crown's ecclesiastical
innovations and to a lesser extent, its fiscal policies, by proving a
threat to the disparate national agencies of government in Scotland
brought about a decisive and crucial shift in the constitutional
equilibrium in both Kirk and State.	 Thus, the breakdown of the peace
commissions during 1637 signposted the political nation's shift away
from acquiescence in the directives of the Court towards the Scottish
revolt against absentee monarchy.402
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Chapter X	 Economic Nationalism and the Shifting Equilibrium 
The Revocation Scheme was the bedrock of Charles I's designs
to effect a fundamental restructuring of Scottish society and
government.	 But, instead of engineering social revolution and
re-orientating government, the introduction and implementation of the
Revocation Scheme permeated a climate of dissent throughout the
political nation and subjected central and local government to
continuous disruption. Because of the spread of class collusion
within the localities and the growing cohesion of the disaffected
element within the country at large, the will of central government to
uphold monarchical authority was eroded progressively. 	 Without the
Revocation Scheme the Covenanting Movement would not have taken root
nor flourished sufficiently to end the personal rule of Charles I.
Yet, since the impact ofthe Scheme was diffuse and its ramifications
predominantly sectarian, the Revocation did not trigger off a concerted
movement for counter-revolution intent on securing a fundamental shift
in the constitutional equilibrium of both Kirk and State.
Paradoxically, Charles the frustrated revolutionary can still
be deemed the major-protagonist of counter-revolution as well as the
leading architect of his own downfall.	 For, the unstinting reliance
on his prerogative which characterised the Revocation Scheme was no
less pronounced in his determined, but insensitive, pursuit of economic
and religious uniformity throughout the British Isles.	 Ever since the
Union of the Crown, any threat - real or imagined - to nationally
disparate agencies of government had served to inflame the emotive
issue of Scottish nationalism.	 In an effort to accommodate such
sentiment Charles, from the outset of his reign, affirmed repeatedly
his concern for the welfare 'of our antient and native kingdome': an
affirmation which served only to widen the credibility gap between the
Court and the political nation when the professed aims of royal policy
were set against their practical implications.
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	More especially,
throughout the 1630s Charles' fiscal policies no less than his
ecclesiastical innovations posed a consistent threat to national
diversity within his British dominions and, in particular, threatened
Scotland with permanent provincial relegation - as an economic and409
religious as well as a political satellite of England.	 This threat to
national identity in the two main spheres where Scotland still enjoyed
international recognition as a separate entity within the British Isles
was instrumental in bringing about the critical shift in the
constitutional equilibrium which had prevailed - albeit with
diminishing credibility - since 1603. The growing desire within
Scotland to limit the powers of absentee monarchy in the national
interest occasioned the emergence of the Covenanting Movement by 1638.
The pursuit of economic as well as religious uniformity can
be associated most readily with Archbishop Laud's dogmatic advocacy of
"thorough".	 But the actual process of eradicating Scottish
particularism was initiated by Charles I, himself. 	 On 30 July 1630,
Secretary Alexander read out a missive to the Convention of Estates -
a missive which was delivered originally to the Privy Council, but
redirected to secure wider publicity and a broader basis of consent -
intimating that negotiations were to commence within Scotland as within
England and Ireland 'to sett up a commoun fishing'. 	 Because of 'the
great abundance of fische upon all the coasts of thes yllands', Charles
was adamant that the fishing rights, 'whiche properlie belong to our
imperiall crowne and ar usurped by strangers', should be exploited 'by
common council and endeavour' for the benefit of all subjects within
the British Isles.
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Charles' determination to establish a common fishing was
based on mercantilist aspirations, to emulate and, above all, to
replace the Dutch - the usurping strangers - who had come to dominate
deep sea fishing in the North Sea following the migration of the
herring shoals from the Baltic at the end of the sixteenth century.
Integral to the maintenance of Dutch supremacy was an accommodation
authorised by James VI in 1594 which was subsequently used, following
the Union of the Crowns, to review and realign licensing arrangements
(in 1609 and 1618) for Dutch fishing in English waters.	 The Dutch
were granted access to Scottish waters provided their fishing busses
did not intrude within a kenning (the equivalent of twenty-eight land410
miles) from mainland shores.	 Accordingly, the Dutch herring fleet
assembled annually in Bressay Sound at the end of May.	 Fishing
commenced in the Shetlands the following month and was pursued
methodically and intensively along the firths of the east coast until
September, whereupon the fleet entered English waters, fishing until
the end of November from Bamburgh in Northumberland to Yarmouth in
Norfolk. 3	The Dutch came to regard the herring fishing in the North
Sea as a major contributor to their national prosperity, meriting
protection by as many as forty war-ships.	 By 1618, up to three
thousand busses, ranging from seventy to one hundred and twenty tonnes
and employing around fifty thousand men, were reputed to be fishing  off
the coasts of Scotland and England.	 The highly capitalised and
technically advanced Dutch fleet was held up as a model of national
enterprise by continental commentators, strategically as well as
commercially, in serving as a nursery for sailors, a proving ground for
navigators and a stimulus to shipbuilding.	 More pertinently, in	 an
age when mercantilism served as a guise for economic nationalism, the
deep sea supremacy of the Dutch coupled to their cavalier attitude
towards the observance of territorial limits was a constant source of
friction within the British Isles, particularly among the English whose
rivalry with the Dutch extended from herring fishing in the North Sea
to whaling in the Arctic.	 The Crown had been counselled repeatedly,
but without any tangible success prior to 1630, to license a company of
adventurers with sufficient powers to establish a cohesive organisation
and attract extensive funding in order to mount a purposeful English
challenge to the Dutch supremacy. 4
Lacking the capital or the technical expertise to compete
realistically against the Dutch herring busses, Scottish aspirations
tended to be concentrated on the exploitation of inshore fishing and
the development of the fishing resources around the western isles,
notably the herring and white fish in the sea lochs of Lewis. 	 In
effect, by reserving the inshore fishing not only on the east coast but
also on the west, from Burrow Head in the Solway Firth to the Butt of
Lewis, the accommodation of 1594 placed Scottish fishing on a411
complementary footing to Dutch deep sea ventures.	 Indeed, the
Scottish fishing community, located mainly in the royal burghs of the
north-east, Fife and the west, was only just beginning to exploit the
hitherto untapped fishing resources of the western isles and the
Minches when Dutch busses first began to appear regularly off Lewis.
Sustained Dutch interest in the fishing reserves around Lewis
had actuated the formation of a company of Lowland adventurers - mainly
lairds and burgesses from Fife - who were licensed by James VI in 1598
to colonise the island of Lewis and develop the town of Stornoway as a
base for deep sea as well as inshore fishing.	 Over the next decade,
the Fife Adventurers, with sporadic military assistance from the Crown,
made stalwart but ill-fated efforts to establish themselves as
colonists.	 The persistent hostility of chiefs fearing similar
ventures elsewhere in the Hebrides and, above all, internecine feuding
with the indigenous Clan MacLeod fomented and covertly sustained by
Kenneth MacKenzie, Lord Kintail, forced the Fife Adventurers to abandon
Lewis by 1610.	 Having bought out the colonists' interests in the
island, Kintail secured royal approval for the expropriation and
forcible eviction of the MacLeods from Lewis - a task which took over
five years to accomplish. The dispiriting experiences of the Fife
Adventurers notwithstanding, the prospect of developing deep sea as
well as sea loch fishing from Lewis was never relinquished totally in
Scotland nor forgotten entirely at Court. 	 The resurrection of a
Scottish Fisheries Company was even being mooted in the last years of
James VI's reign.5
Rather than risk capital in companies of adventurers, the
royal burghs accorded priority to the conservation of their exclusive
fishing privileges, remaining ever alert to encroachments by
strangers - English as well as Dutch - within the prescribed kenning
from mainland shores.	 At the same time, the royal burghs attempted to
improve the marketing of fish on the continent by imposing, through
their Convention, strict quality controls on the barrelling, salting
and curing of herring and white fish.	 Moreover, the Convention was412
never averse to affirming the importance of fishing to the national
economy.	 For, fish were not only a staple constituent of the Scottish
diet, but a staple commodity to the fore among Scottish exports.
Reputedly, no less than eight hundred and as many as fifteen hundred
boats, ranging from four to six tonnes and employing around
six thousand men, were engaged commercially in inshore fishing during
the 1620s, predominantly on the west coast.
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Following the sighting of Dutch busses off the coast of Lewis
and rumours that the Dutch were about to establish a fishing base in
Stornoway, the Convention assumed a posture of defence, affirming on
behalf of the royal burghs on 13 June 1628, that the fishing resources
around the island were the cheiffest commoditie that this countrey
does affoorde and the grittest benefeit that God and nature hes
vouchased upone this realme'.	 The occasional presence of herring
busses off Lewis, however lucrative their catch, was not the main issue
of contention for the royal burghs.	 Far more threatening was the
prospect of the Dutch gaining a permanent foothold on the island
because of the designs of Colin MacKenzie - son and heir of
Lord Kintail and from 1623 first earl of Seaforth - to upgrade
Stornoway from its current status as a burgh of barony in order to
promote its development as the prime fishing port on the west coast.
As acquisitive and astute as his father, Seaforth had been soliciting
the Crown to confer on Stornoway the trading privileges of a royal
burgh but reserve his right to regulate settlement and grant lands in
feu to the burgesses.	 Thus, the Dutch invited to settle in Stornoway
would be licensed to exploit the fishing reserves around the western
isles while paying rents and landing dues to Seaforth.	 For the
Convention, Dutch settling in Stornoway either as freemen or as members
of a free corporation, which would involve lifting the ban on foreign
immigrants participating in Scottish overseas trade, was not just a
detrimental breach in the privileges of the native fishing community
but a matter of general national concern. Superior Dutch capital and
expertise would be deployed to engross the inshore as well as the deep
sea fishing around the Scottish coasts, curtailing severely the export413
of fish to continental markets and causing drastic social dislocation,
with thousands of fishermen being made redundant or obliged to seek
employment with the Dutch.	 Moreover, given the superior commercial
acumen of the Dutch, a colony in Stornoway was but the thin end of a
wedge which would, in effect, entrench Scotland as a Dutch economic
satellite.	 The commercial activities of the Dutch in Stornoway would
spread from fishing to beef, hides and tallow as to plaiding, wool and
yarn, with the result that trade in these commodities would be diverted
from the Lowlands to the Low Countries by-passing the royal burghs.
In the process, Dutch recourse to their own shipping would inflict
terminal damage on the native carrying trade.7
Significantly, by the outset of August 1628 the royal burghs
were prepared to canvass the rest of the political nation - should the
king summon a parliament or convention of estates - in support of their
claim that the current threat to the the Scottish fishing community was
of national not just sectarian concern.	 More immediately, the royal
burghs remonstrated successfully to the Exchequer that Seaforth's
patent from the king upgrading the burghal status of Stornoway should
be delayed pending further investigation into the 'diverse great
inconveniences and dangers' likely to ensue from 'the settling of
strangers in theis partes'.	 On 18 August, Charles reaffirmed his
intention to create a royal burgh on the isle of Lewis. 	 At the same
time, he agreed that Stornoway's patent should be reviewed not
ratified, a decision which provoked vociferous and sustained lobbying
of the Scottish administration.	 By 17 March 1629, the Privy Council
had been won over by the alarmist propaganda of the royal burghs.
Seaforth was censured for having allowed Dutchmen to settle on Lewis
since the outset of 1628.	 He was also admonished that the Dutch were
to cease processing fish on the island while his patent from the king
awaited ratification.	 However, no order was given to evict the Dutch.
Much to their chagrin, the royal burghs learned at their Convention on
10 July, that Dutchmen were still settling on Lewis. 	 More heinously,
the Dutch were not restricting their commercial activities to fishing
but were handling all other marketable commodities to the detriment of414
the provisioning trade between the western isles and the rest of the
country.	 Prompt remedial action was now demanded from the Crown on
the diplomatic as well as the domestic front. 	 Overtures were to be
made to the Estates-General of the United Provinces that the Dutch
colony on Lewis was an unwarranted extension of the accommodation of
1594.	 On 16 July, Mr John Hay, town-clerk of Edinburgh, who had
hitherto directed the royal burghs' lobbying of the Scottish
administration, was appointed and despatched as burgh commissioner to
the Court. His new remit as a lobbyist was to effect the eviction of
the Dutch from Lewis, to have Seaforth's patent recalled and to oppose
any further design to erect Stornoway into a royal burgh.
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That same day, however, Charles instructed the Exchequer to
ratify his bestowal of the trading privileges of a royal burgh on
Stornoway.	 Despite Charles' hope that the royal burghs would now
co-operate with Seaforth in developing Stornoway as the commercial
centre for the western isles and accept the Dutch and other strangers
invited to settle there as naturalised Scots, the royal burghs
continued to remonstrate vociferously.	 Indeed, the ratification of
Seaforth's patent was to be delayed while the Privy Council made a last
effort to resolve the differences between the earl and the royal
burghs.	 On 26 January 1630, the royal burghs attested that Seaforth
had 'brought in great nombers of strangers in the Ile of the Lewes'.
The earl countered that no more than twelve Dutchmen were settled in
Stornoway.	 The Council responded by placing a ban on further
immigration pending the outcome of arbitration. 	 But the Council was
forced to admit on 19 March that no meaningful progress had been made
in effecting a resolution although the ubiquitous Mr John Hay had
offered, on behalf of the royal burghs, 'to plant and people the toun
of Stornoway with natives onelie and to follow out the trade of
fisheing' around the western isles.	 The matter was referred
despairingly to the Court for arbitration, Charles being advised to
give greater weighting to the interests of the Crown and 'the whole
subjects of this your native kingdome' than to the private ends of
either party.
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Over the next four months, Charles appeared to switch his
favour from Seaforth to the royal burghs.	 For on 9 July, a letter Hay
despatched from the Court informed the royal burghs that Seaforth's
patent had been cancelled and that the development of Stornoway was now
likely to be 'devolued in thair handis'.	 Accordingly, each royal
burgh was invited to detail the extent of its willingness to
participate in and finance this venture by 23 July, when their
Convention was due to meet to formulate their common standpoint on all
matters affecting the burgess estate liable to be raised at the
Convention of Estates five days later.	 In the meantime, Hay was
encouraged to continue his negotiations at Court with the keepers of
the signet that, in return for an unspecified gratuity, advance
warning could be given of impending grants affecting the burgess
estate. Thus, the royal burghs could mobilise support in the
forthcoming Convention of Estates to block innovatory ventures
detrimental to their commercial privileges.10
As Charles had been exhorting the Exchequer for over a year
to encourage and expedite speculative projects which would enhance the
income the Crown derived from royalties, the royal burghs were
expecting to block innovatory ventures promoted by private
entrepreneurs - like Seaforth - not by the king himself. 11	Hence, the
detailed instructions for a common fishing submitted by Charles to the
Convention of Estates - specifying the corporate structure, commercial
privileges and financial prospects of his proposed association of
adventurers - caught the burgess estate and, indeed, the whole
political nation unawares.
The common fishing was deliberately not promoted as a unitary
joint-stock company, but as a confederation of provincial fishing
associations based on the chief towns, cities and burghs in the British
Isles.	 Each provincial association was expected to attract its own
investment from local adventurers.	 A select group of prominent
adventurers, 'sindrie chosin men of qualitie', from Scotland, England
and Ireland, were to form a common council charged to draw up the416
regulations governing the conduct of the provincial associations and,
subsequently, to resolve any differences arising between them. 	 This
corporate structure was already reputed to be well established in
Spain, France and the Low Countries, the most notable model being the
College of Herring Fishing which met once a year (at Delft) to
regulate the operations of the Dutch fishing fleet.
Since the provincial associations were to have free access at
all times to the coastal waters around the British Isles, the
adventurers were all to be subjects of the king, either as natives of
Scotland, England or Ireland or as naturalised immigrants. 	 In the
North Sea, the herring fishing was to commence in the Orkneys in June
and continue along the Scottish and English coasts until late January.
Herring and white fish were to be pursued continuously throughout the
year around Ireland and the Hebrides.	 Since Lewis was regarded as
'the most proper seat for a continuall fishing along the western
coasts', the island was to be annexed to the Crown, Seaforth
compensated and at least one royal burgh erected.
Because of the massive capital outlay required to finance
the deep sea fleet of two hundred new busses - ranging from thirty to
fifty tonnes, employing around sixteen hundred men and boys - deemed
necessary to compete meaningfully with the Dutch, an estimate of charge
and profit was published to induce adventurers to invest in the common
fishing.	 The total charge to build, equip and operate one hundred
busses was estimated as £72,000 sterling (f864,000).	 But the gross
profit from three fishing seasons was expected to realise £194,000
sterling (f2,328,000) in the first year - £100,000 from herring between
June and October, a further £72,000 from herring between October and
late January and finally, £22,000 from white fish between March and
May.	 Thus, the clear profit from the first year's fishing, after
allowance had been made for such recurrent costs as tackle, barrels,
salt, wages and victuals, was anticipated to be £82,707 sterling
(£992,484).	 If all two hundred busses were built, the net profit was
expected to double and that £164,414 sterling (i1,984,968) could be417
further increased by a third if catches were marketed directly: that
is, if efficient methods of packing and preserving fish could be
effected at sea, the busses could sell their catches directly in
continental markets.
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Sanguine optimism at Court about the viability of the common
fishing was further bolstered by reports that the Spaniards were
'keenly interested'.	 Spanish interest was two-fold.	 On mercantilist
grounds, the common fishing afforded 'a true way to keep naval forces
vigorous' at private expense without recourse to constitutional
assemblies to vote supply.	 More pragmatically, being directed
specifically against the Dutch, the venture would open up another
avenue of economic reprisals against Dutch commercial supremacy.	 Ever
since the renewal of hostilities between the United Provinces and Spain
in 1621, the Dutch herring fleet had been subjected to sporadic, but
devastating, raids from naval forces based in the Spanish Netherlands.
Despite the presence of naval escorts, the dispersal of busses when
engaged in herring fishing made the Dutch fleet more vulnerable to
random raiding than compact trading convoys. 	 Indeed, between sixty
and eighty busses were sunk off the Scottish coast in 1625. 	 Over the
next decade, Spanish war-ships continued to inflict heavy, if not
altogether crushing losses, probably cutting back the Dutch fleet by
half.
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While international circumstances favoured the launching of
the common fishing, the king's missive detailing the venture was not
accorded an,/enthusiastic reception by the Convention of Estates.	 For
the common fishing was conceived at Court, fashioned according to
English mercantilist aspirations and intended primarily to open a
window of opportunity into Scottish territorial waters at the expense
of the native fishing community as much as the Dutch.	 Indeed, leading
English officials, having collated reports - mainly from English
shipmasters - on the fishing resources around the Scottish coast, were
instrumental in formulating and promoting the association of
adventurers whose corporate structure, commercial privileges and418
financial prospects had already been 'maturelie considered and
approved by the English Privy Council before being despatched north
for ratification by the Scottish estates. 14
The Convention of Estates was not content simply to ratify
the king's missive, however.	 In particular, the king's instruction
that a commission should be appointed to act for Scotland in concert
with a commission he, himself, was to appoint for England and Ireland,
in order to resolve divergent interests affected by the common fishing,
was not effected immediately.	 Instead, leading officials and
councillors attending the Convention directed the estates towards the
appointment of a committee - of fifteen nobles, nineteen lairds, six
bishops and fourteen burgesses - to deliberate how the contents of the
king's missive could be brought to a 'good conclusion'.	 After four
days preliminary deliberations, a new abbreviated committee - of eight
nobles, eleven lairds and seven bishops - was appointed on
4 August 1630, to treat with the Convention of Royal Burghs which was
remaining in session in Edinburgh for the duration of the Convention of
Estates.	 After three days intensive discussions with the royal
burghs, the abbreviated committee concurred that 'they fand the
associatioun with England to be verie inconvenient' to Scottish
interests.	 Glossing over the recent intrusions by the Dutch in the
western isles, the abbreviated committee reported that the inshore
fishing - within twenty-eight miles of the mainland shores - was the
proper, customary and sole preserve of the Scottish fishing community;
that no concession should be made which would allow the English to
market fish directly through Scottish ports; and that discussions on
deep sea bussing should be deferred since the herring fishing season
for 1630 was all but spent.	 The abbreviated committee went on to
affirm that the royal burghs were well able to undertake on their own
account the development of inshore resources within the twenty-eight
mile exclusion zone provided they were given license to 'sett doun
their Plantatiouns in commodious and opportune places for following out
of the fishing'.	 In essence, the abbreviated committee had accepted,
without equivocation, the proposal the royal burghs had forwarded to419
Court in March, offering to develop Stornoway as the centre for
exploiting the fishing reserves around the western isles.
Having delivered its report to the Convention on the morning
of 7 August, the abbreviated committee was directed - largely through
the influence exerted by leading officials and councillors who had
played no part on the committee or in the preliminary deliberations of
its predecessor - to meet once more that afternoon. 	 It was given one
hour to establish whether the royal burghs were prepared to 'enter in
ane association with the English for undertaking the commoun fishing
without exceptioun', or if they would join 'with reservatioun' of the
inshore fishing within twenty-eight miles of the mainland shores, or if
they would 'absolutelie refuse the associatioun'. 	 The royal burghs
chose the second option but added the proviso that they be given
exclusive license to develop new centres - such as Stornoway - to
exploit to the full the fishing resources within Scottish territorial
waters.	 Rather than commit themselves to bussing, the issue of deep
sea fishing was referred back being deemed of concern to 'the whole
bodie of the estaits'.	 The position of the royal burghs having thus
been clarified, the Convention of Estates proceeded to appoint seven
nobles, nine lairds, two bishops and ten burgesses - in effect, the
abbreviated committee of 3 August, supplemented by burgesses from the
original deliberating committee of 31 July - to serve as a committee of
review to discuss the outcome of the initial round of negotiations at
Court when the commissioners appointed to negotiate for Scotland
reported back to the Privy Council at the outset of November.
The Council's appointment of a seven-man commission to
negotiate for Scotland was not announced until 10 August 1630, three
days after the dissolution of the Convention. 	 Its composition, which
was loaded in favour of the Court, made few concessions to the Estates.
Two leading officials - Menteith, the president and Alexander of
Menstrie, the principal secretary - and two courtiers - Hamilton and
Roxburghe - were joined by Tra9Kair, Mr James Robertoun, an advocate,
and Mr John Hay, the latter three being made respectively responsible420
for the interests of the nobles, gentry and burghs.	 Hamilton had
declined to attend the Convention.	 Neither Robertoun nor Hay was
enrolled as a commissioner for the shires or the burghs, although Hay -
unlike Traq9gfair and the other negotiators - had at least been invited
to participate in the committee stages of the common fishing.
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The same day the appointment of the commission for Scotland
was announced, sustained and vigorous lobbying resumed at Court to
influence the negotiating process.	 The royal burghs were adamant that
the continued exploitation and further development of inshore resources
should remain the exclusive preserve of the Scottish fishing community.
Hence, Mr John Hay, who remained the burghs' lobbyist at Court, was
importuned not only to press for the eviction of the Dutch from Lewis
and a diplomatic guarantee that the Dutch would respect the exclusion
zone when fishing off the Scottish coasts, but also to seek the
indefinite postponement of the proposed association of adventurers and
an immediate halt to all schemes to plant Englishmen or other strangers
within any fishing area of Scotland.	 Strict demarcation was to be
observed between inshore and deep sea fishing, Scots who became
involved in the latter process were to land their catches at Scottish
ports.	 Other deep sea fishermen were to be offered no marketing
facilities within Scotland and were to be exhorted to follow the
practice of the Dutch in processing and packaging their catches on
board the busses.
Conversely, the powerful lobby within official circles in
England was intent on expediting the common fishing. 	 As the precursor
to opening up access to Scottish territorial waters, the king was
encouraged to dispense with statutory restrictions, as applicable to
Englishmen, which prohibited strangers from fishing within the Scottish
exclusion zone or marketing their catches directly through Scottish
ports.	 He was also to purchase the isle of Lewis forthwith.	 To
overcome the reluctance of the native fishing community to engage in
deep sea fishing, the Scottish establishment was to be held to account
to build, equip and provision forty busses.
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The initial round of negotiations between the commissioners
for Scotland and their counterparts for England and Ireland commenced
amicably at the end of September 1630.	 However, both sides had
markedly different objectives albeit they were both sympathetic to the
Crown.	 The commissioners for Scotland were cognizant of the
deliberations on the common fishing during the recent Convention of
Estates and were not impervious to the propaganda of the royal burghs
which persistently identified the preservation of the privileges of the
native fishing community with the national interest. 	 Hence, they were
resolved to maintain the exclusion zone for inshore fishing, although
they were prepared to concede and select suitable landing places as
well as sites for magazines and storehouses to facilitate English
participation in deep sea bussing off the Scottish coasts.
Their counterparts, however, being exclusively English
officials and courtiers, appointed by and answerable only to Charles,
were determined to promote the common fishing to sustain the king's
claims to sovereignty around as within the British Isles. 	 Hence, the
association of adventurers was to have unrestricted and exclusive
access to the territorial waters around the British Isles. 	 Given that
the viability of the common fishing turned upon access to Scottish
waters, they were prepared, if necessary, to rely solely upon the
king's prerogative for access to inshore as well as deep sea fishings
off the Scottish coasts.	 Nevertheless, in order to mollify the
nationalist interpretation the Scots applied to their negotiating
commission, the English commissioners agreed that the adventurers were
to observe the separate laws of Scotland as of England and Ireland;
accepted that Scottish adventurers natularised in England should enjoy
the same rights as English adventurers who became denizens of Scotland;
and affirmed that the king in no way intended 'to take away or derogat
from the particular and personall grants and rights of anie of his
subjects whois lawes and liberties he purposeth to mainteane'.
Nonetheless, the customary privileges of the royal burghs were glossed
over, the only concession being that the king would respect their
standing rights and not strain his prerogative when creating new burghs422
to develop the fishing industry in the western isles.	 But, above all,
the English commissioners remained adamant that the corporate structure
and the other specifications for the common fishing enunciated in the
king's missive to the Convention of Estates must be honoured and
implemented: it being the duty of the Scottish commissioners, no less
than themselves, 'not to question, but to advance so important a work'.
Accordingly, the Scottish commissioners were entreated to secure 'more
ample and full power' from their scheduled meeting with the Privy
Council at the outset of November to ensure that the  king's will
prevailed.
17
Further pressure to expedite negotiations along the lines
advocated by the English commissioners was exerted by Charles, himself.
Writing on 12 October, in anticipation of the scheduled meeting between
the Scots commissioners, the Privy Council and the committee of review
appointed by the Estates, Charles attempted to allay nationalist fears
that the common fishing would prove detrimental to Scotland.	 He
reassured the native fishing community that the venture was not
intended to restrict 'any of your ancient priviledges nor benefits
formerlie enjoyed'.	 He reaffirmed that the venture would prove
particularly beneficial to Scottish trade and shipping.	 Hence, it was
imperative that the commissioners for Scotland on their return to Court
had 'an absolute power to conclude', adding in a personal postscript
that he conceived the common fishing to be 'a work of so great good to
both my kingdomes' that the furthering or hindering of the venture
'will ather oblige or disoblige me more then anie one bussines that hes
happened in my tyme'.	 Over the next few weeks, councillors not noted
for their diligent attendance were exhorted to turn up at the scheduled
discussions between the Scottish commissioners, the Privy Council and
the committee of review in order to advance the king's designs for the
common fishing.18
The entreaties of the English commissioners and the
exhortations of the king notwithstanding, the meeting between the
Scottish commissioners, the Privy Council and the committee of review423
scheduled for 3 November was entirely taken up by reports on the
initial round of negotiations at Court.	 Discussions on the conduct
and content of future negotiations were deferred until 8 November and
then, after a cursory exchange of views, for another three days to
permit wider consultations within the political nation and to allow
each estate to consider further 'how the generall fishings may be
undertakin and ordoured with least harme and greatest benefit' for
Scotland.	 Nevertheless, leading officials and councillors remained
adamant that the outcome of these deliberations should be accorded
royal approval.	 Hence, the negotiating commission was recalled and
refashioned on 11 November.	 Its composition was increased from seven
to eight with the addition of another leading official - Morton, the
treasurer.	 Traquhair having just been appointed joint
treasurer-depute, he was succeeded as representative of the nobility by
John Stewart, the recently created earl of Carrick (who was, in turn,
to be replaced by Archibald, Lord Lorne, before the next round of
negotiations commenced the following spring).	 The interests of the
gentry were entrusted to another advocate, Mr George Fletcher, who
replaced Mr James Robertoun.	 The royal burghs continued to be served
by their lobbyist at Court, Mr John Hay.	 At the same time, the
refashioned commission was given absolute power 'to conferre and treate
in all and everie thing that may concern the intendit associatioun'.
Nevertheless, the articles giving the refashioned commission
absolute power to conclude, which were ratified by the whole Privy
Council on 12 November, were only drawn up after extensive
deliberations with the committee of review appointed by the Estates.
In turn, having canvassed opinion within the political nation, the
committee of review was able to exert sufficient political muscle to
ensure that national interests were accorded priority over the king's
British aspirations.	 Thus, the refashioned commission was mandated
that nothing was to be done or concluded during the next round of
negotiations at Court which could be construed as 'prejudiciall or
derogatorie to the lawes, liberteis and priviledges of this kingdome
and crowne thairofi .	 In effect, while appearing to accede to pressure424
from the Court for a speedy resolution of negotiations, the Privy
Council was persuaded that the refashioned commission should insist
upon safeguards for the national interest, particularly for the welfare
of the native fishing community.	 Concessions to the English were to
be qualified.
Accordingly, the midline division separating Scottish and
English territorial waters around the British Isles was to be
maintained.	 Englishmen were to have no rights to fish within Scottish
territorial waters unless members of the association of adventurers.
Although they were to be allocated sites for magazines and storehouses,
the native fishing community was to retain first claim on the most
commodious locations.	 Indeed, the royal burghs remained adamant that
the English should not be allowed to establish plantations in any of
the northern or western isles.	 They were to be permitted to locate
magazines and storehouses on the east coast, south of Buchan Ness but
outwith Aberdeen, on condition the royal burghs were licensed to
develop the fishing centres designated for Lewis. 	 While the
twenty-eight mile exclusion zone was still to remain  in force for the
Dutch and other foreign fishermen, members of the association, whether
natives of England and Ireland or naturalised subjects, were to be
allowed to fish up to fourteen miles off the Scottish mainland. But
again, the royal burghs were resolved that if the English were to be
allowed to fish around the western as well as the northern isles, the
Scots should be given access to the pilchard fishing between England
and Ireland.	 English members of the association settling in Scotland
were debarred from fishing within this redrawn exclusion zone other
than to take fresh fish for their own domestic consumption.	 Likewise,
these English settlers were only to buy fish, victuals and other
necessities at Scottish markets as would suffice for their own
sustenance.	 Nor were they allowed to import or export commodities -
other than fish caught by their own boats. While any member of the
association could land and sell fish in all three British dominions,
fish landed in Scotland by Englishmen were to be subject to the same
ground rents and duties paid by the native fishing community and425
subject to the same customs duties if subsequently exported. 	 Scottish
members of the association were to enjoy reciprocal facilities  in
England and Ireland, but no privilege granted to the association was to
prejudice the liberty currently enjoyed by the native fishing community
to sell fish throughout the British Isles.	 Furthermore, the
proportional commitment of the Scots to the proposed association was
not to be defined or limited to allow for future expansion, 'according
as our abilities sall fra tyme to tyme increase'.	 To preserve and
guarantee separate national interests, common councils were to be
established in both kingdoms as governing bodies for the provincial
associations.	 However, it was conceded that differences between
provincial associations arising from the common fishing off the
Scottish coasts could be settled by either council without recourse to
appeal 19
Finally, the Privy Council was moved to issue a vigorous
assertion of separate national identity, delivering a sharp reprimand
to the style adopted by Charles I in his directives on the common
fishing.
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	On their arrival at Court to resume negotiations, the
refashioned commission was recommended 'To represent to our soverane
lord the prejudice which this kingdome susteanes by suppressing the
name of Scotland in all the infeftments, patents, writts and records
thairof passing under his Majesteis name and confounding the same under
the name of great Britane altho there be no unioun as yitt with
England'.
Such uncharacteristic assertiveness on the part of the Privy
Council can be attributed to resentment simmering since the Union of
the Crowns about the subordination of Scottish to English interests at
Court and, more immediately, to the widespread fears within the
political nation that the common fishing was but the thin edge of a
wedge designed to accomplish the relegation of Scotland to the
provincial status of Ireland.	 Indeed, Irish interests were not
represented directly at the negotiations, but were encompassed within
the remit of the king's English officials who exhibited little concern426
for their advancement.	 The opening up of the fishing around the Irish
coasts served merely as a bargaining counter to secure access to
Scottish territorial waters for the association of adventurers.
Moreover, Ireland supplied a precedent which afforded cold comfort for
Scots expecting to enjoy reciprocal facilities in a common venture with
the English.	 Despite repeated petitioning to secure the same
entitlement to their estates as English settlers, the Scottish planters
in Ulster - even those born after 1603 - were not accorded automatic
recognition as naturalised Irishmen.	 Instead, they had (until 1634)
to apply for expensive certificates of denization from the Crown.
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A further precedent militating against the common fishing
operating amicably as a British venture was the Crown's indifference to
the hostility English vested interests had exhibited towards Scottish
participation in whaling ventures in the waters of the Arctic and North
Atlantic.	 In July 1626, Mr Nathaniel Udward, a leading Scottish
entrepreneur and monopolist, had received a patent allowing himself and
his partners to fish and trade within the seas and territories of
Greenland for the space of twenty-one years, mainly to procure oils for
his soap-works at Leith.	 However, the rival Greenland Company of
London had refused to recognise the validity of his Scottish patent and
over the next three years subjected his ships to continuous harassment
which culminated in the seizure of two whalers, the plundering of their
stores and the incarceration of their crews.	 In November 1629, the
Privy Council had endorsed Udward's claim for £4,000 sterling (£48,000)
compensation on the grounds that the commercial interests of the
kingdom were at stake, specifically the liberty of Scots to engage
peaceably in trade, 'that priviledge which other natiouns doe
promiscuously injoy without controlment'. Despite a suggestion that a
select number of councillors drawn equally from both kingdoms should be
invited to arbitrate, no remedial action was implemented at Court.
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Hence, the Scottish Privy Council was prepared to use the
resumption of negotiations on the common fishing to establish a
constitutional mechanism to ensure that Scottish interests were not427
overlooked at Court.	 The refashioned commission was to press for the
inclusion of at least two Scots, leading officials or courtiers, in all
discussions between Charles I and his English councillors concerning
Scottish affairs - not simply as a matter of protocol but as an
integral aspect in the formulation of policy.	 At the same time, to
focus attention on Scotland's international aspirations as a separate
state, an accompanying instruction was given to the refashioned
commission to remind Charles of the pressing need for diplomatic
overtures to the French Crown to restore and reinvigorate the
traditional privileges enjoyed by the Scottish mercantile community in
France.	 Although the Union of the Crowns had merely compounded not
initiated the gradual erosion of the special relationship between
Scotland and France, the military hostilities and mercantilist
reprisals against the French featured in the king's policy of direct
intervention in the Thirty Years War had all but effaced the commercial
aspects of the "auld alliance".	 Nevertheless, the embargo placed in
February 1628 on the importation of all French goods - to supplement
that of December 1626 on the importation of French wines - had caused
such resentment in Scotland that the Privy Council, following rumours
that English merchants were importing French wines with impunity, began
unilaterally to grant dispensations to Scottish importers from
February 1629.	 Another ten months were to elapse before Charles
countenanced formally the resumption of normal trading relations
between Scotland and France.	 There was no prompt return to normality,
however.	 Scottish trade with France continued to suffer.	 In part
this was self-inflicted, because of the unreliability of the existing
Scottish factors who, much to the chagrin of the royal burghs, were
more concerned with their own personal profit and advancement in French
society than enhancing the prosperity of their own mercantile
community.	 More pertinently, the king, despite his reputed concern
for maritime defences, had taken no effective action to check the
discouraging losses inflicted on Scottish shipping by the piratical
activities of the notorious Dunkirkers - hardly an auspicious prospect
for Scottish participation in the common  fishing. 23428
But, above all, in adopting an assertive posture towards the
Court, the Privy Council was responding to the growing cohesion of the
disaffected element manifested in the Convention of 1630 and reflected
in the composition of the committee appointed by the Estates to review
the initial round of negotiations on the common fishing. 	 Despite the
inclusion of bishops and of lairds well disposed to the Court - such as
Thornton, the fiscal entrepreneur, and Lockhart of Lee, a prominent
militant among the gentry supporting the Revocation Scheme - the
absence of leading officials and councillors had allowed the commission
to come under the sway of the nobles, most of whom had been associated
with dissent since the parliament of 1621.	 Indeed, of the seven
nobles on the committee, all but Carrick had declined to ratify the
Five Articles of Perth and at least three - Rothes, LoudRn and
Balmerino - had been influential in the Convention of 16125 in moving
the Estates to defer, amend and occasionally obstruct the king's
ill-conceived proposals for administrative, financial and judicial
reform.	 Since 1626, Rothes and Loudii had been in the van of the
nobility opposed to the Revocation Scileme. 	 During the Convention of
1630, Loudoln voiced the protests of the nobility against any official
moves to 4Dedite the redistribution of teinds prior to the completion
of valuations and the full payment of compensation as specified in the
legal decreet of 1629.	 Balmerino, acting as spokesman for the lay
patrons and titulars, criticised the bishops for exacting an oath of
conformity from all entrants to the ministry since the summer of 1626,
claiming that the exaction was not only an infringement of their right
to present any qualified entrant to parishes under their patronage but
also 'the transgres of ane standing law'.	 For the only oath on
entrants warranted by parliament, that of 1612, pre-dated the
acceptance of the Five Articles of Perth by six years.	 Moreover, the
Five Articles, following their controversial ratification in 1621, were
deemed 'things indifferent' not just by the presbyterian faction among
the clergy, but by many nobles, gentry and burgesses for whom
conformity was a matter of conscience not doctrinal necessity.
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Although the issues of teind redistribution and episcopal429
enforcement of conformity were undoubtedly contentious and 'lang
debaitit', neither was allowed to provoke constitutional confrontation
with the Crown.	 Indeed, adroit political management, principally by
Menteith with the support of other leading officials, minimised the
opportunities for the disaffected element to make common cause during
the Convention of 1630.	 Thus, a composite motion designed to appease
both titulars and heritors obviated prolonged rancour over teind
redistribution and ensured the ratification of the legal decreet. 	 The
disputed validity of the oath of conformity was referred to the Privy
Council for further consideration and thereby effectively shelved.
While the gentry were allowed to present their itemised programme of
reforms for the improved conduct of government in Scotland, the
inclusion of 'some greivances against ye Bischops', on behalf of the
presbyterian faction within the Kirk, was ruled out of order. 	 In the
event, the main stimulus to solidarity among the disaffected element
was provided by the royal burghs through their appeal to the national
interest to justify their sectarian opposition to the king's economic
policies.	 Hence, their claim that monopolies and patents were an
unsupportable burden on the nation and should be recalled elicited
concerted support among the Estates, particularly when their attack was
directed against the patent for tanning leather granted to John,
Lord Erskine, eldest son of the earl of Mar, the recently retired
treasurer.	 In contrast, their protests that ordinary as well as
extraordinary taxes were assessed and collated inequitably were echoed
separately by temporal lords and a section of the gentry. 25
Erskine's patent, which was granted in 1620 following
extensive discussions between central government and the royal burghs,
was intended to promote the reform of leather manufacture over the next
thirty-one years.	 In return for an expected outlay of £20,000 to
improve the tanning process and to establish skilled workers brought in
from England as instructors for the native craftsmen, Erskine was
conceded the right to exact a stamp-duty on every hide of tanned
leather marketed in Scotland, whether worked in the burghs and towns or
imported.	 This stamp-duty was set at a groat (four shillings) for the430
first twenty-one years of the patent, falling to one shilling
thereafter, Erskine being equipped with vigorous powers of enforcement
to prevent evasion of stamp-duty by native craftsmen or importers.
Although seventeen skilled workers were brought in from England during
1620, the Convention of Royal Burghs remained unconvinced about the
superiority of the new tanning process and regarded the stamp-duty as
excessive.	 Hence, Erskine's patent became a perennial cause of
complaint.	 However, after the complaint of the burgess estate had
been taken up by gentry in the Convention of 1625, the Crown, when
affirming that the patent was to stand on 20 April 1626, acknowledged
that trials should be conducted under the auspices of the Privy Council
to establish the superiority of the new process over traditional
tanning methods.	 This task was not accomplished until March 1629,
Poinurev
when a panel of master craftsmen (cordiner pronounced in favour of
Erskine. The hides tanned by the new pro? ess were deemed 'als good
tanned ledder and wrought at als easie pryces as anie tanned ledder
brought frame England'.	 Thereafter, Erskine brought a series of
prosecutions against refractory native craftsmen who adhered to
traditional methods and refused to adopt the new tanning process. 26
Nonetheless, complaints continued about the excessive rates
of stamp-duty.	 Moreover, as the lists of the prosecuted bear out, the
manufacture of leather was not confined to the royal burghs, but was
practised in most towns throughout Scotland.	 In turn, the exaction of
stamp-duty affected not only the prosperity of the craftsmen and
merchants in the royal burghs, but also squeezed the profit margins of
the tanners in rural communities, undercutting their capacity to pay
rent to their landlords.	 Hence, when the burgesses again referred
Erskine's patent to the consideration of the Estates, they were
accorded a sympathetic hearing by the members of the landed classes
present at the Convention of 1630.	 Although the Estates recommended
further review rather than the outright recall of the patent, Erskine
was placed on the defensive.	 Despite his dogged prosecution of
refractory native craftsmen over the next five years, the royal burghs
were now assured of substantial landed backing for their complaints431
against the continuance of his patent.	 By May 1634, the Crown was
prepared to concede that Erskine's patent would not be renewed. 	 His
exaction of stamp duty was again the subject of official scrutiny in
June 1635, though a further six years were to elapse before the
Covenanters terminated Erskine's patent and all other contentious
monopolies as prejudicial to the national interest.
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Notwithstanding their eventual termination in 1641,
monopolies in general and Erskine's patent in particular had a more
immediate constitutional significance - complementing the contribution
of the common fishing to the cohesion of the disaffected element  in the
Convention of 1630.	 In response to the specific demands of the royal
burghs for their recall, the efficacy of monopolies was referred to the
scrutiny of select committees.
28 As in the case of the common
fishing, deliberations between the select committees and the royal
burghs brought into prominence the issue of the national interest as
affected by the economic policies of the Crown.	 Moreover, service on
the select committees brought together a hard core of activists
inclined as much towards dissent as compliance with the Court. 	 Of the
eleven nobles, twelve lairds and seven bishops who served on the
committees scrutinising monopolies, all but three (one noble and two
lairds) were involved in the committee stages of the common fishing.
Conversely, of the seven nobles, nine lairds and two bishops appointed
to the committee of review following their involvement in the committee
stages of the common fishing, all but seven (three nobles, three lairds
and one bishop) had served on the committees scrutinising monopolies.
While the select committees for both the common fishing and the
monopolies drew extensively upon the services of eight out of the ten
bishops and seventeen out of the thirty-four lairds attending the
Convention, of greater import was the involvement of only sixteen out
of the forty-eight nobles and the total absence of leading officials.
In effect, the select committees became uncensored outlets for dissent,
affording the disaffected among the nobility free rein to organise and
exchange views with the gentry as well as treat with the burgesses.
Only Balmerino among the leaders of  the disaffected element appointed432
to the committee of review had not supplemented involvement in the
committee stages of the common fishing with service on the committees
scrutinising monopolies.29
In short, by sustaining and propagating the distinction
between the policies of the Crown and the national interest, the select
committees appointed by the Estates during the Convention of 1630
actuated a decisive shift in the political equilibrium, away from
compliance with the Court towards collusion among the disaffected: a
shift which was consolidated by the discussions at the outset of
November between the Privy Council and the committee of review after
the initial negotiations on the common fishing at Court. 	 Nonetheless,
while the Privy Council accepted the need to safeguard the national
interest as advocated by the committee, leading officials were still
determined to exercise circumspection rather than countenance
confrontation.	 Hence, the Court was not informed until 23 December,
six weeks after the conclusion of their discussions with the committee
of review, that the commission for Scotland had been refashioned and
the commissioners despatched south with instructions as 'with absolute
power to conclude that great worke of associatioun in the mater of
fishing'.	 No specific or binding reference was made to the nature of
these instructions - as safeguards for the national interest. 30
Moreover, once negotiations resumed at Court in the spring of
1631, the leading officials in the refashioned commission did not
interpret their instructions as binding them to insist upon the
safeguard specified in the discussions between the Privy Council and
the committee of review the previous November.	 Indeed, they were
prepared from the outset to defer to the wishes of the English
commissioners in redrawing Scottish territorial limits.	 On 31 March,
the Privy Council received a letter from the new commissioners for
Scotland disclosing that their English counterparts regarded even a
fourteen mile exclusion zone around the Scottish coasts as excessive.
Being intent on demonstrating to their English counterparts that their
desire was only to reserve sufficient waters to ensure the subsistence433
of the native fishing community, they asked the Privy Council to
provide detailed information on all firths, lochs, bays and isles that
should remain the preserve of the Scottish fishing community. 	 This
task was passed on to the royal burghs who were given until 20 April to
come up with 'ane perfyte answer'.	 Despite protests that they should
be excused on the grounds of 'the hurtful consequences that may follow
thairupon if the English sail be permitted to fishe in the reserved
waters', the burghs did make a belated submission on 21 April.
The burghs were insistent that the redrawn exclusion zone
should still be adhered to, claiming that if strangers were allowed to
fish within fourteen miles of the Scottish coasts, 'this countrie sail
suffer utter ruine'.	 Nevertheless, they did offer a hostage to
fortune in subsequent negotiations by apportioning the fourteen mile
exclusion zone into four distinct sectors - St Abb's Head in
Berwickshire to Redhead in Angus; from Redhead via Buchan Ness in
Aberdeenshire to Duncansbay Head in Caithness; from Duncansbay Head via
Faraid Head in Strathnaver and the seas around Orkney and Shetland to
Stoer of Assynt in Sutherland; from Stoer of Assynt via the Butt of
Lewis and the seas around the western isles to the Mull of Kintyre and
thence to the Solway Sands via the Mull of Galloway.	 However, the
Privy Council deemed these reserved sectors 'to be of too large ane
extent', preferring to secure the king's contentment by retrenching and
restricting the 'universalitie' of the exclusion zone advocated by the
burghs.	 Accordingly, the reserved sectors were redefined as those
waters fourteen miles 'of suche coasts of this kingdome as ar weill
peopled and where the countrie people lives most by fishing without the
whilk they could not possiblie subsist nor yitt be able to pay thair
masters thair fermes and dewteis'.	 Such redefinition, however, did
not lead to drastic revision of the exclusion zone as apportioned by
the burghs.	 Separate sectors were created from Redhead to Buchan Ness
and from Buchan Ness to Duncansbay Head; and the waters from the Mull
of Galloway to the Solway Sands were separated from the rest of the
western seaboard.	 The one notable amendment occurred to this reserved
sector on the western seaboard between the Stoer of Assynt and the434
Mull of Galloway.	 Whereas the burghs claimed the seas around the
western isles, the Privy Council sought only to reserve the waters on
the east side of the isles to the adjacent mainland - that is, the
Minches.
In order to demonstrate that they, no less than the burghs,
were sensitive to the underlying need to protect the interests of the
native fishing community, the councillors submitted both proposals to
Court.	 The commissioners for Scotland were told to exercise their
discretion on which version of the reserved sectors was to be presented
to the king and their English counterparts.	 At the same time, the
commissioners were asked to bear in mind that if bussing had been an
established aspect of Scottish fishing ventures, inshore fishing around
the Scottish coasts would still have been reserved 'for the use and
benefite of the countrie people'.	 Moreover, it could not be sustained
that any Dutch or other strangers had ever fished within the reserved
sectors as defined by the Council.	 However, the king was unimpressed
with either set of proposals apportioning the redrawn exclusion zone
into reserved sectors.	 On 10 July 1631, he informed the Privy Council
that he could not conceive of the necessity for so many reserved
sectors.	 While he was willing that the Scottish inshore fishermen
should have reserved 'all such fischings without which they cannot
weill subsist, and which they of themselffis have and doe fullie
fisch', he was not willing to have any waters reserved 'which may be a
hinderance' to the success of the common fishing.
In effect, the reserved sectors necessary for the subsistence
of the native fishing community were redefined by the king and remitted
to Scotland for further specification.	 Charles was not prepared to
accept the universal reservation advocated by the royal burghs of the
waters fourteen miles from mainland shores; nor the modified
reservation proposed by the Privy Council of the inshore waters
adjacent to areas of dense settlement where the inhabitants were
largely dependent on fishing.	 Instead, he wanted the partial
reservation of inshore waters, only those sectors fished habitually435
and continuously by the natives where their struggle to secure a
livelihood would not impair the commercial prospects of the association
of adventurers.
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When the specification of reserved sectors was duly remitted
from the Privy Council at the end of July 1631, the Convention of Royal
Burghs was adamant that the implementation of a partial rather than a
universal reservation of inshore fishing reinforced the duty of the
Scottish commissioners to give priority to the subsistence of the
native fishing community during the negotiations at Court.	 The Privy
Council, for its part, was not averse to the Convention taking
extensive soundings as to which sectors should be reserved, agreeing on
31 July that the royal burghs could have until 22 September to submit
their specific recommendations for a partial reservation.	 The
Convention utilised the intervening two months to mobilise support not
only among the royal burghs but among interested nobles and gentry,
particularly those landlords anxious to maintain the value of the rents
and duties they derived from fishing settlements outwith the royal
burghs.	 In addition, members of the landed classes who had served on
the committee of review were determined to ensure that the Privy
Council adhered to the spirit if not the letter of their discussions in
November to safeguard the national interest.
Undoubtedly, the propaganda generated by the royal burghs -
tantamount to a seventeenth century cry of "it's Scotland's fish" -
drew upon the public resentment aroused by the Crown's sponsorship of
the association of adventurers at the expense of the native fishing
community.	 Since the prime fishing grounds around the British Isles
were off the Scottish coasts, there was a general antipathy to English
adventurers being conceded any greater privileges than Dutch or French
fishermen. More especially, the opening up of Scottish territorial
waters to English adventurers offered no reciprocal benefits to the
Scots whereas the incursion of busses into inshore waters threatened
the depletion of fishing reserves and the supply of fish to local
markets.	 Furthermore, English adventurers landing and marketing their436
catches at English ports were not obliged to pay the same duties and
customs imposed on Scottish merchants selling fish in English markets
which had been landed at Scottish ports.
Accordingly, a powerful lobby drawn from the nobility and
gentry as well as the royal burghs informed the Privy Council at Perth
on 22 September 1631, of the absolute necessity of reserving the
inshore fishing, preferably in fourteen mile sectors, in the firths of
Lothian, Moray and Dumbarton - respectively, the existing sectors on
the east coast between St Abb's Head and Redhead, as between Buchan
Ness and Duncansbay Head; and that on the western seaboard restricted
to the waters between the Mulls of Kintyre and Galloway.	 It was also
deemed imperative to reserve the fourteen mile sector between Redhead
and Buchan Ness - in part to secure the livelihood of the local
fishing community but, above all, as in the reserved firths, to protect
the salmon fishing - 'ane of the most pryme native commodities of this
land' - from the encroachment of busses into local estuaries. 	 The
nobility and gentry were content to leave further reservations around
the Scottish coasts, particularly around the western and northern isles
to the discretion of the royal burghs, adding only that the Scottish
commissioners should press the Crown for compensation for allowing
English members of the proposed association to fish within Scottish
territorial waters.
The following day, 23 September 1631, the royal burghs made a
supplementary submission to the Privy Council stressing the need to
reserve the salmon fishing in and around the western and northern
isles.	 In addition, the main sea lochs bordering the Minches were to
be reserved for the native fishing community with the recommendation
that no bussing should be allowed within the Minches or from the Butt
of Lewis to Faraid Head in Strathnaver.	 Reservation of the sea lochs
in the Inner Hebrides and on the adjacent mainland was left to the
determination of the Crown as was the fishing around Orkney and
Shetland, with the recommendation that the fourteen mile sector be
upheld around the northern isles.	 The Privy Council in turn, after437
informing the king that the royal burghs had relinquished the
universality of their former claims on inshore waters, went on to
endorse the revised specification submitted by the burghs and their
allies among the nobility and gentry. 	 Unless the partial reservation
encompassed the three firths and the sector between Redhead and Buchan
Ness, the subsistence of the densely populated fishing settlements on
the adjacent mainland would be imperilled, the salmon fishing
devastated and the trade of the country much impaired. 32
Despite the Privy Council's endorsement of the need for a
partial reservation along the lines suggested at Perth by the burghs
and their allies among the nobility and gentry, Charles was coming
under increasing pressure at Court to minimise the concessions to the
Scottish fishing community in order to attract venture capital for the
common fishing.	 For the English commissioners, having already scaled
down the estimated profits to be gleaned by a deep sea fleet of
two hundred busses from £165,414 sterling (as reported to the
Convention of 1630) to £113,000 sterling (that is, £1,356,000 Scots),
were complaining that no adventurer would risk capital until the
fishing grounds open to the common fishing around the British Isles
were finalised.	 Furthermore, they were pressing Charles to buy out
Seaforth's right to the island of Lewis.	 English members of the
association were then to be accorded exclusive rights, as naturalised
Scotsmen, to exploit the fishing reserves around the western isles and,
as burgesses, to develop the town of Stornoway as a commercial as well
as a fishing centre.33
During the nine months that followed the Perth conference,
the royal burghs were obliged to mount a rearguard action as Charles
intervened personally and frequently in the negotiations at Court
between the commissioners of both kingdoms.	 In response to the king's
manifest intent to diminish the reserved sectors, the burghs modified
their demands with respect to the sector between Redhead and Buchan
Ness, seeking only the reservation of four to five miles of inshore
waters along this forty mile coastline.	 They made a further438
concession that only the major not the majority of sea lochs bordering
the Minches were to be reserved for the native fishing community.
However, the burghs were demonstrably aggrieved that Seaforth - a
regular intelligence contact for the English commissioners, not just on
the fishing reserves around the western isles but on the political
manoeuvring within Scotland to discourage the common fishing - had
still not evicted the Dutch from Lewis and that German as well as
Dutch fishermen had taken advantage of the protracted negotiations at
Court to encroach within Scottish territorial waters with impunity.
In a last despairing attempt to reach an accommodation with the Crown
as negotiations dragged on into the summer of 1632, the burghs informed
Hay - now Sir John of Lands (subsequently of Bafo), who was still their
lobbyist at Court as well as commissioner for Scotland - that they were
prepared to advance the common fishing by providing 'such ane competent
number of bushes as shall proportionably fall to their part'. 	 In
return, the three firths of Lothian, Moray and Dumbarton were to be
reserved for the native fishing community.	 They also signified their
assent to English and Irish members of the association fishing freely
elsewhere within Scottish inshore waters provided that the annual
bussing season did not commence before 24 June on the east coast nor
until 1 September on the western seaboard.	 No bussing was to be
allowed in the Minches or between the Butt of Lewis and Faraid Head in
Strathnaver.	 Moreover, English and Irish members of the association
were to refrain from salmon fishing and were not to engage in any
other commercial pursuit within Scotland.
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Charles, however, having served notice on 1 May 1632 of his
intention to raise a summons of improbation and reduction to secure
Lewis for the Crown, was little inclined to compromise.	 The order to
Seaforth to evict the Dutch from Lewis was made binding on all other
landowners in the western isles on 15 July.	 Four days later, Charles
conceded that the salmon fishing should be wholly reserved.
Nevertheless, when he came to proclaim the inshore waters reserved for
the native fishing community on 31 July, the three firths were whittled
down to two - that of Forth and Clyde, alias Lothian and Dumbarton, the439
reserved sectors from St Abb's Head to Redhead and between the Mulls of
Kintyre and Galloway.	 No restrictions were placed on bussing outwith
these two firths.	 The only gesture towards conservation was a warning
against unseasonable fishing within the reserved sector on the west
coast.	 For, the taking of fry from the waters off Ballintrae in
Ayrshire was deleterious not only to the stocks of herring in adjacent
Irish waters but ultimately, to their abundance throughout the western
seaboard.
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Charles did make one other - albeit cosmetic - concession to
appease Scottish sensibilities.	 Following the conclusion of the
protracted negotiations at Court between the commissioners of both
kingdoms on 19 July 1632, two charters were drawn up incorporating the
general association for the common fishing (hereafter the Society) as
the 'Counsell and Commonitie of his Majesteis dominions of
Great Britane and Ireland' under the perpetual protection of the Crown.
Both charters were identical in substance but differed in the ordering
of the king's titles.	 According to the instructions issued by Charles
twelve days later when despatching both charters north for
authentication by his Scottish administration, the one in which his
title as king of Scotland preceded that as king of England was to have
the impress of the great seal of Scotland placed above that of England.
(In the other, protocol was reversed in favour of English ordering and
authentication.)	 Notwithstanding such equitable considerations and
despite his accompanying claim that 'we have had a speciall care to
preserve the dignity of that our antient kingdome', the charters of
incorporation paid scant regard to the safeguards for the national
interest specified in the discussions during November 1630 between the
Privy Council and the committee of review following the initial round
of negotiations at Court.	 No attempt was made to preserve the
exclusive privileges of the royal burghs in the marketing of fish, to
distinguish Scottish from English territorial waters or to erect
separate councils to control the fishing off the coasts of Scotland and
England.
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Indeed, the format of incorporation of the Society, which all
members and their employees were bound to accept under oath, adhered to
the corporate structure outlined to the Convention of Estates in
July 1630 - namely, a confederation of adventurers organised into
self-financing provincial associations and subject to the common
regulation of a council.	 Of the one hundred and fifty-two adventurers
enrolled as the original members of the Society, twelve were designated
councillors, the remaining one hundred and forty composed the commonity
of fellows.	 As the governing body, the council of twelve was
appointed by and removable at the pleasure of the Crown. 	 The
commonity was elected for life but fellows were removable by the Crown
or the council given just (but otherwise undefined) cause. 	 As well as
regulating membership of the commonity, the council was warranted to
licence provincial associations and to resolve differences arising
between them; to make statutes and ordinances for the conduct of the
common fishing and the fishing trade in general which were enforcable
by fines and imprisonment; and to issue specific directives to promote
better government and speedy administration among the provincial
associations.	 Furthermore, every provincial association was to elect
four judges who were empowered to issue local ordinances as well as
resolve internal disputes.	 However, the judges were removable at the
will and pleasure of the council which also served as a court of
appeal in the event of false or partial decisions or undue delay in the
hearing of cases by the provincial judges.	 To settle controversies at
sea within and between provincial associations, the masters, merchants
and principal factors to each fleet were to elect four judges from
among their number prior to sailing who were to serve as an arbitration
panel and issue administrative orders for the conduct of the fleet at
sea.	 Their appointment was valid only for the duration of each
fishing voyage and their decisions were open to review by the council.
Within this confederated structure, Scottish interests were
to be sustained through equal partnership - that is, by Scots being
allocated half of the offices of the Society.	 Thus, six of the
council of twelve were always to be drawn from and charged to441
represent 'the Scottish natioun'; the other six chosen to represent
'the English natioun' were to be of English or Irish descent. The
attendance of at least six councillors, three from each nation, was
necessary before the council could resolve disputes between provincial
associations.	 Two of the four judges within each provincial
association and likewise two on each arbitration panel during fishing
voyages were required to be Scots.	 Moreover, seventy fellows on the
original commonity of one hundred and forty were Scots.	 Although new
adventurers admitted to the Society were not required to be drawn in
equal numbers from each nation, entrance was restricted to natives and
denizens of Scotland or England and Ireland.	 The enrolment of new
adventurers, whether by the council or by provincial judges, required
the attendance of at least one official from each nation.
Notwithstanding the reservation of the salmon fishing and the
inshore fishing within the "firths" of Lothian and Dumbarton, the
charters of incorporation contained specific inducements both to
pressurise and attract support from the native fishing community as
well as individual Scottish adventurers. 	 In order to consolidate its
anticipated dominance of inshore as well as deep sea fishing around the
British Isles and to complement its right to legislate and dispense
justice in all matters affecting the fishing trade, the Society was
granted an unconditional monopoly over the trade in fish throughout the
British Isles, whether caught by members or by native fishermen within
the reserved sectors or imported.	 The Society was awarded further
military, judicial and fiscal concessions.	 All members - councillors,
fellows of the commonity and their employees - were exempt from
military or naval service (as were their boats) unless commanded by a
special warrant from the Crown.	 All members were also exempt from
service upon jury or assize during fishing seasons and from the
payments of all tithes, taxes and fiscal dues except ground rents for
magazines and stores, landing dues for fish packed and preserved
aboard ship and customs arising from overseas trading in fish.37
Scottish participation in the common fishing remained far442
from enthusiastic, however.	 The six Scots appointed to the council of
twelve were all commissioners for Scotland in the negotiations at Court
who had helped draw up the charters of incorporation. 	 Indeed, only
two commissioners were not appointed councillors - Hamilton, who was
currently engaged with the British expeditionary force on the
continent, and Lorne, the latecomer to the negotiations who was elected
a fellow of the commonity.	 Of the other sixty-nine Scots elected to
the commonity, all but twenty were burgesses.	 Moreover, the
involvement of the burgesses was not so much a measure of their greater
commitment to the common fishing as a testimony to their determination
to maintain their interest in the fishing trade now that marketing was
to be monopolised by the Society.	 A more telling indicator of
Scottish commitment can be gleaned from the members of the lay estates
involved in the committee stages on the common fishing during the
Convention of 1630.	 Of the fifty laymen so involved (the clerical
estate can be discounted since no cleric became an adventurer), only
thirteen (four nobles, two lairds and seven burgesses) were elected
to the commonity.	 Of the twenty-six laymen on the committee of review
appointed by the Estates at the end of the Convention, only six (three
nobles and burgesses) were elected to the commonity.	 Only Loudp
among the prominent members of the disaffected element became an
adventurer.
The lack of Scottish enthusiasm for the common fishing was
further in evidence when the Privy Council, having scanned the charters
of incorporation on 7 September 1632, decided that all other
councillors in addition to the fifteen present should be summoned
individually to attend detailed discussions on the charters' contents
on 17 October.	 The committee of review was also invited to attend.
But only twenty-one councillors - less than half the membership -
actually turned up.	 Apart from the nobles, among whom the
disaffected were to the fore, most of the committee of review failed to
put in an appearance.	 However, the leading officials involved in the
negotiations at Court were present.	 Their influence over proceedings
sufficed to have their report on their own conduct as commissioners for443
Scotland approved and commended.	 In like manner, their appointment as
Scottish councillors for the Society secured the ratification of the
entire contents of the charters of incorporation.	 No formal attempt
would appear to have been made to censure the commissioners of
Scotland for their subordination of the national interest to the
aspirations of the king and their English counterparts. 	 Nor was any
attempt apparently made to reject or amend the charters of
incorporation.	 Nevertheless, the contents of the charters did afford
the disaffected element specific guidance on the imposition of
constitutional checks on absentee monarchy.	 For, Charles had insisted
that the Crown must ratify all statutes, laws and ordinances
promulgated by the council of the Society before they attained the
force of law to ensure that they 'be not contrarie nor derogatorie to
the statuts, Laws, Liberteis or acts of parliament of his Majesteis
kingdomes'.	 In turn, the council was to review the decisions and
ordinances of the provincial judges to ensure that they 'be not
repugnant and contrarie to the lawes, acts of parliament nor statutes
of his Majesteis kingdomes'.	 This emphasis on the need to uphold the
statutes, laws and liberties of the kingdom was to resurface as an
integral component of the National Covenant of 1638, in which the
disaffected element were to place their trust in constitutional
assemblies, not Crown or councils, to safeguard the national interest
in both Kirk and State. 38
Neither the authentication of the charters nor the
ratification of their contents, far less their constitutional
ramifications, were of primary concern to Charles I.	 His most
pressing objective, as borne out by the instructions for the
advancement 'of the fischingis of Great Britain and Ireland' which he
despatched north with Menteith (now Strathearn) on 17 August 1632, was
to make the common fishing a practicality by the outset of the herring
season in June 1633.	 Thus, the Privy Council was recommended to
reactivate an enactment of James IV which had been promulgated in 1493
to promote the building, equipping and operating of busses in the
forlorn hope of absorbing the perennial pool of landless labour in deep444
sea fishing.	 This enactment was now to serve as an exhortation to the
nobles and gentry as well as the royal burghs to participate  in
Scottish provincial associations.	 But, above all, the main thrust of
the king's instructions was geared to securing unrestricted access to
the fishing reserves around the western isles for English adventurers
whose provincial associations were to be encouraged to establish
fishing bases on sites bordering the Minches.	 Hence, the Privy
Council was ordered to ensure that all members and employees of the
Society, as well as the native fishing community, 'repairing ather to
the Yles, loches, or seas of that of kingdome for fisching in these
places wher they ar lawfullie authorized, be kyndlie and well used and
by all meanes encouraged to prosecute the said work'.	 Accordingly,
bands of surety were to be exacted from landlords and chiefs on the
western isles and adjacent mainland to indemnify all members and
employees of the Society, whether engaged in fishing or locating
plantations, against harassment and oppression by tenants or other
clansmen as against forced payments of unwarranted or exorbitant ground
rents and landing dues. 39
In turn, the Privy Council used their meeting with the
committee of review, on 17 October 1632, not only to discuss the
outcome of the negotiations at Court and the contents of the charters
of incorporation, but to mobilise support for the prompt implementation
of the king's instructions for the advancement of the common fishing.
Hence, the five burgesses present with the committee of review were
asked directly 'to condescend upon these parts and places in the Yles
and continent whose plantatioun for the fishing would be most useful
and necessar'.	 The five sought to delay their answer until wider
consultations could take place not just among the royal burghs but with
all interested nobles and gentry - the obvious precedent being the
meeting at Perth the previous year to review the current state of
negotiations at Court on reserved sectors.	 However, with leading
officials firmly in control of proceedings, the burgesses' temporising
manoeuvre was rejected.	 Pressed to nominate the most commodious
locations for fishing bases in the western isles and adjacent mainland,445
they first recounted the Crown's repeated refusal to make adequate
reservation of inshore waters for the native fishing community before
proceeding reluctantly to specify three sea lochs in Lewis and four on
the west coast - the seven were not among the major sea lochs on the
western seaboard which the royal burghs deemed most worthy of
reservation for the native fishing community.	 The burgesses went on
to lament that the number of boats from Scottish ports currently
engaged in inshore fishing was 'far inferior to that which in previous
years went out of these bounds'.	 But they did admit, in
anticipation of the Society's busses making their debut in the coming
herring season, that there were eight 'great shippes' and possibly
fifty-two other boats on the west coast and around sixty vessels of
twenty tonnes or more on the east coast suitable for deep sea
fishing. 40
Moreover, although the royal burghs continued to equate the
vitality of the native fishing industry with the national interest,
their efforts to delay or even postpone the implementation of the
common fishing were undermined insidiously through the defection of
Sir John Hay.	 Instead of defending the interests of the native
fishing community (as instructed by successive Conventions of Royal
Burghs), Hay had used his position at Court, first as a lobbyist, then
as a commissioner for Scotland, to ingratiate himself with the king.
Indeed, not only was Hay one of the six Scots appointed to the council
of twelve, but the despatch of the Society's charters of incorporation
and their return to Court following authentication in Scotland was
entrusted specifically to him.	 On 21 December 1632, he was assigned
the task of ensuring that the royal burghs had at least sixty busses in
readiness for the coming herring season.	 Nine days earlier, Hay had
replaced the late Sir John Hamilton of Magdalens as a privy councillor
and as the Clerk-Register of thP Rai ls	 In this latter capacity, he
inherited responsibility for a diligent search of public  records to
find 'authentik evidences', such as treaties and agreements with
foreign princes, which would demonstrate clearly and incontrovertibly
to neighbouring powers the Crown's imperial right to lordship of the446
seas around the British Isles and the justness of the king's
proceedings in establishing the common fishing.41
Prior to the conclusion of negotiations on the common fishing
and his open defection to the Court, Hay had persuaded Charles to issue
a series of commercial concessions favouring the interests of the
royal burghs, collectively and severally. 	 These concessions were
intended, in part, to compensate the royal burghs for the impending
loss of their exclusive rights in the marketing of fish and, in part,
to promote their acceptance of and participation in the Society of
adventurers.	 Thus, on 31 July 1632, the day on which the charters of
incorporation were despatched north, Charles issued a decreet ratifying
the trading privileges of the merchant guilds and the exclusive
controls over production exercised by the craft guilds not only within
the burghs but in their suburbs and immediate rural hinterland.	 An
accompanying decreet ordered the Privy Council to ensure that all
future erections of dependent burghs did not infringe these privileges.
The Privy Council, in turn, delayed publication of these decreets until
its meeting with the committee of review on 17 October, to secure
support from the royal burghs for the implementation of the common
fishing by June 1633.	 The enforcement of these decreets in the
Exchequer did not commence until 24 November - after the royal burghs
had given an undertaking to have at least sixty busses in readiness for
the coming herring season.
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The proliferation of dependent burghs and, in particular, the
growing involvement of the more prominent burghs of barony in overseas
trade, the traditional preserve of the royal burghs, had become a
regular grievance in their Convention and a frequent subject of
litigation by the outset of Charles' reign. 	 Indeed, as early as
18 October 1627, the king was moved to instruct the Privy Council to
support all legal actions raised by royal burghs against encroachments
on their trading privileges by dependent burghs.	 Nonetheless, the
more prominent burghs of barony continued to engage in overseas trade
and to instigate counter-actions in the Court of Session for the447
suspension of prosecutions by royal burghs 'against anie unfrie
persounes'.	 By July 1630, a year after Hay's appointment as their
lobbyist at Court, the royal burghs had retaliated  by extending his
special remit from a watching brief over the king's designs on the
fishing industry to the blocking of any erection of dependent burghs
prejudicial to their trading privileges.	 Twelve months later, the
royal burghs made a direct overture to the Crown for the suppression of
all commercial encroachments by dependent burghs, appealling to their
'General Charters' of 1364 from David II to maintain their exclusive
right to engage in overseas trade.	 Charles responded eventually on
9 February 1632.	 He instructed the Court of Session to uphold the
rights and privileges of royal burghs in all pending actions against
burghs of barony.	 However, neither this measure nor the general
ratification of their commercial privileges five months later satisfied
the royal burghs.	 For the royal burghs claimed that neglect or
indifference to their interests at Court had caused their carrying
trade to suffer.	 Not only had the involvement of burghs of barony in
overseas trade denied them portage dues which had to be recouped
through increased freight charges, but the persistence of the corn
laws, when the transport of victual was becoming the mainstay of trade
throughout Europe, was deemed 'ane unnecessar restraint'. Above all,
the impending implementation of the common fishing and the transfer to
the Society of their exclusive rights to market fish would deprive the
royal burghs of their most profitable and secure trading commodity.
Moreover, the royal burghs were hardly reconciled to the common
fishing by the formal ratification of their commercial privileges in
the coronation parliament on 28 June 1633.	 In order to secure their
exclusive rights to trade in all staple commodities - other than fish -
at home and abroad, the royal burghs were obliged to expend
1,000 merks (f666 13s 4d), 'for favour and kindness done be their
freends'.
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Furthermore, the design of these commercial concessions to
reconcile the royal burghs to the implementation  of the common fishing
was negated by the precipitate behaviour of English members of the448
Society.	 Much to the chagrin of the Convention of Royal Burghs,
English adventurers made preliminary, if not markedly successful,
incursions into Scottish waters during the autumn of 1632,
'notwithstanding the societie of Scots and English was not fully
settled'.
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	No less irritating, though not entirely unexpected, was
the lead taken in the formulation of provincial associations by
prominent English officials - such as Richard Weston, Lord Weston
(later earl of Portland), the lord treasurer, Thomas Howard, earl of
Arundel and Surrey, the earl marshal and Philip Herbert, earl of
Pembroke and Montgomery, the lord chamberlain, all of whom served as
commissioners for England during the negotiations at Court and were
subsequently among the six Englishmen appointed councillors for the
Society. Administrative posts at the disposal of the council of
twelve went largely to the clients of prominent English officials,
particularly to their informants on the fishing resources off the
Scottish coasts. Indeed, the stated intent of the association headed
by Weston and Arundel - as of that headed by Pembroke - to operate out
of Lewis testified to the accumulation of intelligence at Court on the
fishing reserves around the western isles.	 A third, less well
connected association, headed by William Noy, the attorney-general, was
also formed in 1633 but would seem to have restricted its fishing
aspirations to the traditional herring grounds in the North Sea.
Nevertheless, all three provincial associations were to be noted less
for their commercial accomplishments than for their financial
difficulties: all were severely undercapitalised, their debts
consistently outstripped paid-up subscriptions.	 All were defunct by
1641. 45
In fact, the Society as a whole was on the verge of
liquidation by August 1638, a situation which can be attributed, in
part, to indigenous circumstances - such as the separatism of the
native fishing community in Scotland, the inhospitable conduct of
landlords and chiefs in the western isles, the outright hostility of
their tenants and clansmen, and the lack of wholehearted co-operation
from the Scottish administration.	 Nor can external factors be449
discounted - such as the sporadic preying of the piratical Dunkirkers
and Dutch disregard for Charles' imperial claims to lordships of the
seas around the British Isles.	 But, above all, the Society's
difficulties were self-inflicted - the unfounded commercial optimism
of its protagonists (especially Charles), inadequate technical
expertise in marketing as well as deep sea fishing among its members
and employees, and most crucially, a basic lack of financial competence
on the council of twelve and in its subordinate administration.
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	The
outbreak of hostilities between the Crown and the Covenanters in 1639,
prolonged into the 1640s by the outbreak of civil war throughout the
British Isles, merely delivered the final blow to the viability of the
common fishing during the reign of Charles I.
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In Scotland, the burgh not the provincial association
remained the basic unit for the organisation of the native fishing
community as for the marketing of fish at home and abroad.	 Moreover,
by July 1636, the Convention of Royal Burghs had reasserted its
traditional right to specify the quality controls applicable to the
barrelling, salting and curing of herring and white fish.	 Each burgh
was to retain responsibility for carriage and costing as well as
packing and preserving when marketing fish overseas.	 The failure of
the council of twelve to impose strict quality controls until 1637,
coupled to the notable lack of expertise among members and their
employees about the packing and preserving of herring on deep sea
busses, negated the Society's endeavours to break into the lucrative
continental markets dominated by the Dutch. 48
At the same time as the Society was failing to capture
continental markets from the Dutch, its provincial associations were
struggling to displace the Dutch from the western isles and establish
fishing bases in Lewis.	 Despite repeated injunctions for their
eviction, the Dutch had continued to enjoy the patronage of the house
of Seaforth following the death of Colin MacKenzie, the first earl, in
March 1633.	 Indeed, George, the second earl, lacking his father's
influence at Court, had found the continued presence of the Dutch a450
useful bargaining counter to the king's proposed annexation of Lewis.
By February 1634, Charles had conceded that he would prefer to reach an
accommodation with Seaforth rather than resort to law, affirming his
intention not to annex the whole island but only sufficient ground to
establish plantations for the provincial associations.	 To induce the
transfer of the earl's patronage from the Dutch to the English
adventurers, Seaforth was to be allowed to retain the rest of the
island provided he continued to pay his existing feu-duty to the Crown.
Another three years were to elapse before the practical details of this
accommodation were worked out by a four-man investigative committee of
leading officials (Morton, Stirling, Traq4Air and Hay of Barro) with
the assistance of Lord Advocate Hope.	 Other than the town and
precincts of Stornoway which was erected a royal burgh, Lewis was
retained by Seaforth for a feu of £2,000. 	 However, by the conclusion
of this agreement on 13 March 1637, the council of twelve was moving
towards the abandonment of the Society's fishing activities around the
western isles.	 The winding down of the provincial associations'
operations in Lewis coincided with their belated realisation that the
fishing in the sea lochs bordering the Minches could be pursued more
suitably and profitably in the smaller vessels of the native fishing
community than in their own cumbersome busses.	 The process of
withdrawal was all but complete by the time the accommodation between
the Crown and Seaforth was ratified formally in the parliament of 1641,
leaving the king's stated intent that Stornoway was to become a model
of 'civilitie' for the western isles no more than a pious hope.
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As well as Seaforth, other landlords and chiefs in the
western isles were prepared to harbour the Dutch in particular and
foreign fishermen in general, since these strangers were prepared to
pay ground rents and landing dues at higher rates than the native
fishing community.	 Following complaints to the Crown from the council
of twelve that landlords and chiefs were permitting strangers to resort
and trade in the western isles and were exacting unwarrantable and
excessive duties from members and employees of the Society, the Privy
Council was obliged, on 24 June 1634, to commission Archibald,451
Lord Lorne and Neil Campbell, bishop of the Isles, to enquire into the
presence of foreigners in the western isles and the scale of exactions
levied by landlords and chiefs.	 When summoned to account on 29 August
at Inverary, Lorne's family seat in Argyllshire, the principal
landlords and chiefs of the western isles denied harbouring illicitly
foreign fishermen or traders and rejected the allegations that they
were exacting unwarrantable and excessive duties from the provincial
associations.	 Indeed, they claimed to have moderated their customary
exactions to the benefit of the Society, attesting that no more was
asked from its members and employees than had been paid in ground rents
and landing dues by the native fishing community since 1620.	 Although
their testimony was accepted and endorsed by the Privy Council three
months later, landlords and chiefs were undoubtedly not averse to
unleashing their tenants and clansmen on the bases and even on the sea
lochs to disrupt the fishing activities of the provincial associations
should there be any reluctance to pay the prescribed ground rents and
landing dues.	 Following renewed complaints from the council of twelve
about the hostile reception being accorded to the Society's members and
employees in the western isles, the Privy Council issued a further
directive on 7 August 1635, that landlords and chiefs must restrain
their tenants and clansmen from molesting the storehouses, magazines
and boats of the provincial associations. 	 Tenants and clansmen were
not to assemble at sea lochs unless authorised by their landlords and
chiefs and possessed of nets and other requisite tackle. 	 Complaints
about maltreatment by the local populace would seem to have declined in
the wake of this measure.	 Nevertheless, until they assured their own
safety by withdrawing from Lewis, the members and employees of the
provincial associations could not presume that assemblies of clansmen
at sea lochs in the western isles, albeit equipped with the requisite
tackle, were intent on fishing at the behest of landlords and chiefs.
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Moreover, although the Privy Council was prepared, after
prompting from the king, to hold landlords and chiefs accountable for
the reception they, their tenants and clansmen, accorded to the
provincial associations in the western isles, elements within as452
without the Scottish administration were never reconciled to the
implementation of the common fishing.	 Hence, vociferous objections
were raised in the course of 1635, when the council of twelve sought to
demonstrate the Society's judicial autonomy in all matters concerning
the fishing industry by despatching four judges to Lewis to resolve the
differences between the provincial associations and the local populace.
Despite the king's endorsement of the Society's judicial autonomy, the
council of twelve was obliged to defer to the authority of the Privy
Council to redress the grievances of its members and employees when
based in Scotland.	 Furthermore, when Charles decided at the outset of
the herring season in 1636 that his imperial rights to the seas around
the British Isles could best be enforced by licensing rather than
resisting the incursion of foreign fishing vessels, the support he
re0ed from his Scottish administration fell somewhat short of his
expectations.	 By 12 July, the Privy Council had agreed in principle
to license foreign vessels fishing in Scottish territorial waters and
to restrain the unlicensed.	 A pointed directive was issued two days
later that landlords and chiefs in the western isles were not to equate
English adventurers as foreigners.	 However, whereas English officials
were able to call upon the services of the royal navy to enforce
licensing, the task in Scotland was left to the duke of Lennox who, in
his capacity as Lord High Admiral, was traditionally entitled to impose
and collect 'severall dueties' on foreign vessels fishing in Scottish
waters and entering Scottish ports.	 As Lennox was a longstanding
absentee and courtier, this was a recipe for inaction confirmed by the
announcement of discriminatory rates for the imposition of licenses on
6 November.	 Whereas foreigners fishing in English waters were rated
on the tonnage of their vessels, at one shilling sterling per ton,
foreigners fishing in Scottish waters were rated on the tonnage of
their catch when barrelled, at £1 4s (two shillings sterling) per ton.
Seven months later, on 20 June 1637, the Council admitted that it had
still not resolved 'the best and most faisable way to uplift the said
dewtie'.
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Charles' switch of tack in favour of licensing foreign453
fishing vessels was motivated by his inability to bring sufficient
diplomatic or naval pressure on the Dutch to recognise his imperial
right to lordship of the seas around the British Isles.	 Not only were
the Dutch among his nominal allies in opposition to the Habsburg
coalition during the Thirty Years War, their support being deemed
essential for the recovery of Bohemia where his sister, Elizabeth was
queen, but Charles lacked the naval resources even to rival far less
overcome the war-ships protecting the Dutch fishing fleets.
Conversely, the damages inflicted on English adventurers  by Dutch
war-ships as well as Dunkirker privateers in the North Sea had cost the
Society at least six busses and helped precipitate a financial crisis
by 1635.	 For these losses, when coupled to the difficulties the
provincial associations encountered in the western isles, persuaded
many members of the Society to withhold or delay paying in full the
capital they had promised to adventure. 	 Although subscriptions of
venture capital amounting to £22,682 10s sterling (£272,190) had been
promised since 1633, only 0,914 10s sterling (£118,974) had been paid
by 1635, necessitating borrowing by the Society in excess of £3,500
sterling to meet its most pressing commitments - well in excess of
£13,000 sterling (£156,000) having already been expended on busses,
equipment and manpower.	 Rather than retrench, the council of twelve
continued to advocate the expansion of the Society's fishing
operations, covering up its financial difficulties by inflating the
value of its stocks in hand (fish, salt and tackle) and by carrying
forward the damages sustained in the North Sea as assets.	 A notional
profit of £178 2s 7d sterling (£2,137 11s) was declared from the
operation of six busses.	 In order to encourage full payment of
subscriptions, members were offered an indemnity against yearly losses
incurred from 1635, an indemnity which was also to apply to any
additional assessment on members to augment venture capital.
Nonetheless, with the piratical activities of the Dunkirkers continuing
unabated, with the Dutch refusing to accept  licensing on a regular
basis after 1636 and with the provincial associations pulling out of
Lewis from 1637, not even the intricate accounting of its councillors
and administrators could stave off an insuperable crisis of454
liquidity 
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Indeed by October 1637, influential voices within the
Scottish administration were coming to the conclusion that the deep sea
fishing off the Scottish coasts could best be exploited not by
competing against the Dutch but by tapping their unrivalled expertise
as instructors to the native fishing community.	 Thus, Traqujiir, who
had initially supported the common fishing as a means of increasing the
revenues of the Crown - Charles being reputed to receive no more than
£1,500 annually from the customs on fish exported from Scotland - was
pressing Hamilton for a reappraisal of policy at Court.	 No
foreseeable profit could be expected from the Society 'quhich is nou
leik to cum to noying for want of right government'.
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According to the prospectus for the common fishing presented
to the Convention of Estates in 1630, Charles had envisaged a fleet of
at least one hundred busses, costing 02,000 sterling (£864,000) to
build, equip and man, but generating a clear annual profit of around
£82,707 sterling (£992,484).	 From its inception, however, the
Society for the common fishing was consistently afflicted by
'ludicrously insufficient capital' because of the chronic inability of
its councillors and administrators to mobilise and sustain adequate
funding.	 Probably no more than twenty busses were actually built and
operated by the Society.	 In total, £16,975 sterling (£203,700) was
subscribed and paid up as venture capital by members between 1633 and
1637, of which £2,047 7s 10d sterling had to be returned to offset
annual losses incurred from 1635.	 Moreover, because members preferred
to pay their subscriptions in small sums - if at all as commercial
prospects became bleaker - recurrent costs on equipment and manpower
necessitated further borrowing in excess of £4,750 sterling between
1635 and 1637.	 Over that same period, an additional assessment on
members realised only £6,142 13s 4d sterling (£73,712). 	 Instead of
generating annual profits, the Society under the stewardship of the
council of twelve was on the brink of bankruptcy by August 1638: all
capital adventured had been used up and an accumulated deficit of455
£21,070 5s 6d sterling (£252,843 6s) admitted.54
Not only had the common fishing proved a financial liability,
but its implementation had important commercial as well as
constitutional implications which broadened and deepened support within
Scotland for sustained opposition to the policies of an absentee
monarch.	 Above all, the common fishing proved a political liability
by demonstrating that Charles' pursuit of uniformity entailed the
subordination of the resources, institutions and aspirations of the
Scottish people to the dictates of the Court.	 Conversely, the
upholding of the national interest as pioneered by the royal burghs
became a potent rallying cry for the disaffected element from the
Convention of Estates in 1630.	 Moreover, Charles' dogmatic pursuit of
uniformity, which continued unabated throughout the 1630s with respect
to currency revaluation and tariff reform, served not only to emphasise
the provincial relegation of Scotland but also to induce economic
recession north of the Border.	 The prospect of provincialism no less
than the reality of recession extended the scope of dissent beyond the
political nation.	 Whereas class collusion to circumvent the
Revocation Scheme or to forestall the restructuring of local government
was confined to the political nation, entire communities expressed
their contempt for the economic policies emanating from the Court by
collective acts of disobedience.	 Such acts as the circulation of
banned or counterfeit coins through domestic markets, smuggling and the
disregard of trade embargoes, though perennial aspects of civil
disobedience, became commonplace and routine rather than localised and
occasional occurrences in the course of the 1630s.
55	In turn,
habitual civil disobedience throughout Scotland raised  nation&
tolerance for direct political action as for organised protest by the
disaffected element against established authority in Kirk and State.456
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Chapter XI	 The Money Supply and Commercial Disruption 
The most pressing, but least tractable, economic problem
confronting Charles I in 1625 and throughout his personal rule was the
state of the currency.	 At the root of this problem was the
international shortage of bullion.	 Coin - silver predominantly, then
gold - was still the prevailing medium for settling trading balances
between nations and underwriting the credit system necessary for
commercial growth in the early seventeenth century.	 More
specifically, the expansion of a monetary economy in Scotland as
elsewhere in northern Europe meant a growing demand for coin.	 Yet the
supply of silver and gold from the New World was irreversibly on a
downward spiral by 1625.	 Moreover, the preponderance of silver in
commercial exchange had led to a marked appreciation of gold since the
outset of the seventeenth century, a trend compounded by hoarding.
The widening gap between the supply of bullion and the commercial
demand for coin resulted inevitably in price instability, devaluation
of national currencies and disruption to international trade.1
As the costs of central governments escalated because of
increasingly voracious bureaucracies and the recurrence of war on the
continent, European powers were generally tempted to tamper with native
currency and to convert foreign specie in order to stretch out the use
of silver.	 In particular, the debasement and clipping of coin
warranted by German princes from the outbreak of the Thirty Years War
ushered in a period of hyper-inflation throughout the Holy Roman Empire
during the 1620s which pushed back the attainment of price stability
throughout Europe.	 Arguably, an international monetary crisis was
only averted because of the marked reluctance of mercantile communities
to disrupt established trading relationships.	 Thus, silver and gold
coins were allowed to retain their customary values for international
trade but were circulated at inflated rates in domestic markets.
Nonetheless, as prices continued to spiral upwards as the supply of
bullion began to dwindle, employment prospects were jeopardised
internationally which, in turn, coupled the threat of economic
recession to widespread social dislocation.	 Eastern European
countries such as Poland, whose manufacturing base was underdeveloped465
and whose economic prosperity was overdependent on agriculture, were to
suffer most.	 Western countries such as the United Provinces and
England, with diversified economies characterised by relatively
sophisticated commercial institutions and a broadening manufacturing
base, were to demonstrate the greatest resilience against recession.2
Though less dependent on agriculture than Poland, Scotland
lacked the diversity of manufactures and commercial depth found in
England or the United Provinces.	 Nonetheless, strong trading links
with both these countries, while not guaranteeing price stability,
helped foster economic resilience and fend off recession. 	 The
standardisation of exchange rates at the Union of the Crowns - the
Scots pound and mark being fixed at a twelfth of their English
equivalents - and the subsequent circulation of gold and silver coins
of the common monarchy as legal tender on either side of the Border had
served not only to stabilise Anglo-Scottish trade but to promote
. international acceptance of Scottish currency.	 Furthermore, the
paramount economic importance of the Dutch connection, particularly the
trade in coal and salt as Scotland's major currency earner, had led to
the regular supply and nationwide circulation of the "rix dollar", the
silver coin most acceptable for international trade.	 While thus
protected against the worst ravages of inflation, Scotland was not
insulated against the international bullion shortage.
At the same time as the Germanic states were devaluing and
tampering with silver coin, the recurrence of dearth between 1622 and
1624 - and especially the threat of endemic famine in 1623 - obliged
Scottish merchants to lay out native specie to purchase grain in
continental markets.	 In turn, this run on the stock of Scottish coin
occasioned the massive influx of debased foreign dollars to serve the
needs of domestic exchange. Moreover, sectional interests within the
mercantile community were prepared to sabotage the attainment of price
stability by profiteering from the chronic shortage of silver coin on
the continent - notably, in France, the Spanish Netherlands and
Eastern Europe.	 In order to acquire Scottish specie for conversion466
into their own native currencies, Scottish merchants were offered large
discounts on various commodities for payments in cash, discounts which
were not passed on to the Scottish consumer since the merchants sold
the imported commodities at inflated prices - as much as double the
purchase price - in domestic markets.	 The net effect of such
profiteering was to drain off native specie and provoke repeated public
outcry 'for want of exchange'.
The shortage of native coin was also compounded by declining
administrative standards following the migration of the Court to
London.	 Hitherto, foreign money was only allowed to circulate in
Scotland according to the weight and silver content of each coin at
rates set by the Privy Council, tabulated in the Mint and distributed
to designated exchangers appointed by the general of the Mint in the
leading burghs.	 Foreign money brought to these exchangers was either
revalued at the prescribed rates or despatched as bullion to the Mint
in return for Scottish coin of equivalent value. 	 Such central
direction had lapsed by 1619.	 Thereafter, foreign currency was
allowed to circulate at face value or rather at rates determined
diversely and haphazardly by the mercantile community, a practice which
exploited lack of public knowledge on international exchange, deprived
the Crown of a steady supply of bullion and denied the country sound
money.
3
Charles was not insensitive to the parlous state of the
currency at the outset of his reign.	 In an effort to remedy the
wholescale export of Scottish specie, the chronic shortage of native
currency and the excessive reliance on foreign dollars for domestic
exchange, he was prepared to countenance public discussion on the most
efficacious means of attaining sound money.	 Hence, his initial
reforming programme presented to the Convention of Estates on
1 November 1625, contained a plethora of proposals to increase the
stock of native currency in both the short and the long term. 	 Exports
of bullion were to be penalised and its import exhorted.	 Restraints
were to be imposed on unnecessary imports.	 The formation of companies467
to manufacture native products was to be encouraged.	 Existing
currency was to be devalued and new issues of coin debased.	 Charles,
himself, not only favoured the immediate devaluation of existing
currency by up to twenty-five per cent, but also proposed a
corresponding revaluation of feu-duties - hitherto deemed fixed  in
perpetuity - to prevent further erosion of Crown rents and landed
incomes.	 However, the Estates preferred the less litigious option of
restricting exports of Scottish specie to pay for luxury goods from the
continent and, 2 November, ordained the Privy Council to enforce
existing enactments against the importation of unnecessary foreign
wares.	 Moreover, because the state of the currency was a complex
issue which could not be 'summarily digested'  in two days, the Estates
selected a committee to give 'goode advice and deliberatioun'.
Accordingly, eight nobles, eight eight gentry and three bishops,
together with representatives from the burghs of Edinburgh, Dundee,
Aberdeen and Glasgow, were appointed to confer with the Privy Council
and submit a report to the king recommending a definite course of
remedial action by the end of February 1626. 4
The select committee on the coinage included nobles of the
stamp of Rothes, Loud or and Balmerino: eight of its membership went on
to serve on the selec committees for the common fishing and
monopolies appointed by the Convention of Estates in 1630.
Nevertheless, although deliberations on the coinage were prolonged
until the summer of 1627, the select committee did not afford a
constitutional forum for the dissenting element between Conventions.
For the select committee on the coinage was merely a consultative body.
It conducted no independent deliberations during or after the
Convention of 1625 and always met under the tutelage of the Privy
Council.	 Nonetheless, the Council's deliberations with the select
committee did serve to sharpen political awareness about the national
importance of economic issues in general notjust the state of the
currency.	 Despite prompting from the burghs for a timely
recommendation on a definite course of remedial action, the lack of
contensus between councillors and committee members led to the468
deliberations being augmented from the spring of 1626 to include all
interested parties among the nobility and gentry.	 Simultaneously,
since the national economic performance was deemed to be governed
ultimately by the supply of bullion, the remit of the deliberations was
also broadened to cover not only the desirability of restraining
unnecessary imports, but also the expediency of imposing corn laws, of
continuing the export of coal and salt under licence and of monitoring
the prices of staple commodities in domestic markets.	 Although the
latter issues were duly implemented as expedient, no definite action
was taken to remedy the state of the currency. 	 Charles' preference
for devaluation remained unsupported.	 Indeed, the Privy Council
escaped endorsing such a momentous option by holding no more than
cursory discussions on the coinage during the summer of 1626 and then
proroguing repeatedly its meetings with the select committee until the
spring of 1627.
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In the meantime, private consultations were under	 at Court
between Charles and Nicholas Briot, a Frenchman who was a leading
official in the English Mint and the foremost expert on currency then
at the disposal of the Crown.	 In August 1626, Briot submitted a
memorandum strongly dissuading Charles from attempting even a modest
devaluation of no more than eight per cent or, indeed, from any
tampering with the coinage which would prove as beneficial to hoarders
and forgers as to the Crown.	 Existing exchange rates should be upheld
in the interests of international trade and to preserve commercial
confidence at home. Moreover, given that the minting and stamping of
coin remained a royal monopoly, the export of specie abroad was not in
itself harmful but served to promote international acceptance of the
currency by the Crown.
6
	Nonetheless, excessive export of Scottish
specie meant that foreign dollars were continuing to circulate freely
in domestic markets at rates far above the value of their Scottish
equivalents.	 Because the deliberations between the Privy Council were
inconclusive, no official attempt had as yet been made to regulate or
standardise rates of exchange.	 Hence, in May 1627, Napier of
Merchiston, the recently ennobled treasurer-depute, was despatched from469
Court with a missive from the king to reconvene the deliberations on
the state of the currency.	 Despite lengthy discussions with the
select committee, supplemented by advice from officials of the Mint and
leading merchants in Edinburgh, the Privy Council was moved to record
on 16 June, that it was still neither meet nor expedient to devalue the
native currency, to adjust exchange rates or to restrict the
circulation of foreign dollars.
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Over the next eighteen months, lack of official resolve on a
definite course of remedial action did nothing to diminish the flow of
foreign dollars into Scotland or to curtail their circulation at
inflated rates in domestic markets.	 Admittedly, the disruption to
Scottish overseas trade occasioned by Charles' declarations of war
against France and Spain was a more pressing cause of public concern
than the state of the currency.	 The Council did at least recognise
that the excessive circulation of foreign dollars within Scotland was
attributable primarily to the debasement and clipping of coin within
the Holy Roman Empire. Dollars were imported mainly through the east
coast ports either as a direct result of the sea-borne trade with the
German states or indirectly through the Low Countries - notably, from
the acceptance of German dollars in lieu of bullion or "rix-dollars" by
the coalowners and saltmasters on the Firth of Forth.	 Official
indignation was also expressed that the additional varieties of German
dollars recently introduced to Scotland abetted much dishonest dealing,
both with respect to increased opportunities for counterfeiting and,
above all, for merchants to exploit lack of public knowledge about
international exchange.	 Certain German dollars were being exchanged
at rates from four to twenty-nine per cent above the intrinsic value of
their Scottish equivalents.	 Thus, the "lion-dollar" (or "dog-dollar")
was circulating at forty-eight shillings whereas its true worth and
price was deemed no more than forty-six shillings; most flagrantly, the
"base-dollar" was circulating at thirty-three shillings and four pence
whereas its real value was no more than twenty-five shillings and
ten pence; the latest intruder, the "embden dollar" was also
circulating at thirty-three shillings and four pence instead of470
twenty-six shillings. 8
The unabated proliferation of counterfeit and foreign dollars
stirred the Privy Council into a fresh initiative at the outset of
1629.	 Commencing on 15 January, a series of meetings was instigated
with the officials of the Mint and prominent Edinburgh merchants
trading with France, the Low Countries and eastern Europe. 	 General
agreement was reached that the "rix-dollar" and the "lion-dollar" were
the most suitable foreign coins to be retained for public use.
However, no clear guidelines were issued for the disposal of all other
dollars at least cost to the country or inconvenience to the public.
Discussion diverged on whether unacceptable foreign dollars should be
brought to the Mint for conversion into bullion or returned to their
country of origin by the mercantile community in the normal course of
trade.	 Moreover, although it was deemed desirable to restrain all
future imports, there was a tacit acceptance that foreign dollars would
continue to circulate surreptitiously.	 For the Council decreed on
17 February, that the "rix-dollar" should be taken as the
international standard for allowing or discharging the circulation of
foreign coin.	 All efforts to impose restraints over the next twelve
months duly proved ineffective.	 On 18 February 1630, the Council
received an acerbic injunction from Charles requiring more energetic
action.	 Five days later, a special committee of ten leading
councillors was formed to confer with the officials of the Mint and
prominent merchants on 'the best wayes for removing of the present
abuse in the course of forrayne coyne and for bringing in of bulyeon to
the mint house hereafter'. 9
Once again, renewed deliberations led to no definite
programme for remedial action.	 The state of the currency was not even
raised as an issue at the Convention of Estates at the end of
July 1630 - either by officials on behalf of the Crown or by shire
commissioners on behalf of the localities or by the burgesses on behalf
of the mercantile community.	 This apparent lack of concern betokened
nationwide acquiescence in the excessive circulation of counterfeit and471
debased dollars and the seeming futility of embarking unilaterally
upon a remedial programme to eradicate international abuses.	 Indeed,
the only directive emanating from the Council's ongoing deliberations
on the coinage was the issue of a stereotyped proclamation on
8 September, aimed mainly at east coast traders, against the wholescale
importation of foreign dollars and the circulation of counterfeit
.	 10
coin.
However, the Council did receive on 18 November a package of
proposals from Mr John Aitcheson, general of the Mint, offering a
practical remedy for the most patent abuse - the derangement of the
currency occasioned by the circulation of foreign dollars at inflated
rates.	 In the first place, drawing on precedent from the reign of
Mary, queen of Scots, Aitcheson suggested that the 'basest sort' of
dollars be converted into native currency for use as small change
exclusively in domestic markets: in effect, Scotland should copy
France, the Spanish Netherlands and the German states.	 Secondly, the
most acceptable foreign coin, namely the "rix-dollar", should also be
converted into native currency for use as specie in trade with eastern
Europe.	 Although this appeared a rather expensive nationalist option,
Aitcheson claimed that the strict imposition of fines on traders
profiteering from the export of native coin would cover conversion
costs.	 Alternatively, if the Council was not prepared to accept both
proposals, the country's silver coin must either be adapted to the
current rates for gold - a realignment which went against the
international trend of allowing gold to appreciate against silver - or
debased in fineness or weight, a laborious and expensive process.
In either case, consultations would be required with the officials of
the English Mint if the gold and silver coin of the common monarchy was
to continue circulating as legal tender in both countries. 	 In the
meantime, rates for bullion in Scotland should be standardised with
those of England.	 Towards this end, the customs on all goods imported
to Scotland should be doubled and paid either in foreign silver plate
or coin of guaranteed silver content which could then be brought as
bullion to the Mint.	 Aitcheson thus favoured a moderate but472
controlled exchange of silver coin internationally.. For although he
was adamant that the circulation of foreign dollars at excessive rates
should be made a treasonable offence, he warned against Charles I
thinking that he 'can keepe moneyes within Scotland' without severe
disruption to international trade.
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Before any attempt was made to activate Aitcheson's
proposals, the Privy Council received an alternative package from the
Convention of Royal Burghs on 3 March 1631.	 The Convention was less
concerned to advocate constructive remedies than to defend current
practices of international exchange on behalf of the mercantile
community.	 Thus, the wholescale importation of foreign dollars,
especially by coalowners and saltmasters, should be restrained;
tampering with the coinage, counterfeiting or melting down native coin
for bullion should be subject to severe penalties; but it would be
folly to devalue foreign dollars to restrict their circulation in
domestic markets 'till the countrie were first suppleed with better
money'.	 If the peace with Spain continued there was every likelihood
that the country could be disburdened of debased dollars in exchange
for coin of acceptable silver content.	 The Convention did at least
concur that the country's stock of acceptable silver coin could be
conserved if all payments for international commodities were made in
foreign dollars not by the exchange of native specie.	 However, the
Convention remained adamant that the interests of the mercantile
community would best be served if all foreign - other than English -
coin earned as bullion from the exchange of Scottish commodities were
paid directly into the Mint rather than to customs farmers - even
though such direct payment entailed an impracticable degree of
centralisation and afforded an open season for smuggling.12
The Privy Council preferred the advice of the royal burghs to
take no action pending more mature deliberations. 	 Nonetheless,
Aitcheson's package had at least served to pinpoint the importance of
stemming the flow of debased foreign dollars into Scotland from
England.	 By 26 July, the Council was belatedly moved to recognise473
that the overland trade with England - notably in bestial on the hoof
and yarn and cloth by packhorse - was the major avenue for the indirect
import of German dollars outwith the trade in coal and salt from the
Firth of Forth.	 Accordingly, a proclamation was issued two days later
forbidding the wholescale importation of foreign dollars overland.
From 1 September, commodities traded in English markets were either to
be sold for the coin of the common monarchy or exchanged for acceptable
foreign dollars - that is, mainly the nrix-dollar", the Spanish
pistolet and the French crown - which were to be allowed to circulate
within Scotland at rates prescribed by the Council according to their
respective fineness and weight.	 The like prohibition and prescription
was to apply to coalowners and saltmasters from 1 November.
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No further initiative to reform the coinage was attempted
until the summer of 1632.	 At the same time as the revaluing of silver
coin in relation to gold (as suggested by Aitcheson) was being
discussed within English official circles, Charles was again consulting
Briot at Court on the Scottish situation.	 In order to correct the
excessive circulation of foreign coins - at rates averaging ten per
cent above their Scottish equivalents - and the shortage of native
currency for domestic exchange, Briot was now prepared to countenance
a staggered devaluation of foreign dollars linked to a new issue of
small coins with their silver content modestly debased.	 Taking the
n rix-dollar" as the international standard for rating foreign coins
in proportion to their silver content, its value, which fluctuated
between fifty-eight shillings and fifty-seven shillings, was to be
reduced to fifty-six shillings over four months and then stabilised at
that rate for a further six months before being reduced to
fifty-three shillings.	 This was to remain its 'trew raite' of
exchange unless and until the Crown resolved to revalue silver coin in
relation to gold.	 During the first ten months of this staggered
devaluation, foreign dollars were to be called in to the Mint,
exchanged at rates proportional to their silver content in relation to
the urix-dollar" at fifty-six shillings, melted down and re-issued as
less fine silver coin in small denominations (from one shilling to474
four shillings) for exclusive use in domestic markets. 	 Both measures
were designed to inculcate sound money while maintaining the stock of
coin necessary for commercial continuity.	 The staggered devaluation
would prevent the prompt exodus of foreign dollars from the country and
thereby allow time for the gradual introduction of silver coin in small
denominations into domestic markets.	 Moreover, so long as the
debasement of the new coins' silver content was modest in relation to
existing coin of greater denominations, there was little prospect of
'excessive gayne' for forgers and illicit traffickers in foreign
dollars.	 Having recommended the Privy Council and officials of the
Scottish Mint to give their serious consideration to these proposals on
3 June, Charles despatched Briot north three months later to impart his
personal expertise as chief engraver in the English Mint.14
It was not until 24 November 1632 that the chief engraver in
the English Mint presented his credentials to the Privy Council.
However, since Briot claimed that pressing business demanded his prompt
return to Court, his proposals - for a staggered devaluation of foreign
dollars linked to a new issue of small coins with their silver content
modestly debased - were not recounted personally.	 Instead, an
expanded version of his proposals was read out to an attenuated meeting
of the Privy Council on 4 December.	 In the meantime, copies were
circulated among officials of the Mint and prominent Edinburgh
merchants, for consideration by the royal burghs, and written responses
invited for 10 January 1633, when a full meeting of the Council was
summoned for mature and grave deliberation on the state of the
currency, 'a mater of verie great importance quhairin the haill
kingdome hes speciall interesse'. 15
The expanded version of Briot's proposals reiterated the need
for devaluation of foreign dollars so long as the process was staggered
to allow time 'to surrogate als good kynds of money of his Majesteis in
thair places' and thus minimise disruption to the country's commerce.
Moreover, devaluation rated against the "rix-dollar" as the
international standard for exchange, had already proved beneficial in475
stabilising prices in Italian as well as German states during the last
decade.	 Briot was also adamant that a modest reduction in the silver
content in the new issue of coin should not be termed debasement.
For the coins of small denomination for domestic exchange were to be
minted not in great quantities but only sufficient 'as sail be judged
necessarie for use and commoditie of the people'.	 The silver coin of
large denomination used as native specie would remain intrinsically
unaffected.	 However, Briot had not formulated his proposals to secure
their widespread acceptance, far less his personal endearment, within
Scotland.	 He asserted categorically that the current disorders of
foreign money in the kingdom 'hath beene made and continueth without
anie caus or publict necessite'.	 He made a stinging attack on the
mercantile community for their avarice, as on the officers of the
Scottish Mint for their laxity, in encouraging the importation of
foreign dollars and promoting their circulation at excessive rates in
domestic markets.	 He went on to assert that any short term loss
resulting from devaluation - which must be set against the long term
acquisition of sound money - would fall mainly on the rich,
particularly the mercantile community, 'those who possesse the most
part of forrane moneyes, and not upon the people who possesse the
smallest part'.	 Trafficking in foreign coin, especially debased
dollars, for personal advantage to 'the hurt of the commonwealth' was
unwarrantable.	 Not only was the country drained of native specie, 'as
if this kingdome wer a conquest kingdome', but the prerogative and
majesty of the Crown was slighted since Charles I was not known in
Scotland 'by his proper, naturall and coynned money'.
The importance Briot attached to the prerogative and majesty
of the Crown merely reiterated in public the view he had expressed
privately to Charles six years earlier, that the right to mint and
issue coin was 'the most common marke of sovereignty'.	 While it was
politically expedient to undertake widespread public consultations
before altering rates of exchange or debasing or tampering with the
coin, 'it lyeth in the princes power to impose such value to that as he
please without contradicting of the subjectis'.	 Their duty was to476
obey.
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Following the distribution of Briot's proposals by the Privy
Council, the plenary discussions on the state of the currency, arranged
to commence on 10 January 1633, were presaged and dogged by an
acrimonious exchange of views in the written submissions invited from
officers of the Mint and the royal burghs.	 Briot having made no
effort to appease Scottish sensibilities, he set himself up as the
common enemy. Not only was he attacked personally as an uninformed
stranger, but his proposals were savaged on professional, commercial
and, ultimately, constitutional grounds.
Aitcheson, as general of the Mint, was adamant that the
advice imparted by Briot drawing on his experience in England was of
negligible value.	 England had no comparable experience of foreign
dollars circulating at rates far in excess of equivalent native coin.
Devaluation, even if staggered, would cause "rix-dollars" and foreign
coins of like quality to be exported out of the country along with
native specie leaving only counterfeit and debased dollars in
circulation.	 Thus, the attainment of sound money would be postponed
indefinitely.	 Moreover, devaluation as suggested by Briot was
tantamount to an indirect tax of the order of nine per cent on
commercial transactions, 'quhilk wilbe the grietest taxatione that ever
wes impost upon this kingdome'.	 Having rejected devaluation,
Aitcheson came out emphatically against the upward revaluation of
silver coin in relation to gold.	 The difficulties in acquiring and
transporting gold to Scotland had meant that the gold coin of the
common monarchy, notwithstanding the standardisation of Scots money at
a twelfth of the value of sterling, was actually circulating in
Scotland at rates thirty to forty per cent above its standardised
value, 'to the great loss of all the noble and gentlemen and utheris
having occasione to repair to the court of Ingland'.	 (Such
unfavourable exchange rates would have made no small contribution to
the isolation of the Court from the most influential leaders of the
political nation.)	 Furthermore, although upward revaluation of silver477
coin cheapened the cost of certain imports, this cost advantage tended
to be dissipated on luxuries rather than raw materials.	 More
especially, revaluation against the currencies of eastern Europe would
prove critical in times of dearth in reducing the purchasing power of
native specie when prices for Baltic grain were being pushed up by
international demand.
Aitcheson was particularly scathing about Briot's proposal
for a new issue of silver coin in small denominations since his
specifications for minting four shillings, two shillings and
one shilling pieces were wasteful of silver.	 The coins themselves
were liable to slip through people's fingers and become defaced after
several years' usage.	 However, he was not opposed to an issue of	 coin
in small denominations exclusively for domestic exchange provided the
process of debasement was economical.	 Thus, he proposed that the
equivalent of five hundred stones weight of "rix-dollars" and foreign
coins of comparable silver content be brought to the Mint, exchanged at
the rates currently prescribed by the Privy Council, debased by
clipping and re-issued in forty pence and twenty pence pieces.	 His
specifications for minting would not only stretch out the use of
silver by as much as fifty per cent, but also yield sufficient profit
to cover the cost of the wholescale conversion of "rix-dollars" into
native specie for international exchange.	 In turn, the increased
volume of native currency in circulation would serve to stabilise
exchange rates within Scotland.
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The attack on Briot mounted by the royal burghs was even more
swingeing.	 His proposals were written off as irritants rather than
remedies.	 Like Aitcheson, the royal burghs opposed the staggered
devaluation of the "rix-dollar" as an indirect tax on commercial
transactions, 'inferring greater hurt to the subject nor ever wes
imposed upon them in one yeere than even hes been grantit in any
taxationes'.	 They also concurred with Aitcheson that devaluation
would foster the transport of "rix-dollars" and foreign coins of like
quality abroad, thereby diminishing the country's stock of coin by as478
much as a fifth.	 As a consequence, domestic exchange would undergo
chronic disruption - albeit not to the extent that 'commerce among
people sail ceis'.	 In the event of dearth there would be a critical
shortage of ready cash to purchase Baltic grain. 	 Moreover, the
country's embryonic manufacturing industries would suffer in the long
term since the diminishing stock of quality coin would force up the
prices Scottish merchants were required to pay for such raw materials
from eastern Europe as iron, pitch, tar, timber, lint and hemp.
The burghs attested further that Briot's associated proposal
for a new issue of small coins with diminished silver content could
only be pursued 'to the gritt damage of the whole people and that
without any necessarie urgent caus'.	 Rather than facilitating
domestic exchange, the new issue would lead to markets throughout
Scotland being flooded with counterfeit and debased foreign dollars.
Moreover, the new issue would force up prices nationwide, the linking
of debasement to inflation being an accepted constitutional tenet since
the enactment of James III in 1485, 'whair it is declairit that penny
worthes arryses with the pennye'.	 Constitutional precedent was
deployed to oppose debasement on another two counts.	 In the first
place, the new issue of small coins - albeit intended exclusively for
domestic exchange - would breach the principle first prescribed by
enactment of James I in 1424, and subsequently consolidated by the
union of the Crowns, that the silver content of Scottish coins should
be maintained in direct proportion to their English equivalents in
order to facilitate international exchange.	 Secondly, no recognition
had been afforded to the enactment of James VI in 1567, that no
debased coin should be minted or issued without the consent of the
estates.	 Notwithstanding their constitutional strictures, the
burghs directed their most vehement criticisms against those who would
derive personal gain, by way of fees and allowances, when commissioned
to carry out debasement - the officers of the Mint and, more
especially, Briot who, 'when he hes filled himselff with the spoyle of
the people may flie to his owne home'.	 As a stranger, Briot 'aucht to
have cryed himselff more soberlie', since the new issue of debased479
coin, like the staggered devaluation, amounted to a secret tax on the
whole nation.	 Drawing pointedly from the French example, the burghs
asserted that the national interest required that no stranger be
involved in minting or issuing the country's coinage.
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The imputation that officers of the Mint as well as Briot
stood to gain materially from debasement elicited a separate submission
from the master coiner, George Foulles.	 Like the royal burghs, he was
fundamentally opposed to Briot's proposals for a staggered devaluation
of foreign dollars linked to a new issue of small coins with diminished
silver content.	 But, like Aitcheson, he was primarily concerned about
the efficacy of exchanging foreign dollars at the Mint, about the
technical complexities of debasement and about the wastefulness of this
process if carried out to Briot's specifications.	 Thus, he was
prepared to endorse the appeal of the burghs to constitutional
precedent in so far as the issue of a debased coinage was contrary to
parliamentary enactments upholding the principle that the silver
content of Scottish coins should remain in direct proportion to their
English equivalents. However, he was appalled by their slight to his
professional integrity, that he had a vested interest in tampering with
the coinage in order to benefit 'by uther mens great losse'.
Foulles estimated that the first phase of devaluation, when
the Hrix-dollar" was rated at fifty-six shillings for ten months, would
mean an average drop of two shillings in the value of every foreign
coin.	 Since most of the monies currently circulating in Scotland were
foreign dollars, such devaluation was tantamount to indirect taxation
which, if implemented nationwide, would exact 'neir sevin tymes als
much as extraordinary taxation in one yeir'.	 Moreover, as the silver
content of each foreign coin exhibited 'insufferable diversitie' both
with respect to weight and fineness, the actual loss on each coin
exchanged at the Mint and subsequently converted into native currency
according to Briot's specifications could prove as much as five
shillings to eight shillings: a loss which could not be made up even
if (as suggested by Aitcheson) clipping was resorted to instead of480
melting down and reworking with irons.	 Because the loss through
devaluation and debasement fell disproportionately on the holders of
best quality dollars, these coins would tend to be exported rather than
exchanged at the Mint, occasioning a drop of ten per cent - as against
the twenty per cent projected by the burghs - in the country's stock of
coin, a shortfall which would leave debased dollars circulating at
excessive rates in domestic markets.	 More heinously, recourse to
exporting played into the hands of the profiteers within the mercantile
community.	 For the merchants, as the foremost traffickers in coin,
would be able to fix exchange rates 'promiscuouslie' for their own
'exorbitant gain'.
Indeed, Foulles was to range beyond Briot in condemning the
avarice of the merchants.	 He was convinced that the country could	 be
replenished with its own money without recourse to devaluation or
debasement provided some measure of public responsibility could be
instilled into the mercantile community and strong central controls
reimposed over the money supply.	 Endemic commercial indiscipline
meant that little of the forty to fifty stone of silver coined annually
in the Mint - equivalent to forty to fifty thousand merks money - ever
found its way onto domestic markets.	 By evading freight, customs	 and
bullion dues, unscrupulous merchants could make twelve to twenty per
cent profit in shipping native specie overseas.	 By evading import
dues, a further two to three per cent gain could be made from shipping
in debased foreign dollars.	 Thus, as well as seeking the rigorous
enforcement of parliamentary enactments against the transport of native
specie abroad, Foulles called for an immediate inquiry into the
distribution of coined bullion.	 The treasurer and the lord advocate
were to be empowered to examine the accounts of all traders in receipt
of coin direct from the Mint.	 As a further discouragement to the
export of native specie, notably by merchants purchasing in England
such luxuries as gold and silver laces, pearlings and embroideries, the
parliamentary enactments against the importation of unnecessary wares
should also be enforced.	 Conversely, in order to attract bullion to
the Mint, greater imposts should be levied on goods exported under481
licence - that is, on such necessities as victuals, livestock, linen
and yarn, coal and salt.	 Furthermore, parliamentary enactments from
1451 to 1600 were cited in support of strict central management of the
money supply.	 All foreign coin imported into Scotland was to be
brought to the Mint, both to ensure a steady flow of bullion and to
authenticate the silver content of dollars released for exchange, at
tabulated rates, in domestic markets.
The restitution of commercial discipline notwithstanding, the
most integral aspect of Foulles' strategy of replenishment was the
accumulation of a stock of sound money.	 Thus, all bullion acquired
through trade was to be 'exactlie and tymouslie' brought to the Mint.
In addition, every merchant acquiring foreign coin from the export of
Scottish goods should bring dollars of guaranteed silver content to the
Mint to be exchanged as bullion in three ounce quotas, receiving
fifty-five shillings per ounce for every three ounce quota.	 Although
the coin of guaranteed silver content would be exchanged for dollars of
diverse weight and fineness, the loss to the merchants should not be
more than one shilling on every three ounce quota.	 The controlled
displacement of excessively rated foreign dollars from domestic markets
was also to be achieved by the acquisition of specific portions of
English coin and foreign coin of guaranteed silver content.	 Hence, at
least half the English coin received primarily from the sales of
cattle, sheep, linen cloth and yarn, and a like proportion of quality
foreign coin (principally, the "rix-dollar") received from sales of
coal and salt, were to be brought to the Mint and exchanged for dollars
of equivalent value - albeit in diverse denominations.
Foulles estimated that it would take at least two years to
accumulate sufficient bullion, English coin and dollars of guaranteed
silver content to provide the country with a stock of sound money.
In the meantime, although he was opposed to the devaluation of the
dollars currently circulating in Scotland he, unlike Aitcheson, did not
rule out the converse - the upward revaluation of the country's silver
coin.	 Indeed, if the king were 'to cry up silver money' by as much as482
ten per cent, the appreciating value of the accumulated stock of sound
money would cover the cost of its conversion into native currency.
Furthermore, revaluation would encourage the wholescale
transportation of foreign coin 'without lose to the subject'.	 Set
against the Hrix-dollar" at fifty-eight shillings, the raising of its
Scottish equivalent from fifty-four shillings to three pounds meant the
merchants stood to gain at least two shillings on every native coin
brought back to Scotland for every dollar shipped out.	 While Foulles
conceded that revaluation could not proceed without English consent, he
was dismissive of its adverse impact on Scottish trade. 	 Rather
naively, he contended that the cost of living would remain unaffected
since the rise in prices would not exceed but correspond to the ten per
cent revaluation.	 International retaliation was not inevitable and
could even be avoided if native specie was not transported abroad to
purchase foreign commodities.	 He was prepared to admit that
revaluation could have serious repercussions in times of dearth when
prices for victual were pushed up by international demand.
Nonetheless, Scottish coin was at least ten per cent undervalued in
relation to the countries of eastern Europe. Hence, the increased
cost of Baltic grain could be absorbed without critical consequences
for the Scottish consumer.	 The country would be more materially
disadvantaged by the maintenance of excessive and indiscriminate rates
for dollars which would encourage France and other countries of western
Europe to continue dumping debased coins in Scottish markets and
drawing off coins of guaranteed silver content.
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Albeit Foulles' strategy of replenishment was technically
feasible, no stock of sound money could be accumulated without the
goodwill and active co-operation of the mercantile community whom he
had pilloried indiscriminately for their avarice as leading traffickers
of coin.	 Hence, the royal burghs were in no mood to countenance his
strategy.	 In an uncompromising reply of 29 January 1633, Foulles'
proposal for a ten per cent revaluation of the country's silver coin
was 'altogither to be rejected as both unnecessar and prejudiciall to
the kingdome'.	 Unnecessary because upward revaluation should only be483
undertaken during some extremity, such as war, from which Scotland was
currently spared.	 Prejudicial in that upward revaluation of the
coinage was usually outstripped by the accompanying rise in prices.
Not only was the cost of living affected adversely, but inflation was
linked irrevocably to the spectre of dearth. 	 While burghs accepted
that victual prices were governed primarily by plenty or scarcity, they
were prepared to cite constitutional precedents in support of the
inflationary impact of inexpedient upward revaluation - namely, past
enactment of James III in 1467 and of James VI in 1581 justifying
recourse to a devalued currency 'for that only reassone, becaus the
hichting thereof causit dearth'.	 Given the recent experience of
famine in 1623, the burghs were fearful that the upward revaluation of
Scottish coin above the currencies of eastern Europe would imperil
adequate supplies of Baltic grain at prices affordable to the poor.
More immediately, the burghs were concerned about the
commercial disruption at home and abroad resulting from upward
revaluation.	 Given that money and commerce have 'ane mutuall and
reciprocall dependence', they were adamant that 'all commodities sail
ryse to exorbitant rates' with hurtful consequences for the whole
nation.	 Ever conscious of the importance of trade to Scotland's
international standing and being reluctant to disrupt established
trading relationships, the burghs warned that the upward revaluation of
the country's silver coin could lead to retaliation by foreign powers.
Hence, instead of reducing the cost of imports, international
readjustment of exchange rates could force up the prices of such
necessary imports as timber, iron, hemp, lint, pitch, tar and wax, and,
indeed, the cost of acquiring bullion from Spain, the principal
supplier of silver.	 This inflationary trend would prove of general
harm to the domestic consumer and of particular hurt to nobles and
gentry 'travelling abroade or drawin by thair affaires to Ingland'.
For, deteriorating exchange rates 'sal prove ane great meines to
exhaust their estats at home' and thereby underwrite the distancing of
leading politicians from the Court.	 Moreover, the rent-rolls of the
landed classes as well as the incomes of the merchants would suffer484
markedly from the increased cost of staple wares occasioned by upward
revaluation.	 With their competitive edge in international markets
reduced, staple wares would have to be sold cheaply in domestic markets
or even, because limited demand would soon lead to saturation, be cast
'furth to the dung hill'.	 Broadening their remonstrance from the
economic to the political consequences of upward revaluation, the
burghs contended that change and innovation in one aspect like coinage
tended to trigger off 'ane change of the whole estate of all thinges
within the kingdome both moveable and imoveable'.
Revaluation notwithstanding, the proposed means of
accumulating a stock of sound money lacked constitutional warrant since
merchants bringing bullion to the Mint were entitled to receive an
equivalent quantity of the country's own coined money by way of
exchange rather than dollars of diverse denominations.	 On purely
empirical grounds, two years was deemed insufficient time to accumulate
a stock of sound money which would depend primarily on the acquisition
of bullion since no merchant nor any other trafficker in coin was
likely to bring coin of guaranteed silver content to the Mint to be
exchanged for dollars of diverse weight and fineness.	 Moreover, the
Mint's withdrawal of dollars from general circulation to pay for
deposits of bullion and coin of guaranteed silver content would
exacerbate the scarcity of small silver coin in the country,
occasioning an unwanted dependence on copper money for domestic
exchange.	 How the accumulated stock of sound money would pass into
general circulation also remained problematic.	 The cost of its
conversion into native coin could certainly not be recouped if
exchanged for dollars circulating at their current excessive rates.
Conversely, if the country's own currency was revalued upwards to cover
the cost of conversion, the issue of new coin of enhanced value -
albeit with English consent circulating as legal tender in both
kingdoms - hardly served as an inducement for merchants to bring
foreign coins of guaranteed silver content to the Mint and bear a ten
per cent loss by way of exchange.485
The royal burghs were especially aggrieved that the cost of
implementing Foulles' strategy of replenishment would fall heaviest on
the mercantile community.	 As the leading traffickers in coin, the
merchants reputedly stood to gain two shillings on every native coin
brought back to Scotland in exchange for foreign dollars following
revaluation.	 However, in order to encourage the export of foreign
coin of indifferent quality, the merchants were to accept dollars of
diverse denominations at current rates of exchange from the public  in
return for native coin or dollars of guaranteed silver content. 	 In
effect, the merchants were to accept at least a two shillings loss on
every foreign coin withdrawn from domestic circulation in the hope of
recouping this shortfall through international exchange. 	 But the
supposition that upward revaluation would attract sufficient native
coin back from abroad to fund the export of foreign coin of
indeterminate quality was purely speculative, a prospect which
overtaxed the merchants' sense of public responsibility.
At the same time, because of their sensitivity to charges of
commercial indiscipline, the royal burghs were determined to rebut
Foulles' imputation that the limited imports of bullion could be
attributed primarily to profiteering by the mercantile community.
Thus, the perennial scarcity of bullion in the Mint did not signify
that merchants were habitual evaders of customs or wholescale smugglers
of gold and silver.	 On the contrary, divergent bimetallic ratios -
whereby gold was appreciating against silver on international exchanges
since the outset of the seventeenth century - had promoted the outflow
of gold from Scotland and the influx of silver dollars of diverse
denominations.	 The acceleration of this bimetallic flow from 1624 was
attributable to the demands of international trade not the
irresponsibility of profiteers.	 Dearth over the previous two years
had obliged the merchants to lay out native specie to purchase Baltic
grain.	 While this outlay had contributed to the massive influx of
foreign coin of indifferent quality, such an influx was necessary to
sustain domestic exchange since native specie and bullion were required
to maintain the country's international trade, especially the supply of486
necessary wares.
Moving onto the offensive the burghs attested that the
thinking behind Foulles' strategy of replenishment was fundamentally
flawed.	 Since it was 'commerce with naturall commodities that bringis
in the greatest part of the Money', increasing the volume of
international trade not accumulating stocks of bullion was the real
key to sound money.	 Accordingly, Foulles' proposals to conserve
bullion as well as secure its steady inflow to the Mint were dismissed
as either misguided or unwarranted irritants to the country's trading
position.
Thus, the enforcement of parliamentary enactments against
unnecessary imports would not entail a blanket prohibition on the
outflow of native specie (or even bullion) on luxuries - notably, wares
of gold and silver brought in chiefly from France not England - but
recourse to the sumptuary laws, the markedly unsuccessful restrictions
on conspicuous consumption among the lower orders.	 No less misguided
would be the imposition of bullion dues on goods transported abroad
under licence.	 When applied to necessities exported as surplus to the
country's requirements, the impost would blunt the competitive edge of
Scottish livestock, linen and yarn in English markets.	 A more heinous
discouragement to trade was the proposal that dollars of guaranteed
silver content should be brought to the Mint to be exchanged as bullion
in three ounce quotas.	 The resulting loss to the merchants, though
reputedly no more than one shilling on every three ounce quota, was in
effect a sales tax equivalent to an impost of three shillings on every
three pounds of merchandise exported.	 No more acceptable were the
suggested bullion levies to be apportioned from earnings of English
coin and dollars of guaranteed silver content.	 The exchange of
commodities in English markets would be impaired materially by the
specific need to earn specie for the Mint.	 In any case, few merchants
would be content to exchange coin of the common monarchy, which was
legal tender in both countries, for foreign dollars in diverse
denominations.	 A similar levy on sales of coal and salt, while487
primarily the concern of the nobles and gentry, could prove
particularly damaging to the salt trade which had taken advantage of
the wars with France and Spain to make marked advances in English
markets but was now facing retrenchment on the conclusion of peace with
both countries.
The burghs were not content simply to reject Foulles'
strategy.	 They were mindful of the pressing need to rectify the
circulation of dollars at excessive rates in domestic markets and to
ward off the dumping of debased dollars in Scotland by foreign powers.
While they remained implacably opposed to Briot's drastic, if
staggered, devaluation - based on the reduction of the "rix-dollar"
from fifty-eight shillings to fifty-three shillings over ten months -
they were prepared to countenance a modest reduction of two shillings
in the value of the dollar.	 If staggered to an initial reduction of
one shilling, such devaluation would 'fall short far of sevin tymes his
majesties extraordinar taxatioun in one yeir' as postulated by Foulles.
Indeed, since the resulting losses would be dispersed nationwide, such
a modest devaluation could be absorbed without material damage to the
country's commerce.	 Moreover, the burghs were adamant that
devaluation would not warrant strong central controls over the money
supply, notably the bringing of all imported foreign coin to the Mint
to authenticate its silver content prior to release for domestic
exchange.	 Nonetheless, in the absence of tabulated rates of exchange,
they were concerned to allay fears that merchants would have free rein
to profiteer from devaluation.	 Trafficking in coin - as against
bullion - was not concentrated in a few hands but was pursued
throughout the mercantile community which ensured competitive, if
localised, exchange rates to the advantage of the public.
Furthermore, devaluation would not restrict the flow of foreign coin
out of the country since the importation of necessities and the
purchase of goods for re-export, such as wax, required payments in
specie 'and dollores does best serve that way'.	 Although they
glossed over the eventuality that devaluation would draw off dollars
of guaranteed quality leaving only debased dollars in domestic488
circulation, the burghs were adamant that the country's international
trading position required the free movement of money.	 Only when
Scotland had attained an abundance of native currency through an
increased volume of trade should 'ane absolute restraint' be imposed on
importing dollars, 'to the end men may be terrefiet for the inbringing
of any more'.
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Despite the acrimonious tenor of the debate on the state of
the currency and the lack of common resolve among the participants, the
Privy Council did strive for a confensus on the most efficacious means
to restrain the importation of foreign dollars and to augment the stock
of native coin at minimum disruption to the country's commerce.	 Thus,
no official backing was given to Briot's proposal for a staggered
devaluation of foreign dollars linked to a new issue of native coin
with its silver content debased; nor was support forthcoming for
Aitcheson's scheme to convert foreign dollars into debased native coin
by clipping.	 Foulles' strategy of replenishment, whereby the
accumulation of a stock of sound money was the precursor to a new issue
of coin with its silver content enhanced, was likewise denied
endorsement.	 Signposting the growing alienation of the Scottish
administration from the Court, the maintenance of commercial confidence
within the country was preferred over any tampering with the coinage.
For not only did debasement and enhancement have inflationary
consequences nationwide, but such tampering benefited sectional
interests - notably, traffickers in coin who brought foreign dollars
and bullion to the Mint, the officials who earned fees from the issue
of new coin and above all, the Crown, which took a substantial cut from
the proceeds of minting.
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	The Council was no doubt aware that the
resulting increase in the Crown's purchasing power would not be
utilised to clear off arrears of pensions, fees and allowances, but to
buy out superiorities of kirklands and heritable jurisdictions.
While rejecting debasement or enhancement, the Council was
not content to await the original panacea proferred by the royal burghs
that the adjustment of exchange rates in Scotland's favour would489
automatically follow on from an increased volume of international
trade.	 Instead, preference was accorded to an immediate, but modest,
devaluation of the dollar as outlined in the revised proposals of the
burghs.	 Since the 'principal caus' of the circulation of foreign
dollars at excessive rates 'hes proceidit from tollerating thame to pas
within this country at ane heir rate then they pas in Ingland i , parity
was to be restored by reducing the value of the dollar by two shillings
which could be achieved in stages 'without infinite loss to the
people'. Accordingly, the "rix-dollar", as the international standard
for exchange, should be reduced for six months to fifty-seven shillings
and thereafter to fifty-six shillings.
In order to conserve as well as augment the country's stock
of native coin, official backing was given to three proposals which
sought to balance central control of the money supply with the liberal
regulation of commerce.	 Thus, all private trafficking in bullion was
to be proscribed, but merchants bringing bullion to the Mint were to be
guaranteed native coin of equivalent value in exchange which they were
expected toamong domestic markets.	 Merchants were to be gOsit.i-t 
free from any exaction or composition, tantamount to a sales tax, on
bullion brought to the Mint.	 Moreover, to secure a steady flow of
dollars of guaranteed silver content, all foreign coin brought to the
Mint as bullion was to be converted into native currency 'at als easie
rates as is done in Ingland'.	 Above all, commerce was to be
encouraged as the 'best means to draw in money within any Kingdome'
since 'these thingis quhich impedis trade and diminischis the same
procures lykwayis the diminutione and want of money'.	 Given the
limited supplies of native commodities to sustain international
exchange directly, 'greater libertie and ease of custome' should be
tailored to suit the country's carrying trade, notably in 'commodities
brocht hither to rest bot for ane schort tyme' - such as English
cloths, furs, sheep skins, timber and wax - for which there was little
domestic demand.	 While these proposals were advocated as long term
remedies for the general shortage of native coin within Scotland, the
most pressing need was for native coin below the value of twelve490
shillings for domestic exchange.	 Accordingly, a year's supply of
bullion was to be converted into native coin in small denominations,
preferably into one shilling and sixpence pieces, equivalent to, but
distinct from, the English penny and halfpenny pieces.	 In turn, by
maintaining conformity with England, the Council reaffirmed its
rejection of debasement or enhancement of the country's silver coin.
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Following the conclusion of the plenary discussions on the
state of the currency, Charles mulled over the Council's
recommendations throughout the spring of 1633.	 No attempt was made to
implement a modest, staggered devaluation nor to meet the pressing need
for silver coin in small denominations nor to set in train the longer
term proposals to conserve and augment the country's stock of native
coin.	 In the meantime, foreign dollars continued to flow into the
country, displacing native coin and circulating at excessive rates in
domestic markets. Eventually, on 25 May, Charles called for a further
round of private discussions under the auspices of the Privy Council to
prepare the ground for consideration of the coinage in the coronation
parliament when summoned in June.
23
	However, Charles was no longer
prepared to tolerate open or wideranging discussions. When the gentry
convened in Edinburgh prior to the coronation parliament to collate and
articulate the grievances of the localities, including 'the unspeakable
sufferings' arising 'be the abuse of coyne', their meeting was
interrupted and dispersed in the king's name.
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Nonetheless, the shire commissioners were allowed to submit a
brief list of specific economic grievances requiring redress which
featured the scarcity of native coin - both silver and gold - and the
excessive circulation of base coin, particularly foreign dollars.
But Charles again resorted to censorious management.	 The specific
grievances, once aired, were not debated by the estates but remitted to
the Privy Council to seek out expedient remedies.	 Moreover, in the
light of appeals to constitutional precedent during the plenary
discussions on the state of the currency six months earlier, notably to
inhibit tampering with the value of native coin, Charles was adamant491
that the remission of coinage matters to the Privy Council was a mere
favour on his part.	 The sole right of the Crown to revalue, debase or
enhance the country's currency was in no way impaired.	 Indeed,
Charles inserted a personal caveat that the management of the money
supply and the ordering of exchange rates were 'aspects of the
prerogative royall' which did not require the consent of the Estates.25
However, Charles was prepared to make one tangible concession
to promote commercial confidence among the estates as well as conserve
the country's stock of coin.	 The Privy Council was commissioned to
establish 'the dew and just rate and portioun of interest' for money
advanced on credit.	 Apparently, 'the great and exorbitant interest
accustomed formerlie to be takine be merchands and factors of
Scotland', not just for sums loaned within the country but also for
specie advanced by way of exchange in the city of London, 'haith given
occasioun to the frequent and continewall exportatioun of gold and
money furth of this kingdome'.	 The subsequent reduction of the
official interest rate from ten to eight per cent was designed not only
to bring Scotland into line with neighbouring countries and to increase
the volume of the country's commerce, but also to facilitate - albeit
belatedly - the movement of leading politicians between Edinburgh and
the Court.
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Charles peremptorily dissipated the goodwill that could have
accrued from this gesture by requisitioning the two per cent drop in
the interest rate as a benevolence for the Crown to be uplifted from
all annualrents over the next three years.	 While all borrowers paid
interest to their creditors at the new rate of eight per cent as
against the ten per cent originally specified in their annualrents, the
two per cent differential was now to be paid directly into the
Exchequer.	 In effect, Charles suspended the implementation of a
reduced interest rate for three years, a manoeuvre which did little for
commercial confidence within Scotland and prejudiced the resumption of
discussions on the state of the currency in the aftermath of the
coronation parliament. 27492
The discussions, resumed sporadically under the auspices of
the Privy Council, degenerated into sectarian squabbling by the outset
of 1634.	 The royal burghs attempted to shift the onus for the
restoration of sound money onto the coalowners and saltmasters in that
the renewal of the prohibition on the import of foreign dollars should
be applied selectively to the trade in coal and salt not to commercial
exchange in general.	 The burghs' suggestion that coal and salt should
be purchased with the king's own coin not foreign dollars was taken up
by the Privy Council on 30 January, though a short term respite was
granted in favour of foreign traders already shipping coal and salt
from the Firth of Forth.	 Sustained lobbying by the coalowners and
saltmasters over the next six months served to remind the Council that
the viability of the coal and salt industries depended on exports.
The prohibition on the acceptance of dollars carried the danger that
foreign traders would switch to English suppliers, notably around
Newcastle.	 Loss of overseas markets could lead to the wholescale
closure of the elaborate workings on the Forth, a catastrophe of
national rather than regional significance, threatening massive
redundancies among the workforce and widespread social dislocation in
their search for alternative subsistence.	 By 1 August, the Council
was prepared to recognise that the coal and salt industries faced utter
undoing within the year if the prohibition on the acceptance of foreign
dollars was not relaxed.	 Accordingly, this discriminatory prohibition
was lifted until 1 November, not so much to secure commercial recovery
as to allow coalowners and saltmasters to recoup sums due from
defaulting foreign creditors.	 Given the shortage of coin of the
common monarchy on international exchanges, the coalowners and
saltmasters had felt obliged to sell their commodities on credit in a
despairing effort to maintain exports.	 The need to maintain the
commercial viability of the trade in coal and salt made the renewal of
the prohibition ineffective.	 Such discriminatory treatment served
only to promote civil disobedience among coalowners and saltmasters who
continued to traffic illicitly in dollars. 28
Despite instigating the discriminatory prohibition, the royal493
burghs remained the leading protagonists of the need for secure
commercial development in the national interest.	 The stabilising of
prices through the attainment of sound money required the encouragement
of existing industries, such as coal and salt, as well as the
introduction of new manufactures to retain specie at home and attract
coin of guaranteed silver content from abroad.	 Hence, on
4 February 1634, the burghs issued an overture reminding the Privy
Council of the measures for conserving and augmenting the country's
stock of coin which emanated from the plenary discussions on the state
of the currency twelve months earlier.
Given the continuing international shortage of bullion, the
statutory requirement that merchants earn foreign specie from exports
was insufficient to secure the flow of dollars of guaranteed silver
content into the Mint.	 All compositions exacted from merchants
bringing foreign specie to the Mint should be discharged.	 Moreover,
foreign specie brought as bullion to the Mint should be converted into
native coin at the same rates charged in the English Mint: thereby,
merchants bringing coin of guaranteed silver content for conversion
should receive at least sixty shillings per ounce clear of charges.
Conversely, in order to check collusion and fraud in the trafficking in
bullion, each merchant should be personally accountable for ensuring
that foreign specie earned from exports was brought directly to the
Mint.
Notwithstanding these strictures to inculcate public
responsibility throughout the mercantile community, priority was
accorded to a staggered devaluation based on the "rix-dollar"; not just
as a necessary check to the wholescale importation of foreign coin, but
because the maintenance of exchange rates in fixed ratio to those of
England was constitutionally warranted as a 'fundamental' law'.
Hence, the "rix-dollar" should initially be devalued by one shilling
for six months and thereafter by a further shilling at six monthly
intervals until parity with England was restored: that is, when the
dollar reached its true value of fifty-four shillings, whereupon494
traffickers in coin would gain no material advantage from bringing
dollars into the country and their wholescale importation could be
prohibited.	 However, the sustenance of the country's international
trade ruled out a blanket prohibition since dollars should still be
received from 'such strangers as hes no uther money'. 	 Indeed, such
foreign specie could expeditiously be converted into native currency,
particularly as the 'absolute scarcitie' of silver coin in the small
denominations necessary for domestic exchange showed no foreseeable
signs of abating.29
Once again, however, Charles' insistence that all coinage
matters were aspects of his prerogative - necessitating further
deliberation as well as authentication of any remedial programme at
Court - proved a recipe for inaction. 	 When the committee of inquiry
into the running of the Exchequer concluded its investigations on
26 August 1634, its deliberations on the currency had merely gone over
ground covered in the plenary discussions at the outset of 1633. The
committee came out firmly against the retention of a large stock of
coin in the Mint as favoured by George Foulles. 	 The benefit so
accruing to the Crown, which was 'verie considerable in former tymes',
had been wiped out by the massive influx of foreign dollars since the
1620s. Their excessive circulation at rates prejudicial to the public
had not only displaced native coin from domestic markets but occasioned
a 'want of change' in the Mint, thereby undermining the central
direction of exchange.	 While further investigations into the 'abuse
of the coyne' and the running of the Mint were called for, the most
immediate requirement was that the king allow his Scottish
administration to conclude and implement a remedial programme on its
own initiative. 30
Frustrations about the king's authoritarian, but vacillating,
management of the money supply and ordering of the exchange rate had
been building up within official circles ever since Charles had
commissioned Briot, at the outset of 1632, to mint copper coins in
small denominations for domestic exchange.	 His arrogant, but lax,495
implementation of his commission had prejudiced severely the reception
accorded to his proposal - for a staggered devaluation of the
"rix-dollar" linked to a new issue of small coins with their silver
content modestly debased - during the plenary discussions on the state
of the currency at the outset of 1633.
31	Indeed, the committee of
inquiry into the running of the Exchequer, when submitting their
findings to Court on 12 October 1634, went so far as to assert that the
commission renewed in Briot's favour that March should be rescinded.
In like vi, TraliAr, when personally endorsing the findings of the
committee on 21 November, exhorted Hamilton that the state of the
currency was now so grave that the Council must be allowed to act on
its own initiative without waiting on directives from the Court. 	 If
no order was taken by the end of the year, the abuse of the coin 'will
prove unsupportable'.	 As a first remedial step, Briot should be sent
packing.32
The criticisms directed against Briot from within the
Scottish administration did not just amount to a thinly veiled protest
against the Court's inept and insensitive management of the country's
currency, but were symptomatic of a deeper malaise - the disastrous
impact on international exchange of the recourse to copper coin
throughout western Europe.	 As the dominant influence on monetary
exchange within Europe, Spain was the most culpable offender.	 In an
attempt to boost royal revenues by expanding the money supply, vast
quantities of copper coin were minted in Spain from the later sixteenth
century.	 Ostensibly, the recourse to copper was to meet the needs of
small-scale domestic exchange and to expand the use of money among the
lower orders.	 However, Spain's upward revamping of the value of
copper coin from 1603, when the supplies of gold and silver from the
New World were beginning to decline, attracted a large inflow of
counterfeit and debased coins from the Netherlands and the German
states.	 Such illicit trafficking not only caused copper coin to flood
into Spain but clogged up international exchange. 	 Moreover, the
external flow of precious metals from western Europe - to secure raw
materials as well as luxuries from eastern Europe, the Levant and the496
Far East - compounded by the immobilisation of exchange brought about
by hoarding, served to draw off silver coin. 	 Thus, the widespread
recourse to copper to increase the supply and speed up the circulation
of coin occasioned a massive disruption to the monetary system of
western Europe, confirming the hypothesis that bad money drives out
good.	 Indeed, by the 1620s, when the unchecked inflationary demands
generated by the Thirty Years War were pushing up silver premiums by as
much as fifty per cent, the minting of copper coin had become a major
irritant to price stability, both domestically and internationally.
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While the minting of copper coin for the purposes of
small-scale domestic exchange - and, indeed, alms for the poor - was
not a novelty in Scotland, James VI's last issue of 1623 coincided with
the massive influx of foreign dollars into Scotland and served to
accelerate the displacement of native silver coin from domestic
markets.	 Spain's temporary stop on minting copper coin in 1626
relaxed international demand for copper, supplied primarily by Sweden.
Taking advantage of this relaxation and responding to pleas from the
royal burghs that the scarcity of currency for small-scale exchange
required a re-issue of the coinage of 1623 in his own name, Charles, on
12 February 1629, directed that five hundred stone of copper should be
coined into penny and twopence pieces.	 However, the lack of effectual
checks for the excessive circulation of foreign dollars in domestic
markets and the exodus of native specie abroad, meant that Charles'
first issue of copper coin, which was to be ready by April 1631, merely
confirmed that bad money drives out good. 34
Moreover, the re-issuing of penny and twopence pieces, the
traditional "turners", according to the ordinance of 1629 proved
insufficient to meet the expanding use of money among the lower orders.
On the instructions of Charles, the Privy Council issued a directive
on 26 August 1631, trebling the amount of copper to be coined - to
one thousand five hundred stone - and changing the denomination from
the traditional "turners" to 'farthing tokens' - that is, threepence
pieces equivalent to one farthing sterling.	 In essence, the new497
issue was commissioned to promote economic uniformity with England
rather than small-scale exchange within Scotland, the needs of which
could have been met more conveniently by a further issue of the
traditional "turners".	 Despite claims from the Court that the trade
between both kingdoms would benefit from the issue of farthings 'at
the weight and pryces they ar current in England', the Council ordained
that no more than two farthings were to be accepted for every one
pound's worth of goods purchased.	 Conversely, the issue of a
threepence piece as a new Scottish denomination would afford fresh
opportunities for importers of counterfeit and debased "turners",
especially as the specifications for minting the farthing tokens
entailed substantial debasement to stretch out the use of copper.
Even although the royal burghs withheld support for the new issue of
copper coin, Charles remained impervious to the potential danger to the
monarchical position in Scotland from the linking of currency
debasement to economic uniformity.	 Nonetheless, sustained lobbying by
the burghs over the next three months that the re-issue of traditional
"turners" would accord more with the national interest as well as check
the growth of illicit trafficking in copper coin led the Council, on
10 November 1631, to ban the importation of English farthings and other
coins of dubious copper content.	 No more than a miniscule portion of
the new threepence pieces had been minted by 10 January 1632, when
Charles conceded that the latest issue of copper coin should revert to
the traditional "turners", one thousand five hundred stone of which
were to be minted by Briot and be in circulation by January 1635.
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Albeit only diminutive and inconvenient twopence pieces would
appear to have been issued, the coining of the one thousand
five hundred stone of copper, which commenced in February 1632, was
completed by November 1633 - fourteen months ahead of schedule.
Nonetheless, the new "turners" not only proved unpopular with the
general public, but generated much controversy within the Scottish
administration.	 At the core of this controversy were the technical
and financial provisions of Briot's commission to coin the new
"turners", which merely redefined the coinage specifications not the498
working conditions laid down in his original commission to mint the
farthing tokens.	 The leading officials in the Mint were particularly
disconcerted not just by the king's preferment of a stranger, but by
Briot's stated intent to mint the new coins by milling rather than
hammering.	 Their protests about the king's commissioning of Briot
were but partially appeased when Charles conceded that the leading
officials, in return for helping Briot set up the engines and other
machinery required for his innovatory process, should supervise the
daily output of new "turners" from the Mint.	 This concession
notwithstanding, leading officials continued to resent the
establishment of an autonomous workshop in the Mint staffed by workmen
imported from London.	 Briot did little to win over their support,
returning to England the month that coining cvlienced without making
adequate provision for quality control. 	 During his brief sojourn to
Scotland to present his proposals for rectifying the silver coinage
before the Privy Council in December 1632, leading officials impounded
thirty stone of the coined copper for failing to meet the standards
specified in his commission.	 The impounded coin was eventually
returned to Briot for rectification in May 1633, when he returned
temporarily to Scotland to strike medals for Charles' coronation.	 In
view of the king's imminent state visit, all blame for excessive or
deficient weighting was assigned diplomatically to Briot's workmen.
The presentation of accounts for the completed coinage twelve months
later added spice to the complaints of the leading officials in the
Mint.	 Although the cost of coining the one thousand five hundred
stone of copper valued at £9,600 broke even, a loss of £256 13s 4d was
incurred putting the new "turners" into circulation.	 Moreover,
Briot, despite his continuous absenteeism, received generous - if not
excessive - fees of £4,201 4s 6d, whereas the leading officials charged
to oversee daily production during the twenty-one months of coining
received only £131 5s.
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The most contentious aspect of the copper currency within
the country as within the Scottish administration was not Briot's
exercise of his commission, however, but the involvement of499
William Alexander, viscount (later earl of) Stirling. 	 His influence
can be detected behind the king's original commission to Briot to mint
the farthing tokens.	 Stirling was acting not so much in his official
capacity as Court Secretary but as a principal Scottish creditor of the
Crown with special liabilities from the colonising of Nova Scotia.
For it would seem more than a coincidence that on the same day -
10 July 1631 - Charles sued for peace with France by ordering the
abandonment of the Canadian colony, he assigned to Stirling all profits
accruing to the Crown from the projected coining of farthing tokens.
Seven months later, Charles adapted this financial arrangement to
accord to the minting of new "turners". 	 On 20 February 1632, a
contract was drawn up whereby Stirling, in return for bearing the cost
of establishing Briot's workshop in the Mint, was to be compensated for
the abandonment of Nova Scotia.	 The equivalent of £10,000 sterling
(£120,000) of copper was to be coined on his behalf by Briot over the
next nine years. 37	In effect, this contract was tantamount to the
privatisation of copper coining, an expensive gesture for the Crown,
politically as well as financially.	 In popular parlance the new coins
were to be denigrated as the "Stirling turners".	 More pertinently,
the bitter cry arose within official circles that the king, in order to
liquidate his debts to Stirling, had granted his favourite a liberty
'to coin base money'.
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Charles' directive of 13 March 1634, that the continuing
scarcity of coin for small-scale domestic exchange warranted the
further coining of one thousand five hundred stone of copper under the
direction of Briot gave fresh impetus to the public outcry over the
"Stirling turners".	 For Charles' decision afforded the earl, now
hard-pressed by his own creditors, a welcome opportunity to negotiate a
more comprehensive contract for coining copper. 	 The Crown not only
owed Stirling compensation of £10,000 sterling for venture capital lost
in colonising Nova Scotia, but an allowance of £6,000 sterling
(£72,000) granted by James VI, 'for good and faithful service', was
still outstanding.	 According to the redrafted contract of
26 November, once the second one thousand five hundred stone of copper500
had been coined on Stirling's behalf, Charles was prepared to
countenance a further coining of six thousand stone of copper and
thereafter, one thousand five hundred stone annually until the earl s
patent expired in the spring of 1641.	 Another four months were to
elapse before the Exchequer, on 23 March 1635, ratified that the
Crown's debt of £192,000 to Stirling was to be repaid by assigning
the earl the whole profit and commodity arising from 'ye printing of ye
copper coyne' over the next six years.	 This delay in ratification
reflected the spread of opposition to the "Stirling turners" within the
Scottish administration.	 Leading officials charged to supervise the
daily output from the Mint had persistently demonstrated their
opposition to privatisation by rigorous, verging on obstructive,
quality control.	 Hence, Charles had insisted on the exclusion of
leading officials from all oversight of Briot's workshop from
7 January 1635 - other than to ensure that the yearly quotas of coined
copper were not exceeded.	 Obstructive action was not confined to
Edinburgh.	 Charles was again obliged to intervene on 14 March to
uphold Briot's licence to import copper into Scotland free of impost.
Even although Briot had already paid the requisite export dues in
England, his latest consignment of copper plate 'for the fabrication of
copper money' had been stopped at the Border for the further exaction
of custom. 39
Notwithstanding Charles' strictures against obstructive
activities, the continuing opposition to Stirling's patent, not just
within the Mint but throughout the Scottish administration, slowed up
considerably the coining of the second one thousand five hundred stone
of copper authorised in February 1634.	 The actual issue of new
"turners" took over a year longer than the first issue commissioned in
January 1632 and again only twopence pieces would appear to have been
coined (though one penny pieces were also warranted).	 It was not
until the spring of 1637, after discussions between the Privy Council
and Stirling's son, Lord William Alexander, Viscount Canada, that a
further issue of "turners" was authorised on 13 May. 	 However, instead
of confirming that six thousand stone of copper was to be coined as501
specified in Stirling's revised contract of March 1635, the king
warranted the coining of only one thousand eight hundred stone.
Furthermore, because resistance to the privatisation of copper coining
within official circles was more than matched by public antipathy to
the new "turners", Charles conceded that Stirling's patent would not be
renewed on its expiry in the spring of 1641.	 It seems unlikely that
the one thousand eight hundred stone of copper - or even a substantial
portion thereof - was ever coined. For, in a futile attempt to
appease mounting political unrest about the Court's direction of
Scottish affairs, the minting of "turners" was suspended temporarily in
December 1637.	 Although production may have resumed fitfully during
1638, the outbreak of the Bishops' Wars in the spring of 1639
effectively terminated Stirling's patent two years ahead of schedule.
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Stirling himself died on 12 February 1640, his patent for
coining copper having failed to relieve the pecuniary embarrassment
which had characterised his financial ventures as a courtier. His
epitaph among the disaffected element was that of an erstwhile royal
favourite hated for 'overwhelming us with his Black money'.
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	That
Stirling should be so castigated was not so much a reflection that too
many "turners" had been coined on his behalf as a reaction to the lax
standards governing their minting and distribution, especially after
the exclusion of leading officials from all oversight of Briot's
workshop in the Mint from the spring of 1635.	 For lax standards had
opened the flood-gates to illicit trafficking in counterfeit and
debased coin.	 Despite the prohibition on importing farthing tokens
and other foreign coin of dubious copper content imposed from
November 1631, domestic markets throughout the 1630s were steadily
swamped with counterfeit and debased copper coin mainly brought in by
sea from the Netherlands if not overland from England. 	 Periodic
renewals of 'ane full restraint' on the importation of farthing tokens
and foreign "turners" throughout the personal rule of Charles I proved
markedly unsuccessful.	 Not even statutory warnings that illicit
traffickers in copper coin would be subject to rigorous fines and that
forgers were liable to capital punishment could check the influx of502
English farthings, Dutch "turners" and 'such other kyndis of trashe
never tolerated previously'.	 The prolific issue of local commissions
to prominent burgesses assisted by local gentry from 17 March 1635, to
apprehend forgers and illicit traffickers at the leading ports and
customs costs on the Border, also proved of no avail. 	 Unscrupulous
traders were able to exploit the limited experience of using money
among the lower orders as, indeed, the general ignorance of the public
at large about international exchange.	 By placing "turners" in little
bags, copper coins were passed off as dollars in domestic markets.
Moreover, while the traffickers in counterfeit and debased coin bore
the brunt of official rebuke for the chronic disruption of domestic
exchange, affluent merchants were able to exploit the wholesale methods
deployed by Stirling's agents to expedite the circulation of newly
minted "turners".	 Purchased by weight in barrells, "turners" were
released by the piece into domestic markets at slightly inflated rates
in relation to silver.	 Having enticed 'the ruder sort of people' to
accept the "Stirling turners" in exchange for silver coin, the affluent
merchants shipped dollars of guaranteed silver quality as well as
native specie overseas to take advantage of the higher rates for silver
coin in international exchanges - a classic confirmation of bad money
driving out good.
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Furthermore, because the "turners" coined on behalf of the
earl of Stirling were deemed 'under the just weight' of the traditional
"turners" coined for James VI, the incoming Covenanting regime were
faced with a dilemma - whether to revalue or to recoin as part of their
bid to restore public confidence in the country's currency.	 In
response to pressure from commissioners from both the shires and the
royal burghs, parliament in September 1639, in addition to renewing the
ban on importing copper coin and reaffirming the death penalty for
kft convicted forgers, was to di h rge formally all further coining of the
"Stirling turners".	 After two months of prolonged agonising, the
Council was to issue a directive on 2 November, that all "Stirling
turners", other than those reduced in value to one penny, were to be
withdrawn from circulation along with all counterfeit and foreign503
"turners", a decision which had to be reversed within five days because
of the chronic shortage of acceptable copper coin for small-scale
domestic exchange.	 Only the traditional "turners" coined under
James VI had been exempted from this proposed devaluation and only
these copper coins were to retain the confidence of the public and the
Covenanting regime.	 However, the unconditional withdrawal of the
"Stirling turners" from domestic circulation in April 1640, gave fresh
impetus to illicit trafficking in counterfeit and debased coins.
Indeed, such was the chaotic state of the copper money resulting from
the chronic scarcity of acceptable native coin and the renewed influx
of imported coin 'in weight far within the intrinsick value of the
copper', that parliament was moved to affirm in August 1641, that
remedial action could brook no further delay. 	 Despite an experimental
melting down of "Stirling turners" in the Mint that October, another
four months were to elapse before a new issue of "turners" of greater
substance was commissioned.	 At the same time, the "Stirling turners"
were officially demonetised: anyone bringing them to the Mint for
recoining was to receive no more than thirteen shillings and four pence
for each pound weight which had a nominal face-value of ninety-six
shillings.
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Within the broad spectrum of political, judicial and economic
grievances presented for redress to the first Covenanting parliament in
1639, the state of the copper money, however chaotic, was not accorded
utmost priority.	 Yet, the coining of the "Stirling turners" and the
accompanying proliferation of counterfeit and debased "turners" in
domestic markets cannot be dismissed merely as 'another minor cause of
discontent' mainly affecting the burghs during the 1630s.
44	Although
the outcry about the state of the copper money was led by the royal
burghs, disaffection was rife in both town and country - wherever
small-scale exchange took place.	 The leadership given by the burghs
was in keeping with their defence of the national interest in all
matters affecting the Scottish economy and their advocacy of
constitutional checks to counter the ill-conceived and disruptive
directives emanating from the Court.	 In turn, the first Covenanting504
parliament was not only to discharge further coining of the "Stirling
turners" but to require the consent of the estates for any change in
the value of money circulating within Scotland.45
The outcry over the copper money must be placed within the
context of Charles' inept, intemperate and irresolute management of the
country's currency - as, indeed, of the Scottish economy as a whole.
The continuing circulation of unsound money - whether copper or silver
coin - dealt a major blow to commercial confidence within Scotland.
Thus, the consensus in favour of remedial action at the outset of his
reign was being converted into a groundswell of support for the
disaffected element by the close of 1636, particularly after Charles
followed up his nomination of Briot as master of the Scottish Mint with
a swingeing, if staggered, devaluation of the "rix-dollar" and the
issue of innovatory new silver and gold coins extolling his
prerogative.
The demise of George Foulles having created a vacancy for
master-coiner, Charles' nomination of Briot, which reached Scotland on
7 August 1635, created an administrative controversy that dragged on
for ten months.	 The Council remained reluctant to ratify the
appointment because of Briot's personal conceit, vociferous opposition
from the leading officials in the Mint and adverse comment from the
royal burghs.	 Briot was not prepared to accept the normal terms of
his appointment.	 He would not provide surety for the faithful
discharge of his office.	 Nor would he pledge that he would not leave
the country without licence from the Council - even though the lax
standards of quality control in minting the "Stirling turners" were
attributable in no small measure to his continuous absenteeism.	 On
the contrary, as he was already an officer in the English Mint, he
feared that his lucrative fees and allowances as chief engraver would
be prejudiced if he took up permanent residence in Scotland. 	 Apart
from considering Briot an arrogant interloper, the leading officials
in the Mint were greatly disconcerted by Briot's demand to combine the
office of chief engraver and sinker of his Majesty's irons with that of505
master-coiner in order to advance his innovatory use of mill and
press - rather than the traditional hammer - to mint silver and gold as
well as copper coins.	 More speciously, because they were reluctant to
admit Briot's expertise to combine both offices, they claimed the
combination was without precedent in Scotland.
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While the royal burghs questioned the wisdom of appointing
a stranger with no stake in the country, the main thrust of their
criticisms was to secure more favourable terms of exchange at the
Mint.	 They were particularly conscious that gold could be exchanged
at the English Mint at rates twenty-five per cent higher than those
offered in Scotland.	 Moreover, since the value of silver as coin in
both countries was consistently below the value of silver as bullion
in the early seventeenth century, bringing silver for coining at the
Mint was an act of public generosity.	 In order to reward such
generosity, the burghs wanted the rates of commission exacted for the
conversion of bullion into coin halved - from two shillings to
one shilling per ounce - to achieve parity with England.	 Furthermore,
the waiting time for the return of bullion as silver coin should also
be halved - to fifteen days - for all traffickers in coin as for
merchants.
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However, the paramount need to mint silver coin in small
denominations for domestic exchange persuaded the Privy Council to seek
an accommodation.	 Briot's appointment as master-coiner was ratified
on 23 June 1636, but only on a temporary basis which was not to
'strengthen his place and pretention to the said office in time
coming'.	 Over the next fourteen months Briot was to demonstrate his
expertise both as an engraver and a coiner, using customary as well as
innovatory techniques.	 His first issue of silver coin authorised on
21 July, was coined from the bullion made available by merchants from
the foreign specie and silver plate earned from exports. 	 He made use
of the traditional hammer to coin twenty pence, forty pence and
half-merk (six shillings and eight pence) pieces; two-thirds of which
were designated exclusively for domestic exchange, the remaining third506
being restored to the merchants for general release at home or abroad.
Having been authorised by the Council on 29 November, to convert
two-thirds of the foreign dollars currently circulating in Scotland
into native coin as six shillings and twelve shillings pieces, Briot
managed to persuade Charles not only that the conversion could be
accomplished more efficiently by mill and press, but that all royalties
from the exchange of dollars accepted for conversion in the Mint should
be assigned to him.	 Moreover, Briot had his initial inserted on all
coins following the commencement of minting by mill and press on
12 January 1637.	 This innovation, while justified as marking his
expertise as both engraver and coiner, conveyed to the country at
large the impression that he exercised his calling 'insolently'.
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Nonetheless, his expertise convinced a majority in the Privy
Council to ratify his appointment as master-coiner on a permanent basis
from 2 August 1637.	 However, in order to meet the continuing
criticisms of the royal burghs as well as the leading officials in the
Mint, Briot's son-in-law, John Falconer, was associated jointly in the
office, the latter agreeing to provide surety for both.	 A further
concession, the appointment of an eleven-man committee headed by
Traquhair, to determine specifically the duties and obligations of the
masters of the Mint, was pre-empted by the recall of Briot to Court
three days later.	 Although Briot returned briefly to Scotland in
October to mint further issues of silver and gold coins, which were
duly inscribed with the initials of both master-coiners, he would
appear to have made a politic retreat from Scotland by the time the
Covenanting Movement emerged into public prominence in the spring of
1638.	 The contract to convert silver and gold plate into the first
issue of coin on behalf of the Covenanting regime was negotiated
exclusively with John Falconer in June 1639.
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Briot's issues of silver and gold coins - the first since the
king's inaugural imprints of April 1625 50
 - complemented the swingeing
devaluation authorised by Charles in the course of 1636.
Devaluation had actually been under serious consideration since the507
spring of 1635.	 The continuing circulation of foreign dollars at
excessive rates in domestic markets and the chronic shortage of native
coin had led Charles to appoint a ten-man committee of foremost
councillors headed by Archbishop Spottiswood on 15 May, to consider the
readiest remedies for 'the abuses latelie crept in within that our
ancient kingdome'.	 However, the committee had baulked at recommending
devaluation whether immediately or by degrees, preferring instead to
prohibit the exchange of Scottish commodities for foreign specie -
other than dollars of guaranteed silver content suitable for exchange
as bullion at the Mint.	 Accordingly, a remedial package, tried and
found wanting in the past, was again unwrapped on 7 August. 	 All
merchants were to bring bullion earned from exports directly to the
Mint.	 Dealers in cattle and sheep, as in coal and salt, were
forbidden to receive any coin other than that of the common monarchy or
dollars specified as acceptable for conversion into native coin at the
Mint.	 A three month survey was to be instigated, concentrating on the
trade in coal and salt, to ensure that dollars specified as acceptable
were exchanged at rates prescribed by the Mint.	 This effort to
reassert central direction over the country's currency proved of no
avail.	 The receipt of bullion by customs farmers at the ports and
Border towns was maintained to suit the convenience of the Exchequer
rather than the requirements of the Mint.	 Official monitoring of
Exchange rates notwithstanding, debased dollars continued to flood into
the country displacing native coin in domestic markets.
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In a despairing attempt to check the excessive circulation of
foreign dollars - and unscrupulous traders' exploitation of public
ignorance about accurate values for individual denominations - the
value of the "rix-dollar" was reduced by the Council from fifty-eight
shillings to fifty-six shillings on 11 February 1636.	 The immediate
benefit to debtors from the fall in the real value of money was more
than outweighed by the deleterious impact of devaluation upon commerce,
especially evident in the tightening up of credit and the erosion of
landed incomes.	 During the seven months in which this two shillings
reduction remained in force, the Crown itself lost £1,446 10s on the508
value of the taxation voted by the coronation parliament. 52	Over the
same period, the failure of the devalued rate of exchange to reverse
the outflow of native specie and the influx of dollars of diverse
denominations occasioned an official pronouncement, laced with
hyperbole, on 12 September, that 'there is no moneyes at all current
within the kingdome of his Majesties owne proper stampe and coyne'.
Accordingly, after much fraught debate in the Council as to the
expediency of a further one shilling or two shillings devaluation, the
"rix-dollar" was reduced to fifty-four shillings.	 The most popular of
the German imports, the "dog-dollar", which circulated around
forty-eight shillings prior to February, was correspondingly reduced
from forty-six shillings to forty-three shillings and four pence.
These rates (which were to remain in force for the next nine years)
were to be applied rigorously to the exchange of Scottish commodities
for foreign specie as to dollars of guaranteed silver content brought
to the Mint for conversion into native coin.
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Apart from Charles' immoderate and unsupported proposal for
an immediate twenty-five per cent devaluation at the outset of his
reign, the staggered reduction of four shillings in the value of the
"rix-dollar" effected over seven months in 1636 outstripped all interim
proposals for devaluation during the personal rule.	 Far outstripped,
both with respect to time and scale, was the modest proposal for a
two shillings reduction staggered over twelve months which emanated
from the plenary discussions on the state of the currency held under
the auspices of the Privy Council during January 1633.	 Also
outstripped, with respect to time if not scale, was the staggered
reduction of four shillings over two years advocated by the royal
burghs in February 1634.	 Even Briot's initial proposal presented to
Council in December 1632, for a staggered reduction of five shillings
over ten months, was outstripped with respect to time.	 That the
devaluation of 1636 should conform closest to the latter proposal was
no mere coincidence.	 Briot had been instrumental in persuading
Charles about the expediency of 'decrying of the forrane coyne of
dollores to fifty-four shillings'.	 In the event, rather than509
vindicate Briot, the timing and scale of devaluation during 1636
confirmed the worst fears about commercial disruption expressed by the
royal burghs and leading officials of the Mint during the plenary
discussions on the currency of 1633.
The implementation of devaluation was both hasty and
maladroit.	 Instead of conserving native coin, the swingeing reduction
of the "rix-dollar" encouraged traffickers in coin to export dollars of
guaranteed silver content leaving counterfeit and debased coin to
proliferate in domestic markets.	 Devaluation further drained the
country's stock of acceptable coin by forcing up prices of necessary
imports as well as luxuries.	 Native manufactures were generally in
too embryonic a state to take meaningful advantage of the reduced cost
of Scottish commodities overseas.	 Indeed, the accumulative reduction
of four shillings in the value of the "rix-dollar", which was
tantamount to an indirect tax of seven per cent on all commercial
transactions, could not be readily absorbed by the Scottish economy.
The material damage inflicted on commerce at home and abroad served to
postpone indefinitely the attainment of price stability.	 Faced with
the receding prospect of sound money, Aitcheson, as general of the
Mint, renewed his call for a modestly debased issue of coin in small
denominations exclusively for domestic exchange.	 In a memorandum of
10 April 1637, he argued that if one thousand five hundred stone of
dollars of guaranteed silver content were called in to the Mint,
exchanged at fifty-four shillings the piece, melted down and allayed
with copper, then released into domestic circulation as half-merk,
forty pence and twenty pence pieces (in quotas of i100), the country's
stock of coin would be replenished gradually and the Crown salvage some
profit - to the order of £192,800 - from the debacle of devaluation.54
Although Aitcheson's revised proposal for debasement, like
his original scheme for clipping of dollars, was not taken up by the
Privy Council, his review of the present state of the country's
currency did revive debate on the need for a more effective remedial
programme.	 A month later, Charles authorised the renewal of plenary510
discussions under the Council's auspices.	 A large committee of
leading councillors - seven nobles, five gentry and seven bishops - was
empowered on 13 May to confer with leading officials in the Mint and a
delegation from Edinburgh town-council on behalf of the royal burghs.
The Council itself decided on 23 June, that it would be politic to
include 'some understanding' noblemen and gentry in order to broaden
discussion on 'the mater of the coyne'.	 Such was the urgency accorded
to the discussions, that the scheduled meeting of the Commission for
Surrenders and Teinds was discharged to allow the plenary session to
proceed on 26 June.	 In addition to the perennial problems of the
excessive circulation of foreign dollars and the chronic shortage of
native coin, the plenary discussion identified further grounds for
national concern consequent on devaluation. 	 Speculative hoarding of
dollars of guaranteed silver content, proceeding 'frome some ydle
surmises that the dollers are to be cryed up', had accentuated the
current scarcity of acceptable coin for domestic exchange. Following
the Council's public affirmation that there was no immediate prospect
of reflation, 'there is no change to be made in the price and value of
dollars', separate submissions were received from the royal burghs and
the Mint.
55
The immediate concern of the nine-man delegation from
Edinburgh town-council charged to present the burghs' case was to press
for the raising of interest rates.	 Thus, the tightening up of credit
resulting from devaluation could be regularised. The familiar call to
expand the volume of the country's trade was reiterated.	 Without such
expansion, achievable by the easing of customs rates and the fostering
of new manufactures, there could be no secure attainment of sound
money.	 Conversely, Aitcheson remained convinced as general of the
Mint that the 'chieff ground of all the abuses of the Monie in
Scotland' was attributable to 'the insatiable avarice of gredie
merchands'.	 Hence, rather than ease customs rates, the bullion
quotas - whereby merchants were expected to earn foreign specie from
exports - should be doubled and paid directly into the Mint either as
dollars or plate of guaranteed silver content.	 Furthermore, illicit511
trafficking in coin, in defiance of the statutory bans on the
unnecessary export of native specie and the importation of counterfeit
and debased dollars, should be considered subversion.	 With the help
of customs farmers, a roll should be compiled of all skippers and
mariners 'that have travelled to Eastern countreyes thes diverse years
bygane'.	 All persons enrolled should then be examined under oath to
discover 'the transporters of his majesties owne proper coyne, and
contumacious importers and venters of forrane coyne so farr above their
trew worth'.	 Indeed, such was the extent of illicit trafficking that
if the statutory fines were exacted from the traders involved and
placed at the disposal of the Mint, a sufficient stock of money would
be provided to convert all the dollars within Scotland into the king's
own coin without recourse to debasement! 56
No positive action resulted from the plenary discussions
either to alter interest rates or to expand trade.	 Nor was any fresh
initiative launched to clamp down on illicit trafficking in counterfeit
and debased dollars.	 Counterfeiting, which had long been practised
assiduously in Scotland, became a virulent, clandestine pursuit during
the 1630s, particularly in the north-east.	 The Council had
commissioned one of its number, John Guthry, bishop of Moray, to search
out and prosecute all 'forgers, strikers and printers of thir false and
counterfoote dollers' in the region from 1 April 1635.	 However, this
commission proved no more effective than the contemporaneous local
commissions granted to burgesses and gentry to stamp out the illicit
traffic in copper coin through the ports and Border towns.	 The
debasing of dollars by clipping was also a burgeoning clandestine
industry in small towns, especially in the south-west, where the main
practicioners - usually itinerant pedlars and chapmen - could often
rely on local reluctance to reveal their identities and even if
identified, could slip across to Ulster to avoid arrest.	 Further
local connivance in circulating counterfeit and debased coin in
domestic markets added to the difficulties of securing convictions
despite noted endeavours of merchants in the foremost burghs, assisted
by neighbouring gentry, to apprehend forgers and clippers.
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Moreover, Charles' decision that Briot and Falconer should
mint new issues of silver and gold coins served to stimulate a fresh
spate of forgeries from October 1637 - notably of the silver twenty
pence piece for small-scale exchange.	 Above all, however, the new
issues afforded tangible proof that Charles was less concerned to
remedy the chronic shortage of native coin than to use the country's
currency to propagate and extol his prerogative.	 Revealing himself as
the master of insensitive timing, Charles had the Council issue a
directive on 14 December altering the inscriptions which were to be
placed on the coins minted from the consignment of gold fortuitously
brought to Scotland from west Africa by 'the adventurers of Guinee' two
months earlier.	 Disregarding the groundswell of dissent occasioned by
his drive for economic and religious uniformity, Charles instructed
that the lesser coins were to bear the legend, UNITA TUEMUR, (I shall
protect through unity).	 Studiously ignoring the constitutional crisis
triggered off by his ecclesiastical innovations, Charles decreed that
the greater coins were to be marked, HIS PRAESUM UT PROSIM, (I am put
in authority that I may do good).58
The king's propaganda notwithstanding, the new issues of
silver and gold coins did little to halt the displacement of native
specie by dollars in domestic markets.	 Illicit trafficking in coin
continued to plague the incoming Covenanting regime.	 Debased dollars
still flowed through the ports on the west as well as the east coast
during 1638.	 Despite occasional prosecutions intended as salutary
warnings to forgers and clippers, counterfeiting remained a virulent,
clandestine pursuit.	 The aftermath of the Bishops' Wars found the
Covenanting regime struggling valiantly to prevent upward revaluation
of gold in England.	 Such revaluation would have accentuated further
the discriminatory rates at which gold coin circulated in Scotland
contrary to the standardisation of exchange in both countries
prescribed at the union of the Crowns.	 As part of an effort to
reassert central direction over the money supply, the restoration of
exchange centres at the major ports - to collate dollars of guaranteed
silver content as bullion at rates tabulated by the Mint - was under513
active consideration from the spring of 1641.	 Accordingly, an
enactment of 10 September laid down that merchants must provide
sureties to customs farmers, both to fulfil the bullion quotas imposed
on goods exported from Scotland and to guarantee that foreign specie
so earned would not be used for commercial exchange but handed over for
delivery to the Mint.
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	However, the financial pressures occasioned
by military intervention throughout the British Isles over the next
decade were to make the attainment of sound money no more realisable
for the Covenanting Movement than for Charles I.60
That the state of the currency should degenerate from the
critical to the chaotic during the personal rule of Charles I can be
attributed, in part, to the continuing international shortage of
bullion and persistent tampering with coin by foreign powers to
stretch out the use of silver.	 However, prime responsibility must be
accorded to Charles' inept and insensitive management of the money
supply.	 His failure to reassert firm central direction of exchange
rates perpetuated the haemorrhaging of native specie brought about by
dearth in the early 1620s; allowed profiteering and illicit trafficking
in coin to continue unabated; and ensured Scotland remained a dumping
ground for counterfeit and debased coin.	 His failure to maintain
accepted constitutional tenets governing the minting and circulation of
coin distanced leading politicians from the Court and confirmed the
reluctance of merchants to ensure steady supplies of bullion for the
Mint.	 Despite plenary discussions between the Privy Council, the
royal burghs and leading officials in the Mint, Charles preferred to
rely on the advice of courtiers like Briot and Stirling, the one a
stranger, the other a chronic absentee. Though lacking practical or
immediate experience of the problems besetting the country's currency,
both were firm upholders of (and intended beneficiaries from) the
king's unfettered exercise of his prerogative.	 Thus, Charles paid
scant regard to the national interest as manifest by his recourse to
piecemeal expedients rather than implement a concerted remedial
programme to restore sound money.514
In particular, the privatisation of copper coining in 1632,
followed up by the staggered but swingeing devaluation of the
"rix-dollar" in 1636, dealt a massive blow to commercial confidence
throughout Scottish society.	 Indeed, the commercial disruption
occasioned by monopolies and the common fishing was compounded by
Charles' mishandling of the money supply.	 At the same time, his
advocacy of tariff reforms in the interests of economic uniformity was
not only to deepen the recession afflicting Scotland during the 1630s,
but to promote widespread sympathy for dissent on constitutional
grounds and even to provoke civil disobedience which, in turn, lowered
the threshold for direct action in defiance of the Court.515
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